THE 

REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

AND THE 

MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 



BY 

FRANCIS VINTON GREENE 

GRADUATE OF THE D. 8. MILITARY ACADEMY 
MAJOR-GENERAL OF VOLUNTEERS IN THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

AUTHOR OF 

The Russian Army and Its Campaigns in Turkey in 1877-78 (1879). Army Life 

in Russia (1880). Improvements in the Art of War (1882). The 

Mississippi Campaigns of the Civil War (1883). General 

Greene : Great Commanders Series (1885). 

The United States Army (1901) 



NEW YORK 
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 
1911 






Copyright, 1911, by 
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 



Published May, 1911 






*S<jL 




TO THE 

OFFICERS AND MEN 

THOSE NOW LIVING AND THOSE WHO HAVE GONE BEFORE 
OF THE 

UNITED STATES ARMY 

WHO HAVE 

CARRIED ITS COLORS TO VICTORY 

ON MANY FIELDS AND IN MANY CLIMES 

HAVE COMPELLED THE SURRENDER OF ITS ARMED FOES 

AT 

SARATOGA AND YORKTOWN 

VERA CRUZ AND THE CITY OF MEXICO 

DONELSON, VICKSBURG, APPOMATTOX AND DURHAM'S STATION 

SANTIAGO AND MANILA 

AND WHO 

IN THE INTERVENING YEARS OF PEACE 

HAVE 

SUBDUED THE SAVAGE 

EXPLORED THE WILDERNESS 

PREPARED THE GREAT WEST FOR THE 

TEEMING MILLIONS WHO NOW INHABIT IT 

CONTRIBUTED TO THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE 

ABATED THE TROPICAL PESTILENCE 

DIRECTED THE NATION'S PUBLIC WORKS 

CONSTRUCTED THE PANAMA CANAL 

THIS BOOK 

IS 

WITH PROFOUND ADMIRATION AND WARM-HEARTED AFFECTION 

RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED 



PREFACE 

The purpose of the book of which this is the first volume 
is to present, within the limited space of three small volumes, 
the essential facts in our military history, and to make such 
analyses of these facts and such comments upon them as may 
be useful for the future and interesting for the present. 

The army has always been a factor of prime importance 
in our national life. It was due to the skill of Washington 
at Trenton and Yorktown, and the fortitude of his officers 
and men at Valley Forge and elsewhere during eight long 
years, that the labors of Samuel and John Adams, Patrick 
Henry and Thomas Jefferson did not prove fruitless, and that 
the Declaration of Independence became an immortal docu- 
ment instead of passing into the waste-basket of forgotten 
revolutionary pronunciamentos. The success of Scott on the 
Niagara frontier in aid of the wonderful victories of the navy 
in the second war with Great Britain compelled the British 
to relinquish their control over our commerce through the 
right of search and acknowledge our rightful lines of frontier. 
The territorial expansion on the Gulf and the Pacific would 
have been impossible if the armies of Scott and Taylor had 
failed. The Union would have been disrupted and slavery 
perpetuated, in spite of the eloquence of Webster and Phil- 
lips and Sumner and the consummate genius of Lincoln, if 
Grant and Sherman had not understood the art of war. 
Finally, it was not alone the unanimous resolution of Congress 
that made Cuba free and incidentally brought us Porto Rico 
and the Philippines, a commanding position in the Orient 
and the recognition of our greatness as a world power, but 

vii 



viii PREFACE 

also the skill, valor and endurance of the officers and men, 
ashore and afloat, who carried our arms to victory on both 
sides of the globe in a few short months of 1898. 

From the beginning, one hundred and thirty-six years ago, 
the army has been the willing and faithful subordinate of the 
civil power, and the indispensable instrument for carrying 
into effect the will of the people as expressed by their chosen 
representatives. In recent wars it has become an efficient in- 
strument for that purpose. In 1812-15 we paid the deserved 
penalty, at Detroit and Sacketts Harbor, Bladensburg and 
Washington, of twelve years' deliberate neglect of the military 
service, due to the popular belief that a well-trained army 
was not a necessary factor in our scheme of government. It 
is not likely that we shall again make that mistake. Our 
army is to-day no larger in proportion to population, and 
much smaller in proportion to wealth, than after the close of 
any of the wars of the last century; but there is a constant 
effort to make it efficient; and while much remains to be 
done for the improvement of the militia, yet it is better organ- 
ized and equipped than ever before in its history. The value 
of military instruction was never so widely recognized as it 
is to-day. The prejudice against a "standing army," which 
our ancestors brought over from England nearly three centu- 
ries ago, and which so long survived any reason for its exis- 
tence, is at last almost extinct. The good conduct of the 
army, regulars and volunteers, and the inestimable value of 
their services, have nearly overcome this prejudice. We shall 
always have an army. There is every reason to believe that 
it will be efficient. To be so, it must study its past history 
and draw from it the lessons which are applicable to the 
future. 

In the hope of aiding to some extent in this study, the 
following pages have been written. 

A few words about the making of this book may not be 
out of place. 



PREFACE ix 

1st. As to Purpose. — I have had it in mind to write such 
a book for more than twenty-five years, but various circum- 
stances have caused constant postponement. I had originally 
intended to condense the entire history of our military opera- 
tions, from Lexington to Pekin, into one volume of not over 
400,000 words. Experience has shown that such extreme 
condensation would crush the life out of the book, and it is 
now evident that three volumes will be necessary. Under 
these circumstances I have decided to publish the first volume 
without waiting for the others. 

2d. As to Text. — My private library includes nearly all the 
books named in the two lists of authorities. Those which 
are out of print and unpurchasable have been obtained from 
the Library of Congress, the State Library at Albany, the 
New York City Public Library, and the Library of Colum- 
bia University. I desire to express my thanks to the officers 
in charge of these libraries for the facilities which they have 
afforded to me in the use of their ample resources. 

The book has been written with these authorities at hand, 
and citation is given for every fact. The opinions are my 
own, although I confess to being influenced by the simple, 
clear style and accurate thinking of the late John Fiske, and 
also in a minor degree by the brilliant, sympathetic and at- 
tractive history of Sir George Otto Trevelyan. 

3d. As to Maps. — All, except one, of the maps in this vol- 
ume have been previously published in Avery's "History of the 
United States and Its People," and it is to the courtesy of my 
fellow-graduate in the Class of 1870 at West Point and life- 
long friend, Mr. Charles William Burrows, President of The 
Burrows Brothers Publishing Company, of Cleveland, that I 
am indebted for the great privilege of making use of them. 
They are the only maps of the Revolution that are accurate. 
They have been prepared in the only way in which accurate 
maps can be made — viz., by using careful topographical sur- 
veys (in this case those of the United States Geological Survey) 



x PREFACE 

as the basis, and placing on these the positions of the troops 
as stated in the official reports of the commanding generals, 
reconciling the discrepancies between different reports as well 
as possible. Most of them were drawn by Lieutenant Joseph 
Baer, United States Army, while on duty in the Department 
of Drawing at West Point in 1904. 

The only map not taken from Avery's History is the map 
of Harlem Heights, which was drawn under the direction of 
Professor Henry P. Johnston for his admirable monograph 
on "The Battle of Harlem Heights." It is used by per- 
mission kindly given by him and by the Columbia University 
Press. 

Prepared in this way all the maps have been engraved and 
printed at the Matthews-Northrup Works in a manner that 
leaves nothing to be desired. 

4th. As to Proof-Reading and Indexing. — I am indebted 
to Captain Frederick W. Lewis, 29th Infantry, for valuable 
assistance in reading the proofs and comparing the texts with 
the maps. The Index has been prepared by the Publishers. 

Francis Vinton Greene. 

May 1, 1911. 



CONTENTS 



PART I— THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

CHAPTER PAGE 

I.— BOSTON, 1775-76 1 

Lexington, April 19 3 

Bunker Hill, June 17 7 

Siege of Boston, July, 1775-March, 1 770 13 

Dorchester Heights, March 4 18 

Evacuation of Boston, March 17 19 

Invasion of Canada, September, 1775-July, 1776 .... 21 

II.— NEW YORK, 1776 28 

British Plans for the Campaign of 1776 28 

Washington Marches to New York, April 31 

Howe Arrives at New York, July-August 33 

Battle of Long Island, August 27 35 

Washington Retreats from Long Island, August 29 . . . 42 

Action at Kip's Bay, September 15 46 

Battle of Harlem Heights, September 16 49 

Howe's Flank Movement through Westchester, October . . 51 

Battle of White Plains, October 28 52 

Battle of Fort Washington, November 16 57 

Retreat through New Jersey, November-December ... 62 

Washington Crosses the Delaware, December 25 ... . 66 

Battle of Trenton, December 26 67 

Battle of Princeton, January 3, 1777 70 

Winter Quarters at Morristown, January 7 72 

III.— PHILADELPHIA, 1777 75 

Howe's Plans for 1777 . . . • 76 

Burgoyne's Plan, Approved by the King ....... 78 

The Danbury Raid, April 25 80 

xi 



xii CONTENTS 

CHAPTER PAGE 

The Middlebrook Manoeuvres, May, June 80 

Howe Sails for the Chesapeake, July 1 82 

Washington Confronts Him When He Lands, August 25 . 83 

Battle of the Brandywine, September 11 85 

Paoli Massacre, September 21 88 

Howe Takes Philadelphia, September 25 88 

Battle of Germantown, October 4 90 

Defence of Fort Mercer, or Red Bank, October 22 . . . 93 

Capture of Fort Mifflin, November 15 94 

Evacuation of Fort Mercer, November 20 94 

Washington at Valley Forge, December 19 95 

IV.— THE HUDSON, 1777 96 

Burgoyne Arrives at Montreal, May 14 100 

Capture of Ticonderoga, July 6 103 

Battle of Hubbardton, July 7 104 

Engagement at Skenesborough, July 7 104 

Action at Fort Ann, July 8 105 

St. Leger's Expedition from Oswego, July-August .... 106 

Battle of Oriskany, August 6 107 

Siege of Fort Schuyler (or Stanwix), August 4-22 .... 10S 

Defeat of St. Leger, August 22 108 

Schuyler Retreats Down the Hudson, July-August .... 109 

Battle of Bennington, August 16 113 

Battle of Freeman's Farm, September 19 116 

Capture of Forts Montgomery and Clinton, October 6 . . 121 

Battle of Bemis' Heights, October 7 123 

Surrender of Burgoyne at Saratoga, October 17 127 

V.— THE FRENCH ALLIANCE, 1778-81 132 

Valley Forge 132 

Conway Cabal 134 

Greene Appointed Quartermaster-General 136 

Steuben Appointed Inspector-General 137 

British Peace Commission 138 

Skirmish at Barren Hill, May 20, 1778 140 

Evacuation of Philadelphia, June 18 141 

Battle of Monmouth, June 28 144 

Court-Mar tial of Charles Lee, July 4- August 12 148 

Arrival of the French Fleet, July 14 149 

Newport, August 29 153 



CONTENTS * ul 

PAGE 

CHAPTER i rn 

Stony Point, July 16, 1779 J^ 

Paulus Hook, August 19 lb0 

Penobscot Expedition, July 25 161 

Springfield, June 23, 1780 164 

West Point— Arnold's Treason, September 21 167 

New London, September 7, 1781 170 

Movements of d'Estaing, 1779 171 

Arrival of the Second French Expedition, July 10, 17S0 . . 172 
French Army and Navy Blockaded at Newport, July, 1780, 

to July, 1781 173 

The Revolution Nearly Exhausted 174 

Mutiny of the Pennsylvania Line, January 1, 1781 .... 176 

Mutiny of the New Jersey Line, January 20 177 

John Laurens's Mission to Paris, February 13 178 



VI.-BRITISH CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH, 1778-80 . . 180 

British Plans for Dividing the Colonies 182 

Militia Conflicts 183 

Great Bridge, Va., December 9, 1775 183 

Moore's Bridge, N. C, February 27, 1776 183 

Defence of Charleston, June 28 186_ 

Capture of Savannah, December 29, 1778 191 

Conquest of Georgia, January 29, 1779 192 

Action at Beaufort, February 3 I 93 

Engagement at Kettle Creek, February 14 194 

Battle of Briar Creek, March 3 195 

Battle of Stono Ferry, June 20 198 

Siege of Savannah, September 23 202 

Assault at Savannah, October 9 203 

D'Estaing Returns to France, October 20 205 

Clinton's Expedition to the South, October 26 206 

Siege of Charleston, April 10, 1780 208 

Surrender of Charleston, May 12 210 

Action at the Waxhaws, May 29 212 

Action at Ramsour's Mill, June 20 213 

Action at Williamson's, July 12 213 

Action at Hanging Rock, August 8... 213 

Action at Rocky Mount, July 30 214 

Action at Green Spring, August 1 214 

Action at Hanging Rock, August 12 214 



xiv CONTENTS 

CHAPTER PAGE 

Gates Takes Command, July 25 215 

Battle of Camden, August 16 218 

Action at Fishing Creek, August 18, 1780 219 

VII.— BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH, 1781-82 ... 220 

Greene Takes Command, December 4, 1780 222 

Battle of King's Mountain, October 7 224 

Action at Fish Dam, November 9 225 

Action at Blackstocks, November 20 225 

Battle of the Cowpens, January 17, 1781 229 

Retreat to the Dan, January, February 232 

Passage of the Catawba, February 1 233 

Passage of the Yadkin, February 8 234 

Passage of the Dan, February 15 235 

Action at Wetzell's Mill, March 6 237 

Battle of Guilford, March 15 239 

Cornwallis Retreats to Wilmington, April 7 242 

Greene Marches to South Carolina, April 244 

Battle of Hobkirk's Hill, April 25 246 

Rawdon Evacuates Camden, May 10 248 

Capture of Fort Motte, May 12 248 

Capture of Orangeburg, May 11 249 

Capture of Fort Granby, May 15 249 

Siege and Capture of Augusta, May 22-June 5 249 

Siege of Ninety-Six, May 22-June 19 250 

Battle of Eutaw Springs, September 8 255 

Evacuation of Savannah, July 11, 1782 . . -• 257 

Evacuation of Charleston, December 14, 1782 257 

VIII.— YORKTOWN, 1781 259 

Cornwallis Marches to Virginia, April 260 

Situation in Virginia, May 261 

Lafayette Retreats from Richmond, June 262 

Steuben Retreats from Charlottesville, June 262 

Arrival of Wayne, June 10 263 

Battle of Jamestown, July 6 263 

Clinton's Instructions to Cornwallis, June-July 266 

Cornwallis at Yorktown, August 2 267 

Allied Army Moves Toward New York, June 268 

Allied Army Marches to Virginia, August 270 

Movements of French and English Fleets, August . . . 270 



CONTENTS xv 

CHAPTER PAGE 

Naval Battle off the Chesapeake, September 5 273 

Clinton Sails to Relief of Cornwallis, October 19 . . . . 273 

Siege of Yorktown, September 28 274 

Capitulation at Yorktown, October 19 275 

End of the War, November 25, 1783 27S 

Washington's Ability as a Soldier 279 

PART II— THE MILITARY POLICY OF THE ^ 
UNITED STATES 

Ancient Origin of the Prejudice against a Standing Army . . . 286 

Formation of the Continental Army, 1775 288 

Washington's Opinions on the Defects of the System in Use During 

the Revolution, 292 

The Constitutional Powers of Congress 295 

The Manner of Raising Troops for the War of 1812 297 

Secretary Calhoun's Reports, 1818-20 299 

Volunteers and Militia for the Florida War, 1835 301 

Calling Out Troops for the Mexican War, 1846 - . 305 

The Enormous Levies for the Civil War, 1861-65 307 

Reduction of the Army after the Civil War 311 

Report of the Burnside Committee in 1878 312 

New Methods Adopted for Raising Troops in the War with Spain, 1898 315 

United States Volunteers for the Philippines, 1899 319 

Secretary Root's Reports and Resulting Legislation, 1901-03 . . . 320 

Organization and Duties of the General Staff 325 

The Militia Act of 1903 327 

The Necessity for a Definite Military Policy to Meet Existing Con- 
ditions 331 

APPENDIX 337 

INDEX 343 



MAPS 

FACING PAGE 

Lexington and Concord, April 19, 1775 4 

Bunker Hill, June 17, 1775 6 

Boston, July, 1775-March, 1776 12 

Invasion of Canada, September, 1775-July, 1776 20 

Arnold's March, September 5-November 13, 1775 22 

Quebec, December 31, 1775 24 

New York, April-November, 1776 28 

Long Island, August 27, 1776 36 

Harlem, September-October, 1776 48 

White Plains, October 28, 1776 52 

Movements of Nathan Hale, September 10-22, 1776 52 

Fort Washington, November 16, 1776 56 

Retreat through New Jersey, November- December, 1776 .... 60 

Trenton, December 25, 1776 66 

Trenton and Princeton, January 2-4, 1776 66 

Philadelphia, August-December, 1777 76 

Fort Washington, November 16, 1776 80 

Danbury Raid, April 25-26, 1777 SO 

Brandy wine, September 11, 1777 84 

Fort Mercer, October 22, November 20, and Fort Mifflin, November 

15, 1777 84 

Germantown, October 4, 1777 92 

Arnold's Naval Engagement, October 11-13, 1776 96 

The Hudson, July-October, 1777 96 

Ticonderoga, July 6, 1777 102 

Hubbardtown, July 7, 1777 102 

Bennington, August 16, 1777 102 

Freeman's Farm, September 19, 1777 116 

Bemis Heights, October 7, 1777 122 

Fort Schuyler, August 3-22, 1777 126 

xvii 



xviii MAPS 

FACINO PAGE 

Forts Montgomery and Clinton, October 6, 1777 126 

Surrender of Burgoyne, October 17, 1777 126 

Valley Forge, December 19, 1777-June 17, 1778 132 

Philadelphia Evacuated, June 18, 1778 132 

Barren Hill, May 20, 1778 146 

Monmouth, June 27, 1778 146 

The French Alliance, Movements between New Jersey and Newport, 

1778-1781 150 

Springfield, June 23, 1780 152 

Penobscot, July 25, 1779 152 

New London, September 7, 1781 152 

Newport, August 29, 1778 152 

Sullivan's Indian Campaign, 1778-1779 156 

Stony Point, July 16, 1779 158 

Tryon's Raid, July 5-8, 1779 158 

Arnold's Treason. Andre's Capture, September 20-25, 1780 . . . 166 

Boston to Savannah, 1776-1781 186 

Sullivan's Island (Charleston), June 29, 1776 186 

South Carolina, 1779-1780 192 

Savannah, October 9, 1779 202 

Charleston, April 10-May 12, 1780 202 

King's Mountain, October 9, 1780 218 

Camden, August 16, 1780 218 

Campaign of 1781 226 

Retreat to the Dan, January-February, 1781 232 

Cowpens, January 17, 1781 238 

Guilford, March 15, 1781 238 

Hobkirk's Hill (Camden), April 25, 1781 . 246 

Ninety-Six, May 22-June 5, 1781 246 

Eutaw Springs, September 8, 1781 254 

Virginia, 1781 258 

Petersburg, April 25, 1781 260 

Chesapeake, September 5, 1781 260 

Richmond, January 6, 1781 260 

Yorktown, September 30-October 19 1781 274 



AUTHORITIES 

A.— THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1. Force's "American Archives," 4th series, 6 vols.; 5th series, 3 vols., 

1774-76 (Amer. Archives). 

2. Journals of Congress, edition of 1823, 4 vols., 1774-83 (Jour. Cong.). 

3. Journals of the Continental Congress, edition of 1906, 15 vols., 

1774-79 (Jour. Cont. Cong.). 

4. Sparks's "Writings of Washington," 12 vols. (Sparks). 

5. Sparks's "Letters to Washington," 4 vols. (Sparks, Letters). 
These 44 volumes correspond in some measure (though much less 

complete) to the Official Records of the War of the Rebellion. 
They contain the greater part of all the original documents that 
have been published on the American side, except such as have 
been brought out in memoirs and biographies of the minor char- 
acters of the Revolution. 

6. Dawson's "Battles of the United States," vol. I (Dawson). 

7. Lossing's "Field-Book of the Revolution," 2 vols. (Lossing). 
Dawson is valuable on account of the copious references he makes 

to original documents. Lossing visited every battle-field of the 
Revolution between 1847 and 1850. 

8. E. J. Lowell's "The Hessians in the Revolution" (Lowell). This is 

founded upon original German authorities. 

9. Eelking's German Allies in the American Revolution (Eelking). 

10. Heitman's "Officers of the Continental Army" (Heitman). This 

contains a brief account of every regiment and every officer of 
the Continental army, as shown by the records of the War 
Department. 

11. Frothingham's "Siege of Boston" (Frothingham). 

12. H. P. Johhston's "Campaign of 1776 Around New York and 

Brooklyn" (Johnston, 1776). 

13. H. P. Johnston's "Battle of Harlem Heights" (Johnston, Harlem). 

14. H. P. Johnston's "Stony Point" (Johnston, Stony Point). 

15. H. P. Johnston's "Yorktown Campaign" (Johnston, Yorktown). 

16. Stryker's "Trenton and Princeton" (Stryker). 

17. Moore's "Treason of Charles Lee" (Moore). 

18. Keim's "Rochambeau" (Keim). 

19. I. N. Arnold's "March to Quebec" (Arnold's March). 

20. I. N. Arnold's "Benedict Arnold" (Arnold). 

21. Kapp's "Steuben" (Kapp, Steuben). 

22. Kapp's "Kalb" (Kapp, Kalb). 

23. D. Schenck's "North Carolina 1780-81" (Schenck). 

These nineteen books are exhaustive memoirs which contain probably 
every original fact and figure which is known concerning the respec- 
tive events of which they treat. 



xx AUTHORITIES 

24. Howe's "Narrative, 1781" (Howe). 

25. Burgoyne's "Narrative, 1780" (Burgoyne). 

26. "Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy," B. F. Stevens, 1888 (Clinton- 

Corn wallis). 

27. Tarleton's "Campaigns of 1780 and 1781" (Tarleton). 

28. Riedesel's "Memoirs," 2 vols. (Riedesel). 

29. Hansard's "Parliamentary History of England," vols. XVII-XXIII, 

1775-83 (Hansard). 
These, together with Force and Dawson, are the chief sources of 
British official reports and maps. Stevens's compilation of the 
documents relating to the campaign of 1781 is unique. 

30. Stedman's "American War," 2 vols., 1794 (Stedman). 

This was written by a very competent officer who served in the 
British army from Boston to Yorktown. Its maps are valuable 
as historical documents although inaccurate as to topography. 

31. Winsor's "Reader's Handbook of the American Revolution," 1 vol., 

1879 (Winsor). 

In this full bibliography the librarian of Harvard University gives 
a chronological list of the events of the Revolution and, as to 
each event, a reference to the volume and chapter of every book 
and every map of any value which had been published in re- 
lation thereto. He properly styles it "a continuous foot-note to 
all histories of the American Revolution." 

The standard histories — Gordon, Ramsay, Botta, Hildreth, Bancroft, 
Fiske, Avery and (most brilliant and, I believe, most accurate 
of them all) Trevelyan; the contemporary journals of Moultrie 
Henry Lee, Thacher and Simcoe; the earlier biographies — 
Sparks's "American Biographies," Marshall's "Washington," 
Irving's "Washington," Johnson's "Greene," G. W. Greene's 
" Greene," Drake's " Knox," Reed's " Reed," Bowen's " Lincoln, " 
Stark's " Stark"; all these are well known. Probably no one has 
read them all ; certainly I have not. I have, however, consulted 
each of them as to their opinions on certain important events. 
They are all founded on the original documents above listed, 
or on personal recollections, but are not in themselves original 
authorities. In addition to these there are, of course, hundreds 
of other books on the Revolution, the bibliography of which is 
very voluminous. 

B.— MILITARY POLICY 

1. Force's "American Archives," 4th series, 6 vols.; 5th Series, 3 vols., 

1774-76 (Amer. Archives). 

2. "American State Papers, Military Affairs," 7 vols. 

These stout quartos, 16 volumes, about 1600 pages per volume, 
18,000,000 words in all, were published by Peter Force, under 
authority of Congress, in the years 1837 to 1853. They are the 
chief repository of facts and figures relating to military affairs 
from 1774 to 1830. 

3. "Journals of Congress," edition of 1S23, 4 vols., 1774-83 (Jour. 

Cong.). 



AUTHORITIES xxi 

4. " Journals of the Continental Congress," edited by Worthington C. 

Ford, and published by authority of Congress in the years 1904 
to 1909. They number 15 volumes and contain a verbatim copy, 
including interlineations, erasures and corrections, of the original 
journals in the archives of the State Department for the years 
1774 to 1779. The copying and printing of the journals for the 
succeeding years is now in progress (Jour. Cont. Cong.). 

5. Sparks's "Writings of Washington," 12 vols., 1858 (Sparks). 

6. Sparks's "Letters to Washington," 4 vols., 1853 (Sparks, Letters). 

7. "Military Laws of the United States." Compiled by J. F. Callan, 

1862 (Mil. Laws). 

8. "Military Laws of the United States." Prepared by Lt.-Col. Geo. 

B. Davis, Dep'v Judge Advocate General, U. S. Army, 1897 
(Mil. Laws, 1897). 

9. "Military Laws of the United States," 4th edition, 1901. With 

supplement to March 4, 1907, prepared by Major John B. Por- 
ter, Judge Advocate, U. S. Army (Mil. Laws, 1907). 

10. Henry Adams's "History of the United States, 1801-1817," 9 vols., 

1890 (Adams). 

11. Provost Marshal General's Report. War of the Rebellion. Official 

Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (War Records). 
This report contains complete statistics on all matters relating to 
the recruiting of the Northern armies and the enforcement of the 
Conscription Laws of 1863. 

12. Reports of the Commissioner of Pensions (Com. Pensions). 

13. Upton. "Military Policy of the United Suites." Written in 1880. 

Published (after General Upton's death) by the War Department 
in 1904 (Upton). 

14. Burnside Committee Senate Report 555. 45th Congress, 3d Session, 

Dec. 12, 1878 (Burnside). 

15. "Messages of the Presidents." Compiled and published by J. D. 

Richardson, 9 vols. (1898), under authority of Congress (Mess. 
Presidents). 

16. Revised Statutes of the United States. 1878 (Rev. Stat.). 

17. Army Registers. 1860 to 1910 (Army Reg.). 

18. Register of the Graduates of the U. S. Military Academy (Grad. 

U. S. M. A.). 

19. Cullum's Biographical Register of the Graduates of the U. S. Mili- 

tary Academy (Cullum). 

20. Report of the Secretary of War, 1898 (Sec. War). 

21. Report of the Adjutant-General U. S. Army, 1898 (Adjt.-Gen.). 

22. Reports of the Chief of Staff (Chf. Staff). 

23. Reports of the Secretary of War, 1899-1903, reprinted in one volume, 

1904 (Sec. War) 



PART I 
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

"The problem, that a nation can be defended against a perma- 
nent force, by temporary armies, by occasional calls of the hus- 
bandman from his plough to the field, was completely disproved; 
and, in demonstrating its fallacy, the independence of America had 
nearly perished in its cradle." 

— John Marshall. 



CHAPTER I 
BOSTON 1 

The relations between England and her American coi- 1775 
onies, which had been growing more and more strained concord and 
during the twelve years following the close of the French 
war in 1763, reached a crisis on an April morning when April 19 
the royal troops were sent out from Boston to destroy 
military stores at Concord — and incidentally to arrest 
Samuel Adams and John Hancock, on the way, at Lex- 
ington. The political consequences of that day were stu- 
pendous. In a military sense its importance was due 
to the fact that the grenadiers and light infantry, ex- 
celled by none in the British army for training, discipline 
and military experience, after killing eight farmers on 
the Lexington Common, met such a sturdy resistance 
from the rustic militia at Concord that they beat a hasty 
retreat to Boston; and on the way back, although rein- 
forced by a brigade of regulars under command of the 
eldest son of the Duke of Northumberland, were so sur- 
rounded, ambushed, outflanked and assaulted by the 
hordes of gathering militia, that they barely escaped 

1 The story of Lexington and Concord and Bunker Hill has been told 
many thousand times in books and orations. The one exhaustive and com- 
plete account, vivid in narrative and replete with official documents, is that 
given in The Siege of Boston, by Richard Frothingham, published by 
Little & Brown in 1849 and reprinted in 1903. The notes and references 
in that book to the original authorities are so copious that a general ref- 
erence to Frothingham only is necessary here. The original authorities 
are quoted there in every instance. 

3 



4 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1775 complete capture, and left 73 killed, 174 wounded and 26 
missing on the road; a total loss equal to 15 per cent of 
their strength. 
The Mass*. Within a week the British troops were shut up and 

chusetts Array x \ 

besieged in Boston by a force of nearly 20,000 "minute- 
men" — that portion of the Massachusetts militia, one in 
four, who were designated to answer any call at a minute's 
notice. But the minute-men, determined as they were 
and actuated by intense patriotism, came and went ac- 
cording to their own estimate of the relative importance 
of their agricultural and military duties; the Massa- 
chusetts Congress thereupon began the formation of an 
"army," whose strength they thought should be 30,000 
men, of which their own colony should furnish 13,600. 
The adjoining colonies were asked to contribute their 
quota, and New Hampshire, Connecticut and Rhode 
Island promptly responded. The troops were enlisted 
until the end of the year, were organized into regi- 
ments, and Artemas Ward was appointed general and 
commander-in-chief. 
The British The garrison of Boston, which remained closely be- 

sieged until its evacuation nearly a year later, consisted 
at this time of eleven infantry regiments, many of which 
became famous under Wellington's command nearly forty 
years later, some artillery and a few marines from the 
squadron of several men-of-war then lying in the harbor 
under command of Admiral Graves. It numbered about 
3,500 men, organized into three brigades, under Brigadiers 
Earl Percy, Pigott and Jones. The commander-in-chief 
was Major-General Thomas Gage, who had been a lieu- 
tenant-colonel under Braddock, had served through the 
French war and then been promoted and assigned to 
command all the troops in America. He had visited 



Garrison 




Lexington and Concord 
April 19, 1775 



Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company, Publishers, Cleveland, Ohi< 




From Avery's History of the United States and Its People 



BOSTON 5 

England in 1773 and returned in the spring of 1774 as 1775 
Governor of Massachusetts, in addition to his military 
duties. 

Six months after his arrival he reported to the Secretary 
for the Colonies that "if the misunderstandings proceed 
to the last extremity, to begin with an army of 20,000 
men will in the end save Great Britain both blood and 
treasure." But the minister considered what was trans- 
piring in Massachusetts to be "the acts of a rude rabble, 
without plan, without concert, without conduct"; 1 and 
he thought a smaller force quite sufficient, if used promptly 
and vigorously. Later, however, he so far changed his 
mind as to send out three major-generals, Burgoyne, 
Howe and Clinton, all of whom had had military experi- 
ence and were also sitting as Members of Parliament. 
They brought with them several additional regiments, May 25 
carrying the total strength of the garrison to about 
10,000 men. 

Gage had previously thrown up some earthworks near The Fortinca- 

t-» xt 1 • c -r^ 01 tion at Boston 

Boston Neck, on the site of what is now Dover Street, 
commanding the road over the narrow causeway which 
connected Boston, then almost an island, with the main- 
land. As soon as Ward's regiments began to arrive, they 
also undertook the construction of field-works, covering 
all the roads leading to the west and south of Boston, 
and designed to prevent any further incursions of the 
British troops like that of Concord. These works were 
skilfully located, planned and constructed under the 
direction of Colonel Richard Gridley, chief engineer, who 
was now sixty-four years old, but had lost none of the 
great reputation he had acquired at the siege of Louis- 
burg, thirty years before. The works were not fully 

1 Sparks, III, 506-507. 



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 



1775 



Lack of 
Cannon 



April 29 



May 8 



Capture of 
Ticonderoga 
and Crown 
Point 



completed until several months later, but ultimately 
they comprised nineteen distinct groups of redoubts and 
trenches covering a space of nearly twelve miles, from the 
Mystic River on the left to Dorchester on the right; the 
centre was at Cambridge, where Ward now had his head- 
quarters, and where Joseph Warren directed the sessions 
of the Provincial Congress and the Committee of Safety. 
But cannon were lacking to man these field-works. 
There were only twenty-three small pieces of artillery in 
the colony. Therefore a proposition of Captain Benedict 
Arnold was eagerly accepted. He had arrived at Cam- 
bridge with a fine company from New Haven, and re- 
ported to the Committee of Safety that the forts at the 
southern end of Lake Champlain were feebly garrisoned 
and in bad condition, but that they contained more than 
100 cannon of various sizes from 4-pounders to 20- 
pounders. 1 He asked permission to attack and capture 
these forts. The committee quickly acceded, made him 
a colonel, authorized him to raise 400 men and sent him 
on his errand. When he reached the vicinity of Lake 
Champlain he found a party of about 200 men, "Green 
Mountain Boys," under command of Colonel Ethan 
Allen, bent on the same mission, by permission of the 
Connecticut Assembly. Arnold's men had not arrived, 
so he joined Allen as a volunteer, and by a brilliant 
coup they captured Ticonderoga at dawn on May 10, 
and Crown Point two days later. Arnold made a care- 
ful return of the ordnance stores and the cannon, of 
which there were 197, and he reported 87 of them 
serviceable. 2 Some of the lighter calibres were speedily 
sent to Cambridge, according to Colonel Gridley's in- 
structions, but the larger guns had to wait for next 

1 Amer. Archives, 4, II, 450. 2 Ibid., 4, II, 646. 




Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company, 
Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio 



From Avery's History of the United States 
and Its People 



Bunker Hill 
June 17, 1775 



BOSTON 7 

winter's snow and sledges before they could be trans- 1775 
ported. They then arrived in time to compel the evacu- 
ation of Boston. 

While these fortifications were progressing, Gage issued June 12 
an insulting proclamation, 1 said to have been draughted 
by Burgoyne, and the Massachusetts Committee of 
Safety responded by a resolution 1 that Bunker Hill, June 15 
which commanded Boston on the north, ought to be 
occupied. Gage was also planning to occupy this hill, 
and news of his intention had reached the Colonial army. 
Both sides were eager to fight, the Americans to answer 
Gage's proclamation and the British to avenge the dis- 
aster at Lexington. A bloody battle was the result. 

On the evening of June 16, Colonel Prescott was sent Battle of 
from Cambridge with three regiments and a fatigue party 
to fortify Bunker Hill. Either through mistake, or from 
a desire to place his redoubt as near Boston as possible, 
he passed over Bunker Hill and selected Breed's Hill. 
Colonel Gridley, chief engineer, laid out a square redoubt 
about 40 yards on a side, and the work began about mid- 
night. Before daylight the parapets were 6 feet high, 
with banquettes of wood and earth from which the men 
could fire. A breastwork of similar height, about 100 
yards long, extended from the north-east angle of the re- 
doubt toward the Mystic River. The site of the redoubt 
is that on which Bunker Hill monument now stands. 

The operations had been conducted so quietly that Gasre-s pian of 

Attack 

they had not been detected by the British. At dawn, 
about 4 a. m., the redoubt was observed, and fire was June 17 
opened on it by one of the men-of-war and by the battery 
on Copp's Hill, in Boston. Gage called a council of war, 
and rejecting the advice of Clinton, determined to assault 

1 Amer. Archives, 4, II, 9G8, 1354 



8 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1775 the works in front, instead of cutting them off in the rear. 
The assaulting party was to be under the command of 
General Howe, and to consist of the grenadier and light 
infantry companies of ten regiments supported by four 
full regiments, 5th, 38th, 43d and 52d. The 47th Regi- 
ment and a battalion were to assemble at the North Bat- 
tery prepared to cross, if necessary. While the troops 
were crossing the river and forming for attack, a furious 
cannonade was to be opened from the works at Boston 
Neck in the hope of creating a diversion, and preventing 
reinforcements being sent to Bunker Hill from Cam- 
bridge. 

These movements were all made as planned. About 
noon the troops embarked at Long Wharf and North Bat- 
tery, and were rowed to Morton's Point and landed with- 
out opposition, under cover of the guns of Copp's Hill and 
the six men-of-war, which at a range of 800 to 1,000 
yards swept the ground on all sides of the redoubt but 
without doing much damage. About 2 o'clock the boats 
were sent back to North Battery and there embarked the 
47th and the marines, landing them, however, near the 
present navy-yard, about 500 yards to the left of Howe's 
main body. 

Prescott meanwhile completed the work on his forti- 
fications and strengthened a rail-fence and hedge extend- 
ing from the end of his breastwork to the shore of the 
Mystic, with a re-entrant angle which gave cross-fire in 
its front. He also asked for reinforcements, and Ward 
sent him two additional regiments from Cambridge, and 
a little later portions of several other regiments. With 
them came as volunteers Generals Putnam, Pomeroy and 
others who fought with muskets, and just before the at- 
tack opened Joseph Warren, President of the Provincial 



BOSTON 9 

Congress, the active spirit of the Committee of Safety, 1775 
who had been appointed a major-general by the Provin- 
cial Congress three days before, also arrived and took 
his place within the redoubt. The command, however, 
remained with Colonel Prescott, a most gallant and 
capable soldier. 
Howe's men were in dress uniform, with knapsacks, Howe's 

, . , , . . , Formation 

three days rations, cartridge-box, ammunition and mus- for Assault 
ket, the total load being estimated by Stedman 1 at 125 
pounds; doubtless it weighed less, but it probably seemed 
as much in the excessive heat of the cloudless summer day. 
Howe leisurely formed his command in three lines at a 
distance of 600 yards, and at 3 o'clock in the afternoon 
began the attack. Personally he advanced with the right 
wing against the rail-fence, while Brigadier Pigott with 
the left wing marched against the breastwork. The 
houses in Charlestown were set on fire by carcasses from 
Copp's Hill, but a gentle breeze from the north blew the 
dense smoke to one side so that it did not conceal the 
attacking troops. These came forward in fine order, the 
advance being covered by the fire of their artillery, and 
the infantry occasionally firing, but without effect. The 
Americans were restrained by their officers from firing 
until the British lines were within forty yards from the 
redoubt on one side and the rail-fence on the other. 
Then they opened fire, deliberately, with careful aim and 
with terrible effect. The British loss was enormous, 
particularly among the officers, who led their men with 
great gallantry and at this short range could easily be ■ 
distinguished. The line hesitated, recoiled and then 
turned in hasty retreat back almost to the point whence 
it had started. 

1 Stedman, T, 127. 



10 



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 



1775 



Second As- 
sault 



Third Assault 



American Re- 
treat 



Howe reformed his men and led them forward a second 
time, in the same manner, firing as they advanced, and 
stepping over the bodies of those who had fallen in the 
first assault. This time the Americans held their fire 
until the British were within twenty yards (for powder 
was scarce and precious) and then delivered it with the 
same fatal effect. The British stood it for a few minutes, 
returning the fire with spirit, but the losses were so great 
that they were again compelled to retreat. Clinton, who 
had been observing the battle from Copp's Hill, now 
crossed the river with a second battalion of marines and 
some other troops and aided in rallying the regiments as 
they retreated to the beach. 

Howe was determined, notwithstanding his enormous 
losses, to renew the assault, and in spite of reluctance on 
the part of some of his officers and men, he formed them 
for a third attack. The men were ordered to throw off 
their knapsacks, to move forward in column, reserve their 
fire and rely on the bayonet. Again in person Howe led 
the grenadiers and light infantry against the breastwork 
and rail-fence on his right, while Pigott accompanied by 
Clinton assaulted the redoubt on his left. This time he 
succeeded. The Americans had fired about thirty rounds 
in the two preceding assaults, and now had only two 
rounds left, made up by tearing open what remained of 
the artillery cartridges. They reserved their two rounds 
to the last, but when these had been fired they were help- 
less, for they had no bayonets. The British came over 
the parapet of the redoubt from three sides at once, there 
was a hand-to-hand fight, and then the Americans were 
forced out of the redoubt, Warren being killed just after 
the retreat began. It continued in fairly good order, 
Putnam covering the rear with his Connecticut regiment; 



Battle 



BOSTON 11 

the principal losses on the American side occurred during 1775 
the retreat over Bunker Hill, the British keeping up a 
vigorous fire to which the Americans could not reply for 
lack of ammunition. About 5 o'clock the British halted 
their pursuit at Charlestown Neck, and the battle was 
over. The Americans filed into their lines on Prospect 
Hill and Winter Hill, expecting to be attacked there; 
but Howe decided that such an attack would be unwise. 

In the eight years of the Revolution there was no bat- Results of the 
tie more bloody, none more important. The Americans, 
without proper organization, equipment or supplies, had 
fought the best regular troops of Europe, and had re- 
pulsed them until their ammunition gave out. All the 
advantages of victory were on their side, and they were 
convinced that they could do it again and that regular 
organization was not necessary — a conviction which they 
tenaciously held throughout the Revolution; and then 
transmitted it to their descendants, who have believed 
in it almost to this day. On the British side, as soon as 
news of the battle reached England, Gage was recalled in 
disgrace and disappears from history. Howe, who had 
showed the greatest personal gallantry and exposed him- 
self perhaps unnecessarily, was said to have been com- 
pletely unnerved. Of the eleven officers on his staff, all 
were wounded, and ten died of their wounds within a few 
days or weeks. The memory of the carnage on that hot 
summer's afternoon never left him. He failed to press 
home his victory at Long Island; he was slow in pursuing 
Washington through New Jersey; he was cautious and 
timid in his manoeuvres at Middlebrook; he did not reap 
the full advantage of his victories at Brandywine and 
Germantown; and he made no effort to attack Wash- 
ington at Valley Forge. While his personal courage 



12 



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 



1775 



Losses 



Military Criti- 
cism 



did not flinch, he lacked moral courage, initiative and 
vigor throughout the two years in which he exercised 
supreme command after Gage's departure. 

Gage's report says that he sent 2,000 men into action 
and that his losses were 1,054, or 53 per cent. Doubtless 
he underestimated the number engaged, for the losses 
were in 14 regiments of infantry, 1 of artillery and 2 
battalions of marines. Their numbers could hardly have 
been less than 3,500. There were, according to his own 
report, 228 killed and 826 wounded, and about 1 in 10 
were officers. On the American side all or parts of 15 
regiments were engaged, 12 from Massachusetts, 2 from 
New Hampshire and 1 from Connecticut. Their numbers 
were never accurately ascertained, but were estimated at 
from 1,500 to 5,000; probably there were about 3,500, 
the same as the British. Their losses were 441: 140 
killed, 271 wounded and 30 prisoners. Five out of six 
pieces of artillery were lost. 

On both sides there is ground for criticism of the mili- 
tary movements. In the unorganized condition of the 
Massachusetts army it was most unwise to bring on a 
general engagement ; the British were shut up in Boston, 
and every road leading into the country was well guarded 
and fortified. The proper course to pursue was that fol- 
lowed by Washington after he arrived, viz., to await 
attack within their lines. In such an attack all the 
advantages would have been on the American side. 

On the other hand, Gage's plan of attack was most 
faulty. He had the co-operation of the navy, with 7 
vessels and 200 guns. 1 The Mystic and Charles Rivers 
were navigable for these ships, and they enveloped the 
Charlestown peninsula, which was then connected with 

1 Stedman, I, 123. 



BOSTON 13 

the main-land by a narrow causeway. Had Gage landed 1775 
his troops near this causeway, in Prescott's rear and under 
the protection of the fleet with such a vast preponderance 
of artillery, the capture or annihilation of the American 
force would seem to have been inevitable. In place of 
that he decided on an open assault, the first in a long list 
in our history of direct assaults over an open country 
against field intrenchments. Some of these assaults have 
succeeded, but the most have failed. In this case it was 
unjustifiable because unnecessary — other and better plans 
being available. 

Both sides were, in fact, spoiling for a square stand-up 
fight, and this overruled all other considerations. Like 
Bull Run, eighty-six years later, Bunker Hill cleared the 
air, and showed to all concerned that there was a desper- 
ate struggle ahead. The Americans, more than ever — if 
that were possible — conscious of the justice of their cause, 
were now confident of their ability to win it. And the 
British were equally amazed and depressed by the obsti- 
nate and masterful resistance which they had encountered. 

While these events were in progress at Boston, the congress 

Assiiincs 

Continental Congress, in session at Philadelphia, was control. 
arranging to assume control of the contest on behalf of all 
the colonies. It took over the armies of Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, New Hampshire and Rhode Island, assem- 
bled at Boston, as the "Army of the United Colonies," 
appointed Washington its commander-in-chief, adopted 
rules and regulations for its government (the first edition June 15 
of the Articles of War), called upon the other colonies to 
raise reinforcements for the army, adopted measures for 
the manufacture of saltpetre and gunpowder and the 
casting of cannon, appointed a Board of War, authorized 



14 



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 



1775 



Appointment 
of General 
Officers 



The Major- 
Generals. 



the raising of $2,000,000 by bills of credit and took other 
steps to carry on the contest, including the appointment 
of four major-generals and eight brigadiers. 1 

The selection of Washington was due in part to the 
reputation he had gained in his service under Braddock, 
but perhaps even more to the fact that he was the 
most influential man in Virginia. His appointment was 
brought about by John Adams 2 in the hope that it would 
bring Virginia and other Southern colonies to the aid 
of New England. No one could then foresee that in 
the next few years Washington would display those pre- 
eminent qualities as soldier, leader and statesman which 
have made him immortal. 

The major-generals were Artemas Ward, Charles Lee, 
Philip Schuyler and Israel Putnam. Ward was selected 
out of deference to Massachusetts, whose troops he com- 
manded; he remained through the siege of Boston and 
then resigned. Lee was supposed to be an accomplished 
soldier of large experience, but proved to be an advent- 
urer, a charlatan and a traitor. Schuyler was one of the 
most prominent men in New York, had served with credit 
in the Indian wars, and was a capable soldier, ultimately 
forced out of the army by the intrigues of Gates. Putnam 
had served at Ticonderoga and Montreal and Havana, 
and had a great reputation for intrepid daring as well as 
for his popular manners. Although at the time of his 
appointment he only commanded a regiment, he held a 
commission as brigadier-general from Connecticut. 

The brigadiers were Seth Pomeroy, William Heath and 
John Thomas, of Massachusetts; Richard Montgomery, 
of New York; John Sullivan, of New Hampshire; David 

1 Jour. Cont. Cong., II, 91, 93, 99. 

* Morse's Life of John Adams, 92, 100; Sparks, III, 479-4S0. 



BOSTON 15 

Wooster and Joseph Spencer, of Connecticut; and Na- 1775 
thanael Greene, of Rhode Island. Geographical and po- The Brigadier- 
litical, as well as military considerations, controlled these 
selections. The youngest of them, Greene, then thirty- 
three years old, was without military experience, but was 
destined to become the most famous soldier, after Wash- 
ington, of the Revolution. He was at Boston in com- 
mand of the Rhode Island "army" of three regiments. 
Pomeroy, Wooster and Spencer were between sixty and 
seventy years old, veterans of former wars. Pomeroy 
declined his appointment, being dissatisfied that Putnam 
should be chosen over his head to be a major-general; but 
a year later he went out with the militia to the Hudson 
River, and died there of sickness contracted in camp. 
Wooster served for a while in Canada, but was considered 
inactive and inefficient, and resigned. He also went out 
with the militia in the following year, and was mortally 
wounded in a skirmish near Danbury, Conn. Spencer's 
service was inconspicuous, and he resigned in the spring of 
1778 to go to Congress. Thomas was also a veteran. He 
rendered good service at Boston, and after Montgomery's 
death was sent to command the troops in Canada, and 
died there in 1776. Montgomery, Sullivan and Heath 
were all under forty years of age when they received their 
appointments. Montgomery had been an officer in the 
British army, had fought under Wolfe, and had resigned 
and emigrated to America three years before. He was a 
splendid soldier, and his death, in the assault on Quebec, 
in the first year of the war, was a great loss. Sullivan and 
Heath were too young to have served in the previous 
wars, and had no military experience when appointed. 
But they soon learned their trade, and rendered good 
service throughout the war. 



16 



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 



1775 

The Adjutant- 
General. 



The Quarter- 
master-Gen- 
eral. 



Arrival of 
Washington, 
July 10 



At the same time that these appointments were made, 
Horatio Gates, of Virginia, was appointed adjutant- 
general. He also had been an officer in the British army, 
had served with Braddock, and on the conclusion of the 
last war had settled in Virginia. He intrigued Schuyler 
out of his command, received the surrender of Burgoyne 
after Arnold had done all the hard work, tried without 
success to displace Washington, made a complete failure 
of his Southern campaign and then disappeared from 
public life. Mifflin, of Pennsylvania, who accompanied 
Washington to Cambridge, was made quartermaster- 
general. He was thirty-one years old, a merchant in 
Philadelphia, and successful in politics, both before and 
after the Revolution. But he was not a soldier, was a 
failure as quartermaster-general and joined Gates in his 
intrigues against Washington. 

On the whole, remembering that the Colonies at the 
beginning of the Revolution had no military organiza- 
tion, these first appointments to the chief places in the 
army were very judicious. Excepting Lee, who had no 
standing except such as was created by his own gascon- 
ade, all were men of importance in their respective com- 
munities, and eleven of the fifteen had been in active 
campaigns as regulars or volunteers. Two of them — the 
commander-in-chief and the youngest brigadier — were 
destined to place their names forever in the list of great 
soldiers; and it is pleasing to remember that from the 
day they first met at Boston there was never jealousy, 
discord or ill feeling between them, but always loyalty, 
friendship and sympathy, growing ever stronger and 
firmer until the death of Greene eleven years later. 

Washington arrived at Cambridge on July 3, inspected 
the troops, examined the lines and made his report to 



men- 
tal Army 



BOSTON 17 

Congress. The army numbered 20,242 officers and men, 1775 
of whom 17,215 were present for duty. There were 35 The cont 
regiments, of which 26 were from Massachusetts and 3 
from each of the other New England colonies. These 
men knew how to shoot, from long practice, but they had 
no other military knowledge ; they were of high character, 
intensely patriotic, fiercely independent and extremely 
impatient of the restraints of discipline. Their terms of 
enlistment would all expire within six months. Powder 
was extremely scarce, there were only a few pieces of 
artillery, there was no cavalry and hardly any organized 
supply departments. The fortified lines, previously de- 
scribed, were only partially constructed. 

For the next eight months Washington's task was to 
organize this army; to replace it, within cannon-shot of 
the enemy, by another army, when the enlistments ex- 
pired at the end of the year; to extend and complete his 
fortifications; to be prepared at every moment to repel 
an attack by the British should Howe decide, as every 
one supposed he would, to venture forth from Boston. 
Public opinion, ignorant of the difficulties with which 
he was surrounded, demanded that Washington attack 
Boston; and he himself shared the longing to do so. 
Four times Washington called his generals, Ward, Lee, sept. 11 
Putnam, Thomas, Heath, Sullivan, Spencer, Greene and Oct. is 
Gates, in council of war, and submitted the question 
whether Boston should be attacked, and each time in 1775 
such a manner as to suggest an affirmative answer. But Jan. 16 
each time they advised, unanimously, against it. There Feb. 16 
can be no question that their advice was judicious. 

Finally, however, in March — when Washington had en- 
listed and organized a new army, and had procured the 
temporary services of ten regiments of militia; when 



18 



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 



1776 



Seizure of 

Dorchester 

Heights 



March 2 
March 3 
March 4 



Knox had dragged the heavy cannon through the snow 
from Ticonderoga; when the privateers had captured an 
abundance of powder from the incoming British supply 
ships; when the fortifications were completed so as to 
furnish rallying-points in case of defeat — the time for 
taking the offensive under favorable conditions had 
arrived, and Washington eagerly seized the opportunity. 
His plan was to send Thomas with 2,000 men, supplied 
with intrenching tools, fascines, etc., from the Roxbury 
lines to seize and fortify Dorchester Heights — what is now 
called Telegraph Hill, in Thomas Park, South Boston. 
These heights, at an elevation of about ninety feet, com- 
manded the channel and the south-eastern side of Boston. 
If occupied, with the large guns from Ticonderoga, they 
made Boston and its connections with the sea untenable. 
Howe knew this, and had long contemplated an attempt 
to seize these heights. That he did not venture during 
all the long months of the siege to put his thought into 
execution shows the paralysis which had been inflicted 
upon him and his troops by the losses at Bunker Hill. 
The movement was carried out exactly as planned. For 
two nights the batteries at Cobble Hill, Lechmere's Point 
and Roxbury kept up a furious cannonade against the 
British lines, and on the third night, about 8 o'clock, 
Thomas moved out, occupied the Dorchester Heights, and 
under protection of advanced guards sent out toward 
Nook's Hill and Dorchester Point to protect him against 
possible attack from Boston or Castle Island, his men 
under Gridley's direction dug up the frozen ground, and 
before daylight had finished two very substantial redoubts. 
Howe was amazed. He wrote to Lord Dartmouth that 
it must have required the work of 12,000 men (the fatigue 
party in fact numbered 800), and is said to have remarked 



BOSTON 19 

that his whole army could not have done as much in a me 
month. But the forts were there, and his only alterna- 
tive was to attack and capture them or to evacuate British nan 
Boston. He immediately decided on the former, and as- Attack n 
sembled 2,400 men, under Earl Percy, to embark in trans- 
ports, rendezvous near Castle Island, and the next night 
attack the Dorchester Heights from the east. His prep- 
arations were plainly visible from the heights where 
Washington had gone in person. To meet them Wash- 
ington ordered a reinforcement of 2,000 men for Thomas, 
and simultaneously assembled 2 brigades at Cambridge, 
about 2,000 men each, carefully selected, under Sullivan 
and Greene, and ordered them to embark in boats which 
had been previously collected in the Charles River, cross 
the back bay, force their way through Boston to the works 
at Boston Neck, which were too strong to be assaulted in 
front, attack them from the rear, open the gates and let 
in the troops from Roxbury. But a furious gale came 
up during the afternoon and continued through the night 
and the next day, so that neither plan could be carried March 5 
out, and Percy's troops returned to Boston. Howe then Evacuation of 
decided to evacuate the town. Ten days elapsed, how- 
ever, before the embarkation was complete. In the 
meantime, Washington kept up an almost constant can- 
nonade from all his batteries, strengthened his works on 
Dorchester Heights, and after several unsuccessful at- March ie 
tempts, finally succeeded in building batteries on the 
north-eastern side of the Dorchester peninsula, and also 
on Nook's Hill, nearly a mile nearer to Boston than Dor- 
chester Heights. The next morning Howe completed his March 17 
embarkation, and accompanied by the men-of-war his 
transports dropped down to Nantasket Roads, and a 
few days later sailed for Halifax. Washington's troops 



20 



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 



1776 



April 4 



Results of 
First Year of 
the War 



entered Boston by Charlestown Neck and Boston Neck 
within a few hours after Howe had embarked. 

Howe took away with him about 11,000 soldiers and 
seamen and 1,000 loyalist refugees. He left behind a 
prodigious amount of supplies and military stores of all 
kinds, in excellent condition and most welcome to Wash- 
ington's straitened army; he threw most of his powder 
into the bay, and he abandoned 159 cannon, most of 
which had been rendered useless by spiking or breaking 
the trunnions. Washington's force, as shown by his 
morning report of March 9, numbered 1,254 officers and 
15,767 men present for duty in the infantry regiments, 
640 in the artillery and 6,838 in the Massachusetts mili- 
tia. He returned the militia to their homes and ordered 
five regiments to march for New York the day after he 
entered Boston. The rest of the army, except five regi- 
ments left as a garrison under General Ward, followed as 
soon as the British fleet left Nantasket Roads. Wash- 
ington himself started for the same point in less than 
three weeks after the evacuation. 

The first year of the war (less one month) had thus 
terminated. It had the same characteristics as the suc- 
ceeding years. On the one side were the best regular 
troops of Europe, commanded and led by generals of 
wide experience and personal courage, but of not more 
than average ability, well equipped and supplied from 
the ample resources of a wealthy nation, whose animat- 
ing motives were a sense of duty, allegiance to the king 
and contempt for what they called the rustic rabble 
which had broken out in rebellion. On the other side 
was an irregular force, enlisted for a short period and 
constantly changing, without military training or dis- 
cipline, without arsenals, factories or depots of supplies, 



St. Maurice .,» g t 
Forge 





Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company, Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio 
From Avery "s History of The United States and Its People 



Invasion of Canada 

-. #- 1 . r 1*7-7 r TnKr t"7-t£ 



BOSTON 21 

and without money or financial credit; but animated 177s 
with a fiery passion for liberty, a profound belief in the 
righteousness of their cause and a firm determination to 
redress their grievances at any sacrifice ; commanded by 
a soldier and statesman of lofty character, inflexible in 
purpose yet diplomatic in argument and free from any- 
thing like intolerance, with varied military experience 
and military instincts and ability of the highest order, 
capable of pursuing a Fabian policy with infinite patience 
so long as conditions imposed it, and then striking with 
extraordinary rapidity and sagacity when the conditions 
were favorable for the offensive ; gaining and holding the 
confidence of his followers in an almost unrivalled degree. 
What one side lacked, the other possessed. The odds 
were about even, and the contest was not unequal. It 
took eight long years to decide it, of which nearly seven 
were filled with active hostilities. 

The operations at Boston were not the only military 
events of the first year. A daring offensive campaign 
had been carried on in Canada. Benedict Arnold, whose 
career ended in infamy but whose military ability, en- 
ergy and reckless daring cannot be denied, had written 1775 
from Ticonderoga to the Continental Congress, 1 suggesting May 23 
an invasion of Canada; to which Congress responded by 
requesting Governor Trumbull, of Connecticut, to appoint 
"a person in whom he can confide" 2 to command at 
Ticonderoga, and by passing a resolution that no expedi- 

1 In J. N. Arnold's Life of Benedict Arnold and in Justin H. Smith's 
Arnold's March to Quebec there are voluminous references to and ex- 
tracts from journals and other original documents; so that no reference is 
necessary for the next six pages further than to say that the statements of 
facts herein made are founded on those documents. 

3 Jour. Cont. Cong., II, 74. 



22 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1775 tion ought to be made into Canada. But shortly Con- 
gress changed its mind in consequence of news that the 
tory governor of New York was trying to engage the Ind- 
ians in the Mohawk Valley to attack the posts on Lake 
Champlain. Congress thereupon appointed Schuyler to 

June 27 command the Northern army, 1 to take personal com- 

mand at Ticonderoga and to invade Canada, if practicable 
"and not disagreeable to the Canadians." Schuyler pro- 

juiy is ceeded to Ticonderoga. His own colony was dilatory in 

raising troops, but he found there 1,352 men, mostly 
from Connecticut, under command of Colonel Hinman. 
They were as deficient in every military requirement as 
those at Cambridge. But Schuyler began immediately 
the construction of boats and advised Washington of his 

July 31 intention to cross the lake and invade Canada. Mont- 

Aug. 17 gomery reported to him as second in command, and by 

the end of August the expedition was ready to start. 

Arnold's pian Meanwhile Arnold had returned to Cambridge and had 
laid before Washington a plan to invade Canada by way 
of the Maine wilderness and capture Quebec by surprise. 
It was a most daring — almost foolhardy — project. Yet 
it came astonishingly near to success. Arnold had learned 
that in all Canada there was only one regiment, and 
the greater part of this was with Governor Carleton at 
or near Montreal. Quebec was entirely undefended. 
Washington carefully considered the project, and finally 
adopted it and gave detailed instructions for the conduct 

sept. 5 of it. 2 A detachment was made up for Arnold of 1,050 

men, infantry from New England and riflemen from 
Pennsylvania and Virginia, all selected for their knowl- 
edge of woodcraft, and none ordered except those who 
had volunteered. Among the officers were Christopher 

1 Jour. Cont. Cong., II, 109. 2 Dawson, 113-115. 



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Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company, 
Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio 



From Avery's History of the United States 
and Its People 



Arnold's March 
Sept. 5-Nov. 13, 1775 



BOSTON 23 

Greene, Daniel Morgan, Aaron Burr and Henry Dearborn. 1775 
The expedition marched from Cambridge to Newbury- sept. 11 
port, there embarked in ten small transports, sailed to 
the Kennebec and up that river almost to Bath, disem- 
barked and, provided with 200 boats for the portages, 
plunged into the wilderness. 

At that date Schuyler was confined to his bed in Ticon- s eP t. 25 
deroga with a bilious fever, but the expedition under schuyier's 
Montgomery, about 1,200 men and four 12-pounders, had from e Ticon- 
crossed LakeChamplain, descended the Sorel (or Richelieu) 
River and laid siege to St. John, a fortified town garrisoned sept. 1 
by a portion of the 26th Regiment under Major Preston. 1 
While the siege was in progress Montgomery was rein- 
forced by several hundred men from New Hampshire and 
New York and by a battalion of Canadian patriots under 
command of his wife's kinsman, Colonel James Living- 
ston. Ethan Allen with a small force was sent to gain 
recruits in Canada, and while so engaged undertook to 
capture Montreal. In the skirmish which resulted, Allen 
and about half his party were taken prisoners, and Allen sept. 25 
himself put in irons and sent to England. A little later 
another expedition was sent out which captured Fort Oct. is 
Chambly, lower down on the Sorel, with its garrison of 
168 men; among the spoils were six tons of powder, the 
most valuable commodity on the continent. A few weeks 
later St. John surrendered, with 400 regulars and 100 Nov. 3 
Canadians. Montgomery immediately pressed on to capture of 

Montreal 

Montreal, which was without defence, and was surren- 
dered by a committee of its citizens; Carleton escaping Nov. 12 
in a small boat on the St. Lawrence to Quebec. 
On the day that St. John surrendered Arnold was about 

1 See Operations in Canada. Appendix to Sparks's Letters, I, 460-549. 
This contains the official reports and correspondence of Schuyler, Arnold, 
Montgomery, Wooster, Sullivan and Gates. 



24 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1775 30 miles from Quebec, after a march of incredible 
Arnolds hardships and hunger through 200 miles of what is still 

the wilderness a mountain wilderness, the best hunting ground for big 
game east of the Rocky Mountains. He had sent a 
Oct. 13 letter to Schuyler by an Indian, but the letter was given 

to Governor Carleton, who thus first learned of Arnold's 
approach, and immediately began to remove all the 
boats in the river so as to prevent Arnold's crossing. But 
Nov. io Arnold pushed on and when he arrived at the river he 

collected canoes and dugouts, and although delayed three 
days by a severe gale and by the presence of a frigate 
and a sloop of war, he succeeded in crossing on the fourth 
Nov. 13 night; and landing at the same place where Wolfe had 

landed sixteen years before, he climbed the cliffs to the 
Plains of Abraham and marched toward the western 
Amoid gates of the city. He had about 650 half-naked men, 

Quebec the rest having perished in the wilderness; and they had 

barely 400 unbroken muskets between them, and five 
rounds of ammunition. Arnold promptly demanded the 
surrender of the city; but he was in no condition to 
enforce his demand, for the place was strongly fortified, 
had an abundance of heavy guns and was garrisoned by 
about 1,900 men, regulars, irregulars and seamen, who 
had within ten days been gathered for its defence. Had 
Arnold arrived two weeks earlier, or had his letter to 
Schuyler not been delivered to Carleton, it is quite pos- 
sible he would have surprised and captured the place. 
Situated as he was, there was nothing to do but fall back 
Nov. 19 about twenty miles, up the river, to Point aux Trembles, 

and await the arrival of Montgomery, to whom he had 
already written. 

When Montgomery received his letter he made instant 
preparation to march to his assistance. After leaving 



BOSTON 25 

detachments at St. John and Montreal, and sending home 1775 

men whose enlistments had expired, he could only take 

300 men with him, but with these he set out in transports Nov. 24 

which he had captured at Montreal, and made his way Dec. 3 

down the river, joining Arnold at Point aux Trembles, Montgomery 

and handing over for his ragged and half-clothed men 

a year's supply of clothing which he had found in the 

military depots at Montreal. Their combined forces 

numbered less than 1,000 men, but they forthwith laid 

siege to Quebec. The Canadian winter was already upon 

them, and in a few weeks the enlistment of most of their 

men would expire. They were more than 300 miles from 

their own base of supplies. Their only chance was in 

a vigorous assault. Montgomery's plan was to send 

Livingston's Canadian battalion to make a feint on the 

upper town while the main assaults were to be made on 

the lower town by Arnold and himself; he following the 

road under the cliff from Wolfe's Cove to Cape Diamond, 

and Arnold coming by the St. Roque road from the 

opposite direction. If they gained possession of the 

lower town with all its magazines, they hoped to induce 

Carleton to surrender the upper town without further 

resistance. 

The troops moved out at 2 o'clock on a winter morn- Dec. 31 
ing, the weather intensely cold and a driving snow-storm 
in their faces. On reaching Cape Diamond, Montgomery 
at the head of sixty men attempted to carry a stockade 
with a rush. He was instantly killed, together with his Assault on 
aide and ten others; the rest of his party fled. Arnold 
reached the Palace Gate, on the other side of the town, 
just before daybreak. He, too, led the storming party, 
and fell at the first fire, severely wounded in the leg. 
Had the wound only been mortal, his name would have 



26 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1775 gone down in history side by side with that of Wolfe 
and Montgomery, instead of being forever the synonym 
of treason. Morgan, with the main body, was close 
behind Arnold, but in the narrow, crooked streets his 
retreat was cut off and he was compelled to surrender 
with 426 men. The remnants of the two columns made 
their way back to camp. 

Arnold was carried to a hospital, from which he directed 
the command of the few hundred men still left to him, but 
he wrote to Schuyler for reinforcements and he ordered 
no retreat; nor did Carleton attack him while his little 

1776 band remained shivering in their camp to the west of the 
April i city. The reinforcements arrived three months later, 

and with them General Wooster, who assumed command. 
A sort of siege was undertaken, but it was not effective. 

May i He was soon superseded by General Thomas. And then 

reinforcements began to arrive for the garrison — the first 
detachment of the British and Hessians who had just 
arrived from Europe under command of Burgoyne. 

Retreat from Thomas raised the siege and retreated to the Sorel, (Riche- 
lieu), marching up its banks to Chambly, where he died of 

May 30 small-pox. General Sullivan, who had already been 

ordered to supersede Thomas, arrived a few days later. 
Reinforcements brought his strength up to 2,500 men, 

June 7 and he made an attack on Three Rivers, but was de- 

feated. Sullivan's army numbered 5,000 on paper, but 
less than half that number fit for duty; they were com- 
pletely discouraged and demoralized, "the small-pox, 
famine and disorder had rendered them almost lifeless." 
Burgoyne, who had commanded in person at Three 
Rivers, was daily receiving reinforcements. There was 
no alternative for Sullivan but a hasty retreat, and he 

juiy i brought the remnants of his force to St. John and Isle- 



BOSTON 27 

aux-Noix, and thence across Lake Champlain to Crown 1776 
Point, where Montgomery had set forth just ten months 
before. 

In the lack of proper returns and the disorder of the Results of the 

, , • , • mi , , i Expedition 

retreat, it is impossible to say just how many men were to Quebec. 
sent on this expedition, and how many were lost. But 
it appears that from first to last not less than 8,000 men 
served in Canada, and barely 3,000 returned fit for duty. 
It was a bold expedition, possibly beyond the resources 
of the Colonies at that period; but Washington considered 
it with the utmost care, gave it his full approval and 
felt confident of its success. And Montgomery and Ar- 
nold showed, in its earlier stages, how apparently insur- 
mountable difficulties can be overcome by a judicious 
combination of skill, energy and daring. Had Mont- 
gomery lived, or had Arnold been left in command when 
the reinforcements came to Quebec in April, perhaps it 
might have succeeded. But the generals who were sent 
in succession to take command, Wooster, Thomas and 
Sullivan, were none of them equal to an enterprise of this 
character. 1 Had it succeeded, it would probably have 
united Canada to the Thirteen Colonies, and changed the 
whole course and outcome of the war. 

1 See the interesting analysis of Sullivan's character in Washington's 
letter of 17 June, 1776, to the President of Congress. Sparks, III, 426; 
IV, 364. 



CHAPTER II 



NEW YORK 



1776 



British Plans 
for Carrying 
on the War 



The war had begun in an attempt, from the British 
stand-point, to put down a local insurrection in Massa- 
chusetts; but when the news of Bunker Hill and the 
siege of Boston reached London, it was evident that 
there were thirteen colonies to subdue, occupying more 
than a thousand miles of sea-coast, and a hundred miles 
or more into the interior. To carry out this subjugation 
more men were needed and a more comprehensive plan 
for their operation. 

Parliament had provided in December, 1774, for an 
army of only 18,000 men, 1 and when it met in the follow- 
ing year more than two-thirds of this force was cooped 
up in Boston. It now provided for 12,000 additional 
seamen and an army of 55,000 men. 2 But as this largely 
increased force could not be raised immediately, and as 
allies were not to be had, George III and his ministers 
arranged to buy soldiers for cash. Treaties were made 
with the Duke of Brunswick, the Landgrave of Hesse- 
Cassel and other petty German rulers by which they 
undertook to furnish a large body of troops, to serve 
The Hessians under their own officers in America. For each soldier 
killed England was to pay $35, and for each wounded, 
$12; England was also to pay all expenses of every char- 
acter, and in addition to pay to the Landgrave personally 
$550,000 per annum, and to the other princes in propor- 

1 Amer. Archives, 4, I, 1479. 2 Ibid., 4, VI, 143. 

28 



1776 
Oct. 26 



1776 



Jan. 9 



NEW YORK CAMPAIGN 

OF I776 

2 3 4 

ENGUSU PT*TUTS.MILI8 

American Troops 

American Works of Defense. * 

British Troops 

Hessian Auxiliaries 

Encampments of British Forces 

Strategic movements are shown 
in broken blue (American) and 
red (British) lines, the direction 
being indicated by arrow heads. 

The dates are all of the year 1776 




Courtesv of The Burrows Brothers Company, 
' Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio 



New York 
April-Nov., 1 --6 



From Avery's History of the United States 
and Its People 



NEW YORK 29 

tion. While the employment of mercenaries was an 1776 
ancient practice, yet there were special features in these 
treaties 1 which made this bargain quite unique in its 
infamy and degradation. The number of such troops 
sent to America was 29,867 r of whom about 1,200 were 
killed or mortally wounded, 6,354 died of other causes, 
5,000 deserted, and 17,313 returned to their homes nearly 
eight years later. 2 About 60 per cent came from Hesse, 
and these mercenaries were thus known under the gen- 
eral name of Hessians. 

The last of the 6 treaties relating to these transactions 
was ratified by Parliament and the first contingent, 
numbering about 17,000 men, together with 7 British 
regiments, were ready to sail early in the year, and more 
were to be ready in the spring. A British regiment at Feb. 5 
that time consisted of 2 battalions, 12 companies, about 
50 officers and 672 men. One company in each battalion 
remained at home, and a regiment took something under 
600 men to America. 

The preparations were thus made to send out about 
20 regiments or 12,000 men from England, and 17,000 British Force 

for the New 

Hessians, which, added to the 19 regiments that Howe campaign 
had at Boston and the 3 in Canada, would make a force 
of about 42,000 men — which was thought to be ample 
for the purpose. The first detachment under Burgoyne 
(who had gone to England on leave in December) ar- 
rived in the St. Lawrence in April, and pushing its way 
through the ice reached Quebec in time to drive back the 
Americans there under Sullivan, as we have seen. 3 

In preparing a plan for the operation of their troops, 
the British generals were mindful of the topographical 

1 Printed in full, Amer. Archives, 4, VI, 271-278. 

2 Lowell, 20, 300. 3 Ante, p. 26. 



Campaign 



30 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1776 features of the Atlantic seaboard, which had already 
determined the line of military operations during the 
wars with the French while the latter still possessed 
Canada. The valley of the Hudson and the northern 
lakes pierces the range of mountains which extends from 
New Hampshire to Georgia, and affords a natural low- 
grade line of communication from Montreal to New York. 
The Hudson played the same part in the Revolution as 
the Mississippi in the Civil War. If the British could 
take and hold this line it would cut off New England from 
the other colonies. In the former the war had its origin 
pian of and its most ardent supporters; in the latter were three- 

fourths of the population and the seat of government. 
While New York itself did not then possess the relative 
importance it now has — the colony being seventh in 
population and the city being exceeded in the number 
of its inhabitants by Philadelphia, and almost equalled 
by Boston 1 — yet the harbor was unrivalled, the river 
was navigable for the ships of the day almost to Albany, 
and Great Britain had complete control of the sea, the 
incipient American navy consisting only of a few small 
privateers. Howe and Burgoyne had long resented the 
humiliation of being shut up in Boston, which was not 
easy of defence and whence no offensive movements could 
be undertaken to advantage. They desired to transfer 
the seat of war to New York, capture that city, and seize 
and hold the line of the Hudson. The new campaign 
was planned on that basis. 

The British did not follow out this general plan, of the 
soundness of which there can be no question, but allowed 
themselves, as we did later in the Civil War, to be drawn 
into diversions, in the hope of restoring their authority 

1 A Century's Growth of Population. Census Bureau, 1909, pp. 9-11. 



NEW YORK 31 

in certain localities, forgetting that the way to gain solid 1776 
results in war is to destroy the opposing army and not 
merely to occupy territory. They thus planned a side side issues 
issue against Charleston, in South Carolina, where Clinton 
had been sent with 2,000 men from Boston and where he 1775 
was to be joined by a reinforcement of 7 regiments under Dec. ie 
Cornwallis, convoyed by a fleet under Admiral Parker. 1 
Similarly, the imminent danger in Canada led to sending 
Burgoyne to reinforce Carleton at Quebec. Clinton failed 
at Charleston and then joined Howe at New York. Bur- 
goyne, however, instead of reinforcing Howe and thus 
concentrating a force of such strength as would crush all 
opposition, moved on along an eccentric line to Montreal, 
and in the following year crossed Lake Champlain to 
Ticonderoga, intending thence to move down the Hudson. 
He could not act in concert with Howe, being separated 
from him by hundreds of miles of wilderness. The result 
of acting on such widely divergent lines, instead of con- 
centrating every available man at New York, was that 
Burgoyne lost his entire army. 
On his way to Charleston, Clinton had stopped at New Movement or 

i c i • i the American 

York, and as soon as Washington heard 01 this he sent Army to 

. New York 

Lee to collect such militia as he could in Connecticut, 
New York and New Jersey and organize the defence of 1776 
New York. 2 A resolution of Congress 4 then sent Lee to Jan. 8 
command the newly formed Southern Department; but 

1 Post, p. 184. 

2 Two exhaustive monographs have been published by Prof. Henry P. 
Johnston of the New York City College, one on the campaign of 1776 
around New York, having special reference to the battle of Long Island, and 
the other on the Battle of Harlem Heights. Like Frothingham's Boston 
and Arnold's March, they are filled with references to original documents 
and copies of a great many of them. These documents have been followed 
in this chapter and it seems unnecessary to make specific references. 

4 Jour. Cont. Cong., IV, 180. 



32 



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 



1776 

Mar. 1 

March 16 to 
April 13 

Lee's Plan 



April 29 



May 12 



Fortifications 
of New York 



June 10 



Washington soon arrived with his army, which had left 
Boston as soon as Howe's fleet had sailed from Nan- 
tasket Roads. 

Lee had reported that the situation of New York, sur- 
rounded by deep water, afforded no possibility of defence 
against an enemy having complete command of the sea. 
His plan of defence was to build a few small batteries at 
salient points on North and East Rivers, but to concen- 
trate the main defence in an intrenched camp on Brooklyn 
Heights, which commanded the navigation of the East 
River. Washington approved this plan, and ordered 
Greene's brigade to occupy these heights and the brigades 
of Heath, Spencer and Stirling to be stationed just out- 
side of what then constituted the city of New York, viz., 
from the Battery to St. Paul's Church. These positions 
were taken up early in May and all hands worked hard 
to complete the fortifications. After deducting the 5 
regiments left in Boston and 16 sent to Canada, Wash- 
ington had only 19 left for New York. Their returns 
showed a strength of 589 officers and 9,963 men, of whom 
7,952 were present for duty. 1 

The plans of the fortifications were somewhat modified 
and enlarged after Washington's arrival, and their con- 
struction was carried out and the guns placed in them 
under direction of Colonel Henry Knox, who had been 
Gridley's assistant at Boston and now commanded the 
Regiment of Artillery. As finally completed the works 
consisted of no less than 21 redoubts with 121 guns, one- 
quarter of which were 32-pounders (the largest siege-gun 
then in use) and one-half larger than 9-pounders. These 
guns had come from Ticonderoga, from Boston, from the 
Bahamas (where they had been captured by Commodore 

1 Sparks, III, 493. 



NEW YORK 33 

Ezek Hopkins) and from the gun foundries in various 1776 
colonies. While Congress had erroneous views about the 
length of enlistment and the organization of armies, it 
displayed extraordinary energy in the manufacture of 
cannon, small-arms and powder. 

The two works on Governor's Island and Red Hook, 
with 12 guns, guarded the approach from the Bay to the 
East River. A battery on Paulus Hook, with 8 guns, 
was intended to protect the Jersey shore of the North 
River. On Manhattan Island there were 11 redoubts, 
with 79 guns, situated on slight eminences adjacent to the 
water, from the vicinity of Chambers Street around the 
Battery and up the East River to 86th Street opposite 
Hell Gate. On Long Island, in front of Brooklyn (then a 
hamlet of a dozen houses, just east of the present Borough 
Hall), there were 7 redoubts, mounting 29 guns, stretching 
across the ridge which extends from Greenwood Cemetery 
to the Brooklyn Reservoir, and which at the point fortified 
was about a mile in width between the swamps of Wall- 
about Bay on the north and Gowanus Creek on the south. 

The first squadron of the British fleet arrived from Arrival of the 
Halifax, bringing Howe and his Boston troops; next 
came Clinton and Cornwallis, who had been defeated at 
Charleston ; and finally Lord Howe, the naval commander- 
in-chief, with the Hessians, and the Household troops 
from London. It was an imposing array, more than 400 
transports and 32,000 soldiers the largest expedition that 
England had ever sent abroad; convoyed by 10 line- 
of-battle ships and 20 frigates, manned by more than 
10,000 seamen, and armed with about 1,200 guns, many 
of them 64-pounders and 74-pounders, which completely 
outclassed the guns which had been collected with so 
much difficulty by Knox. 



July 3 
Aug. 1 
Aug. 12 



34 



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 



1776 



July 12 



June 3 



July 2 



Disposition of 
the Troops at 
New York 



As the successive detachments arrived they went into 
camp on Staten Island just inside the Narrows. Wash- 
ington viewed their arrival with no little anxiety; which 
was increased when two of the men-of-war sailed up the 
North River, under a furious cannonade which failed 
either to stop them or do them any serious damage. 
These ships anchored in the broad Tappan Zee, forty 
miles above New York, thus cutting off all communica- 
tion by water with the Northern army. 1 His position 
was indeed precarious. Heroic efforts had been made 
to increase his force. Sullivan had brought back his 
Continental regiments, or what was left of them, from 
Ticonderoga, and Congress had passed a resolution call- 
ing out 13,800 militia for the defence of New York. 2 By 
the returns at the end of August, 3 Washington had 25 
regiments of Continentals and parts of 75 regiments of 
militia, with a paper strength of 33,363, of whom there 
were " present fit for duty" 20,328. Opposed to these 
hastily collected and untrained troops was the greater 
part of the military and naval force of England, supple- 
mented by all the mercenaries that it could hire. 

Washington, however, did not lose confidence. He 
issued an impassioned address to his troops, 4 telling them 
that "the fate of unborn millions will now depend, under 
God, on the courage and conduct of this army," and called 
upon them to "resolve to conquer or die"; and he dis- 
posed his troops to the best advantage. They were di- 
vided into five divisions under Putnam, Heath, Spencer, 
Sullivan and Greene (all of whom were now major-gener- 
als); and, as the enemy had complete command of the 



1 Sparks, III, 469, 475. 2 Jour. Cont. Cong., IV, 412. 

3 Sparks, III, 493; Amer. Archives, 5, II, 450, 451. 

4 Sparks, III, 449. 



NEW YORK 35 

water and could choose his point of landing, three divisions 1776 
were stationed near the southern part of Manhattan Isl- 
and, one in the northern part from Fort Washington to 
Kingsbridge, and one on Long Island. Greene com- 
manded the latter, and for four months had not only di- 
rected the construction of the redoubts, but had recon- 
noitred every foot of the ground by which they could be 
approached, and had compelled strict discipline and vig- 
ilance on the part of his troops. Unfortunately, early in 
August he succumbed to the malarial fever, with which so 
many of his men were prostrated, contracted in the swamps 
of Wallabout and Gowanus, adjacent to his works. He 
endeavored to direct his command from his bed in camp, 
but finally, a few days before the battle, he was at the 
point of death, and had to be carried to a house on Man- 
hattan Island. Sullivan was sent to take Greene's place, Aug. 20 
and four days later, when it seemed probable that the Aug. 24 
attack would be made on the Long Island side, Putnam, 
the senior major-general, was sent to take command. 
Neither of these officers had an opportunity to become 
familiar with the situation before the attack was made. 

It was made in overwhelming force. Under cover of Battle of 
the navy, Howe embarked 20,000 men and 40 pieces of 
artillery in small boats at Staten Island and landed them Aug. 22 
on the beach of Gravesend Bay. It was eight miles from 
the Brooklyn lines, and Washington was in no position 
to prevent or hinder the movement. Howe then sent 
Cornwallis with the Guards and Hessians to the hamlet 
of Flatbush, just south of what is now Prospect Park, 
and at the foot of a long ridge, which beginning at the 
bay (near Greenwood Cemetery) extends, in a direction 
north of east, through Prospect Park to the Brooklyn 
Reservoir and many miles beyond. The rest of Howe's 



36 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1776 troops were in rear and to the left of Cornwallis, and in 
this position they remained for three days; during which 
Howe received from the tory farmers of Long Island 
complete information as to Washington's position. On 
the other hand, Howe's inaction left Washington in doubt 
whether the landing on Staten Island might not be a 
feint with a part of his troops, whereas the main landing 
might be on Manhattan. Washington, however, each 
day sent reinforcements to Long Island, in all 10 regi- 
ments, bringing the strength up to about 7,000 men, or 
more than one-third of his effective force, and, as pre- 

Aug. 24 viously stated, sent Putnam to assume chief command. 

Aug. 25 He examined the lines in person with Putnam, and on 

returning to his head-quarters wrote a sharp letter to the 
latter in regard to the lack of vigilance and discipline 
among the troops, but he did not give him specific instruc- 
tions as to the placing of them. Washington's exact lan- 
guage was as follows: 1 "I would have you form proper 
lines of defence around your encampment and works on 
the most advantageous ground. . . . The wood next to 
Red Hook should be well attended to. . . . The militia 
. . . will do for the interior works, whilst your best men 
should at all hazards prevent the enemy's passing the 
wood and approaching your works. The woods should 
be secured by abatis where necessary, to make the en- 
emy's approach as difficult as possible." 

It is hardly possible that Washington intended to 
spread out his small force along the entire ridge, seven 
miles long, from the river road to Jamaica pass. Putnam, 
however, seems to have so understood it, although he 
gave no definite orders to carry such a plan into effect. 

Aug. 23 He appears to have acquiesced in the dispositions made 

1 Sparks, IV, 63. 



:d'e Tavern 




Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company 
Publishers, Cleveland Ohio 



From Avery's History of the United States 
and Its People 



Long Island 
Aug. 27, 1776 



NEW YORK 37 

in Sullivan's orders; 2 regiments "to possess the Flat- 1776 
bush road," 2 others "to take possession of the Bed- 
ford road/' and 2 others of "the road near the river." 
The Jamaica pass, five miles to the east of Flatbush, was 
not guarded. 

Howe's plan was to make a feint along the coast road Howes piaa 
and in front of the Flatbush pass, while a turning column 
of fully half his strength was to make a night march to 
the eastward and come in by the Jamaica pass, march 
west by the Jamaica road and come squarely in rear of 
all the American positions outside of their fortifications. 
The movement was carried out in accordance with this 
plan. Major-General Grant with 2 brigades, about 5,000 
men, moved forward along the coast road; Lieutenant- 
General de Heister with 3 brigades, about 6,000 men, Battle of 
moved toward the Flatbush pass (Prospect Park); while 
Clinton, Percy and Cornwallis with 5 brigades, about 
10,000 men, made the turning movement. At 3 o'clock Aug. 27 
in the morning Grant and de Heister were skirmishing with 
the American outposts and Stirling was hurried forward 
with 5 regiments to meet Grant. A sharp action ensued 
in the hills near what is now Greenwood Cemetery, in 
which Stirling held his own against superior numbers and 
inflicted on the enemy the greatest losses of the day. 

As early as 9 o'clock in the morning the turning column Howe's Fiank 
was squarely in his rear, and in the rear of Sullivan, who, 
with 6 regiments was defending the Flatbush pass against 
the feigned attack of the Hessians; and the head of the 
column was nearer the fortified lines and main camp of 
the Americans than either Sullivan or Stirling. This 
turning column — light dragoons, Guards, Highlanders, in- 
fantry regiments and ten pieces of artillery, in all 10,000 
men, under Clinton, Cornwallis and Percy, with Howe 



38 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1776 himself in personal command — had left Flatbush at 9 

Aug. 26 o'clock the night before, and piloted by tory guides, had 

marched to the east and then to the north, and before 
dawn had reached the Half Way House (Howard's Tav- 
ern) on the Jamaica road on the eastern side of the 
Jamaica pass (Atlantic and Vesta Avenues), about five 
miles from the American fortifications. The American 
army was absolutely without cavalry, and for such 
scouting and outpost duty as is usually performed by 
cavalry it had to rely upon small parties of officers who 
owned horses. Such a party, five in number, was ob- 
serving this Jamaica pass. It was surrounded and capt- 

Aug. 27 ured by Clinton's dragoons about 3 o'clock in the morn- 

ing. The Jamaica road (East Fulton Street) was thus 
open, and after resting his troops at the pass until day- 
light, Howe marched along that road, coming in the 
rear, first of Sullivan and then of Stirling, without warn- 
ing. One regiment was posted nearly three miles out 
on Sullivan's left flank in the direction of the Jamaica 
pass, but it was in the woods and not on the road, and 
the British soon surrounded it and compelled the sur- 
render of the colonel and most of his men, while the 
others scattered and escaped. The three regiments at 
the Bedford pass, about a mile to the left of Sullivan, 

8.3o a. m. were next uncovered, and after a short skirmish began a 
hasty retreat toward the forts. The British moved more 

Aug. 27 quickly on the road than these fugitives in the woods, 

and Sullivan found himself attacked by Clinton in his 
rear and the Hessians in his front at the Flatbush pass 
(Prospect Park). He quickly ordered a retreat, which 
soon turned to a flight, and Sullivan himself was captured. 

Stirling's With all this firing on his left and rear, Stirling saw that 

his position was untenable. About 11 o'clock he started 



NEW YORK 39 

to retreat by the coast road to the Gowanus road and ms 
thence to the forts, but he had not gone far when he 
saw that he was surrounded. On his left were the Gow- 
anus marshes, supposed to be impassable, on his right 
the main body of the British turning column, and squarely 
in front of him was Cornwallis with the Highlanders and 
the Second Battalion of the Guards. These were posted 
at the Cortelyou house on the Gowanus road where it 
climbs the hill skirting the Gowanus marsh (Third Street 
and Fifth Avenue). 

Stirling promptly decided upon a heroic measure. He Aug. 27. 
took Major Gist and part of the Maryland regiment and 
advanced to attack Cornwallis, ordering the rest of his five 
regiments to make their escape across the swamps and 
thus gain the forts. While Stirling and his handful of 
men kept up a stubborn fight for half an hour, or more, 
the greater part of his men did actually escape through 
the swamps, with only six or eight drowned. The Mary- 
landers were finally driven back and dispersed, and 
Stirling himself was captured. 

About this time Washington in person arrived at Cobble Arrival of 
Hill, one of the forts. As soon as he heard of the action 12 u. 
he had ordered 6 regiments across from New York, but 
the mischief was done long before they could arrive. 
They began filing into the forts about noon, and by 2 
o'clock in the afternoon the remnants of the 12 regiments 
that had been in the battle had succeeded in reaching 
these works. Inside the works were as many more regi- 
ments which had not been engaged. Howe's troops were 
fatigued with an all-night march and more or less fighting 
during a considerable part of the day. He had 20,000 
men, less his losses; inside the works, about a mile long, 
with both flanks protected by swamps, were about 8,000 



40 



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 



1776 



Aug. 27, 
3 P. M., 
Howe Decides 
not to Assault 



men, half of whom had been in action and defeated. 
Should Howe assault the works? His men, it is said, 
were eager for it, and in his own report Howe says it 
required repeated orders to prevent it. If he succeeded 
in an assault, it is difficult to see how Washington's army, 
with a deep river at its back, could have escaped capture 
or dispersal. Howe says that he thought he would have 
succeeded, but would have sustained heavy loss; and he 
was satisfied that he would be able to gain the works, 
almost without loss, by siege operations. 1 He therefore 
did not assault. 

The battle was over. On the British side it was a 
Responsibility brilliant victory, skilfully planned and well executed. 
On the American side it was a humiliating defeat. Who 
was responsible for it? Volumes have been written on 
this question, and it is not easy to answer it in a 
sentence. 

In the first place, no one exercised general command. 
The part played by Putnam, the commanding general, 
was insignificant. Sullivan defended the pass, where he 
had gone as soon as he heard the firing, as long as it could 
be defended, but Putnam had arrived and superseded 
him in the chief command three days before, and it is 
unjust to hold Sullivan responsible for the conduct of 
the battle. 2 Stirling had five regiments and fought splen- 
didly with them, and there his responsibility ended. 
Putnam, in spite of his well-earned reputation for gal- 
lantry at Ticonderoga, eighteen years before, and later 
at Concord and Bunker Hill, did practically nothing as 
a commanding general; and Washington never again 
placed him in a position of high responsibility. 

1 Howe's Report; Dawson, 156; Howe's Narrative, 4, 5. 

2 Sparks, IV, 517, 518. 



NEW YORK 41 

Secondly, the American army was surprised, because me 
it had no cavalry; and was attacked and outflanked 
by an army of regular troops of nearly three times its 
numbers. 

Thirdly, Greene's illness was a terrible misfortune. 
He knew his troops and knew the ground, and (as he 
showed later on) he possessed extraordinary skill and re- 
sourcefulness in similar situations. 

Finally, Washington was commander-in-chief; it was 
for him to give orders ; he had more than once examined 
the ground; and Long Island was one of the points from 
which he had been expecting an attack for four months. 
His letter of August 25 1 to Putnam is quite long, but it 
does not give specific instructions in regard to the dis- 
position of the troops. It does, however, instruct Put- 
nam "at all hazards" to prevent the enemy's approach- 
ing his works. Was Washington wise in allowing the 
troops to remain outside of their works, in the passes 
two or three miles distant where he had seen them on 
his visit of the 24th? Considering the quality of his 
untrained troops, who had never been in a battle in the 
open, but who had shown wonderful resistance behind 
trenches, it seems that he made a grave error in not keep- 
ing his men in their redoubts, and repeating the per- 
formance of Bunker Hill, as they probably would have 
done. 

Howe's report 2 gives an itemized list of his losses — 63 
killed, 283 wounded and 31 missing — and of the prisoners 
taken, 1,097 in all, including 91 officers; and there is no 
sufficient ground to doubt the accuracy of his figures. 
The dead and wounded Americans were practically all 

1 Sparks, IV, 65. 

2 Dawson, I, 148, 156; Johnston, 1776, pp. 202-206. 



42 



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 



1776 left within the British lines; their exact number is not 
known. Washington reported them at " about 1,000." ' 



Precarious 
Situation on 
Long Island 



Aug. 28 



Aug. 28 

Preparations 
for With- 
drawal 



Aug. 29 



Washington may have made a mistake in accepting 
battle in the open, but his next movement was an oper- 
ation unsurpassed in military skill. It was no longer a 
question of defending his forts on Long Island. With 
their garrison demoralized by defeat there might be doubt 
as to the outcome of an assault; but there was no need 
for Howe to make an assault. On the afternoon follow- 
ing the battle he began a siege, breaking ground for his 
first parallel about 600 yards in front of Fort Putnam 
(Washington Park). With complete command of the 
sea and an overwhelming superiority in artillery, he could 
land troops to take the works in reverse, cut off all com- 
munication between New York and Long Island and 
compel a surrender. Washington saw that his troops 
must be withdrawn from Long Island without a mo- 
ment's delay an'd joined to those on Manhattan; and he 
acted with that extraordinary rapidity which was char- 
acteristic of him in such an emergency. 

The morning after the battle he brought over from New 
York three regiments, one of them the "Fourteenth 
Regiment of Foot" in the Continental Line, commanded 
by Colonel John Glover, and made up almost entirely of 
Marblehead fishermen. There were no handier men in 
a boat than these in all the world; and they rendered 
great service here in the next two days, as well as later 
on at Trenton. Washington then sent orders to collect 
all the small boats in the Harlem River and the East 
River as far as Flushing. In order not to discourage 
his men with notice of a retreat, he issued a general order 

1 Sparks, IV, 71. 



NEW YORK 43 

saying that General Mercer had arrived and that he had 1776 
fresh troops from New Jersey which were expected that 
afternoon; that the sick were an encumbrance to the 
army and were to be removed to New York; that these 
troops of Mercer's were to take the place of some of those 
on Long Island ; and therefore all regiments were ordered 
to parade "with their arms, accoutrements and knapsacks 
at 7 o'clock at the head of their encampments and there 
wait for orders." Having made all his preparations, 
late in the afternoon Washington called a council of war 
of the eight general officers present and laid the facts 
before them. 1 They unanimously advised a retreat; and 
at dark it began. First the sick were carried down to 
the ferry; then followed the militia; and after them the 
Continental regiments. Six of the latter, specially selected 
under command of Mifflin, were left to man the works 
until dawn. As the others reached the ferry they found The Troops 
a great number of boats, of all sizes and shapes and de- 
scriptions, manned by the men of Glover's regiment, and 
some from Colonel Hutchinson's Twenty-seventh Foot, 
which came from Gloucester. General McDougall, who 
had raised the first New York regiment and had lately 
been made a brigadier, had charge of the embarkation; 
and Washington spent the night riding along the mile or 
more of road which is now Fulton Street, from the ferry 
to the fortified lines, everywhere encouraging the men 
and directing their movements. 

It was a very dark night, with torrents of rain and a Aug. 29 
north-east gale, which at first made it almost impossible 
even for the Marblehead sailors to handle their boats. 
Toward midnight the rain ceased and the wind sub- 
sided; the crossing then went on rapidly. About 2 

1 Amer. Archives, 5, I, 1246. 



44 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1776 o'clock in the morning a blunder was made which might 
possibly have wrecked the whole movement. An aide- 
de-camp, mistaking his orders, started Mifflin's entire 
command for the ferry. Fortunately Washington met 
them on the road, and led them back to the works. 

Just before dawn, by good fortune, a dense fog settled 
down over the river and the works. Under cover of this, 
Mifflin's regiments were withdrawn without being noticed 
by the British in their trenches close by. They reached 
the ferry and were all carried over, Washington himself 
accompanying the last of them, in the early morning. 

Aug. 30 A more skilful operation of this kind was never con- 

ducted. 

Washington's The troops landed near what is now Fulton Street 

of His Troops in New York, and joined their comrades in the city and 
its suburbs. In a few days the army was reorganized 
into three divisions under Putnam, Spencer and Heath, 
and posted at various points along the East and Har- 
lem Rivers, from the Battery to Kingsbridge, watching 
keenly to see where Howe would cross. The troops were 
greatly discouraged, and the militia, as Washington said 

sept. 2 in his letter to the President of Congress, were going off 

"in some instances, almost by whole regiments, by half 
ones and by companies at a time." 1 This spread dis- 
affection among the Continentals, and Washington did 
not hesitate to say that his condition was " still more 
alarming." In the midst of his cares he found time to 
write to Congress those excellent recommendations, 
which will hereafter be quoted, about the formation of a 
permanent, regular army. 2 He was not dismayed, nor 
did he neglect any precautions. He anticipated that 
Howe would move to Westchester and attack across the 

1 Sparks, IV, 72. 2 Ibid., IV, 72, 80, 89. 



NEW YORK 45 

Harlem River, and he therefore posted nearly half of his 1776 
force in the vicinity of Kingsbridge; he ordered the 
fortifications at Fort Washington to be completed, and 
others to be built at Fort Lee on the opposite Jersey 
shore ; and he called a council of war and asked the ad- shaii New 
vice of his generals as to whether New York should be or°Evacuated? 
evacuated. Greene, then convalescent from his fever, sept. 7 
in a strong and ably written opinion advised that the city 
be immediately evacuated and burned, 1 so that it should 
not become a head-quarters and depot of supplies for the 
British. Washington had asked the instructions of Con- 
gress on this point, and they had instructed him to "have 
especial care taken, in case he should find it necessary sept. 3. 
to quit New York, that no damage be done to the said 
city by his troops on their leaving it; the Congress 
having no doubt of being able to recover the same, though 
the enemy should, for a time, obtain possession of it." 2 
The other generals were divided in opinion, some being 
in favor of evacuating; some of defending the city; and 
some of the middle course, which was adopted, of leaving 
part of the army in the city, part near Kingsbridge and 
part at intermediate points. 3 Within a week Greene sept. 12 
headed a petition asking for a reconsideration of the 
question, and at a new council it was decided by ten to 
three to evacuate immediately. 4 A considerable part of 

1 Sparks, IV, 86. 

2 Jour. Cont. Cong., V, 733. The expectations of Congress were not 
realized. New York was the base of operations for the British throughout 
the war, and they held it until November 25, 1783. If it had been de- 
stroyed in 1776, the course of the war might have been quite different. On 
the other hand, the propriety of destroying a city, even to gain so great a 
military advantage, might well have been questioned, but apparently it was 
not. Such an act is now forbidden by the Hague Conventions of 1899 
and 1907. 

3 Sparks, IV, 91. 

4 Amer. Archives, 5, II, 326, 329. 



46 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1776 the stores had already been moved to Fort Washington 
and the removal of the rest was hastened. 
sept. 6 Meanwhile the British ships had assembled near Gov- 

British ships ernor's Island (which had been abandoned), and one of 
River the ships had passed up the East River without being 

seriously injured, and this was soon followed by others. 
Howe had spread his men along the shore of the East 
River as far as Hell Gate, leisurely making his prepara- 
tions to cross. The crossing was finally made on a 
sept. 15 Sunday morning from Newtown Creek to Kip's Bay 

British Land (34th Street), the navy covering the landing with a heavy 
cannonade. The Americans posted on the shore could 
not stand the grape-shot. They retired, and 84 boat- 
loads of Guardsmen and Hessians, with Clinton and 
Cornwallis and Donop in the lead, landed without diffi- 
culty. Two brigades which were posted as a support on 
Murray Hill joined in the retreat toward the Blooming- 
dale road. Washington heard the cannonade and gal- 
loped from his head-quarters, nearly four miles away, at 
the Morris House. 1 He rushed in among the fugitives, 
used strong language, drew his sword and fired his pistols 
— all to no purpose. He could not rally them. In the 
melee he narrowly escaped capture, and some thought 
that he courted death, 2 as it was with difficulty that his 
staff dragged him away. 

The retreat was general — and speedy; it soon degen- 
erated into a panic and rout, affecting even regiments 
that had most distinguished themselves at Bunker Hill, 
and were hereafter to show intrepid courage at Trenton 
and the Brandywine. Putnam's division came up by 
the road nearest the North River, and but for the patri- 
otic hospitality of Mrs. Murray, who detained Howe and 

1 Sparks, IV, 93. 2 Ibid., IV, 95. 



NEW YORK 47 

his principal generals at lunch, 1 a large part of it would 1776 
have been captured. By nightfall the remnants of the Americans 
flying army were gathered on the heights north and west Hariem 
of Harlem, near what is now 130th Street and Manhattan 
Avenue. The losses of the day were 17 officers and 350 
men. At dark, Howe's troops were posted across the Howe pursues 
island from Bloomingdale (97th Street and Broadway) Bioomingdaie 
through McGowan's Pass (Central Park), to Horn's Hook se P t. 15 
(86th Street and East River). 

Naturally Howe was elated and Washington depressed 
by the events of the day; and the spirits of the American 
troops were not improved by the heavy rain as they 
arrived after sunset on the heights north of the " Hollow 
Way," and there bivouacked on the wet ground without 
tents. But Washington arranged them in some order, 
Putnam's and Spencer's division in the rear (147th Street) 
and Greene's division (which had been commanded by 
Heath during Greene's illness) in front (127th to 135th 
Streets west of Manhattan Avenue). Before he went to 
bed Washington had given orders for Colonel Knowlton 
and his "Rangers" to reconnoitre in the morning, and sept. 16 
find out the dispositions of the enemy. These " Rangers " Knowiton's 

• 1 ., T /. n -ii Reconnois- 

were a special corps, recently organized, of five picked sance 
companies from New England regiments, all good shots; 
and they were to do constant scouting, in the absence of 
cavalry. Their officers were splendid young fellows, 
among them Nathan Hale, who at this moment was ab- 
sent at his own request, working his way through Con- 
necticut across to Long Island and thence to Manhattan, 
seeking to gain information for Washington as to the 
position and movements of Howe's troops. He was des- 
tined to be hanged as a spy about a week later, and to be 

1 Thacher, 00. 



48 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1776 immortalized by the beautiful statue which now stands 
in City Hall Park. 

Knowlton started on his reconnoissance before dawn, 
crossed the " Hollow Way," climbed the Claremont Hill 
(where Grant's monument stands) and moved along the 
edge of the bluff for more than a mile before he met any- 
thing. He then ran into the British pickets and the ad- 
vance of Leslie's brigade near the Jones house (105th 
Street near Riverside Drive). There was a sharp skir- 
mish lasting half an hour, and then Knowlton, having 
accomplished his object and developed a force greater 
than his own, retreated to the " Hollow Way" (130th 
Street under Riverside Drive). 

Washington was up at daylight, writing to Congress 1 
an account of the "disgraceful and dastardly" retreat of 
the previous day, and had just finished his report when 
he heard the firing. He promptly rode to the front and 
there met Putnam, Greene and Reed (who had succeeded 
Gates as adjutant-general a few months before). Reed 
had been with Knowlton. They made their report to 
Washington to the effect that the party which had fol- 
lowed Knowlton as he retired did not exceed 300 men. 
Washington seized the opportunity, in the hope of re- 
deeming the disgrace of the previous day, and reinspiring 
his discouraged men. He planned to capture this de- 
tachment which was in plain view across the little valley, 
sounding their bugles with the fox-hunting calls, as at 
the end of a hard run. He reinforced the Rangers with 
the Third Virginia regiment, just arrived from the 
vicinity of Mt. Vernon, and ordered Knowlton to try to 
get in rear of the British party, while a feint was made 
nearer the river by part of one of Greene's Rhode Island 

1 Sparks, IV, 95. 




COURTESY Of THE COLUM81A UNIVERSITY MESS 




ENRY f». J0MN8TQI* 



NEW YORK 49 

regiments 1 under Lieutenant-Colonel Clary. This feint 1776 
had the desired effect. The British detachment came 
down the Claremont Hill to meet them. Before the 
Rangers could get in their rear the British began to re- 
treat, followed by Clary on their front and Knowlton fir- 
ing on their flank. In climbing the rocks (about 123d 
Street and Morningside Park) Knowlton was instantly 
killed, and Leitch, the major of the Virginia regiment, re- 
ceived a wound from which he died within two weeks. 
The British continued to retreat until they reached a buck- Battle of Har- 
wheat field (120th Street, between Broadway and River- se P t. i6 
side Drive), where they were reinforced and made a 
stand. Washington had also sent in reinforcements, the 
greater part of Greene's division, so that there were about 
1,800 Americans engaged. Putnam, Greene, George Clin- 
ton and Reed, were all in the action and all displayed 
great courage, which animated the men. More rein- 
forcements came up to the British, including the 42d 
Highlanders and some of Donop's Hessians. There was 
a sharp engagement in the buckwheat field lasting an 
hour and a half. There were no intrenchments on either 
side. It was a fight in an open, almost level, field, the 
two lines being not more than a hundred yards apart. 
Again the British and Hessians retreated, through an 
orchard about a third of a mile in the rear, where they 
made a short stand; and then finally to the vicinity of 
the Jones house (105th Street), more than a mile from 
the " Hollow Way," where the action had begun at 11 
a. m. It was now about 3 p. m., and Howe had brought 
up nearly the whole of Cornwallis's division and the 
Hessians, probably 5,000 men. Washington had no 
intention of bringing on a general engagement and sent 

1 Sparks, IV, 98, 99. 



50 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1776 an aide to order a retreat. The troops marched back to 
Harlem Heights in good order and without being mo- 
lested. Washington's loss was about 30 killed and 100 
wounded, and Howe's 14 killed and 157 wounded. 
Results of It was not a great battle; yet the numbers engaged 

were about equal to, and the losses incurred were greater 
than, those at Bennington, Stony Point, King's Moun- 
tain or Cowpens. Its importance is due to the fact that 
the same troops which had fled in a disgraceful panic on 
the previous day at Kip's Bay recovered their courage; 
drove the British and Hessian regulars before them for 
more than a mile; fought them in the open at 40 yards' 
range; and finally, when the object of the movement was 
accomplished, retreated in good order and without mo- 
lestation to their own lines. All this had a wonderful 
effect in restoring the morale of the Continental army. 
It completely checked Howe's advance. He made no 
offensive movement for nearly four weeks, contenting 
himself with fortifying the hills from Bloomingdale 
through McGowan's Pass to Hell Gate, while Washing- 
ton was fortifying the opposing heights north and west 
of Harlem. There were three distinct lines of trenches 
and redoubts, extending from the Hudson River to 
the Harlem Plain, one on the present site of 147th Street, 
the next at 153d Street and the third at 162d Street. 
On the hill at 182d Street a large pentagonal bastioned 
redoubt (Fort Washington) was constructed, the re- 
mains of which are still visible. It was capable of hold- 
ing 2,000 men; it was 200 feet above the water; it com- 
manded a fine stretch down the river as well as across 
it; and in connection with Fort Lee on the opposite 
Jersey shore and a line of sunken vessels, booms and 
chains in the river, it was intended to prevent the British 



NEW YORK 51 

men-of-war and transports from passing up the Hudson. 1776 
Great was Washington's disappointment when it was 
shown that these works could not effect that purpose. 
Two frigates sailed up the river with a favorable breeze; 
and although bombarded by the guns of the forts on both Oct. 9 
sides, they passed the obstructions without serious injury. 
Howe's next plan was to move past Washington's 
flank — a movement quite similar to that which Grant Howe's Fiank- 
made on a much larger scale in 1864. The lines which thfough Vei1 

Wpst chaster 

Washington had built on Harlem Heights were very 
strong, and they were defended by 14,750 * men, who 
had shown in the engagement of September 16 that they 
were still full of fight. Howe wisely decided not to 
assault these works. His own lines were now strong 
enough to be held by a small force, which would make 
New York safe from recapture. Leaving Lord Percy's 
division in these works he embarked the rest of his army 
in small boats at 86th Street and moved them through 
the Sound to Throg's Neck. This movement threatened Oct. 12 
Washington's communications, but it was not effectual. 
Throg's Neck is connected with the main-land by a cause- 
way and bridge crossing Westchester Creek. Washing- 
ton sent a few regiments to destroy this bridge and take 
position on the west side of the creek. Howe could not 
have forced the crossing without great loss; he therefore 
put his men in boats again and moved them across the 
water to Pell's Point, 2 south of New Rochelle. Washing- 
ton met this movement by extending Spencer's division Oct. is 
along the hills behind the Bronx, with their outposts out 
on the shore of the Sound in touch with Howe's landing 
parties. Three days later Washington arrived at White 

1 Sparks, III, 493; Amer. Archives, 5, II, 910. 

2 Howe's Report, Dawson, 185. 



52 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1776 Plains, 1 about eight miles north of New Rochelle, with 

Oct. 21 Heath's division; and a few days afterward he was 

joined by Sullivan's, Stirling's and Lee's divisions. He 

then had at White Plains about 13,000 men— his entire 

army except about 2,000 men left at Fort Washington, 

and 4,500 at and near Fort Lee, which were under 

the command of Greene. 2 Howe had a slightly larger 

number. 

Battle of Washington selected a position near White Plains, 

white Plains fortified it by tw0 ij nes f intrenchments and there 

awaited Howe's attack. The trenches were on slightly 
rising ground, the left protected by swampy ground and 
the right resting on the Bronx River. Beyond the right 
was a piece of high ground, called Chatterton's Hill, 
which commanded the plain over which Howe would 
have to advance. It was occupied by Haslet's Delaware 
regiment, with two guns of Captain Alexander Hamilton's 
battery, and supported by McDougall's Brigade; in all 
about 1,600 men. 3 

Although Howe outnumbered Washington he deemed 
it unwise to attack the main position until he had gained 
possession of this Chatterton's Hill. He therefore sent 

Oct. 28 Leslie with his own brigade and three regiments of Hes- 

sians, about 4,000 men in all, to dislodge Haslet. They 
forded the Bronx and advanced up the hill, their attack 
preceded by a sharp artillery fire from thirteen guns posted 
on the east side of the Bronx. Such effective resistance 
was made by two excellent regiments in McDougall's 

ioa.m. brigade and by Hamilton's two guns that the first at- 

tack failed. Later it was renewed in front, while Rail, 
with one of the Hessian regiments, made his way around 

Sparks, IV, 524. 2 Ibid.; Amer. Archives, 5, III, 663. 

3 Dawson, 179, 184. 




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From Avery's History of the United States 
and Its People 



White Plains, Oct. 28, 1776 
Movements of Nathan Hale, Sept. 10-22, 1776 



NEW YORK 53 

Haslet's right flank; and this attack succeeded. Mc- ms 
Dougall retreated, bringing off the guns and joined 
Washington's main position. The British loss was 28 
killed, and 126 wounded; 5 officers being among the killed, 
and 5 among the wounded; the Hessians lost 77. 1 The 
American loss was not reported in detail but was esti- 
mated at less than 200. 

Howe thus gained Chatterton's Hill, but he did not Oct. 30 
attack the main lines that day nor the next. On the third 
day he was reinforced by two brigades of Percy's division, 
which he had ordered up from New York; and by the 
second division of Hessians under Knyphausen which had 
just arrived from Europe. This brought his strength up 
to about 20,000 men, and he determined to attack on the Oct. 31 
following day. A storm delayed the movement and, Nov. 1 
under cover of the storm during the next night, Wash- 
ington withdrew five miles to a strong position on 
the heights of North Castle. Howe did not follow 
him. 2 

The chief object of Howe's manoeuvre — to get in rear 
of Washington, and by occupying a line from Long Island 
Sound to the Hudson to surround him and cut off his com- 
munications with New England — had thus failed. He 
had, nevertheless, succeeded in dividing Washington's 
small force into three bodies, one in New Jersey, at or near 
Fort Lee, one on Manhattan Island, at or near Fort Wash- 
ington and the third at North Castle. The main body, at 
North Castle, and the most important post, at Fort 
Washington, were twenty-five miles apart; and Howe 
was between them. Moreover, his ships had shown that 
they could ascend the river; he could obtain his sup- 

1 Howe's Report, Dawson, 184-185; Lowell, 301. 
* Dawson, 186. 



54 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1776 plies by water and could concentrate his troops at any 
point along the river. 

This faulty disposition of Washington's troops invited 
disaster, which was not long in arriving. It was due to 
the unanimous desire of Congress that the last remaining 
point on Manhattan Island — Fort Washington — should 
not be abandoned. Congress sent Washington resolu- 

oct. 11 tions 1 to this effect, and these unfortunately influenced 

the better judgment of Washington, and also of his gen- 
erals. 

Early in November there were in service 106 regiments, 
of which about one-third were Continentals and two-thirds 
militia. They numbered on paper about 2,400 officers 
and 40,000 men; 2 but the "rank and file, present, fit for 
duty," were only about 19,000. Gates at Ticonderoga 
had about 6,000; Heath, in the Highlands, with head- 
quarters at Peekskill, had about 3,000; Lee, at Norch 
Castle, on the Croton River, had 5,000; and there were 
2,700 at Fort Washington, and an equal number at Fort 
Lee, both under command of Greene. Howe, with 
nearly 20,000 men, was at Dobb's Ferry on the Hudson, 
about midway between Lee and Greene; he had fully 
10,000 more at New York and Staten Island. 3 Carleton, 
with nearly 10,000 men, was at Crown Point, and had 
just defeated Arnold in a spirited naval engagement on 

oct. ii Lake Champlain. 4 After that he retired to Canada and 

Nov. 2 went into winter quarters. 

As previously stated, when Washington withdrew from 

Nov. i White Plains to North Castle, Howe did not follow him. 

1 Jour. Cont. Cong., VI, 866. 

2 Returns of November 3, November 9, November 13. Amer. Archives, 
5, III, 499, 663, 702. 

3 Sparks, V, 542. 

* Sparks, IV, 155; Dawson, 167-174. 



NEW YORK 55 

On the same day he sent a detachment from his troops me 
at New Rochelle to occupy the heights north of Spuyten 
Duy vil ; and a few days later he moved his main body Nov. 5 
from White Plains to Dobb's Ferry. Washington imme- 
diately saw what Howe's plan was. "That they will in- 
vest Fort Washington is a matter of which there can 
be no doubt. 1 ... I think it highly probable, and al- 
most certain, that he will make a descent with a part of 
his troops into Jersey." 2 He prepared to meet this situ- 
ation as fully as the force at his disposal would permit. 
Greene had written asking for instructions in regard to Oct. 31 
Fort Washington, and Washington had replied leaving the 
matter to Greene's discretion, only reminding him of the 
previous intention to hold the fort to the last. While 
Howe was transferring his base from the Sound to the 
Hudson River he ordered vessels to come up to meet him 
at Dobb's Ferry. A frigate and two transports broke Nov. 5 
through the obstructions and passed up the river. Greene 
reported this to Washington, 3 and on the same day Nov. 7 
Washington advised Greene of Howe's movements, and 
his interpretation of them, and said that he should prob- 
ably come in person with "the troops designed for the 
Jerseys." 4 When Washington, on the following day, 
received Greene's report of the passage of the British 
ships up the river, he began to doubt the advisability of 
attempting to hold Fort Washington any longer. He 
immediately wrote to Greene, 5 expressing such doubts, Nov. 8 
and saying: "I am therefore inclined to think that it will 
not be prudent to hazard the men and stores at Mount 
Washington; but as you are on the spot, leave it to you 

1 Sparks, IV, 163. » Ibid., IV, 159. 

8 Amer. Archives, 5, III, 556. * Ibid., 5, III, 557. 

•Amer, Archives, 5, III, 602; Sparks, IV, 164. 



56 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1776 to give such orders as to evacuating Mount Washington 
as you judge best, and so far revoking the order given to 
Colonel Magaw to defend it to the last." 

Washington had by this time come to have great con- 
fidence in Greene's judgment. Greene was himself the 
soul of loyalty. Had Washington given him an order it 
would have been promptly obeyed, whatever his own 
opinion might have been. Washington not only did not 
give an order, but he did not intend to give one. He in- 
tended to — and did — advise Greene that the views he had 
previously entertained and had expressed the last time 
he saw Greene had been modified by subsequent events, 
and without giving any positive orders he left it to 
Greene's discretion to act as he thought best. Judged by 
the result, Greene decided wrongly, 
oct. 11 Congress had passed urgent resolutions that the fort 

Oct. i6 should be held. 1 At a council of war, where sixteen gen- 

eral officers were present — including every prominent 
officer in the army except Greene himself, who was ab- 
sent in New Jersey — it was unanimously " agreed, that 
Fort Washington be retained as long as possible." 2 
Colonel Robert Magaw, of Pennsylvania, who commanded 
in Fort Washington, and was considered one of the best 
regimental commanders in the Continental service, advised 
Greene that he could hold the fort until the end of the 
year. 3 Greene concurred in this view, believing that the 
garrison would make as vigorous a defence as at Bunker 
Hill. He therefore exercised, unwisely, the discretion 
vested in him by deciding not to withdraw the garrison. 
Nov. io When Washington arrived the responsibility of de- 

1 Jour. Cont. Cong., VI, 866. 

3 Amer. Archives, 5, II, 1117; Sparks, IV, 155. 

1 Anier. Archives, 5, III, 619. 



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From Avery's History of the United States and Its People 



NEW YORK 57 

tiding the question rested on him. He had left White 1776 
Plains, taking Putnam and Mercer and a small body of 
troops with him, had crossed the Hudson at King's Ferry Nov. 12 
(Stony Point — Verplanck's Point), and riding down on the 
Jersey side in advance of his troops, reached Greene's Nov. 13 
camp at Fort Lee. The matter was fully discussed, but, 
as Greene said, "finally nothing concluded on"; 1 and as 
Washington said, 2 when three years later Charles Lee 
criticised his leadership, the discussion " caused that war- 
fare in my mind, and hesitation, which ended in the 
loss of the garrison." 

Being still in doubt, two days later Washington de- 
cided to cross the river and examine the position in per- 
son. In company with Putnam and Greene and Mercer, Nov. 16 
he was rowed across early in the morning, but just as they 
landed the cannonade began, and the attack soon fol- 
lowed. Greene's description is quite graphic. 3 " There 
we all stood in a very awkward situation. As the dis- 
position was made and the enemy advancing, we durst 
not attempt to make any new disposition ; indeed, we saw 
nothing amiss. We all urged his excellency to come off. 
I offered to stay. General Putnam did the same, and so 
did General Mercer; but his excellency thought it best 
for us all to come off together, which we did, about half 
an hour before the enemy surrounded the fort." This 
was certainly a humiliating position for the commander- 
in-chief and his principal officers to be in. 

The battle took place in this wise. Howe moved his loss of Fort 
main body southward from Dobb's Ferry, and the Hes- 
sians westward from New Rochelle; he formed his prin- 
cipal line on the heights, north and east of Harlem River, 

1 Greene to Knox, Knox, 33. 2 Sparks, VI, 329. 

'Ibid., 34. 



58 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1778 between the Hudson and the Bronx. In advance of 
them, the Hessians occupied a position south of Harlem 
River at Kingsbridge, and Cornwallis another position 
(University Heights) east of the river, both of which they 
fortified; while Percy brought part of his division from 
McGowan's Pass up to the " Hollow Way" (125th Street 
and Manhattan Avenue). The Americans were thus 
surrounded by something more than 13,000 men 1 — 12 
British and 15 Hessian regiments. Thirty flatboats were 

Nov. 14 brought up the Hudson from New York, and during the 

night succeeded in passing Fort Washington and through 
Spuyten Duyvil into the Harlem River south of Kings- 
bridge. Howe was fully posted as to the American posi- 
tion by the adjutant of Magaw's regiment, 2 who had 
deserted two weeks before and given Howe plans of all 
the works and the strength of the garrison. 

Magaw, on the American side, commanded three regi- 
ments : his own and Shee's (now under Cadwalader) from 
Pennsylvania, and Rawlings' of Maryland; and detach- 
ments from the so-called " Pennsylvania Flying Camp," 
under Colonel Baxter, equal to about three more regi- 
ments. Cadwalader was in the lines from 165th Street 
south to the " Hollow Way"; Rawlings was in those on 
the heights near the Hudson, south of Inwood, Baxter 
at Laurel Hill (Fort George) on the Harlem, and Magaw 
in Fort Washington. 3 

Nov. i6, The attack began almost simultaneously on three 

sides, Knyphausen and Rail leading the Hessians in two 
columns against Rawlings, Cornwallis landing from the 
thirty boats and scaling the heights of Fort George 
against Baxter, and Percy crossing the " Hollow Way" 

1 Amer. Archives, 5, III, 1058. ■ Lossing, II, 619. 

'Dawson, 189. 



NEW YORK 59 

and attacking Cadwalader. The attack was preceded and ms 
covered by a heavy artillery fire from the east side of the 
Harlem River. 1 Cadwalader made only a feeble resistance 
and fell back toward Fort Washington; but Rawlings de- 
fended his position with great vigor, and it was only after 
two hours of hard fighting and heavy losses that the 
Hessians, with their enormous superiority of force, were 
able to drive him back. 2 Baxter was mortally wounded, 
and his men retired before Cornwallis. Learning that 
Cadwalader was retreating, Howe ordered a fourth attack, 
which had originally been intended as a feint, to be 
made vigorously by the 42d Highlanders, crossing the 
Harlem in boats and climbing a steep hill near the 
Morris House (165th Street), and trying to intercept 
Cadwalader. Magaw sent a detachment to oppose this, 
and the Highlanders lost heavily; but they finally car- 
ried the hill and captured the detachment. They were, 
however, so delayed that they were unable to intercept 
Cadwalader, and he succeeded in reaching Fort Wash- 
ington. 3 

Early in the afternoon all the Americans, more or less 
demoralized, had been driven from their outlying works 
into Fort Washington. After some parleying Magaw sur- 
rendered the entire body to Knyphausen. 4 

Howe at first followed up his victory with energetic Nov. is 
pursuit of the troops in New Jersey. Leaving the Hes- 
sians with their prisoners, he sent Cornwallis with twelve Nov. 19 
regiments across the Hudson at Yonkers, and marching 
down behind the Palisades he arrived in rear of Fort 
Lee. Greene had detected the movement; and sending 

1 Howe's Report, Dawson, 194. 

*Ibid., 195; Lowell, 80-84; Eelking, 51. 

3 Sparks, IV, 180. i * Dawson, 191, 195. 



60 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1776 report of it to Washington (who was at Hackensac, as- 
sembling the men he had brought from North Castle) 
Greene brought off the garrison of Fort Lee during the 

Nov. 20 night, and reached the Hackensac bridge only a few hours 

before Cornwallis. Here he was joined by Washington, 
and a brief stand was made to cover the retreat of the 

Nov. 23 troops at Hackensac village, behind the Passaic. Then 

the retreat was continued to Newark. 1 

Howe's losses at Fort Washington were 78 killed, 374 
wounded and 6 missing. About three-fourths of the 
losses were in the Hessian regiments under Knyphausen, 
which attacked Rawlings from the north. The American 
loss was 59 killed and 2,818 prisoners, of whom 96 were 
wounded. Adding 105 captured at Fort Lee, the total 
loss of the Americans was approximately 3,000 men. 
The British chief of artillery made an itemized report 
of the artillery, 2 ammunition and stores taken in the 
two forts; it included 146 pieces of artillery, over 12,000 
shot, shell and case, 2,800 small-arms and 400,000 musket 
cartridges. The Continental treasury and the limited 
resources of the Colonies in gun factories were in no con- 
dition to stand such a loss. 
From every point of view it was a terrible disaster. 

Results of the Had Howe pursued Washington with the same relent- 
waswngton less energy and well-directed skill that Grant pursued 
Lee eighty-eight years later, it is hard to see how the 
Continental army could have escaped destruction. Howe 
had nearly 30,000 regular troops, as good as any in the 
world. He had captured the city of New York and the 
line of the Hudson for forty miles above it — and that 
comprised about all there was of the State of New York 

1 Sparks, IV, 187, 189. s Amer. Archives, 5, III, 1058, 1059. 




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Retreat through New Jersey 
Nov. -Dec, 1776 



NEW YORK 61 

at that time,. the settlements around Albany being little 1776 
more than Indian trading-posts. He had complete com- 
mand of the river, with over 300 transports protected by 
nearly 80 vessels of war. Properly handled, these could 
have prevented any of Lee's division from crossing the 
Hudson to join Washington, and with their aid a com- 
paratively small land force could either have captured 
Heath at Peekskill and Clinton at Fort Montgomery, or 
driven them away from their posts, and given Howe the 
much-desired command of the Hudson to Albany. By 
controlling the Hudson and remorselessly following Wash- 
ington's few remaining regiments wherever they went, 
and keeping the field as long as they kept it, notwith- 
standing the season, he could have ended the war before 
spring. 

Perhaps he did not know the despondency prevailing American 
on the American side. John Adams, the most important 
man in Congress — President of the Board of War and 
member of the committee to seek aid from foreign na- 
tions — had gone home to spend three months with his Oct. 13, 1776. 
family in Massachusetts. 1 Congress was ready to pass 
the resolutions, which it did pass a few weeks later, 2 to Nov. 23 
make Washington dictator, and adjourn to Baltimore — 
where there would probably have been no quorum, if 
Washington had failed at Trenton. Washington him- 
self wrote to Congress 3 from Newark that "the situation 
of our affairs is truly critical," and to his brother, 4 a little 
later: "In a word, if every nerve is not strained to recruit Dec. is 
the new army with all possible expedition, I think the 
game is pretty nearly up." 

1 Morse, Life of John Adams, 146; Familiar Letters of John Adams, 233. 

2 Jour. Cont. Cong., VI, 1027. 

a Sparks, IV, 190. * Ibid., IV, 231. 



G2 



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 






1773 

Howe Goes 
into Winter 
Quarters 



Dec. 20 



Dec. 8 



Washington 
Retreats to the 
Delaware 

Nov. 29 

Dec. 3 



Howe missed his chance. Instead of driving Wash- 
ington to Philadelphia and dispersing his army as its 
enlistments expired, he halted Cornwallis, first at Bruns- 
wick, and then at Trenton; and went into winter quar- 
ters, saying (to Lord George Germain) 1 that his in- 
tention did not extend beyond getting and keeping 
possession of East Jersey. Instead of seizing and hold- 
ing the Highlands of the Hudson he sent Sir Henry Clin- 
ton, with 6,000 troops and a large part of the navy, to 
Newport, intending in the spring to capture Providence 
and thus penetrate into New England. 2 There was no 
enemy at Newport, and the place was captured without 
resistance; the advance to Providence was never made, 
and the British troops which spent the next three years 
at Newport made the inhabitants miserable but accom- 
plished no military purpose. 

Howe, having thus completed his plans for a quiet 
winter, Washington, by a supreme effort of genius and 
daring at Trenton, changed the whole situation. No 
second opportunity like that of December, 1776, ever 
came to Howe or his successor. 

Washington had been only a few days at Newark when 
Cornwallis appeared on the opposite side of the river; 
simultaneously the Hessians crossed the Passaic above 
his left flank, and it was rumored that Howe was em- 
barking men for Staten Island, to turn his right by way 
of Amboy. 3 Washington therefore retreated to Bruns- 
wick and a few days later to Trenton, and took position 
behind the Delaware, having taken the precaution to 
secure all the boats on the river for 70 miles above Phil- 
adelphia. 4 His force was reduced to about 3,000 men, 5 

1 Amer. Archives, 5, III, 1316. 2 Sparks, IV, 220. 3 Ibid., IV, 194. 
<Amer. Archives, 5, III, 1027, 1120, 1152. 6 Ibid., 5, III, 1035. 



NEW YORK 63 

whose enlistments would expire at the end of the month. 1776 
With his soldierly instinct he felt sure that Howe would 
pursue him with his entire force, attempt to cross the 
Delaware above or below him, crush him in action and 
push on to Philadelphia. So convinced was he that 
Howe would adopt this plan that he wrote to Congress 1 Dec. s. 
that "the object of the enemy cannot now be doubted in 
the smallest degree." He therefore suggested that Phila- Dec. 9 
delphia should be fortified, and sent Putnam there to 
take charge of the works, and Mifflin along with him to 
take charge of the stores and aid in raising the militia, 
with whom he had great influence. Congress, after con- 
ferring with Putnam and Mifflin, passed a resolution, 2 
"That the Continental general commanding at Phila- 
delphia be directed to defend the same to the utmost 
extremity," and adjourned, to meet later in Baltimore. Dec 12 

There was no stampede on Washington's part. What- 
ever he might write privately to his brother, he showed 
no lack of confidence to those around him, in his letters 
to public officials and in his orders to his subordinates. 
At no time in his whole career did he act with more in- 
tense energy than during these three weeks in December, 
writing almost daily letters 3 to the governors of States 
and to Congress, suggesting measures for raising troops 
and apologizing for those which he himself had taken if 
they should seem to exceed his authority. "A char- Letter to 

»-. t • • 1 1 1 i Congress, 

acter to lose, an estate to forfeit, the inestimable bless- Dec. 20 
ings of liberty at stake, and a life devoted, must be my 
excuse." 4 

On leaving White Plains he had given Lee formal 
and explicit orders in writing as to what Lee should 

1 Sparks, IV, 206-208. 2 Jour. Cont. Cong., VI, 1026, 1027. 

3 Sparks, IV, 200-264. * Ibid., IV, 235. 



March 
Oct. 14 



64 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1776 do in certain contingencies, and the most important part 
Nov. io of these orders directed Lee, 1 in case the enemy should 

cross the Hudson, to follow "with all possible despatch." 
Nov. i6 After the loss of Fort Washington he sent orders to Lee 

to bring his entire force to join him. 2 While at Newark, 
Congress authorized him 3 to call upon Schuyler for the 
Pennsylvania and Jersey troops, and the instant he re- 
ceived the resolution he wrote to Schuyler 4 to send them. 
Lee'sjmatory All of these instructions were promptly carried out ex- 
cept in the case of Lee. That officer had recently re- 
turned from the South, much inflated in his own estima- 
tion, as well as that of more judicious men like Jay and 
Duer, 5 by the victory at Charleston, the credit of which 
in reality was due to Moultrie and not to himself. The 
succession of disasters and retreats, from Long Island to 
White Plains and from Fort Washington to Newark, 
filled his traitor's mind with the thought 6 that perhaps 
people could be induced to believe that Congress had 
made a mistake in the selection of a commander-in-chief 
sixteen months before, and that a soldier who had seen 
service under the King of England, the King of Poland, 
and the Empress of Russia might be selected as his suc- 
cessor. He was therefore in no hurry to join Washington ; 
to the latter's repeated instructions to hasten his march 
he returned frivolous replies, meanwhile writing to his 
friends, 7 Reed and Rush and Gates, wondering if Wash- 
ington was such a great man as had been thought. Fi- 
nally, however, Washington's orders became so imper- 
ative that he dared not disobey, and he put his com- 
mand in motion ten days after he had received the first 

1 Sparks, IV, 170. 2 Ibid., IV, 186, 187, 192, 193. 

1 Jour. Cont. Cong., VI, 977. 4 Sparks, IV, 192. 

8 Moore, 37. 8 Ibid., 49, 50. 

T Ibid., 38, 42; Reed, I, 255; Sparks, IV, 535. 



NEW YORK 65 

order. He crossed the Hudson at King's Ferry (Stony 1776 
Point — Verlpanck's Point), and had to make a detour by Dec. 2 
way of Morristown in order to avoid Cornwallis. He 
marched as slowly as possible — 40 miles in 8 days — and 
one night, while sleeping at a tavern at Baskinridge, 3 Dec 12 
miles from his command, he was captured by Cornwallis's 
dragoons and carried a prisoner to Howe. 1 The latter at capture of 
first thought of treating him as a deserter from the 
British army; and for this or other reasons Lee under- 
took to advise Howe as to the strength and position of 
the American army and the best means of compassing 
its destruction. He even went so far as to hand to 
Howe, in his own handwriting, a plan for the next cam- 
paign, 2 which Howe put away among his papers, where 
it was not discovered till nearly eighty years later. 

Of all this, of course, Washington knew nothing; he 
did know, although he could not account for it, that Lee 
was very slow in joining him. His troops did finally 
arrive under Sullivan, and Heath and Gates arrived Dec. 20 
almost at the same time. 

Washington seems to have had a very good service of 
information; 3 for his letters show that at this time he had 
learned, to his surprise, that Howe had gone into winter 
quarters, instead of intending to attack him and try to 
capture Philadelphia. As soon as he learned this, Wash- 
ington determined on his counter-stroke. The rein- 
forcements he had received had been partly counter- 
balanced by expiration of enlistments and the melting 
away of the militia, but he had with him now 30 small 
Continental regiments, containing 4,160 men, present for 
duty. They were organized into 8 brigades and 2 divi- 

1 Moore, 52-59; Sparks, 530-541. ■ Moore, 84. 

s Sparks, VI, 39, 255. 



66 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1776 sions, 1 under command of Sullivan and Greene. They 
were posted on the west bank of the Delaware, guarding 
all the fords for 20 miles above the big bend of the river 
at Bordentown. Lower down the river, at Bristol, was 
Colonel John Cadwalader with a regiment of Penn- 
sylvania militia. Washington's head-quarters were in 
rear of the centre of his line, at a hamlet called Newtown."- 
Howe's orders 3 for winter quarters had placed 6 bri- 
gades, probably 15 regiments, in Princeton and Bruns- 
wick, and 6 regiments of Hessians 4 under Donop, on the 
Delaware from Bordentown to Burlington, 3 of them be- 
ing at Trenton under Colonel Rail. The total force was 

Dec. 8 about 12,000 men. Cornwallis had attempted, two weeks 

before, to turn Washington's left flank by crossing the 
Delaware at Coryell's Ferry, but finding no boats had 

Dec. 20 given up the attempt; and when the troops went into 

winter quarters had returned to New York, intending to 
go to England on leave of absence until spring. He had 

Dec 23 turned over the command to Major-General Grant. 5 

Washington wrote to Cadwalader at Burlington, 8 

Washington "Christmas day at night, one hour before day, is the 

Delaware e time fixed for our attempt upon Trenton. For Heaven's 
sake, keep this to yourself. ... I have ordered our men 
to be provided with three days' provisions ready cooked, 
with which, and their blankets, they are to march; for 
if we are successful ... we may push on." Washing- 
ton's plan was to cross the Delaware at McKonkey's 
Ferry, nine miles above Trenton; then march down the 
east bank in two columns, Sullivan's division on the river 

1 Amer. Archives, 5, III, 1401; Sparks, IV, 244. 

2 Sparks, IV, 232, 243. 

3 Howe to Germain, Amer. Archives, 5, III, 1317. 

4 Lowell, 87; Eelking, 59. 

6 Amer. Archives, 5, III, 1318. 6 Sparks, IV, 241. 




Trenton and Princeton 



NEW YORK 67 

road, and Greene's division (which Washington accom- 1776 
panied in person) on the Scotch, about two miles to the 
left. The two roads entered the village of Trenton from 
the south-east and north-west, and, uniting, formed its 
main street. Artillery, to the number of eighteen pieces, 
was distributed through the two columns. Knox was to 
have charge of the crossing, and the boats were to be 
manned by Glover's Marblehead regiment. "A pro- 
found silence to be enjoined, and no man to quit the 
ranks on the pain of death." * 

The movement began soon after dark. "The floating Dec. 25 
ice in the river made the labor almost incredible. How- Knox's Letter 
ever, perseverance accomplished what at first seemed 
impossible. About 2 o'clock the troops were all on the 
Jersey side; we were then nine miles from the object. 
The night was cold and stormy; it hailed with great 
violence; the troops marched with the most profound 
silence and good order." 2 The Hessians had duly cele- 
brated Christmas and were sound asleep. The troops 
"arrived by two routes at the same time, about half an 
hour after daylight, within one mile of the town. The 
storm continued with great violence, but was in our 
backs, and consequently in the faces of the enemy. 
About half a mile from the town was an advanced guard 
on each road, consisting of a captain's guard. These we Battle of 
forced, and entered the town with them pell-mell." 
Rail and his officers were rudely awakened in the gray Dec. 26 
dawn of this cheerless morning — but by a distinguished 
company. Washington was with the head of column, 
Greene by his side, and the advance party was a company 
of the Third Virginia, whose officers were Captain William 

1 Washington's order of December 25, Stryker, 114. 

2 Knox, 36. 



68 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1776 Washington and Lieutenant James Monroe, then less 
than eighteen years old, afterward President of the United 
States. Knox was directing the artillery, and among its 
officers was Captain Alexander Hamilton, whose twentieth 
birthday would come in a few days. The artillery was 
being brought into position to fire down King (now 
Warren) Street, and Greene was moving his infantry 
down a parallel street, and extending his right to connect 
with Sullivan, who simultaneously began the attack. 
The Hessians attempted to bring two guns into action, 
but the Virginia company charged them and captured 
the guns, both Captain Washington and Lieutenant 
Monroe being badly wounded in the melee. 1 

It had been a part of Washington's plan that Ewing, 
with a small brigade of militia was to cross at Trenton 
ferry, just below the village, and Cadwalader with his 
Pennsylvania militia at Bristol ferry, about ten miles 
lower down; but neither of them could cross on account 
of the ice. The river road from Trenton to Bordentown 
was thus left open, and when the Hessians turned out 
into the streets in some confusion, a portion of them, 
about 500 in number, who were attacked by Sullivan, 
made their escape by this road. Rail tried to form the 
rest in the streets at the north end of the village, but 
these were commanded by artillery, and he therefore 
moved out of the village to the east, intending to escape 
to Princeton. The movement was detected, and Greene 
quickly threw out Hand's regiment of riflemen on his 
left flank as far as Assanpink Creek, cutting off all es- 
cape in that direction. Rail then called upon his gren- 

1 The monograph by W. S. Stryker on the Battles of Trenton and Prince- 
ton is of the same character as those of Frothingham and Johnston; and 
one general reference to it seems to be sufficient. 



NEW YORK 69 

adiers to follow him in attack at the head of King Street ; ms 
but he fell mortally wounded, and the rest thereupon 
surrendered. They numbered 32 officers and 886 men, 
and about 30 had been killed. The American loss was 
2 privates frozen to death during the night march and 
2 officers and 1 private wounded. 1 

Washington thought best not to push on immediately 
to Princeton (as it is said Greene and Knox advised), 2 
but to retire to the west bank of the river with his prison- 
ers, which he did the same evening. The Hessians who 
had escaped to Bordentown so alarmed Donop that he 
immediately retreated to Amboy, and Cadwalader, who 
had succeeded in crossing at Bristol, occupied Borden- Dec. 27 
town. He had with him about 1,800 militia, 3 and more 
were on their way to join him from Philadelphia, where 
they had been raised by the exertions of Mifflin. 

The terms of enlistment of Washington's entire force Washington 

T&kps the* 

expired in three days, but by promising them a bounty offensive 
of ten dollars in addition to their regular pay he per- 
suaded them to remain six weeks longer. He then wrote 4 
to the commanding officer at Morristown authorizing 
him to make the same arrangements with the four regi- 
ments at that place, and to Heath 5 at Peekskill instructing 
him to march to Morristown, as he was satisfied that Howe 
would not attempt anything against the Highlands in 
the dead of winter. He then made his plans to take the 
offensive — a most daring plan considering the weather, 
his deficiency in equipment and transportation, the ab- 
sence of any cavalry in his command and the fact that 
the enemy largely outnumbered him and was composed 

1 Sparks, IV, 247. 2 G. W. Greene, I, 300. 

3 Dawson, 204; Sparks, IV, 255. l Sparks, IV, 253. 

6 Ibid., IV, 249. 



70 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1776 of regular troops. Washington recrossed the Delaware, 
Dec. 30 the operation requiring two days, owing to the large 
Dec. 31 masses of floating ice in the river. At the same time he 

ordered Mifflin 1 and Cadwalader, whose combined forces 
of militia now amounted to 3,600 men, to join him, and 
he took a position on the hills behind Assanpink Creek, 
just east of Trenton, facing west. 

1777 Cornwallis, as soon as he heard of the affair at Trenton, 
Jan. 2 abandoned his idea of a leave and hastened back to his 

main command at Brunswick. 2 He immediately pushed 
forward toward Trenton, and with the greater part of his 

Jan. 2, force, probably 6,000 men, arrived in front of the Assan- 

pink position. There was a vigorous cannonade on both 
sides, but the creek was not fordable, the bridge was 
well guarded and the day was near its close. Cornwallis 
decided to postpone his attack until the next day, when 
two brigades which were bivouacking that night on the 
road between Princeton and Trenton would join him. 
As in the retreat from Long Island, so now in the advance 
to Princeton, Washington displayed that marvellous ce- 
lerity which he always showed in a critical situation. At 
dusk he sent his baggage down the river to Burlington; 
large camp-fires were lighted and kept burning all night, 
and by their light men could be seen working at the in- 
trenchments. At midnight his entire force withdrew, 

Battle of Sullivan in the lead, and making a wide detour to the 
east, marching about eleven miles during the night, early 
in the morning he struck Colonel Mawhood's brigade of 
three regiments, on the road just south of Princeton. 3 
They had broken camp and were just starting for Tren- 

jan. 3 ton to join Cornwallis. Mawhood turned his leading 

1 Sparks, IV, 258. 2 Howe's Report, Dawson, 210. 

3 Sparks, IV, 259. 



NEW YORK 71 

regiment (17th) and made a violent attack upon Mer- 1777 
cer's brigade, which was at the head of Sullivan's col- 
umn. After the first discharge of guns on both sides 
the British charged with the bayonet, and as few of Mer- 
cer's men had any bayonets, they fell back in some con- 
fusion. Then, as at Kip's Bay, Washington rushed into 
the thick of the fight, and this time he succeeded in ral- 
lying the fugitives. 1 It was a fight at very close quar- 
ters for about fifteen minutes; General Mercer, Colonels 
Haslet and Potter, and several other officers were killed. 
Washington escaped unharmed, and bringing up Hand's 
and Hitchcock's and Poor's and Patterson's and Reed's 
regiments, all veterans of every engagement since Bunker 
Hill, he overpowered the 17th Regiment. After losing 
nearly half its strength, 2 the rest of this regiment fought 
its way through to the road leading south toward 
Trenton and escaped. The other two regiments, 40th 
and 55th, were thus cut off from the 17th and from 
their brigade commander. They made a stout resist- 
ance; but Washington, bringing up his entire strength, 
drove them back through the village and the college 
grounds at Princeton to and across a small stream 
called Millstone River. They continued their retreat to 
Brunswick; while Washington after giving a few hours' 
rest to his men, who had been marching and fighting for 
nearly forty continuous hours, turned to the left and 
marched a few miles up the river and halted for the night. 3 
Cornwallis had discovered early in the morning that 
Washington had evacuated his lines at Trenton, and he 
turned back on the same road over which he had ad- 
vanced on the previous day, and marched rapidly toward 

1 Marshall, I, 132; Lossing, II, 32. 

2 Howe's Report; Dawson, 211. 3 Sparks, IV, 261. 



72 



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 



1777 



Jan. 4 



Jan. 7 



Washington 
Arrives at 
Morristown 



Howe 
Withdraws 
from New 
Jersey 



Princeton. Washington had not neglected to destroy 
the bridges over Stony Creek and Millstone River, 
and Cornwallis was delayed so long in repairing these 
that the whole day was spent in covering the ten miles 
to Princeton. The next day Washington marched seven- 
teen miles in the direction of Morristown, crossing the 
Raritan near Bound Brook, and selecting a good position 
for the night in the hills near Pluckamin. Remaining 
there two days, he marched to Morristown and went into 
winter quarters with the troops already there, and with 
Heath's troops from the Highlands and Lincoln's militia 
from New England, who soon joined him. 1 Cornwallis 
did not follow or molest him either at Pluckamin or 
Morristown. On the contrary, Washington sent out de- 
tachments which had skirmishes with convoys on the 
lines of communication of both the British and Hessians, 
in which they were successful. Howe was apparently so 
stupefied at Washington's audacity that he withdrew 
entirely from Jersey, except for a few miles along the 
Raritan from Brunswick to Amboy, and made no move- 
ments of any importance for nearly six months. 

Washington's losses at Princeton were never accurately 
reported, but they included 10 officers, most of them of 
high rank, and 30 men killed, and probably 100 wounded. 2 
Howe reported 3 his loss at 19 killed, 58 wounded and 1,000 
missing; but of the latter about 100 were killed and 300 
or more subsequently found their regiments — so that his 
actual loss was probably about 700, or five times as great 
as Washington's. 

To military students no page in history is more inter- 
esting, more worthy of study in every detail, than that 

1 Sparks, IV, 264, 272. J Dawson, 208. 

3 Howe's Report, Dawson, 208; Stryker, 458. 



NEW YORK 73 

which records the events of those fourteen days in Jersey, 1777 
from Christmas, 1776, to Wednesday, January 7, 1777. 
Washington had in very truth "snatched victory out of Results of 
the jaws of defeat." The planning of such an audacious Princeton 11 
stroke, the skill with which every feature of it was exe- 
cuted with ill-trained, half-clad, and barefooted troops, 
the personal gallantry of the commanding general at a 
critical moment — all denote the great soldier. Wash- 
ington's reckless exposure in the hand-to-hand encoun- 
ter on Stony Creek was on a par with that of Napoleon 
at Lodi and of Skobeleff at Plevna; it was designed with 
the same purpose, and it produced the same effect, of 
endearing him to his men. 

The astounding but well-deserved results of the whole 
movement at once and forever established Washington's 
reputation as a soldier. 1 

1 Lossing makes the statement (II, 33) that Frederick the Great said: 
"The achievements of Washington and his little band of compatriots be- 
tween the 25th of December and the 4th of January, a space of ten 
days, were the most brilliant of any recorded in the annals of military 
achievements." Stryker copies this (p. 464) but without giving any 
authority. 

There is also a mythical story, widely believed, that Frederick sent a 
sword to Washington with an inscription engraved upon it, " From the old- 
est soldier in Europe to the greatest soldier in the world." 

Both stories are entirely without foundation. They have been exhaust- 
ively examined and disproved by the State Historian of New York (Preface 
to New York and the War with Spain, 1903), Moncure D. Conway (Cen- 
tury Magazine, April, 1901), Leland Haworth (American Historical Re- 
view for April, 1904, IX, 460-478), Edward J. Lowell (Hessians, 53-55). 
These researches prove that Frederick, while despising his relatives for 
selling their subjects "to the English as one sells cattle to be dragged to 
the shambles," showed no sympathy for the Americans in their struggle, 
and expressed no opinion about Washington. In a letter, dated June 23, 
1777, to his brother, Prince Henry, he said, "I purpose to draw out this 
negotiation [with the American agent, Arthur Lee] in order to fall in with 
the side for which Fortune shall declare herself " (Amer. Hist. Rev., IX, 
466). 



74 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1777 Nor were the political effects less important. It not 

only stopped all of Howe's operations for six months, but 
it laid the foundation for the French alliance. 



CHAPTER III 
PHILADELPHIA 

From his position at Morristown, Washington threat- 1777 
ened Howe's flank in case the latter moved either toward Advantages of 
Philadelphia or up the Hudson. His own communica- Positional 

' . . . Morristown 

tions were open via Peekskill to New England and via 
Trenton to Philadelphia. He continued during the winter 
to send out small parties to harass the British troops on 
the Raritan and prevent their obtaining supplies, so that 
speedily Howe and his staff as well as his soldiers, al- 
though in possession of the best harbor and one of the 
largest cities on the Atlantic coast, were reduced to the 
salt provisions that they obtained from England. 

Washington then addressed himself to the annual task Raising a 

... t> 1 ' i /-* 1 «j i New Army 

of raising a new army, for which Congress by its resolu- 
tion 1 at Baltimore had given him practically unlimited 
powers. In spite of extraordinary energy on Washing- 1775 
ton's part, recruits came in slowly. The 88 battalions Dec. 27 
authorized by one resolution 2 and the 16 battalions of sept, is 
infantry, 3 regiments of artillery and 3,000 light horse 
authorized by another, 3 amounted in all to nearly 76,000 Dec. 27 
men. Months after these resolutions had passed Wash- 1777 
ington reported to Congress 4 that his force in Jersey was March 14 
less than 3,000 fit for duty, all but 981 of whom were 

1 Jour. Cont. Cong., VII, 1043-1046; Sparks, IV, 550. 

* Jour. Cont. Cong., V, 762. 

8 Jour. Cont. Cong., VII, 1043-1046; Sparks, IV, 550. 

* Sparks, IV, 364. 

75 



76 



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 



1777 



May 24 



Howe's Plans 



1776 

Nov. 30 



militia. About 1,000 at a time were being passed through 
the hospitals for inoculation against small-pox, for 
Washington had wisely determined that his army should 
not be destroyed, as the army in Canada had practically 
been, by that dreaded disease. Later on, however, the 
new regiments began to come forward, and he had 43 
regiments, from New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, 
Maryland and Virginia. They were organized into 10 
brigades and 5 divisions, under Sullivan, Greene, Stirling, 
Stephen and Lincoln. They numbered 8,378 officers 
and men. 1 Other regiments, from New York and New 
England, were assembled under Putnam at Peekskill, 
whence they could move toward Albany or Morristown, 
as circumstances might require. 

The difficulty about arms, which at one time was very 
serious, because the men as their enlistments expired 
carried their guns home with them and refused to give 
them up, had been fortunately solved by the arrival of 
vessels from France bringing 23,000 muskets 2 and 1,000 
barrels of powder, in addition to blankets and other 
military stores. 

As the months wore along Washington gave incessant 
thought to what Howe's plans would probably be; and 
he was convinced that Howe would bring the troops from 
the St. Lawrence to join him at New York, attack Wash- 
ington with all his strength, and if he succeeded push on 
to Philadelphia. 

While this was obviously the proper military plan for 
Howe to follow, yet Howe had different ideas in mind. 
He conveyed these to Lord George Germain in a long 
letter, which expressed the "hope of finishing the war in 
one year." He assumed that the army in Canada would 

1 Sparks, IV, 432; Marshall, I, 145. 2 Sparks, IV, 338, 375. 



awwWLss 




PHILADELPHIA 77 

advance against Albany, and for his own troops he pro- 1776 
posed the following: * "1st, an offensive army of 10,000 
men," to move from Providence and attack Boston; 
"2d, an offensive army of 10,000 men," to move up the 
Hudson to Albany, leaving 5,000 to defend New York; 
"3d, a defensive army of 8,000 men," to be stationed in 
Jersey. After the movements against Boston and Albany 
had succeeded the entire force was to be united in Jersey 
for an attack on Philadelphia — the campaign to end the 
following winter in Virginia and the Carolinas. To carry 
out this programme he asked for 10 additional ships of 
the line, and reinforcements of 15,000 more troops, sug- 
gesting that they might "be had from Russia or from 
Hanover, and other German states." 

A few weeks later Howe modified his views, and wrote Dec 20 
to Germain 2 saying that sentiment was changed in Penn- 
sylvania, that the people were anxious for peace; he 
therefore proposed to abandon the operations against 
Boston and Albany; to leave 2,000 men in Newport, 
4,000 men at New York, 3,000 on the Hudson, and with 
his main body of 10,000 effectives to act offensively in 
Jersey and take Philadelphia. Charles Lee had been a 
prisoner in Howe's hands for five days prior to the date 
of this despatch. Under the threat of being treated as a 
deserter, he had told Howe all he knew — and more. The 
news of the alleged change of sentiment in Pennsylvania 
quite probably came from him. 

When these despatches reached London, Burgoyne was 
again there on leave of absence, and he offered his advice. 
His plan 3 was for a movement across Lake Champlain; 

Howe's Narrative, 9; Amer. Archives, 5, III, 926. 

2 Howe's Narrative, 10, 11; Amer. Archives, 5, III, 1317. 

3 Burgoyne, Appendix, iii-xii. 



78 



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 



Feb. 28 

Burgoyne's 
Plan 



1777 a movement from Oswego across Oneida Lake and down 
the Mohawk River; and a movement up the Hudson — 
all three to be directed against Albany. This plan was 
submitted to King George, who wrote on it an endorse- 
ment in his own hand, 1 giving it his general approval; 
he rejected the suggestion that the troops in Canada 
might be brought to join Howe at New York, saying, "I 
greatly dislike that idea"; he also said explicitly : "The 
force from Canada must join him (Howe) at Albany." 2 
This plan was therefore the one adopted so far as the 
London authorities were concerned; Burgoyne was 
selected to command the two expeditions from Canada; 
March 27 and he left London, carrying a despatch to Sir Guy 
Carleton, 3 the Governor of Canada, to that effect. No 
definite instructions were sent to Howe, but he was in- 
MarchQ formed by a despatch, 4 which reached him before the 

orders were given to Burgoyne, that it was not thought 
necessary to send him so large a reinforcement as 15,000 
men; that a smaller number would be sent; and no 
objection was made to his plan to proceed against 
Philadelphia. 

Howe's despatch of December 20 (above quoted) had 
stated his intention to attack Philadelphia by the direct 
route through Jersey; but later he changed his mind and 
April 2 devised a third plan. He outlined this in a confidential 

despatch 5 to Germain, written four days after Charles Lee 
had put in his hand a written memorandum of the con- 
March 29 ditions as Lee thought they existed in the Central and 
Southern States, and a plan of campaign based on these 

1 The King's endorsement in full is given in Fonblanque's Burgoyne, 487. 

1 Ibid. 

3 Germain to Carleton, Burgoyne, Appendix, xii-xvii. 

* Germain to Howe, Howe's Narrative, 12. 

5 Howe to Germain, Ibid., 13. 



PHILADELPHIA 79 

assumptions. Lee argued ' that there was a strong tory 1777 
sentiment in Pennsylvania and Maryland, and that the Lee's pian 
proper line of attack upon Philadelphia was by way 
of the Chesapeake. While this written proposition of 
Lee's, as previously stated, never came to light until 
eighty years afterward, and was not referred to in any 
way by Howe, it seems to have been the basis of the plan 
which he adopted. 

The extraordinary spectacle was thus presented of a 
subordinate general going to London and getting the 
King's approval to one plan of campaign; of the King's 
minister sending full instructions to one general and none 
to the other who was to co-operate with him; and of this 
other general making his own independent plan on the 
advice of a prisoner, who had turned traitor to the coun- 
try whose uniform he then wore. This confusion of 
plans led to the complete surrender of one British army, 
and the ultimate failure of the other; it was a factor of 
the highest importance in the ultimate success of the 
American cause. 

The military situation was, in a striking degree, similar Military suua- 
to that in front of Washington eignty-nve years later. Beginning of 
When McClellan left Johnston at Manassas and went by 
a circuitous route to the Peninsula he found Johnston 
facing him on his arrival ; and when Howe left Washing- 
ton in Jersey and travelled 400 miles to the Head of Elk 
he found Washington drawn up to meet him. At the 
Head of Elk, Howe was 70 miles from Philadelphia, 
whereas he had been only 60 miles from it at Bruns- 
wick; and the same enemy and same commander op- 
posed him, after he had consumed two months of the 
best season of the year in making the change. Had 

1 Moore, 88-89. 



the Year 



80 



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 



1777 



April 24 

Raid into 
Connecticut 



Washington 
Moves to 
Middlebrook 



May 29 



Howe adopted a plan similar to that of Grant's in 1864, 
and insisted on the troops in Canada being sent to join 
him at New York; and with the combined force of nearly 
35,000 regulars had he attacked Washington's 8,000 
newly raised Continentals with the same fierceness that 
was shown in the Wilderness, it hardly seems possible 
that Washington, fertile as he was in resources, could 
have saved the Revolution from being crushed in the 
spring of 1777. But, as stated on a previous page, 
Howe never recovered from the mental paralysis which 
he received at Bunker Hill. 

While Washington was at Morristown, keenly watching 
for every move of his adversary, Howe made a raid into 
Connecticut. Governor Tryon (tory governor of New 
York) with 2,000 men landed at Fairfield, marched up to 
Danbury, destroyed a large amount of stores which the 
Americans could ill afford to lose, encountered the mili- 
tia under Arnold and Wooster in a sharp engagement 
at Ridgefield (in which Wooster was mortally wounded) 
and then returned to New York. This raid had no 
effect on the campaign, and it cost the British a loss of 
about 200 in killed and wounded. 1 

Washington meanwhile kept his eye unceasingly on 
Howe, and being more than ever convinced that the 
latter would move toward Philadelphia, he broke up his 
camp at Morristown and moved about twenty miles 
south to the Raritan River, so as to be nearer Howe's 
line of march. Here he occupied a strong position, 
which Greene had selected, on the heights of Middle- 
brook, just back of Bound Brook, about ten miles from 
Brunswick. His right under Sullivan was sent out as 
far as Princeton. Then followed two months of extremely 

Dawson, 213-219; Sparks, IV, 404-406. 



Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company, 
Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio 




From Avery's History of the United States 
ami Its People 




|l|S L A. N D M"" / 

Huntington / 

THE M.-N. WORKS 73 :iO S/ ' , 

Danbury Raid 
April 25-26, 1777 



Fort Washington 
Nov. 16, 1*76 



in 



PHILADELPHIA 81 

interesting manoeuvres, carried out on both sides with 1777 
excellent skill. First, Howe tried to manoeuvre Wash- Howes 

ington out of the strong Middlebrook position, and get 

1.1 .11 fiii June 13 

him down in the lower open country where he could at- June 22 

tack him to better advantage. He therefore crossed the 
Raritan with about 10,000 men and placed himself be- 
tween Washington and Princeton — on the road to Phila- 
delphia. Washington did not leave his position. He 
doubted, as he wrote Schuyler, 1 whether this was "a June 16 
real move toward Philadelphia"; if it should so prove, 
he intended to let Howe get as far as the Delaware, 
where he would meet with opposition fro: the militia 
in his front, and then follow rapidly, cut his communica- 
tions and attack his rear. Washington having correctly 
interpreted Howe's first move, it failed. 2 

Howe's second move was somewhat more successful. June 23 
He retreated suddenly to Amboy, hoping thus to tempt Howe's second 
Washington out of his strong position, and then turn 
sharply and attack him. The bait was too tempting; 
Washington sent Greene with three brigades in pur- 
suit, and himself followed Greene with his entire force. 
Greene did not advance more than five miles beyond 
Brunswick, not wishing to get too far from the main 
body, but Stirling on his left advanced almost to Staten 
Island Sound. 3 

Then Howe made his third manoeuvre. He had taken Howe's Third 
part of his troops across to Staten Island; he now sud- 
denly recrossed the Kills, drove Stirling back in some 
confusion, and marched rapidly to Westfield, several 
miles west of Rah way. He was thus on Washington's 
left flank, threatening his communications with the Hud- 
son. He hoped that Washington would attack; but 

1 Sparks, IV, 462. 2 Ibid, IV, 469. s Ibid., IV, 470, 473. 



82 



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 



1777 



June 30 



Howe Sails 
lor the 
Chesapeake 



July 7 
July 21 



July 24 



Washington 

Marches 

Southward 



Washington returned quickly with his whole force to the 
Middlebrook lines. 1 

The third manoeuvre having thus failed, Howe re- 
turned to Staten Island, put his troops on board trans- 
ports and men-of-war, 228 in number, and proceeded to 
carry out his main purpose of transporting his army to 
the south of Philadelphia. 

Washington knew that the troops were on board and 
that the ships had dropped down to the lower bay; 2 but 
he could not learn positively that they had sailed. At 
the same time came reports from Schuyler at Albany 
and Putnam at Peekskill which led him to believe that 
Howe intended to move up the Hudson. Burgoyne had 
crossed Lake Champlain, captured Crown Point and 
Ticonderoga and was advancing rapidly on Albany. It 
might be that Howe would suddenly bring his ships back 
from the lower bay or from outside and sail up the Hudson 
to join Burgoyne at Albany. Washington therefore or- 
dered Putnam to send two brigades to reinforce Schuyler, 
made arrangements to collect shipping to move his own 
troops up the Hudson, if necessary, and marched in that 
direction himself; first to Morristown, then to Ramapo 
and then to the Clove (near Haverstraw Bay), and he 
sent two divisions (Sullivan's and Stirling's) to cross the 
Hudson at Peekskill. After being three days in the Clove 
he received positive information that Howe's fleet had 
gone to sea. He rightly surmised that their destination 
was the Delaware, and he promptly put his army in 
motion to the southward, recalling Sullivan and Stirling 
to Morristown. The new battalions had been gradually 

1 Sparks, IV, 475. 

2 Washington's despatches to the President of Congress and others de- 
scribing his perplexities during these anxious seven weeks are given in 
Sparks, IV, 479-505; V, 1-44. 



PHILADELPHIA 83 

filling up and his force numbered now about 14,000 1777 
men. 1 

When Washington reached the Delaware River he juiy3o 
halted until he should hear of Howe's arrival in the Del- 
aware Bay. News of this came the next day, and he 
resumed his march to the south, pushing on himself as Jui y 31 
far as Chester, to reconnoitre. There he learned that Aug. 1 
Howe's fleet had remained only a day in the Delaware 
and had put to sea again. He halted the army in the 
vicinity of Philadelphia, and ordered Sullivan's and Stir- 
ling's division (which had remained at Morristown) to 
march back to Peekskill. Nothing was heard of Howe's 
fleet for three weeks. During this time Washington had 
moved northward again to the vicinity of the Delaware; 
and a council of war was unanimously of opinion that Aug. 21 
Howe had gone south to Charleston, that it would be 
useless to follow him there, and the army should move to 
the North River, with a view possibly to its marching to 
Albany. But the next day came authentic information Aug. 22 
that Howe's fleet was at anchor in the Chesapeake. 2 
Washington put his troops, " harassed by marching and Washington 
countermarching," as he wrote to his brother, 3 again in through 
motion to the southward; marched through Philadelphia 
with colors flying and drums beating on a Sunday morn- Aug. 24 
ing, exciting no little admiration and animating the 
militia to turn out, and reached Wilmington the follow- Aug. 25 
ing day. Taking Greene and Lafayette (who had just Howe's Army 

i <• -n . , , Lands at Head 

arrived from r ranee, been commissioned a major-general, of Eik 

1 Lossing, I, 331. 

2 Howe embarked his troops (18,000 in all) July 5, sailed July 23, 
reached the capes of the Delaware July 30, sailed from there the same 
day, passed the capes of the Chesapeake August 16, and landed at Head 
of Elk August 25. Howe's Narrative, 23, 24. 

3 See foot-note 2, previous page. 



84 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1777 although a few days less than twenty years old, and 
joined the army) and a small escort, Washington rode 
forward nearly twenty miles on a personal reconnoissance, 
and from a high hill near the Head of Elk saw the British 
camp. He decided to post his army behind a small creek 
about eight miles south of Wilmington and accept bat- 
tle. Howe, after making a feint against this position, 

se P t. 8 moved past Washington's right flank with the intention 

of crossing the Brandywine, 1 seizing the high ground be- 
hind the Brandywine and cutting off Washington's com- 
munications with Philadelphia or forcing him to fight at 
a disadvantage. But Washington promptly detected the 
movement, 2 retreated to Wilmington, crossed the Brandy- 
wine, and marching twelve miles up its eastern bank 

sept. io took position at Chad's Ford. Greene with his own 

division and two other brigades was in the centre, op- 
posite the ford; Sullivan with his division and those of 
Stirling and Stephen was posted about two miles up the 
creek with instructions to guard the fords as far as the 
forks of the Brandywine; and Armstrong, with the 
Pennsylvania militia, guarded the fords on Greene's left. 
The total force was about 11,000 men. 3 

sept, io On the same evening Howe halted at Kenneth Square, 

about eight miles south of Chad's Ford. 

Howe's pian Howe's plan for the ensuing battle was substantially 
the same as at Brooklyn, and if Washington had not been 
present in person, with Greene at hand to carry out his 
orders, it would probably have succeeded. He directed 
the Hessians to advance to Chad's Ford and make a 
feint of attacking there, while the larger part of his army 
under Cornwallis was to march up the Brandywine, 

1 The Brandywine empties into the Delaware at Wilmington. 

2 Sparks, V, 56. s Dawson, 278. 




Brandvwine 
Sept. ii, 1777 




Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company 
Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio 



From Avery's History of the United States 
and Its People 



Fort Mercer, Oct. 22, Nov. 20, and Fort Mifflin, Nov. 15, 1777 



PHILADELPHIA 85 

cross the stream at the forks and come down in rear of 1777 
the American position. 1 

Howe's army moved at daybreak. Knyphausen with sept. 11 
his Hessians and two British brigades, about 5,000 men 
in all, marched on the direct road to Chad's Ford, arriving Battle of the 
there about 10 A. m. He drove back the American out- 
posts and carried on quite an active artillery duel with 
Greene's batteries posted on the heights behind the ford; 
Cornwallis with the greater part of the British troops and 
some Hessians, about 10,000 men all told, marched twelve 
miles up the Brandywine, crossed the forks, and then 
turning southward came squarely in rear of Sullivan's 
division, posted behind Jones's Ford, almost without 
firing a shot. 2 In the four hours which had elapsed since 
Knyphausen began skirmishing at Chad's Ford, Sullivan 
had received from his "light parties" and had transmitted 
to Washington contradictory information concerning the 
enemy's movements. The first report 3 was that a large 
body of the enemy was marching to the westward a few 
miles from the Brandywine; Washington immediately 
ordered Sullivan to cross the creek and attack that body 
in flank, while he in person joined Greene and made 
preparations to cross above Chad's Ford and cut off 
Knyphausen from the rest of Howe's army. Before 
these plans could be carried into effect, Sullivan received 
word from a scouting party at the forks of the Bran- 
dywine that there was no appearance of the enemy 
in that neighborhood. He thereupon discontinued his 
movement, and so reported to Washington, who coun- 

1 Howe's Report, Dawson, 281. 

2 Ibid., 282. 

3 Sullivan was much criticised for his conduct at the Brandywine. His 
defence, accompanied by copies of the reports from the " light parties," is 
given in full in Sparks, V, 456-463. 



11 A. M. 



86 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1777 termanded the orders to Greene. Later came a definite 
M . report that the British could be plainly seen forming on 

Osborne's Hill, about a mile or more in rear of Sullivan 
and to his right. Sullivan promptly withdrew his divi- 
sion from the creek, changed front to the right and 
formed line across the main road at the Birmingham 
meeting-house. His troops were hardly in position when 
Cornwallis attacked him with great violence. The fight- 
ing around the stone meeting-house (which is still stand- 
ing) was very fierce. Sullivan was greatly outnumbered, 
and his three divisions in succession gave way, Stirling 
making the most stubborn resistance. Finally both 
were overwhelmed, and the retreat became a rout. Two 
of Sullivan's aides were wounded, and Lafayette got a 
bullet hole in his leg which laid him up for several weeks. 1 
Washington had meanwhile received the report from 
Sullivan 2 of the appearance of the British in his rear; 
he ordered Greene to leave Wayne to defend Chad's 
Ford, and with his other brigades (Muhlenberg's and 
Weedon's) to go to Sullivan's assistance. Greene lost no 
time, and marching his men four miles in forty-five min- 
utes, 3 he formed a line in rear of Sullivan's retreating 
M . troops, opened his ranks to allow them to pass through 

and then opposed the British with such vigor as to halt 
their advance. His position was a strong one, on both 
sides of a narrow pass in the road, and flanked by thick 
woods. Repeated attacks were made by the British, 
but they could not dislodge him, and Greene still held 
the position when night put an end to the firing. Mean- 

1 Many of the houses on the Brandywine battle-field are still standing 
(1911) just as they were at the time of the battle; and the Pennsylvania 
Historical Society has erected sign-posts indicating the movements of the 
troops as well as the spot where Lafayette was wounded. 

2 See foot note 3, previous page. 3 G. W. Greene, I, 449. 



PHILADELPHIA 87 

while, Wayne, with his small force, was unable to resist 1777 
the advance of Knyphausen; the latter had crossed 
Chad's Ford as soon as Greene's main body had gone to 
Sullivan's aid. Wayne effected his retreat behind the 
rear of Greene's line and gained the road to Chester. 
During the night Greene retreated in good order and sept. 12 
without molestation. In the morning the army was as- 
sembled at Chester and marched to Germantown. 

The British losses were officially reported as 90 killed, 
480 wounded and 6 missing. 1 The Americans left their 
dead and wounded on the field, and no accurate report 
of them was ever made. Their loss was estimated at 300 
killed and 600 wounded. 2 

In this battle Washington had about 11,000 present 
and Howe between 15,000 and 18,000. 3 The disparity 
in discipline, arms and equipment was even greater. It 
has been often questioned whether Washington was justi- 
fied in fighting a battle under these adverse conditions. 
On the other hand there can be no doubt that public 
opinion, in and out of Congress, imperatively demanded 
it; and had Washington retreated without a battle the 
effect would have been more disastrous than the defeat. 
It was indeed a defeat, but Washington saved it from 
being a rout. 

Neither the army nor its commander was discouraged. 
After giving his men only one day's rest at Germantown, 
Washington boldly crossed the Schuylkill with the in- 
tent of attacking Howe, who had slowly followed him. 
The two armies met at Warwick Tavern, about twenty se P t. 16 
miles west of Philadelphia and fifteen miles from Chad's 
Ford. The battle did not take place. Something hap- 

1 Howe's Report, Dawson, 278. 

1 Marshall's Washington, I, 158. » Lossing, II, 170, 178. 



88 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1777 pened of a nature which military commanders no longer 
have to take into account in making their plans. The 
ammunition in Washington's army, and a large part 
of that in Howe's, was totally ruined ' by a violent rain 
storm, which continued unabated during the greater 
part of two days. Washington had no recourse but to 
retreat across the Schuylkill near Perkiomen, where fresh 
supplies could be obtained. During this retreat the so- 

paoii Massacre called "Paoli massacre " occurred. Wayne's division, 
which constituted the rear guard, was encamped for the 

sept. 21. night at Paoli Tavern. He was attacked by three regi- 
ments under General Grey, 2 who reached Wayne's camp 
without firing a shot, and used the bayonet so effectively 
that they claimed to have killed and wounded 300 men 
and to have taken between 70 and 80 prisoners, with a 
loss on their own side of only 4 killed and 4 wounded. 3 
Wayne managed to extricate the rest of his division 
and retreat to Chester. He was court-martialled but 
acquitted. 4 

Howe captures After this affair Howe manoeuvred against Wash- 
ington's right flank, causing him to move farther up 
the Schuylkill; and then, suddenly countermarching, he 
crossed the Schuylkill at Sweed's Ford (Norristown) and 
placed himself between Washington and Philadelphia. 
Washington was not in condition to give battle, and 

sept. 25 Howe marched down the Schuylkill and took possession 

of Philadelphia, encamping the bulk of his troops at 
Germantown. As soon as Washington had obtained 
fresh ammunition he followed Howe and went into camp 

1 Sparks, V, 66. 

2 Great-grandfather of Earl Grey, at present (1911) Governor-General 
of Canada. 

s Howe's Report, Dawson, 317. 
4 Sparks, V, 166; Dawson, 315. 



PHILADELPHIA 89 

on Skippack Creek, about twenty miles from German- 1777 
town. 1 

In a campaign of thirty-two days since landing at the Results of the 
Head of Elk, Howe had met and defeated his enemy and 
gained possession of their capital, the Congress adjourn- 
ing to York. He had a superiority in numbers and im- 
mense advantage in munitions and supplies. His move- 
ments were well conducted, but they lacked the final 
element of success; he had not destroyed his adver- 
sary's army. This army, in fact, speedily came forward 
to attack him, on a bold and hazardous plan, which came 
surprisingly near to success. 

Upon taking possession of Philadelphia, Howe posted 2 Howe's 

• i l v fjioiii Position at 

the greater part of his army along the line 01 the school Germantown 
House Lane, which ran through the market square of the 
village of Germantown, about seven miles from Phila- 
delphia. At the market it intersected the road (Ger- 
mantown Avenue) which led from Philadelphia through 
Chestnut Hill to the open country on the north-west, and 
along which for nearly two miles stretched the ancient 
village of Germantown. Howe's line was about three 
miles long, his left on the Schuylkill, his centre at the 
market, and his right on a small stream about a mile to 
the north of the market. In front of a large part of his 
line was the precipitous gorge of the Wissahickon, nearly 
200 feet deep. His outposts were about two miles in ad- 
vance, at the end of the village toward Chestnut Hill. His 
force numbered about9,000men, 3 and he had3,000or more 
in Philadelphia. The rest of his army had been detached 
across the Delaware River in Jersey, and on learning this 
Washington deemed the moment auspicious for attack. 4 

1 Sparks, V, 73, 77; Dawson, 318. 2 Howe's Report, Dawson, 330. 

s Lossing, 11. 4 Sparks, V, 78. 



Plan 



Plan of Attack 



90 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1777 His plan was somewhat similar to that which had suc- 

washington-s ceeded so well at Trenton. Leaving his camp on Skip- 
pack Creek, nearly twenty miles from the Germantown 
market, one column under Sullivan, consisting of his own 
and Wayne's divisions flanked by Conway's brigade, 

Washington's was to f ollow the main road and attack the British left ; 
another column under Greene, with his own and Stephen's 
divisions flanked by McDougalPs brigade, was to make a 
devour by the Lime-kiln road and strike the British right 
beyond the market; the Pennsylvania militia under 
Armstrong was to follow the Manatawny road, on the 
ridge between the Schuylkill and Wissahickon, and cross- 
ing the Wissahickon at its mouth to get in rear of the 
British left; the Maryland and Jersey militia under Small- 
wood and Forman were to follow the York road, a mile 
or more on Greene's left, and fall upon the rear of their 
right. Stirling's division formed the reserve, following 
Sullivan on the main road through Chestnut Hill. Wash- 
ington in person was with Sullivan's column. His entire 
force, including some troops recently arrived from Peeks- 
kill, numbered only 8,000 Continentals and 3,000 militia. 
The four columns were to march all night on separate 
roads covering a width of about seven miles, separated 
by broken country and deep ravines. These columns 
were to converge at daylight and simultaneously attack. 
It was indeed a bold plan. 

oct. 3, Leaving their camps at dusk the night march was car- 

ried out as directed, and about sunrise the next morning 
Conway's brigade passed over Chestnut Hill, and drove in 
the British pickets at Mount Airy. 1 These fell back on 

Battle of their supports, consisting of a battalion of light infantry 
and the 40th Regiment. Colonel Musgrave then placed 

1 Sparks, V, 78. 



7 P. M 

Oct. 4 



Germantown 



PHILADELPHIA 91 

five companies of the latter regiment in a strong stone 1777 
house belonging to Chief- Justice Chew. 1 They barricaded 
the doors, and firing through the windows they resisted 
every effort to dislodge them by infantry and artillery. 
They held this position throughout the entire battle. 

Finding it impossible to capture this house, Sullivan 
pushed on, dividing his command, his own division on the 
right of the road and Wayne's on the left. The British 
contested every wall and garden, but were slowly forced 
back toward the market. The Pennsylvania militia, in- 
stead of gaining the rear of the British left, did not cross 
the Wissahickon, but contented themselves with firing a 
few shots across the ravine and then retreated. Nash's 
brigade from Stirling's division was then sent to protect 
Sullivan's right. The Maryland and Jersey militia did 
not come into action at all. 2 

The battle had been in progress for about three-quarters 
of an hour before Greene arrived on the left. He had a 
longer road to march than Sullivan, his guide lost his 
way, and when day broke there was a heavy fog which 
soon became so dense that it was impossible to see more 
than a few yards. 3 When he did come into action, 
Stephen's division on the right of the Lime-kiln road 
fired into Wayne's division, mistaking them for the enemy 
in the fog. This caused confusion and led to the retreat 
of both divisions, uncovering Sullivan's left and Greene's 
right flank. The battle, however, continued for nearly 
two hours longer; Greene fighting his way along the 
Lime-kiln road and driving the British back until he 
reached the market house; Sullivan doing the same on 

ir This house is still standing (1911) in excellent preservation; and, I 
believe, it is owned by the lineal descendants of Chief-Justice Chew. 
2 Lossing, II, 111. 3 Sparks, V, 79, 83, 102; Dawson, 328, 329. 



town Panic 



92 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1777 the right of the road from Chestnut Hill ; and Maxwell's 
brigade from the reserve was still firing on the Chew 
house, nearly two miles behind Sullivan. Cornwallis was 
hastening from Philadelphia with reinforcements; 1 Howe's 
main body had been driven through the entire length of 
the village, and it is said that he was making prepara- 
oct. 4, tions to retreat to Chester. 2 Then occurred one of those 

The German- panics 3 to which all armies are subject, and which are 
never explained. Possibly it was the fog; possibly the 
firing back at the Chew house which led the Americans 
to think that they were surrounded; possibly it was be- 
cause their ammunition was exhausted. Whatever the 
cause, the retreat began suddenly at all points on their 
line. Seeing this, General Grant, who commanded on 
the British right, rallied his disorganized troops and made 
a vigorous attack. In spite of the personal efforts of 
Washington, who was again in the midst of the fight, 4 the 
Americans gave way at all points and hastily retreated. 
By nightfall they reached their camps on Skippack Creek. 
They had saved all their artillery. Cornwallis had pur- 
sued them for five miles, skirmishing with the rear guard 
under Pulaski, and then abandoned the pursuit. 5 

Howe reported his losses as 535 killed, wounded and 
missing, of whom less than 100 were killed. The losses 
on the American side were stated by the Board of War to 
be 152 killed, 521 wounded and 400 missing. 6 General 
Agnew on the British and General Nash on the Ameri- 
can side were mortally wounded, and died a few days 
later. General Stephen was tried by court-martial for 

1 Howe's Report, Dawson, 330. 2 Sparks, V, 83. 

'Sparks, V, 79, 102; Dawson, 325. 

* Sullivan's letter, Sparks, V, 467. 

8 Sparks, V, 80; Wayne's letter, Dawson, 329. 

e Dawson, 324. 




Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company, 
Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio 



From Avery's History of the United States 
and Its People 



Germantown 
Oct. 4, 1777 



PHILADELPHIA 93 

"unofficer-like conduct" and intoxication, and was dis- 1777 
missed. 1 

Washington remained in the camp on Skippack Creek Oct. 29 
for three weeks and then moved eastward again to the 
hills near the village of Whitemarsh, about four miles 
from Chestnut Hill. Howe came out to attack him, but 
after an inconclusive skirmish he decided that Washing- Dec. 5 
ton's position was too strong. 2 He returned to Phila- Decs 
delphia and went into winter quarters. Soon after 
Washington selected the camp at Valley Forge, twenty- 
five miles up the Schuylkill from Philadelphia, and Dec 19 
moved his troops there. 3 

In the meantime Howe had gained possession of the Destruction of 
American forts on both sides of the Delaware near Phila- the Delaware 
delphia. These works consisted of one redoubt, Fort 
Mifflin, on the Pennsylvania side, just below the mouth 
of the Schuylkill; another, Fort Mercer, opposite to it, 
at Red Bank, on the Jersey shore ; and a third, at Billings- 
port, about three miles below, on the Jersey side. In 
addition to the redoubts, the channels of the river were 
obstructed by chevaux-de-frise. The redoubts were gar- 
risoned with infantry and artillery at the time of the 
battle of the Brandywine. 4 Immediately after that battle 
Earl Howe, 5 commanding the British fleet in America, 
sent some of his lighter vessels from the Chesapeake 
around into the Delaware. In co-operation with a British 
regiment sent across the river at Chester, they removed Oct. 6 
the obstructions and captured the garrison atBillingsport. 6 

The next attempt was made against Fort Mercer, and Fort Mercer 
here a gallant and successful defence was made. The 

1 Lossing, II, 114. 2 Dawson, 368-373. 

s Sparks, 522-525. 4 Dawson, 350; Lossing, II, 85-86. 

s Brother of General Howe. 6 Earl Howe's Report, Dawson, 357. 



94 



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 



1777 garrison consisted of two Rhode Island regiments under 
command of Colonel Christopher Greene. They num- 

22 bered not more than 400 men. They were attacked by 

Count Donop and 1,200 Hessians, who had crossed the 
river at Gloucester (just below Camden). These made 
a furious assault but were completely repulsed. Donop 
was mortally wounded, 10 other officers and 140 men 
were killed and wounded and about 200 were taken 
prisoners. The loss in the garrison was only 14 killed and 
23 wounded. 1 This brilliant defence brought the warm- 
est commendations and the present of a sword from Con- 
gress to Colonel Greene. 

Howe next turned his attention to Fort Mifflin. It was 
garrisoned by a Maryland regiment of 300 men under 
Colonel Smith, afterward reinforced by 150 Pennsylvania 
troops sent from Washington's camp. Instead of assault- 
ing this, Howe reduced it by artillery. He erected shore 
batteries with guns taken from his brother's fleet — four 
32-pounders, six 24-pounders and one 13-inch mortar. 
With these he kept up a vigorous cannonade for an entire 
day, inflicting heavy losses on the garrison. Next a 
combined land and naval attack was made, the shore 
batteries being reinforced by 6 men-of-war, carrying 191 
guns, besides smaller vessels. The redoubt was battered 
to pieces, about 250 of the garrison were killed and 
wounded (Colonel Smith being among the latter) and 
the rest made their escape during the night to Fort 
Mercer. 

Finally, Howe sent a strong force against Fort Mercer. 
It was commanded by Cornwallis and numbered about 
5,500 men. It crossed the Delaware at Chester and 
marched up the east bank of the river. The little gar- 

1 Report of Colonel Greene, Dawson, 355; Howe's report, Dawson, 356. 



PHILADELPHIA 95 

rison was unable to cope with an opposing force of this 1777 
magnitude and evacuated the fort. 1 Cornwallis took 
possession and dismantled it. Washington heard of this 
movement and immediately detached Greene 2 with his 
division to cross the river at Burlington and march down 
to the relief of Fort Mercer; but it was too late. The fort 
had been evacuated the day Greene left Whitemarsh. 
After some unimportant manoeuvring by Greene and 
Cornwallis, both returned to their respective camps. 3 

Howe was thus in possession of Philadelphia and in 
undisputed communication with his brother's fleet. His 
army remained there for seven months, absolutely inac- Nov., 1777, to 
tive, gradually deteriorating in discipline, its officers 
engaged in the Mischianza and other foolish gayeties. 
Meanwhile Washington and his half-clad soldiers were 
shivering and almost starving at Valley Forge. 

1 Washington's, Howe's and Earl Howe's Reports, Dawson, 364-367. 

2 Sparks, V, 167. 

» G. W. Greene, I, 518-533. 



CHAPTER IV 
THE HUDSON 

1776 While Howe had been carrying on his Philadelphia 
origin of the campaign, Burgoyne had advanced from Canada along 

the line of the Hudson, and had surrendered his entire 
army at Saratoga. 

The circumstances under which this campaign origi- 
nated, and the lack of co-operation between Howe and 
Burgoyne, have already been explained. 1 Briefly, Bur- 
goyne's plan contemplated a movement of tories and 
Indians from Oswego down the Mohawk Valley, and an 
advance of British regulars and Hessians from Montreal 
through Lake Champlain and the upper Hudson — both 
to unite at Albany, where Howe was to join him from 
New York. 2 No instructions having been sent to Howe, 3 
that part of the plan disappeared; the other two move- 
ments were undertaken. 

1777 The force detailed to Burgoyne consisted of 3 British 
July i brigades, 3 Hessian brigades, 38 pieces of light artillery 

and 10 pieces of siege artillery. They numbered 7,213 
rank and file. In addition there were 250 Canadians 
and 400 Indians; so that, counting the officers, Burgoyne 
had something over 8,000 men. The expedition from 
Oswego was commanded by Colonel St. Leger, and con- 
sisted of 900 Indians and 700 white men; the latter made 

1 Pp. 77-79, ante. 

3 Burgoyne, Appendix IV, 13. * P. 78, ante. 

96 



Port!-- 




Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company, Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio 
From Avery's History of the United States and Its People 



Arnold's Naval Engagement 



ion on 
the American 



THE HUDSON 97 

up of tories under Sir John Johnson, and detachments 1776 
from two regular regiments. 1 

On the American side, the "Northern Department" situat 
was still under the command of Schuyler. When Sullivan side' 
retreated from Montreal in the summer of 1776, Congress 
passed a resolution 2 directing Washington to send Gates 
to take command of the American forces in Canada. By 
the time Gates arrived the American forces were no June 17 
longer in Canada, but had been driven back to Crown 
Point and Ticonderoga. Gates interpreted his instruc- 
tions to give him independent command of the troops in 
the field, leaving Schuyler the nominal command of the 
department, but without any real authority. Schuyler 
submitted the question to Washington, asking the de- 
cision of Congress; and Congress decided that Gates was Relations be- 
not to be independent of Schuyler. 3 But their respective andGaLT 7 
functions were never clearly defined, and much friction 
resulted. 

There were no military movements in the Northern 
Department after Gates's arrival, except Arnold's brilliant 
naval battle on Lake Champlain, which, although fought Oct. 11 
by the army, was a naval engagement. When Washing- Oct. 13 
ton was hard pressed in New Jersey, Gates was ordered, 4 
with seven regiments, to join him; but on his arrival he Dec 20 
pleaded ill health and received leave to go to Philadelphia. 
He thus was not present at Trenton or Princeton, but 
spent the next few months in consultation with Congress. 

1 Burgoyne, 12-17; Appendix XI, 51. 

In 1780 Burgoyne defended himself before a committee of Parliament, 
and published a book entitled A State of the Expedition from Canada. 
It consisted of his narrative, the evidence and an appendix containing 
the official orders, reports, correspondence and returns. 

3 Jour. Cont. Cong., V, 448. 

3 Ibid., V, 526. 

1 Sparks, IV, 192, 216, 222. 



98 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1777 That body passed a resolution 1 desiring him to resume 

Feb. 20 the duties of adjutant-general, and when Washington 

heard of this he urged him to accept. 2 While Gates was 

March 25 considering the matter Congress passed another resolu- 
tion 3 directing him " immediately to repair to Ticonderoga 
and take command of the army there." 

March 15 Congress meanwhile had passed a resolution 4 severely 

reprimanding Schuyler on account of a respectful letter 
which he had written to it concerning matters affecting 
the discipline of his troops. He determined to proceed 
to Philadelphia, settle his accounts and retire from the 
service. The New England delegation had been at all 
times opposed to him; the New England troops had ex- 
pressed an unwillingness to serve under him on account 
of the controversy between New York and New Hamp- 
shire over the territory which became the State of Ver- 
mont; he had been criticised and held responsible for 
the failure of the expedition to Quebec; he was denounced 
as an aristocrat and his loyalty to the United States was 
questioned. 5 Twice before he had advised Washington of 
his intention to resign, 6 but had yielded to Washington's 
urgent entreaty to remain in service. 7 He was now con- 
vinced that Congress desired to displace him and that 
his opportunity for usefulness was gone. 

Apra But on arriving in Philadelphia and presenting his 

memorial to Congress he was favorably received, was 
put in command of the troops there in place of Putnam, 
who had just been ordered to Peekskill, his accounts 

May is were speedily settled, and the Board of War made a re- 

1 Jour. Cont. Cong., VII, 136. 2 Sparks, IV, 355. 

8 Jour. Cont. Cong., VII, 202. * Ibid., VII, 180. 

6 Sparks, III, 243, 535-540; Irving, 217. 

6 Sparks, Letters, I, 109, 287. 

7 Sparks, III, 191,209,243. 



THE HUDSON 99 

port recommending that he be directed to take command 1777 
of the Northern Department, and that Gates be offered 
his choice of resuming the duties of adjutant-general or 
of serving under Schuyler. 1 Congress adopted the first 
part of the report, passed a resolution defining the limits May 22 
of the Northern Department (including Ticonderoga), 
assigning Schuyler to the command of it, and repealing 
the resolution adopted two years before by which his 
head-quarters were established at Albany. 2 

Gates did not accept either of the appointments sug- 
gested by the Board of War. He was unwilling to serve 
under Schuyler, and obtained leave to withdraw from j U ne9 
the Northern Department, and proceeded to Philadelphia, jui y 8 
where he continued his intrigues with Congress until that 
body passed a resolution directing him "to repair to 
head-quarters and follow the directions of General Wash- April 1 
ington." St. Clair, meanwhile, had been selected for Apm 29 
service at Ticonderoga and directed to proceed there 
forthwith. 

After the loss of Ticonderoga (as related hereafter), 
Schuyler again fell under the ban of Congress, and a reso- 
lution was passed directing him to report at head-quarters, Aug. 1 
and Washington to select another officer to command his 
department. Simultaneously the New England delega- 
tion, headed by John and Samuel Adams, sent a letter 
to Washington extolling the merits of Gates and asking 
that he be appointed in Schuyler's place. But Washing- 
ton wrote to Congress asking to be excused from making 
the appointment and suggesting that Congress make its 
own selection. Congress then, "by the vote of eleven Aug. 4 
States," elected Gates "to command the Northern army." Aug. 19 

1 Jour. Cont. Cong., VII, 300, 336, 349, 364. 

2 Ibid., VIII, 375. 



100 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1777 He arrived at the mouth of the Mohawk three days after 
the victorious battle of Bennington and relieved Schuyler 
of his command. 1 

These events have been related in detail because they 
were so scandalous, and had such an important relation 
to the military operations in the North, to the effort to 
displace Washington during the following winter, and to 
the subsequent appointment of Gates to command the 
Southern army — where his career came to an inglorious 
end. 
schuyier's The force which Schuyler had at his disposal to oppose 

the advance of Burgoyne against Ticonderoga and St. 
Leger against Stanwix was very small. St. Clair, who 
commanded at Ticonderoga, had 2,546 2 Continentals and 
900 militia. Outside of this, there were only small de- 
tachments of militia at Skenesborough (now Whitehall), 
Fort Ann, Fort Edward and Albany. 
May a Burgoyne had arrived at Quebec as soon as the ice was 

Burgoyne out of the St. Lawrence. Sir Guy Carleton, the Governor 
of Canada, although practically superseded by Burgoyne, 
rendered him every assistance. Burgoyne went on to 
Montreal and there found his troops, an enormous train 
of siege artillery (in addition to that previously men- 
tioned) and an ample fleet to convey his force across 
June 20 Lake Champlain. 1 Everything was speedily assembled 

June 27 at Cumberland Point (Plattsburg), and a week later he 

landed at Crown Point. 3 
Topography at Ticonderoga played such an important part in the 
French and Indian wars, the Revolution and the War of 
1812, and will have such an essential part should we 
ever, unfortunately, be again involved in hostilities with 

1 Jour. Cont. Cong., VIII, 540; VII, 217; VIII, 596, 604; Sparks, V. 14. 
3 Carrington, 311; Dawson, 231. * Burgoyne, 9-11. 



THE HUDSON 101 

Great Britain or Canada, that it may be well to describe 1777 
somewhat in detail the topographical features which 
create such importance. From Montreal to New York 
the distance (by rail) is 384 miles; and paralleling the 
rail and other roads is a navigable water route for the 
greater part of the distance — 149 miles from New York 
to Troy and 147 miles from Whitehall to St. Johns. 
Between Troy and Whitehall, the valley of the Hudson 
is followed for 49 miles to Fort Edward ; thence to White- 
hall, 22 miles, there are two low valleys (through which 
the Champlain canal has been constructed), the one lead- 
ing out of the Hudson and the other into Lake Cham- 
plain at Whitehall; and the highest point of the land 
between them is only 147 feet above sea level. 

This long, narrow depression, between the St. Law- 
rence and Sandy Hook, is flanked (in its northern half) by 
mountains rising to a height of 2,500 feet or more — the 
Green Mountains of Vermont on the east and the Adiron- 
dacks on the west. It has been a natural highway for 
the early explorers, for the Indians, for military opera- 
tions and for commerce; it has rare scenic beauty. 

For more than 20 miles at its southern end, Lake 
Champlain has a width of half a mile or less, and lofty, 
rugged hills rise on either side from the water's edge. 
Then, as it widens and comes into a more open country, 
it passes between two mountains, Mount Independence 
on the east and Mount Defiance on the west, which over- 
look the country for a long distance to the north ; and at 
this same point it meets the outlet of Lake George, which 
discharges its water through a narrow gorge about 3 
miles long, in which there is a drop of about 220 feet. 

The surrounding hills are now and always have been 
densely wooded. 



102 



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 



1777 

Previous 

Operations at 
Ticonderoga 



St. Clair's 
Garrison 



Through this gateway the Colonial militia attempted, 
without success, to force their way in their first encounter 
with the French in 1690. The French then built a stone 
fort on the point at the edge of the lake, just north of 
Mount Defiance and Mount Independence, which they 
named Fort Carillon. In 1758 Montcalm and Levis sup- 
plemented this by intrenchments of wood and earth, with 
entanglements of felled timber in front. Against these 
Abercrombey hurled 15,000 men in a murderous assault, 
losing nearly 2,000 — the bloodiest battle ever fought on 
this continent prior to the Civil War. In the following 
year Amherst attacked it in a more rational manner, by 
siege operations; and the French, being largely outnum- 
bered, blew up the stone fort and abandoned it. The 
English partially rebuilt the ruin and named it Fort 
Ticonderoga. They maintained a garrison there until it 
was taken by Ethan Allen and Benedict Arnold in 1775, 
as we have seen. It was the starting-point of Mont- 
gomery's expedition to Quebec in that year, and the rally- 
ing-point of Sullivan's retreat in the following year. 

During the winter and spring its works had been some- 
what strengthened and new works had been built on 
Mount Independence. To man them properly a garrison 
of 10,000 men was required. St. Clair was authorized 
to call on the neighboring States for militia, and could 
have raised them if he had had provisions. 1 But his sup- 
plies were insufficient for the men he had; and Burgoyne's 
advance thus found him with a garrison of barely 3,500 
of whom one-third were militia. 

They were posted partly at Fort Ticonderoga and 
partly in the trenches and works on the sides and summit 
of Mount Independence. A bridge had been built across 

1 St. Clair's narrative, 240-250. 



S German 
Auxiliaries 
under 
Otlt. con Hkdetel 




TlCONDEROGA 

July 6, 1777 



Attack, of Americans upon British Advance Corps 
B - Detachment under Earl of Balcarres 
C - American Position after Gen. Riedesel arrived 
D • British Position after the action 
E - House in which wounded were cared for 

q as American Forces 

c=3 ■■ British Forces fS3 Oi German Auxiliaries 

HUBBARDTOWN 

July 7, 1777 




Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company, 
Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio 



From Avery's History of the United States 
and Its People 



Bennington 
Aug. 16, 1777 



THE HUDSON 103 

the lake at this point. The commanding hills of Mount 1777 
Hope, on the north-west, and Mount Defiance, on the 
south-west, were not occupied, because the force was 
insufficient and because Mount Defiance was believed to 
be inaccessible. 

Burgoyne's journal l shows that after remaining three Burgoyne-s 
days at Crown Point, to bring up the rear of his army, 
he advanced in two columns; Fraser's brigade, of about June 
3,000 men and 10 guns, on the west side of the lake, and 
a Hessian detachment on the east; with the main army 
behind them on both shores and on frigates and gun-boats 
in the lake. Two days later, Phillips's brigade seized 
Mount Hope, which commanded the outlet of Lake 
George, and thus cut off St. Clair from all communica- 
tion in that direction. 2 The artillery was then landed j u iy2 
and a reconnoissance was made to the top of Mount 
Defiance, which was found not to be inaccessible. The 
British dragged their artillery to its summit, which com- 
manded within easy range the fortifications not only at 
Ticonderoga but also at Mount Independence. As soon 
as these guns were discovered St. Clair called a council 
of war 3 of his principal officers, and they unanimously juiy 5 
decided that the position was untenable, that Ticonderoga 
should be evacuated that night, taking the cannon and 
stores to Mount Independence if possible, and that an 
immediate retreat should be made from Mount Inde- Evacuation of 
pendence to Skenesborough (Whitehall). The heavy ar- 
tillery — 128 pieces — was abandoned; a few lighter pieces 
with some provisions and stores were placed on boats 
with Long's regiment and sent up the lake to Skenes- 
borough, while the rest of the force, under St. Clair, un- 

1 Burgoyne, 11, Appendix XXV. 

2 Ibid., XXVII. 3 Dawson, 231. 



104 



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 



1777 



July 6 



July 7 



Battle of 
Hubbard ton 



Engagement 
at Skenes- 
borough 

July 6 



dertook to march to the same point, following a cir- 
cuitous route of about 45 miles through Hubbardton 
and Castleton, there being no road through the rough 
country adjacent to the lake. St. Clair reached Castle- 
ton the next evening, but the rear guard, consisting of 
Warner's and Francis's regiments, with the stragglers 
and infirm — about 1,200 men in all — was then about six 
miles behind, at Hubbardton. 1 Here they were over- 
taken in the morning by Fraser's brigade, which had 
marched nearly all night. He made a most vigorous 
attack, and was soon reinforced by the advance guard of 
the Hessians under Riedesel. 2 Warner was defeated, 
Francis was killed, their retreat to Castleton was cut off, 
and their men dispersed through the mountains to the 
eastward. 3 Their losses were never accurately known. 
Burgoyne claimed that 200 dead were left on the field 
and 600 wounded; 4 Gordon says the total loss was 324, 
but does not give his authority. He gives the British 
loss as 20 officers and 183 killed and wounded. 5 

Meanwhile, Burgoyne in person had pursued Long up 
the lake. As soon as the retreat was discovered the naval 
vessels had pushed forward and cut a passage through 
the bridge, and by 3 o'clock in the afternoon, Burgoyne, 
with two frigates and several gun-boats, carrying three 
regiments of infantry, arrived in the vicinity of Skenesbor- 
ough. 6 The Americans were in a stockaded fort; the 
British regiments landed and climbed the adjacent hills 
with the intention of getting in rear of the fort and cutting 



1 St. Clair's Report, Dawson, 229. 

2 Burgoyne, Appendix XXX; Riedesel, I, 363. 

3 St. Clair's Report, Dawson, 229. 

* Burgoyne's Report, Dawson, 234 ; Riedesel, I, 363. 

e Gordon, II, 484; Riedesel, I, 363; Burgoyne, Appendix XXXIII. 

e Burgoyne, Appendix XXX; Riedesel, I, 362. 



THE HUDSON 105 

off the retreat. But before this could be accomplished 1777 
the fort and the boats near by in the river were set on fire, 
and Long and his men hastily retreated up the valley of 
Wood Creek to Fort Ann. Here he was overtaken the Engagement 
next morning by the 9th British Regiment, with the 

July 7 

two other regiments of Phillips's brigade only a short 
distance back. Long attacked the 9th Regiment and a 
sharp engagement took place, but when the two other 
regiments came up he was forced to retire. After setting 
fire to Fort Ann he retreated to Fort Edward. 

Hearing that Skenesborough was occupied, St. Clair 
was forced to retreat from Castleton eastward to Rutland, 
and after a painful and circuitous march of seven days 
he joined Schuyler at Fort Edward. The remnants of jm y i2 
Warner's men remained in the vicinity of Rutland. 1 

Burgoyne's campaign thus began with a brilliant vic- 
tory. The loss of Ticonderoga created consternation in 
Congress and throughout the Colonies. Washington was 
then in the vicinity of Ramapo, baffled by conflicting 
reports of Howe's movements, and heard the news by 
successive reports received from Schuyler at Fort Ed- 
ward. He immediately bent every energy to reinforce 
Schuyler. He sent Morgan's Virginia riflemen from his 
own army, and directed Putnam to send him two brigades 
(Nixon's and Glover's); he also ordered Arnold to join Reinforce- 
him; he sent Lincoln to organize and command the New schuyier 
England militia; and he wrote the most urgent letters 
to the governors of New York and the New England 
States, telling them how critical the situation was, and 
calling upon them to use every effort to fill up their Con- 
tinental regiments and to call out the militia. 2 As a 

1 St. Clair's Report, Dawson, 230. 

3 Sparks, IV, 476, 480, 484, 500; V, 17. 



106 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1777 result of these measures, reinforcements kept arriving on 
the upper Hudson during July, August and September, 
until at the time of Burgoyne's capitulation Gates's 
morning return showed 13 brigades of infantry besides 
artillery and cavalry, with a total strength of 1,698 
officers and 18,624 men, of whom 14,914 were present 
for duty. 1 

The other part of Burgoyne's plan — the expedition 
under St. Leger from Oswego — met with complete dis- 

st. Leger aster. The route via Oswego and Oneida Rivers, Oneida 
Lake, Wood Creek and the Mohawk Valley had also 
been followed in the earlier French and Indian wars; 
and a stockaded fort had been built at the portage be- 
tween Wood Creek and Mohawk River, near the present 
city of Rome, and called Fort Stanwix. 2 It was more or 
less in ruins in the spring of 1777, and Schuyler sent 

April Colonel Gansevoort of the 3d New York Regiment to 

take command. He put the works in as good a condition 

May 28 as possible, and renamed the place Fort Schuyler. He 

was soon joined by Lieutenant-Colonel Willett and the 

juiy 15 rest of his regiment. 3 

St. Leger arrived at Oswego and began organizing his 
expedition. News of this reached General Herkimer, 
who commanded the militia in Tryon County, and he 
issued a call for every able-bodied man in the county. 
They assembled, to the number of about 800, at Fort 
Dayton, now the village of Herkimer. 4 Thence they 

Aug. 4 marched to the relief of Fort Schuyler, 30 miles to the 

westward, before which St. Leger had appeared on the 

Aug. 3 previous day. News of their approach reached St. Leger, 

1 Printed in Burgoyne's narrative, Appendix CIV. 

2 Arnold, 141. 3 Ibid., 149. 
4 Arnold, 149; Burgoyne, Appendix LXXVIII. 



6 A. m. to 
2 P.M. 



THE HUDSON 107 

and he sent all his Indians, under Brant, and a part of his 1777 
loyalist militia to ambuscade Herkimer near Oriskany, 
about 5 miles east of Fort Schuyler. Here the road, on 
which Herkimer was advancing, crossed a deep ravine, 
at the bottom of which was a marsh and causeway. 
Just as Herkimer's force had passed over the causeway Aug. 6 
and was climbing the western slope of the ravine, 1 with 
their wagons still on the causeway, the Indians sur- 
rounded them and attacked with great fury. Herkimer Battle ot 
was wounded almost at the first fire, but he caused him- 
self to be propped up against a tree, lighted his pipe and 
directed the battle for eight hours. 2 It was a bushwhack- 
ing fight at close quarters, and the Tryon County militia 
were as expert in that kind of fighting as the Indians 
themselves; moreover, they personally knew the tory 
militia opposed to them, and fiercely hated them. 3 No 
quarter was asked or given, and the losses were out of all 
proportion to the numbers engaged. 

During the morning three messengers from Herkimer, ha.m 
sent to advise the garrison of his approach, succeeded 
in reaching Fort Schuyler. Lieutenant-Colonel Willett, 
with 250 men, was immediately ordered to make a sortie, 
which was completely successful, the tory and Indian 
camps being both captured, with a large amount of sup- 
plies and all of St. Leger's and Johnson's papers. The 
Indians fled to the woods. When news of this reached 
the ambuscading party an hour or so later, the Indians 
there also fled, leaving Herkimer and his militia in pos- 
session of the field. 4 

1 The spot is marked by a large monument just south of the New York 
Central tracks, 225 miles from New York City. 
'Arnold, 151; Lossing, I, 246. 
3 Dawson, 242. 
1 Arnold, 152. 



108 



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 



1777 



Siege of Fort 
Schuyler 



Aug. 12 



Aug. 21 



Auk. 22 



Defeat of St. 
Leger 



Notwithstanding this success, the siege was not yet 
abandoned. Herkimer was carried back to his home 
and died of his wounds. About one-third of his militia 
had been killed and wounded, and the rest soon retired to 
Fort Dayton (Herkimer). St. Leger gathered together 
his tories and Indians and his 200 regulars, and closely 
invested Gansevoort in Fort Schuyler. Willett was then 
sent to ask aid from Schuyler. With one companion he 
succeeded in making his way through St. Leger's line and 
reached Schuyler, then at Stillwater. Schuyler called the 
usual council of war and explained the importance of 
relieving Fort Schuyler. To his astonishment there were 
mutterings accusing him of cowardice and treason, and 
intimating that he was planning this move in order to 
give Burgoyne an opportunity to enter Albany unop- 
posed. Schuyler then called for a brigadier to lead the 
relieving party, and Arnold, although a major-general 
and second in command, instantly volunteered. 

With 800 men, all of whom had volunteered for the ser- 
vice, he began his march the following day, and soon 
reached Fort Dayton. From this point he contrived to 
send men into St. Leger's camp carrying exaggerated 
statements of his strength, and was preparing to follow 
them and attack St. Leger, when the Indians, alarmed at 
these reports and discouraged by the losses at Oriskany 
and the sortie, became mutinous and deserted in a body. 
The next day St. Leger raised the siege, and with his 
regulars and the few tories who still remained with him, 
retreated hastily to Oswego, and later to Montreal. 2 

Thus ended St. Leger's expedition. 

While these events were in progress others of equal 
importance to the success of the Americans were trans- 

2 Arnold, 153-162; Dawson, 247; Lossing, I, 243-252. 



THE HUDSON 109 

piring near the upper Hudson. After the battle of 1777 
Hubbardton and the engagements at Skenesborough and July 7 
Fort Ann, Burgoyne assembled his entire force at Skenes- Juiy 6 
borough and prepared to advance to the Hudson at Fort July 8 
Edward. 1 He decided to use all his boats to bring his 
supplies via Lake George, but to march his men by the 
direct route through the wilderness of Wood Creek. 
Although the distance was only 22 miles, a road had to 
be cut for nearly the entire distance, and the obstructions 
which Schuyler's axemen had created had to be removed. 
Thus 20 days were consumed in the operation. At the 
end of that time Burgoyne arrived at Fort Edward, and 
on the same day Phillips took possession of Fort George, j u i y 29 
at the head of Lake George. Fort George then became 
Burgoyne's secondary base of supplies, but although the Burgoyne 
distance to Fort Edward was only 15 miles, the country Edward 01 
was so broken and heavily wooded, and the transportation 
so poor, that it was with great difficulty that his army 
could be supplied. 2 
Schuyler's reinforcements had hardly yet begun to schuyier 

t 1 • /• <i . . . Retreats to 

arrive, and ins force was too small to oppose any resistance stniwater 
to Burgoyne. He therefore abandoned Fort Edward and j u i y 27 
retreated down the west bank of the Hudson to Still- j u iy3i 
water, about 25 miles south of Fort Edward and the 
same distance north of Albany. 3 

The fatal defect of Burgoyne's plan was the inability Difficulty of 
to supply his army. At Fort Edward he was 185 miles ISynls 
from his base at Montreal. There were 23 miles of land Amy 
transport at the northern end and 15 miles at the south- 
ern end, and the latter was through most difficult country. 
The intervening 147 miles was by water, Lakes Cham- 

1 Burgoyne, Appendix XXXIV. 

2 Ibid., 16-19. 3 Arnold, 140-148. 



110 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1777 plain and George, but there was a troublesome portage 
between the two at Ticonderoga. 

Burgoyne, therefore, began to look for supplies in the 
enemy's country. He had heard that Bennington — in 
the southern part of the " Hampshire Grants," now the 
State of Vermont, but then claimed both by New York 
and New Hampshire — was a great depot of corn, flour 
and cattle; that it was defended by only a few militia; 
and that the district "abounds in the most active and 
most rebellious race of the continent, and hangs like a 
gathering storm on my left." x He therefore deter- 
mined to deliver a blow at Bennington, capture its stores, 
disperse its militia, and strike terror to its inhabitants. 
Incidentally he expected to obtain horses to mount the 
Duke of Brunswick's Dragoons, a project which Riedesel 
had much at heart. If the move succeeded, he thought 
it would prevent the sending of any American reinforce- 
ments to the relief of Fort Schuyler, and would enable 
St. Leger to join him in a triumphant entry into Albany. 2 

For this expedition Burgoyne detailed the Brunswick 
dragoons (unmounted), Captain Fraser's selected marks- 
men, some tory militia and some Indians, and 2 field 
guns, the whole numbering about 600 men under com- 
mand of Lieutenant-Colonel Baume. 3 To facilitate the 
Raid toward operation and to be ready to take advantage of its suc- 
cess, Burgoyne moved down the east side of the Hudson 
and built a bridge near Saratoga (now Schuylerville). 3 
Schuyler fell back to the islands at the mouth of the 
Mohawk. 4 

Baume left the Hudson at Saratoga, and moving up 
the Battenkill crossed the hills to Cambridge and thence 

1 Burgoyne, Appendix XLVI; Riedesel, I, 368-372. 

a Burgoyne, XLIV. 3 Ibid., XLI. * Arnold, 163-165. 



Bennington 
Aug. 14 



THE HUDSON 111 

to the Hoosick River at the mouth of Walloomsac 1777 
Creek. There he encountered a small party of American Aug. 14 
militia, and he soon learned that Burgoyne had based 
his plans upon quite erroneous information. 1 There was, 
in fact, a body of New England militia, under General 
John Stark, far exceeding his own force in numbers, 
posted at the village of Bennington, about 7 miles up the 
Walloomsac, 2 and the remnants of the regiments which 
had fought under Warner at Hubbardton seven weeks 
before were now resting and recruiting at Manchester, 
about 20 miles to the north. Baume sent a messenger Aug. u 
to Burgoyne with a report of these facts. 3 

Stark had served in the French and Indian wars, had 
taken a New Hampshire regiment to Boston in time for 
Bunker Hill, had been colonel of the 5th Continental 
Regiment in the following year, and had served in all the 
engagements under Washington, including Trenton and 
Princeton. Then several promotions were made over 
his head at which he took offence, resigned and retired 
to his farm. When Ticonderoga fell, the New Hamp- 
shire legislature made him a brigadier-general and asked 
him to raise the militia for their defence. They had no 
confidence in the officers who commanded under Schuyler, 
and when Lincoln, sent by Washington to organize the 
New England militia, ordered Stark to join Schuyler at 
Stillwater, Stark refused point-blank, and said it was at stark Refuses 
his own option whether he acted in conjunction with the orders 
Continental army or not. 4 When Congress heard of this 
it sent the correspondence to the New Hampshire legis- congress cen- 

, . ,-» . sures Him 

lature, with a resolution saying that btark s action was 

1 Baume's Report; Burgoyne, Appendix LXX. 

2 Stark's Report, Dawson, 260. 

3 Burgoyne, LXX. * Stark's Memoirs, 10-50. 



112 



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 



1777 " destructive of military subordination/ 7 and requesting 
. 19 that he be instructed to conform to the "same rules 

which other general officers of the militia are subject to 
whenever they are called out at the expense of the 
United States." This was three days after Stark had 
gained the victoiy at Bennington. On hearing of this 
Congress expressed its appreciation of what Stark had 
done, and later passed a resolution giving him a vote of 
thanks and appointing him a brigadier-general in the 
Continental army. 1 

Seldom has such rank insubordination produced such 
excellent results. In this case it resulted in placing Stark ; 
with superior force, at the very point where Baume was 
going to collect stores and horses; as the latter approached 
Stark sent word to Warner to march at once to his relief, 
and in spite of a drenching rain Warner arrived in time 
to be of assistance. 

Burgoyne received Baume's report during the night, 
and immediately ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Breyman, 
with the Brunswick grenadiers and other Hessians, 642 
men in all, with 2 field guns, to reinforce Baume; and 
marching as rapidly as he could over the bad roads in 
the heavy rain, Breyman arrived while the battle was in 
progress. 2 

After spending a day at Van Schaick's mill, Baume 
moved forward the next morning, the advance guard of 
the militia retreating before him. But after he had 
moved up the north bank of the Walloomsac about four 
miles, the militia were reinforced by Stark's main body, 
coming down the creek from Bennington. Baume hesi- 
tated to attack, and selecting a good position, spent the 

1 Jour. Cont. Cong., VIII, 656; IX, 770. 
3 Burgoyne, XLIII; Riedesel, 127-133. 



THE HUDSON 113 

rest of the day in intrenching. His unmounted dragoons 1777 
were loaded down with immense hats, boots, swords and 
muskets; and on a hot August day in a thinly settled 
country, with bad roads and torrents of rain, were ill 
equipped to match the New Hampshire farmers in their 
shirt-sleeves and with no impedimenta except a gun 
and cartridge-box. 1 

Early the next morning Stark sent out these farmers, Aug. is 
whom Baume at first did not recognize as soldiers, to 
surround the Hessians; 200 under Colonel Nicholls by the 
right, 200 under Colonel Herrick by the left; while the 
main body, under Stark himself, moved down the creek Battle of 
to attack them in front. Before Baume realized it he 
was surrounded by double his numbers — all good marks- 
men. His Indians fled at the first shot, but the Bruns- 
wickers fought hard and used their two little field-guns 
to the best advantage. Two hours of incessant fighting 
followed, which finally became a hand-to-hand encounter 
after the ammunition was exhausted. Baume was mor- 
tally wounded, a large part of his force had been destroyed, 
some surrendered, and the rest escaped down the creek. 

Stark's men divided their attention, some plundering 12 m. 
the Hessian camp and some pursuing the retreating 
dragoons. When the pursuit had gone about half-way 
to Van Schaick's mill, Breyman arrived from one direction 
and Warner from the other; the battle was fiercely re- 
newed and Breyman lost almost as heavily as Baume 
had. Abandoning his artillery 2 and wagons at dusk, he 
hastily retreated to the Battenkill and Saratoga. 

1 Stark, 50-75; Lossing, I, 391, 399. 

2 The history of these four guns is interesting. They were of French 
manufacture, were taken by Wolfe at Quebec in 1759, captured by Stark 
at Bennington in 1777, surrendered by Hull at Detroit in 1812, retaken 
at Niagara in 1813. Fonblanque's Burgoyne, 273. 



114 



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 



1777 



Burgoyne's 
Precarious 
Position 



July 29 to 
Aug. 20 



Sept. 13 



Burgoyne 
Advances 



Stark's force, including Warner's men, numbered about 
2,000; Baume and Breyman had about 1,300. The 
American losses, according to Stark's report, were only 
30 killed and 40 wounded; he also reported that there 
were 207 Hessians dead, a large number wounded and that 
he had taken 700 prisoners. The Hessian accounts put 
the number at somewhat less; but even these admit the 
loss of 596 men, exclusive of the loss among the British. 1 

Thus the Hessian detachment on the east and St. 
Leger's expedition on the west were practically de- 
stroyed, almost at the same time. Burgoyne's position 
immediately became precarious. It was just at this 
time that Gates arrived and superseded Schuyler. The 
army was immensely elated by the two victories, the 
militia turned out in large numbers, Stark soon marched 
to join Gates, and the reinforcements of Continental 
troops were now coming in rapidly from New England 
and from Peekskill. 

Burgoyne had now been on the Hudson for three weeks, 
slowly and with infinite toil dragging his provisions and 
boats over from Lake George in the hope of accumulat- 
ing a sufficient supply to last him during an offensive 
campaign of thirty days, and enough boats to move them 
on the Hudson, from one rapids to the next, as he ad- 
vanced toward Albany. He continued this work for 
three weeks longer, and then believing that he had suffi- 
cient supplies, he crossed from the east to the west bank 
of the Hudson on the bridge which he had built just above 
the mouth of the Battenkill, and moved forward. His 
letters to Germain show that he was far from being con- 
fident of success. He said: "I yet do not despond." 2 

1 Burgoyne, XLIII; Riedesel, 132; Dawson, 259. 

2 Burgoyne, XLVIII. 



THE HUDSON 115 

Nevertheless he knew he was already outnumbered by 1777 
the reinforcements which had come to the American 
army; he realized that he was far from his base of sup- 
plies, that he could not obtain supplies from the enemy's 
country and that his communications were in danger of 
being cut off. He could probably have saved his army 
by a prompt retreat to Ticonderoga. To have done so 
would have been to acknowledge the failure of the whole 
plan which he had induced the King to adopt. More- 
over, he had a lingering, though faint, hope that Howe 
would march up the Hudson; and finally the King's 
orders of March 16 required him "to force his way to 
Albany." As he wrote Germain, he felt that he was not Aug. 20 
at liberty to disregard these. 

Gates, on his arrival, found the main body of the Aug. 19 
American army on the islands at the mouth of the Mo- situation in 
hawk, with Poor's brigade 4 miles up the Mohawk on his Army 
left, Lincoln and Stark at Bennington, 30 miles on his 
right, and Arnold on the upper Mohawk, 110 miles on 
his left. Arnold, after the relief of Fort Schuyler, 
promptly returned and joined Gates just as Burgoyne 
was preparing to cross the Hudson. Gates had already sept. 10 
issued orders to have everything in readiness to march, 
but had made no movement. When Arnold arrived and 
was assigned to the command of the left wing, he took 
Kosciusko (apparently on his own responsibility), made sept. 12 
a reconnoissance of the ground in his front, selected a 
position at Bemis' Heights, about 6 miles in advance, 
and furnished Kosciusko the men to fortify it. 1 The 
lines were on a plateau about 200 feet above the Hudson, 
with a deep ravine (Mill Creek) in their front, and ex- 
tended around three sides of a rectangle more than 2 

1 Arnold, 165-178. 



1 P. M. tO 

2 P. M. 



116 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1777 miles in length. Gates's army, about 9,000 strong, occu- 
pied these lines, Arnold on the left and Gates on the right, 
when Burgoyne, after five days of cautious advance, 
sept. 19 came in sight. The latter's plan was to send Fraser and 

Breyman on his right to move around the head of the ra- 
vine and attack the American left; he himself with the 
Battle of main body of the British was to cross the ravine, and, 
Freeman's d e pi yi n g n the southern side of it, to attack the centre; 
while Phillips and Riedesel were to move along two 
roads near the Hudson and protect his left. His force 
had been reduced by losses to a strength of about 6,000 
men. As his columns on the march were widely separated 
in a broken country, their arrival in position was to be 
announced by the firing of signal-guns, and these were 
heard early in the afternoon. 

These movements had been observed for more than 
three hours, but Gates gave no orders. Arnold at 
length, after much entreaty, obtained permission to send 
Morgan's riflemen against the Canadians and Indians 
who formed Fraser's advance. Morgan attacked with 
such impetuosity that his men got out of hand, and when, 
after driving back the Indians and Canadians, he came 
upon Fraser's main body, he was in turn driven back with 
considerable loss. Seeing this, Arnold, without waiting 
for further orders, brought up his entire force, and lead- 
ing them in person he made a furious assault upon Fraser. 
The fighting continued at close quarters and often hand 
to hand for about four hours. Arnold applied for rein- 
forcements to Gates, but Gates refused to send them for 
fear that he would expose his camp. Phillips and Rie- 
desel, finding that Gates did not advance against them, 
marched to the sound of the guns and Arnold had nearly 
the whole of Burgoyne's force opposed to him. Not- 



3 P.M. 




Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company, 
Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio 



From Avery's History of the United States 
and Its People 



Freeman's Farm 
Sept. 19, 1777 



THE HUDSON 117 

withstanding the superiority of the force opposed to him, 1777 
he held his ground until sunset, and then returned within 
his lines. The British lay upon their arms, where they 
were when the fighting terminated. 

The losses on the American side were 65 killed, 218 Report of 
wounded and 33 missing; on the British side more than Adjutant-ben- 
500. One regiment, the 62d, which left Canada 500 
strong, came out of this battle, according to Burgoyne, 
with only 60 men and 5 officers. 1 

This was the first of the Saratoga battles, sometimes 
called Freeman's Farm and sometimes Bemis' Heights. 
Instead of attacking, as he had intended, Burgoyne had 
been thrown on the defensive from the beginning of the 
action. The next day he began intrenching on the north 
and east sides of the Mill Creek ravine, about a mile or 
more distant from the American lines; and he remained 
there until the second battle, eighteen days later. The 
Americans, meanwhile, continued to strengthen their 
lines. 

On the second day after the battle, Burgoyne received sept. 21 
word from Sir Henry Clinton advising him of his inten- 
tion to attack Fort Montgomery, opposite Peekskill ; 2 
and Burgoyne sent back the same messenger that night, 
and followed this by two other messengers. They all 
carried the same message, viz., that Burgoyne could hold 
out until October 12, and he urged Clinton to come to his 
assistance before that date. All three reached Clinton Oct. s 
in safety, and the latter sent them all back. The return Oct. 9 
trip was not so successful. The bearer of one message, 
Sergeant Taylor, was captured at Kingston and hung as 
a spy; Captain Campbell, who carried the second, is 

1 Dawson, 285-290; Riedesel, 144-150; Arnold, 170-190. 

2 Burgoyne, 24. 



118 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1777 said by Lossing to have delivered it to Burgoyne on the 
Oct. 17 night before the surrender, although Riedesel does not 

mention this; Captain Scott, who bore the third, was 
unable to reach Burgoyne, and after the capitulation 
escaped down the river and joined the British fleet, 
oa. 8 The message which was intercepted was written at 

Fort Montgomery, and was in these words: "Nous y 
voici, and nothing now between us and Gates. I sin- 
cerely hope this little success of ours may facilitate 
your operations. In answer to your letter of 28th of 
September by C. C. [Captain Campbell] I shall only say, 
I cannot presume to order, or even advise, for reasons 
obvious. I heartily wish you success." * 

This indifferent reply, sent to a brother general who 
had just informed him how desperate his situation was, 
shows that Clinton's point of view in regard to the Hud- 
son campaign was very different from Burgoyne's. 

On the American side, Gates now became intensely 
jealous of Arnold. He did not mention his name in the 
sept. 22 report which he made to Congress (not to Washington) 

of the battle; and his adjutant-general, Wilkinson, was 
circulating reports that Arnold had not been on the field. 
The feud was stimulated by the fact that Schuyler's staff 
officers had remained with the army and were serving 
with Arnold. Finally Arnold, whose mind was ill- 
balanced, although he was a brave and skilful soldier, 
became so incensed that, after a stormy interview with 
Gates, he foolishly applied for permission to leave the 
army, which Gates promptly gave him. But Arnold 
was very popular with his troops, and they begged him 
to remain. Arnold decided to do so, but Gates then re- 
fused to allow him to resume command, and announced 

1 Sparks, V, 131; Lossing, I, 684. 



THE HUDSON 119 

his intention to assign Lincoln, as soon as he should 1777 
arrive, to command his division. When the second 
battle came on Arnold was in camp without any defined 
position. 1 

Meanwhile, Lincoln was collecting the militia near 
Bennington, but before marching to join Gates he sent 
a detachment under Colonel Brown on a raid against sept, is 
Burgoyne's communications. Brown marched via Hub- American 

, i i i -n Raid on Bur- 

bardton to Mount Independence and captured that hill, goynes com- 

. . . municatioM 

while part of his force went by way of bkenesborougn to 
Mount Defiance. Brown took 293 prisoners, released 100 
Americans and captured all the outlying posts, but was 
unable to take the fort at Ticonderoga. He then re- 
joined Lincoln, and the latter brought his troops, about sept. 27 
2,000 in number, to Gates's camp. 2 Gates now outnum- 
bered Burgoyne more than two to one, but he made no 
move against him; and Burgoyne remained on the de- 
fensive, hoping from day to day to hear of Clinton. 

No news came. 3 Clinton, however, was moving up the 
Hudson. His expedition was undertaken under the fol- 
lowing circumstances. Although Germain had failed to 
give Howe any instructions to co-operate with Burgoyne, 4 
yet the latter had written to Howe three letters — from 
Plymouth in April, from Montreal in May and from 
Crown Point in June 5 — in each of which he had advised 
Howe of the instructions he had received to force his 
way to Albany and effect a junction with him. Howe 
received all three letters at New York; and just before 
sailing for the Delaware, he sent Burgoyne a brief and 
indefinite reply saying that "after your arrival at Albany, 
the movements of the enemy will guide yours; . . . Sir 

1 Arnold, 190-195. s Lossing, 150. 3 Burgoyne, 25. 

4 See page 78, ante. 6 Burgoyne, 9, 11. 



120 



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 



1777 



July SO 



Oct. 3 

Clinton Moves 
up the 
Hudson 



Oct. 5 



American 
Force in the 
Highlands 



Oct. 5 



Henry Clinton remains in the command here, and will 
act as occurrences may direct." But after arriving in 
the Delaware and before sailing to the Chesapeake, Howe 
decided to write to Clinton, suggesting that he make a 
diversion in Burgoyne's favor, if he could do so with- 
out endangering the security of Kingsbridge. The date 
when Clinton received this letter is not known. It was 
prior to September 12, the day on which he wrote Bur- 
goyne of his intention to attack Fort Montgomery. But 
Clinton did not move until the long-delayed reinforce- 
ments arrived from England, nearly three weeks later. 

Then he started up the Hudson with three columns, 
one of which marched from Kingsbridge to Tarrytown 
and the other two proceeded to the same point by water. 
The total force was about 3,000 men, and it was con- 
voyed by several ships of war. At Tarrytown the entire 
force was put on boats and landed again at Verplanck's 
Point, threatening Putnam at Peekskill. 1 

Putnam had about 1,200 Continentals and as many 
militia. They garrisoned the forts, which had been built 
at great expense early in the year, at the southern en- 
trance to the Highlands; Fort Independence on the east 
side and Forts Montgomery and Clinton on the west. 
The river was obstructed by a boom and chain opposite 
Fort Montgomery, and two frigates were on the north 
side of the boom to protect it. When Putnam saw this 
strong force approaching the eastern shore he retired to 
the hills behind Peekskill, and brought over a part of the 
force stationed on the west shore. A few hours later the 
British galleys had advanced far enough up the river to 
prevent any further communication between the two 
shores, so that Putnam, when he desired on the following 

1 Clinton's Report, Dawson, 344. 



Clinton 



THE HUDSON 121 

day to send men to the relief of the forts on the west shore, 1777 
was unable to do so. 1 In reality Clinton's move at Ver- 
planck's Point was only a feint; his real objective was 
the west shore. He seems to have been well posted in 
regard to these forts, and his dispositions were skilfully 
made. At daybreak the next morning his entire force Oct. 6 
landed above Stony Point, and was pushed forward 
through the deep valley behind the Dunderberg until it 
came within about a mile of Fort Clinton. Here the 
advance, consisting of the 52d and 27th Regiments and 
some tory militia, about 900 in all, under Colonel 
Campbell, marched around Bear Hill into the valley of capture of 
Peploap's Kill, 2 which empties into the Hudson between gomery and 
the two forts, to attack Fort Montgomery. The main 
body, about 1,100 men under General Vaughan, which 
Clinton accompanied in person, was to attack Fort Clin- 
ton from the south. The rest of his force, under Gen- 
eral Tryon, was in reserve, keeping up communication 
with the fleet, and ready to support either column if 
necessary. 3 

The two forts w°re under command of General James 
Clinton. His brother, General George Clinton, 4 recently 
elected Governor of New York, was attending a session 
of the legislature at Kingston. Hearing that a move- 
ment up the river was- projected, he adjourned the legis- 
lature and hastened to hia brother's assistance, bringing 
with him such militia as he could gather, which carried 
the total strength of the garrison to about 800 men. 
He arrived two days before the British landed. On 

1 Putnam's Report, Dawson, 341. 

* So named on the map in Stedman, vol. I; now called Popelopen Creek. 
8 Clinton's Report, Dawson, 345. 

* Fort Clinton was defended by James Clinton and George Clinton, and 
captured by Sir Henry Clinton. 



122 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1777 Sunday evening he sent out a reconnoissance to the 
Oct. 5 south and it returned the next morning with the infor- 

mation that the British had landed. Governor Clinton 
despatched as many men as he could spare to scour the 
roads to the south. They soon met the British and were 
driven back. The British attack was then made by 
both columns, and though it encountered a spirited de- 
fence, the assailants entered both works about sunset. 
Part of the garrisons surrendered and the rest escaped 
over the hills and across the river. The British loss was 
about 40 killed and 150 wounded; that of the Americans 
about 250 killed, wounded and missing. The two Ameri- 
can frigates were burned by their crews, who escaped 
to the east shore. The boom and chain across the river 
were destroyed. The British ships sailed up the river 
and attacked Fort Constitution, opposite West Point, 
and it was hastily abandoned. Putnam, with the men 
who had been at Peekskill, retreated up the river to Fish- 
kill. The Americans lost 67 cannon in the various forts 
and 30 on the frigates, besides a large amount of powder, 
ordnance stores and provisions. 1 

It was a signal success on Sir Hen^ • Clinton's part, and, 

as he wrote to Burgoyne, there wa^ nothing between him 

and Gates. If he had pushed ^l quickly to Albany he 

might have changed the whol«> situation. But instead 

1777 of doing so he wrote to Burgoyne a trifling letter, 2 sent 

oct. s Vaughan up the river on a marauding expedition as far 

Oct. 13 as Kingston, which was burned, and then returned with 

cnnton to his entire force to New York. He attempted to justify 

Dec 8 °i6 ne ' his action on the ground that he could not take any 

1 Reports of Governor Clinton, Sir Henry Clinton and Putnam, Dawson, 
341-346; Sparks, V, 88, 91, 471^76. 
3 P. 118, ante. 




Courtesy of The Burrows Biothers Company, 
Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio 



From Avery's History of the United States 
and Its People 



Bemis Heights 
Oct. 7, 1777 



THE HUDSON 123 

chances at New York. The excuse was not sufficient, 1777 
for he had 8,500 men, and there was no enemy nearer 
than Putnam, whom he had driven away from Peekskill, 
and Washington, who was in front of Philadelphia con- 
fronted by a superior force under Howe. Clinton ac- 
knowledges that he understood from Captains Campbell 
and Scott how desperate Burgoyne's situation was. 
That under these circumstances he was so concerned 
about the safety of New York can only be explained on 
the theory that Washington's wonderful exploit at Tren- 
ton and Princeton in the preceding winter had made Clin- 
ton attribute to Washington almost supernatural powers. 

Burgoyne's situation was indeed desperate. He had Burgoyne-* 
written to Clinton that he could hold out until the 12th. situation. 

Oct 

On the 3d he put his men on half rations, and on the 7th, 
still hearing nothing from Clinton, he determined to at- 
tack; but his advance was made in a half-hearted fashion, 
for the purpose, as he said in his report to Germain, of 
discovering "whether there were any possible means of 
forcing a passage, should it be necessary to advance, or 
dislodging him, for the convenience of a retreat." 1 Hav- 
ing started the battle, he lost control of it, and Arnold 
fell upon him with fury, inflicting a terrible defeat. 

Leaving the greater part of his force in the intrench- Battle of 
ments which he had constructed on the north and east Heights 
sides of Mill Creek, Burgoyne in person took 1,500 regulars Oct. 7 
and six pieces of artillery, and attempted to go around the 11 a. m. 
head of Mill Creek ravine and attack the American left. 
His movement was detected, and before he reached the 
American lines Gates had sent Morgan's riflemen to attack 
his right, and a strong force consisting of Poor's brigade, 
two New York regiments and the Connecticut militia to 

1 Burgoyne, LXXXIX. 



124 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1777 assail his left. Severe fighting was the immediate result ; 

2 p.m. Fraser was mortally wounded, and Burgoyne, abandon- 

ing his artillery, was driven back across the ravine and 
into his lines. Arnold, although deprived of all com- 
mand, had gone into the fight with his troops, leading 
them and inspiring them. Finally he took entire charge, 
brought up all the troops he had lately commanded and, 
himself in the van, hurled them against the lines held by 
Earl Balcarras in the centre, and later against a strong 
redoubt held by Breyman on the extreme right of the 
British lines. The fighting continued throughout the 
autumn afternoon. Balcarras made a successful defence ; 
but Breyman was killed, a large part of his men were 
taken and his works captured just before sunset. Arnold 
was wounded as he entered the redoubt. 

Burgoyne's Night put an end to the fighting, which had resulted 

in a loss on the American side of only 150 men, whereas 
the British had lost about 600. There was no question 
of Burgoyne's defeat, and during the night he abandoned 
his lines and part of his tents and provisions, retreated 
about a mile across a creek to the north of Mill Creek and 
took refuge in three redoubts overlooking the Hudson 
which he had previously constructed. 1 Gates did not 
appear on the field, but remained in his tent, spending 
a good part of the day in discussing the merits of the 
Revolution with Burgoyne's aide who had been wounded 
and captured. 

Oct. 8 The next day there was skirmishing in front of these 

redoubts, while three columns in succession were sent 
past his right flank to capture the fords of the Hudson in 
his rear. Detecting these movements during the after- 

9 p.m. noon, he abandoned his hospital and wounded and re- 

1 Burgoyne, XC-XCII; Arnold, 196-211; Dawson, 301, 307. 



THE HUDSON 125 

treated five miles to Saratoga (Schuylerville), where on 1777 
the second morning he assembled his men and began the Oct. 10 
construction of new lines on the heights above Fish 
Creek. Gates followed him and soon completely sur- Oct. 11 
rounded him, the main body of the Americans on the 
south of Fish Creek, Poor's and Learned's brigades and 
Morgan's riflemen on the west of the British camp, 
Fellow's brigade on the heights across the Hudson and 
Stark in Burgoyne's rear at Fort Edward. 

Burgoyne then called a council of war, himself, Oct. 12 
Phillips, Riedesel and Hamilton, and submitted five pos- 
sible movements to his associates; but the only one that 
was seriously considered was a prompt retreat to Fort 
Edward. To accomplish this a start of four miles, un- 
observed, was deemed essential. Scouts were sent out, 
and on their return reported that the army was so sur- 
rounded that it would be impossible for it to march 
without being immediately discovered. 

Burgoyne then called a second council of war, "con- Oct. 13 
sisting of all the general officers and field officers and cap- 
tains commanding corps," and asked them whether an 
army was justified "in capitulating in any possible situ- Negotiations 
ation," and whether "the present situation is of that 
nature." Both questions were unanimously answered 
in the affirmative. An officer was then sent to Gates 
with a letter from Burgoyne asking a "cessation of arms" Oct. 14 
long enough to enable Burgoyne to state the terms "by 
which in any extremity he and his army mean to abide." 
Gates replied, naming his own terms, and granting a 
cessation of arms until sunset. The sixth article re- 
quired Burgoyne's army to be paraded in their camps, 
ground their arms and be marched to the riverside on 
their way to Bennington. The council was reassembled 



126 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1777 and unanimously rejected this article. An officer was 
sent back and at sunset delivered this ultimatum to 
Gates: "If General Gates does not mean to recede from 
the 6th article, the treaty ends at once. . . . The cessa- 
tion of arms ends this evening." He also delivered the 
terms which Burgoyne was willing to accept. To the 

Oct. 15 surprise of every one, the next morning Gates sent an 

officer to Burgoyne, practically accepting the latter's 
terms, but stipulating that the conquered army should 
leave its position at 2 o'clock on that day. Gates had, 
in fact, just learned of the capture of Fort Montgomery 
and Fort Clinton and the advance of Vaughan up the 
Hudson. He was disposed to take the best terms he 
could get. But the stipulation about moving before 2 
o'clock made Burgoyne suspicious. He determined to 
gain time, and appointed commissioners to arrange 
terms. Their negotiations continued until 11 p. m., at 
which hour the articles were agreed upon, the British 
commissioners giving their word that they would be 

Oct. is signed by Burgoyne. But when they returned to their 

camp at midnight Burgoyne had just learned from a 
deserter that Fort Montgomery had been captured and 
that part of Clinton's army had reached Kingston. Bur- 
goyne thereupon called his council together again and 
asked whether it was honorable to withdraw from a 
treaty definitely agreed upon by authorized commission- 
ers; fourteen officers thought it was dishonorable and eight 
that it was not. Burgoyne refused to be bound by their 
decision, and agreed with the minority. 1 He then asked 

1 The minutes of the council are given in Burgoyne's narrative, Appen- 
dix, pp. cii to cv. General Riedesel also wrote out, on September 18, 
his memorandum of the negotiations. Riedesel's Memoirs, pp. 175-184. 
Stedman (I, 385-392) gives verbatim the letters that were exchanged 
between Gates and Burgoyne. 



Camp ohfti-HUh Forces 

under "SW^cfcPv 





^V/J-3 British three gun batteries 
JS 2 " four mortar battery 
lj> 4 Redoubts to cover batteries 
5 Lines of approach 

Fort Schuyler 
Aug. 3-22, 1777 



Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company, 

Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio 

From Avery's History of the United States 

and Its People 




Forts Montgomery and Clinton 
Oct. 6, 1777 



Surrender of Burgoyne 
Oct. 17, 1777 



THE HUDSON 127 

whether the army would defend their position to the last 1777 
extremity. On this the opinions were conflicting, the 
majority inclining to the opinion that they would not. 
In order to gain more time, Burgoyne sent word to Gates 
early in the morning that he had heard that some of the 
American army had been sent to Albany, and in order to 
assure himself that he was surrounded by a force three or 
four times as numerous as his own, he wished to send one 
of his own officers to examine his force. This was more 
than Gates would stand, and he replied declining his re- 
quest, saying that he would show his army after the con- 
vention was signed, warning Burgoyne of the consequences 
of refusing to sign the articles agreed upon by authorized 
commissioners, and telling him if they were not signed "Articles of 

... , . . Convention" 

within an hour he would resort to extreme measures, signed 
Another council was then summoned, and, although opin- 
ions were still divided, Burgoyne decided to yield. He 
signed the articles 1 and sent them to Gates, who signed 
them in turn. 

The British and Hessians marched out of their camp oct. 17 
the following afternoon, laid down their arms and then 
marched through the American camp, where the troops 
were paraded under arms and then on toward Albany. 
The return, drawn up that day, showed 341 officers, 586 strength of 

-v. . the Surren- 

non-commissioned officers and 4,836 privates, a total of dered Army 
5,763. 2 Burgoyne gives a detailed statement of his total 
losses during the campaign, amounting (among the regu- 
lars, exclusive of Canadians and Indians) to 415 killed, 
911 wounded and 1,169 prisoners, a total of 2,495. 3 
The garrison of Ticonderoga and Crown Point escaped 

1 The original document is in the possession of the New York Historical 
Society. 

2 Dawson, 300. 3 Burgoyne, LI. 



128 



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 



1777 to Montreal. The Hudson was free down to Spuyten 
Duyvil. 

Ten times has the United States army received the 
capitulation of the armed force opposed to it, viz.: at 
Saratoga, Yorktown, Vera Cruz, City of Mexico, Donel- 
son, Vicksburg, Appomattox, Durham's Station, Santiago 
and Manila. Saratoga was the first, and it gave rise to 
an unfortunate controversy which was not the case in 
any of the others. In his first proposals Gates stipulated 
that Burgoyne's army "can only be allowed to surrender 
[as] prisoners of war." But later he agreed to a " Con- 
vention" instead of a " Capitulation," and its thirteen 
articles said nothing of prisoners of war. The essence of 
the convention was that all the troops, of whatever coun- 
try, under Burgoyne's command were "to march out of 
their camp, with the honors of war," and lay down their 
arms "by word of command of their own officers"; were 
then to march to Boston, and as soon as Howe should 
send transports to receive them, were to sail to England, 
"on condition of not serving again in North America 
during the present contest," unless they or any part of 
them should be exchanged by cartel. 1 As a matter of 
fact they were never sent to England, but were kept at 
Boston for a year, then sent to Charlottesville, Va., and 
after that to Lancaster, Pa., and other places. Mean- 
while each side charged the other with bad faith and a 
breach of the convention. 

The real trouble was that under the convention it was 

possible to send Burgoyne's army back to England for 

garrison duty, releasing fresh troops for service in Amer- 

oct. 20 ica. Burgoyne wrote a private letter to Germain, three 

'The convention in full is printed in Dawson, 303, 304; Riedesel, I, 
184-186. 



Controversy 
about the 
"Convention 
Troops" 



THE HUDSON 129 

days after the surrender, calling attention to this possi- 1777 
bility, and claiming great credit for " saving the army." l Nov. 5 
Gates seems not to have seen this point, but Washington's Nov. 13 
clear mind saw it the moment he read the document, and 
he wrote to Heath, 2 who commanded at Boston, pointing 
it out to him, and requiring him to insist on a rigid com- 
pliance by Burgoyne with his part of the terms. Howe 
did not like to send his ships so far away from New 
York, and presently he asked to have the point of em- 
barkation changed to Newport; but Washington refused 
to make any change. 3 If Howe could send his ships to 
Boston, and spare them for the long voyage to England, 
well and good; but there should be no change whatever Dec. 17 
in the terms. The matter presently came up in Congress, 
and that body resolved that the embarkation should not 
take place until the convention was explicitly ratified by 
the court of Great Britain. It charged that Burgoyne 1773 
had not surrendered all his "arms," because he had re- Jan. s 
tained or concealed his cartridge-boxes and colors, and 
Riedesel admits that he took the colors off their staffs, 
burned the latter and put the colors in his trunks. 4 
Howe complained that the prisoners were suffering for 
food and shelter, and Congress insisted that the British 
should pay for the provisions, and in gold at that, not in 
Continental currency. 5 

It was an unseemly controversy and many of the posi- 
tions taken by Congress were not tenable ; but it all arose 
from the trick by which Burgoyne tried to outwit Gates 
by a surrender which would result in bringing an equal 
number of fresh troops from England as fast as ships 

1 Burgoyne, XCVII. 3 Sparks, V, 144. 

3 Ibid., V, 234, 535-538. 4 Madame Riedesel's Memoirs, 161 

* Jour. Cont. Cong., IX, 1032; X, 35. 



130 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1777 could cross the ocean and back. The controversy dragged 
on for nearly four years, Burgoyne meanwhile going to 
England on parole, and taking his seat in Parliament 
where he defended before a committee his conduct while 
in America. More than four years after the surrender, in 
Dec. 17. nsi a debate in the House of Commons on the American war, 
he complained that he was still a prisoner of war. 1 Dur- 
ing all these four years the subject of " convention troops" 
was in controversy both in and out of Congress. Finally 
Congress turned the whole matter over to Washington. 2 
In the meantime most of the officers and a large part of 
the men had been gradually exchanged; and others, par- 
ticularly the Germans, were allowed to escape and settle 
in America, where they permanently remained, but some 
of them were still prisoners when peace came in 1783. 3 
The surrender of Burgoyne was of signal advantage to 
the American cause. It hastened the French alliance; it 
left the Hudson permanently in American control ; it put 
out of action more than one-fourth of the King's forces 
in America. It has been sufficiently pointed out that 
Burgoyne's plan, which he persuaded the King and the 
ministry to adopt, although the latter failed to advise 
Howe of his part in it, was inherently wrong and inevi- 
tably doomed to failure. With the means of transporta- 
tion then existing an army could not operate in a hostile 
country when separated from its base of supplies by 180 
miles of wilderness. Even if Howe had carried out the 
part originally assigned to him, the British disaster might 
have been greater than it was; for, remembering what 
Washington accomplished at Trenton and at Yorktown, 

1 Hansard, Pari. Hist, of England, XXII, 862. 

2 Jour. Cong., Ill, 46, 218. 

8 Sparks, VI, 257; Riedesel, II, 175. 



THE HUDSON 131 

it is quite possible that in the event of Howe going up ms 
the Hudson to join Burgoyne, Washington might have 
taken New York, cut Howe off from his ocean base and 
captured his army as well as Burgoyne's. The plan 
which offered the greatest chance of success in the spring 
of 1777 was the one that King George " greatly disliked" * 
and that Washington, with clear military insight, antici- 
pated and dreaded, viz. : to bring every man in America 
to New York, and with this overwhelming force to crush 
Washington. Could his army have been destroyed or 
scattered, the conquest of the Hudson and the separa- 
tion of New England from the Middle States would have 
been an easy task. 

1 P. 78, ante. 



CHAPTER V 
THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 1 

1778 The site of the encampment at Valley Forge is now an 

Military historical park owned by the State of Pennsylvania. 

of the position The house occupied by Washington and the other stone 
houses in the vicinity are in substantially the same con- 
dition as they were during the terrible winter of 1777- 
78; the lines of intrenchments and the redoubts in or 
adjacent to the works can still be distinctly traced. 2 
They follow the contour of wooded hills, which rise at 
their highest point to an altitude of 354 feet above the 
waters of the Schuylkill on the north and Valley Creek on 
the west. To the eastward the hills slope gently into an 
open country, to the north the slope is more abrupt 
and to the west it is precipitous. The length of the 
" inner line" of intrenchments was about a mile and a 
half, and they enclosed an irregular triangle of about 500 
acres between Valley Creek and the Schuylkill. But a 
large part of the troops were encamped, or hutted, out- 
side of these lines for a distance of two miles to the east- 
ward. From these positions, in case of attack, the troops 

1 The statue of Rochambeau in Lafayette Square, Washington, was 
unveiled in 1902; and in connection therewith Congress has published an 
elaborate memoir, edited by George de B. Keim, under the title of Rocham- 
beau, which contains much original data, not hitherto available, concern- 
ing the French troops and ships. 

2 See Annual Report Valley Forge Park Commission, 1906. 

132 




Valley Forge 
Dec. 19, 1777-June 17, 177J 




Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company, 
Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio 



From Avery's History of the United States 
and Its People 

Philadelphia 

Evacuated June 18, 1778 



THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 133 

could quickly retire within the main lines behind which 1778 
a very strong defence could be made. 

The distance, following the windings of the Schuylkill, 
from the mouth of Valley Creek to the Middle Ferry (now 
Market Street bridge in Philadelphia) was twenty-one 
miles; and by road, from Washington's outposts at Port 
Kennedy (at the mouth of Trout Creek) to those of 
Howe at Germantown, it was about sixteen miles. 

In this position, easily defensible, with a rich and long- 
settled agricultural region at his back from which to ob- 
tain supplies, and in which were already the crude begin- 
nings of what is now the great mineral and manufacturing 
district of Reading, Washington was on Howe's flank as 
he had been the previous winter at Morristown, and was 
prepared quickly to follow Howe should he make any 
move. 

The American army remained at Valley Forge just six Dec. 19, 1777, 
months — months of intense anxiety for the commander- mlO* 
in-chief and of terrible suffering for his men. It was 
destitute of shoes, clothing and provisions; it was not 
properly organized; it was deficient in knowledge of drill 
and manoeuvres; it had no proper system of account- Principal 
ability; its regiments and battalions were mere skele- 
tons and recruits were not forthcoming to fill them up. 1 
While Washington was working with all his energy to 
remedy these defects the wretched Conway Cabal was 
equally active in contemptible intrigues with Congress, 
the purpose of which was to displace Washington and 
substitute Gates as commander-in-chief. 

These were also months of great events in Europe; the 

1 The terrible winter at Valley Forge has been described in every history 
of the Revolution. Perhaps the most vivid picture of it is that given in 
Trevelyan, III, 294-302. 



134 



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 



1778 
Feb. 6 

March 

April 
Feb. 8 
March 8 
March 21 



Dec. 22 
Dec. 23 



Conway Cabal 



conclusion of the French alliance; the adoption by the 
British ministry and King of measures offering to the 
Colonies everything they had asked for except indepen- 
dence ; the despatch of commissioners to treat with Con- 
gress for peace on these terms; the resignation of Howe 
and the appointment of Sir Henry Clinton in his place; 
and the sending of instructions 1 to Clinton that "the war 
must be conducted on a different plan," the offensive to 
be abandoned, part of his force to be sent to the West 
Indies to attack the French at St. Lucia, part to Florida 
to retain the British possessions there, part to harry the 
New England coast towns, Philadelphia to be evacuated, 
everything to be concentrated at New York, and if in 
danger there — scuttle for Halifax. 2 

The campaign of 1777 marked the end of all active 
operations by the British in the Northern States. The 
war was to last five years longer, but the British strength 
was to be frittered away in disjointed movements at 
great distance from each other; and although the force 
at New York was to be maintained at a strength always 
at least fifty per cent greater than the Continentals under 
Washington, it was to remain all those years strictly on 
the defensive. 

At the beginning of the winter Washington wrote to 
Congress 3 two letters which conveyed a most graphic 
picture of his starving and naked army. Congress ap- 
pointed a committee 4 to go to Valley Forge; it remained 
there for several months, and in concert with it Washing- 
ton formulated plans for overcoming the defects above 
enumerated. As to the Conway Cabal, it was a contest 
of pygmies against a giant. Washington shattered and 



1 Sparks, V, 395, 548-551. 
3 Ibid., V, 192-203. 



2 Germain to Clinton, Sparks V, 550. 
4 Jour. Cont. Cong., IX, 1052. 



THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 135 

destroyed it by the sheer force of his lofty character and ms 
great services. Gates, indeed, had strength enough to 
secure his appointment two years later to the command 
of the Southern army, where, having no Arnold to lead 
his troops as at Saratoga, he speedily proved, to the com- 
plete satisfaction of all concerned, his shallowness and 
incapacity. But Mifflin, Conway and the rest were more 
quickly disposed of; Mifflin being without military em- 
ployment for nearly a year, then resigning and going to 
Congress where he had no influence; Conway, wounded 
in a duel, resigning his commission in the army, writing 
an abject apology to Washington and finally returning 
to Europe and disappearing forever from public view. 1 
No one ever ventured again to dispute the fact that 
Washington was the one indispensable man for the suc- 
cess of the Revolution, or to suggest any other name for 
the position of commander-in-chief. 

As to the more distinctly military problems at Valley 
Forge, Washington solved them one by one, so that when 
the army moved in June it was in a condition of military 
efficiency which it had never before approached. The 
most pressing questions were food and clothing. The 
country was not deficient in either, and the responsibil- 
ity for the destitute condition of the army was partly due 
to the unwise action of Congress and partly to the 
hopeless inefficiency of the quartermaster's department. 
The delegates in Congress, seldom more than twenty-five 1777 
present, were very jealous of a standing army, but they 
did not hesitate to pass the most despotic resolutions. 2 sept. 17 
Among others they ordered Washington "to take, wher- Nov - 14 
ever he may be, all such provisions and other articles Dec - 10 

1 Sparks, V, 517. J Ibid., V, 187, 406. 



136 



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 



1777 



Greene Ap- 
pointed 
Quartermaster- 
General 



March 23 



1778 

Washington 
to Greene, 
August 15, 
1780 



as may be necessary for the comfortable subsistence of 
the army under his command, paying or giving certifi- 
cates for the same"; 1 but it made no adequate provision 
for paying the certificates. To enforce this impressment 
with the utmost rigor was to deprive the army of the sup- 
port of the people. Washington exercised the despotic 
powers conferred upon him by this and previous resolu- 
tions with great prudence and much less vigorously than 
Congress demanded. 2 Such supplies as he did seize were 
never at the place wanted, for Mifflin, the quartermaster- 
general, had for six months practically abandoned the 
duties of his office, 3 and his department was in com- 
plete disorder. 4 In concert with the committee, Wash- 
ington prevailed upon Congress 5 to make better provi- 
sion for payment of the certificates; and jointly they 
persuaded Greene, much against his will, to perform 
the duties of quartermaster-general without vacating his 
position in the line. 6 Having accepted the task, he bent 
every energy to its successful accomplishment. Before 
the army moved in June he had established a line of 
depots or magazines of supplies in rear of the army from 
the Head of Elk to the North River, 7 and as Washington 
expressed it, "by extraordinary exertions you [he] so 
arranged it as to enable the army to take the field the 
moment it was necessary, and to move with rapidity 
after the enemy." 8 
The deficiencies in drill, organization, discipline and 

1 Jour. Cont. Cong., VIII, 752; IX, 905, 1014. 

2 Sparks, V, 187, 188. 3 G. W. Greene, II, 20, 43, 49. 

* Report of committee of Congress, February 12, 1778. Original is in 
handwriting of Joseph Reed; a complete copy is published in Life and 
Correspondence of Joseph Reed, I, 360. 

5 Jour. Cont. Cong., X, 210, 223, 224, 325. 

6 Ibid., X, 210. 7 G. W. Greene, II, 57. 
8 Sparks, VII, 153. 



THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 137 

accountability were overcome by the fortunate arrival of 1778 
a thoroughly competent man, Steuben, who had served Feb. 23 
at Prague and Rossbach and the other battles of the Seven 
Years' war, on the personal staff of the great Frederick, steuben 
He joined Washington as a volunteer, and later, when he inspector- 

. . c i • • i General 

had proved his entire competency for the position, he 
was appointed inspector-general of the army. 1 He in- May 27 
troduced a definite plan (which Congress subsequently 
approved) of organization in the infantry, artillery, cav- 
alry and engineers; he devised a system of accounta- 
bility for public property which resulted in enormous 
saving; he taught the troops how to take care of their 
arms ; he gave them their first drill-book 2 and regulations 
for troops in active service; he personally drilled them 
until they could execute manoeuvres with creditable ex- 
actness. 3 It was to do these things that he had been 
selected and sent over by the French ministers. 4 In 
view of their plans to aid the American cause with men, 
munitions and money, they wished to improve the mili- 
tary efficiency of the American army. There was proba- 
bly not a man in the whole world more competent for 
this task than Steuben. 

In order to increase the strength of his army, Wash- 
ington succeeded, in spite of much insubordinate opposi- 
tion on the part of Gates and Putnam 5 in bringing to Washington 
■n /-^ 1 to Putnam- 

Valley I orge the greater part 01 the Continentals that Nov. 19, 1777 

had been at Saratoga. The militia, which had formed 
more than half of Gates's army, went home soon after 

1 Kapp, Steuben, 52, 192-273; Sparks, V, 526, 529; Jour. Cont. Cong., 
XI, 465, 514, 538, 543, 550. 

2 Kapp, Steuben, 200-214. 
s Ibid., 52, 192-273. 

'Ibid., 68, 69; Sparks, V, 527. 

6 Sparks, V, 125, 161, 162; Sparks, Letters, II, 536-544. 



138 



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 



1778 



Recruits for 
the Army, 
Feb. 26, 1778 



British Peace 
Commission 



the surrender. Moreover, these Continentals, like those 
already at Valley Forge, were depleted to a mere fraction 
of their normal strength. In order to fill up the ranks, 
Congress, which had hitherto "recommended" to the 
States to furnish their quota, now undertook to "require 
forthwith" the States to do this by means of a draft. 1 
Effectually to carry out a draft required powers and ad- 
ministrative organization far beyond those possessed by 
the Congress under the Articles of Confederation; and 
it is probable that the personal appeals which Washing- 
ton made all through this winter and spring to the 
governors of States, Jonathan Trumbull in Connecti- 
cut, George Clinton in New York, Thomas Wharton in 
Pennsylvania, Patrick Henry 2 in Virginia, and others, 
had more effect than the resolutions of Congress, how- 
ever commanding their language might be. Between 
them all, however, a certain number of recruits were 
obtained. The committee of Congress led Washington 
to believe that the 104 battalions (16 Continental and 
88 State "line") which existing laws then authorized 
would produce an army of 40,000 men for the year's 
campaign. 3 In fact they produced barely half that 
number. 

As for the British Peace Commission, headed by the 
Earl of Carlisle, which arrived at Philadelphia, it was two 
years too late. The French alliance bound each country 
not to make peace without the consent of the other, nor 
without acknowledgment by Great Britain of the inde- 
pendence of the United States. 4 Congress refused to 



1 Jour. Cont. Cong., X, 200. 

2 Sparks, IV, 477; V, 9, 146, 239, 252. 
» Ibid., V, 314. 

♦Treaty of Alliance, February 7, 1778. 
the United States, 308. 



Treaties and Conventions of 



THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 139 

treat on any other terms, 1 and the mission was a ridicu- 1778 
lous failure. 

The motives which induced France to make the Feb. 6 
alliance cannot be discussed here. The signing of the 
treaty was due to the campaign of 1777, resulting in the 
capture of Burgoyne's army on the Hudson and to the 
fierce, if inconclusive, battles around Philadelphia. It French 
necessarily involved the prompt despatch to America of 
a considerable land and naval force by France. 

At the beginning of June, therefore, Clinton, who had May 11 
relieved Howe in the command, began to make prepa- 
rations for evacuating Philadelphia. Washington was 
watching him like a hawk. As at Trenton, his service 
of information seems to have been remarkably efficient. 
Everything of importance that transpired in Philadelphia, 
either in the way of events or of plans under discussion, 
came to the knowledge of Washington within forty-eight 
hours or less. 2 

At this time the British force in the United States strength of 
numbered 33,756; made up of 18,174 British regulars, Armies ° 
11,007 Hessians and 4,575 Provincials; and they were 
stationed, 19,530 at Philadelphia, 10,456 at New York March 26 
and 3,770 at Newport. 3 The American regular force, or 
"Continental line" and the State "lines," according to 
the returns which Washington laid before a council of 
war, were about 15,000, of whom 11,800 were at Valley 
Forge, 1,400 at Wilmington and 1,800 on the Hudson. 
Washington thought that he could get enough additional 
recruits to bring the entire force up to 20,000. At this 

1 Jour. Conk Cong., XI, 701, 702. 

2 Sparks, V, 377, 393, 409. 

3 The returns of the British army, copied from the State Paper Office in 
London, at various periods from 1777 to 1782, are given in Sparks, Writings 
of Washington, V, 542-545. 



140 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1778 council, after a long discussion, it was decided not to 
May 8 attack Philadelphia, but to wait events. 1 The army at 

Valley Forge was organized into four divisions under 
Greene, Stirling, Lafayette and Wayne. Lee, who had 
recently been exchanged, was again on duty as second 
in command. Steuben was inspector-general. 
May is With a view to watching the first move in the expected 

evacuation of Philadelphia, Washington threw out an 
advance guard between the Schuylkill and the Delaware. 2 
It was composed of Lafayette's division, numbering about 
2,100 men and 5 guns. They advanced to a hamlet 
known as Barren Hill, about 11 miles from Valley Forge 
and only 2 miles from Clinton's outposts at Chestnut 
Hill. In selecting Lafayette, who was not yet twenty- 
one years old, for this important duty, Washington doubt- 
less intended a compliment to France. But within forty- 
eight hours he was in mortal dread lest the outcome 
might be anything but pleasing to France. For, from 
the top of the high hill at Valley Forge, he saw, across the 
rolling ground between him and Barren Hill, the smoke 
of skirmishes and the dust of marching columns, which 
showed that the young marquis was in full retreat toward 
a ford on the Schuylkill and in imminent danger of being 
cut off. 

Clinton had, in fact, planned to capture Lafayette and 
came very near doing it. He had sent Grant with about 
5,000 men via Whitemarsh to come in rear of Lafayette's 
skirmishat left, Grey with about 2,000 men to cross the Schuylkill 
and come behind Lafayette's right, while with a consider- 
able force under his own command he marched through 
Germantown and Chestnut Hill to attack Lafayette in 

1 Sparks, V, 360. 

2 Washington's instructions to Lafayette, Sparks, V, 368. 



Barren Hill 



THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 141 

front. These movements were made during the night; 177s 
and early the next morning Lafayette was nearly sur- May 20 
rounded by a force about five times greater than his own. 
He extricated himself from this dangerous situation with 
no little adroitness; 1 and although Grant was nearer to 
Matson's ford (now Conshohocken) than Lafayette was, 
the latter, by skilful feints of his rear guard against both 
Grant and Clinton, marched by the longer road (through 
Manatawna), got past the head of Grey's column and 
crossed Matson's ford (Conshohocken) in safety. He 
took a strong position on the heights on the south bank 
of the Schuylkill, while Washington assembled every 
man at Valley Forge to march to his assistance. Thanks 
to Steuben's drills, they were all under arms in fifteen 
minutes. But notwithstanding his enormous superiority 
in force, Clinton did not cross the ford nor attack. He 
retired almost immediately to Germantown; and Lafay- 
ette returned to Valley Forge. Clinton lost 2 men killed 
and 7 or 8 wounded, and Lafayette's losses were about 
the same. 

The foolish Mischianza in honor of Howe took place the May is 
same day that Lafayette moved to Barren Hill; and a May 25 
week later Howe sailed for England. Clinton began 
loading his transports with his heavy baggage, and early 
in June several vessels had dropped down the river. 
Washington was fully informed of this; he was more 
than ever on the alert; frequent councils of war were 
held; and preparations were made to move promptly as 
soon as Clinton made any movement. 2 

Finally, the transports being loaded with all they could Evacuation of 

, ,. , , , . , . Philadelphia 

carry, including some cavalry and the Anspach regiment, 

1 Sparks, V, 377, 546; Irving's Washington, III, 407. 

2 Sparks, V, 393, 395, 398, 403. 



142 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1778 which it was feared would desert on the march, 1 Clinton 

June is, assembled his troops just south of Philadelphia, crossed 

the Delaware to Gloucester Point and marched out to 

iq a. m. Haddonfield, 5 miles. 2 Washington had information of 

this within a few hours; and early in the afternoon 6 

brigades, 3 under Lee and 3 following under Wayne, had 

June i9, marched from Valley Forge. Washington with all the 

Marches from rest of his army marched at 5 o'clock the next morning. 

This was the first fruit of Greene's work as quartermaster 

and Steuben's as drill-master. 

Washington believed that Clinton would move to New 
Brunswick, cross the Raritan, then march to Amboy and 
cross the Kills to Staten Island. 2 Such was exactly 
Clinton's plan. It was therefore a race for New Bruns- 
wick, and a very pretty race it was. The distance was 
58 miles from Philadelphia, 66 miles from Valley Forge. 
The roads were rather better on Washington's line of 
march; the weather was the same for both — intense 
heat (the thermometer exceeding 100° F. in the sun) 
alternating with violent showers. 
June 24 On the sixth day Clinton had advanced only 34 miles, 

and was in the vicinity of Allentown, 2 about 10 miles 
east of Trenton. Washington was squarely in front of 
him, 3 having marched 47 miles, crossing the Delaware at 
Coryell's ferry (Lambertville), 15 miles above Trenton; 
his main body was north and east of Princeton, and Max- 
well's brigade and the New Jersey militia were in contact 
with Clinton, 4 breaking down the bridges, blockading the 
roads and otherwise obstructing his march. 

Clinton therefore had to change his plan and make 
Sandy Hook instead of New Brunswick his objective. 

1 Lowell, Hessians, 212. 2 Clinton's Report, Dawson, 415. 

3 Sparks, V, 409, 411, 416, 422^23. 4 Ibid., V, 423. 



THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 143 

He put all his baggage, wheeled vehicles and pack-horses ms 
under Knyphausen; and turning to the right at Allen- The Two 
town he sent them forward on the road which leads c™tSt m 
through Freehold village, or Monmouth Court House, to 
Sandy Hook. Hitherto he had been able to move his 
columns on parallel roads, but now he had only a single 
road, and his impedimenta stretched out for a length of 
12 miles. The armed force with Knyphausen consisted 
of a regiment of cavalry, a battalion of light infantry, 2 
brigades of British, 2 brigades of Hessians, and some 
Provincials. In spite of the heat and the deep sandy 
roads, Knyphausen reached Freehold — 19 miles — on the 
second morning. 1 Clinton followed him 2 with a regiment 
of cavalry, a battalion of light infantry, 3 battalions of June 26 
grenadiers and 3 British brigades. He arrived at Free- 
hold the same afternoon. 

The whole force then rested a day in a fairly strong de- 
fensible position on both sides of Monmouth Court House, 2 June 27 
their flanks protected by pine woods and their front by 
streams and morasses. 

Washington on the previous day was at Cranberry, 8 
miles east and south of Princeton, with his main body; 
and his advance guard of nearly 4,000 men, under Lafay- 
ette, was on the Monmouth road about 5 miles in rear of 
Clinton, with orders to attack their rear guard. But as 
Lafayette was too far separated from the main body, 
Washington drew him off to the north toward English- 
town, 6 miles west of Monmouth. At Lee's request 
Washington sent him with two more brigades to join 
Lafayette; and on his arrival Lee, as senior officer, was 
in command. 3 

1 Clinton's Report, Dawson, 415. 

2 Sparks, V, 424. » Ibid., V, 423. 



144 



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 



1778 
June 27 



June 27 



Battle of 
Monmouth 



June 2S 

5 A. M. 
8 A. M. 



10 a. M. 



11.30 A. M. 



At the close of this day, therefore, the positions were as 
follows: Clinton and Knyphausen, about 15,000 men, 
on the Monmouth plain and the hills just south of it, 
facing west; Lee with the advance, 5,000 men and 12 
guns, at Englishtown; and Washington with his main 
body, 6,000 men, between Cranberry and English- 
town. 

About 10 or 12 miles north of Monmouth (Freehold) 
the country is broken, the Middletown hills rising to an 
altitude of about 400 feet and affording a number of good 
defensible positions. Washington was very anxious to 
attack Clinton while he was still in the low ground and 
before he could reach these hills. He therefore sent ex- 
plicit orders 1 that evening to Lee to have his men in 
readiness for attack, intending to march with the main 
body at daylight to his support. 

The next morning Knyphausen resumed his march, 
and as soon as his column was stretched out Clinton 
followed. 2 Washington heard of it and put his own 
troops in motion at sunrise, at the same time sending an 
order to Lee to attack Clinton. Lee moved forward rather 
leisurely, and began a skirmish with Clinton's rear guard 
about a mile north of the Court House; but instead of 
making a vigorous attack he gave a number of contra- 
dictory orders and then ordered a retreat. 3 The officers 
and men were astonished, and fearing that something 
was wrong the retreat soon became disorderly. Wash- 
ington, galloping ahead of his main body, met the fugi- 
tives about three miles east of Englishtown 4 and the same 
distance west of the Court House where Lee had had his 



1 Sparks, V, 420, 424, 425. 

2 Clinton's Report, Dawson, 416. 

3 Sparks, V, 420, 424, 425. 



4 Ibid., V, 419. 



THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 145 

skirmish. He soon encountered Lee, and there is little ms 
doubt that Washington's passionate nature, which he Battle of 
usually controlled by his strong will, for once got the ju™™™ 1 
better of him. All accounts agree that strong language 
was used, but the exact words are in dispute. Dawson 
quotes Lafayette as saying — on his visit to Vice-President 
Daniel D. Tompkins at his house in New York on August 
15, 1824, forty-six years after the event — that Washington Meeting of 
called Lee "a damned poltroon." 1 If ever profanity is andTcharies 
justifiable, it was then. Here were the fruits of Washing- 
ton's labors with the committee of Congress to establish 
the army on an efficient basis, of Greene's work as quar- 
termaster to put it in condition to march, of Steuben's 
instruction in drill and discipline — all in danger of being 
lost by the combined incapacity, cowardice and treason 
of this damnable Charles Lee. While Arnold, two years 
later on the Hudson, planned an infamous stroke which, 
had it succeeded, might have proved serious, yet what 
Arnold actually accomplished in injury of the American 
cause was but a slight fraction of the mischief caused by 
Lee on this hot Sunday morning at Monmouth. In spite 
of Clinton's numerical superiority, had Lee attacked him 
vigorously and held him at the Court House until Wash- 
ington came up, Washington would have passed around 
Clinton's right flank between Monmouth and Middle- 
town, penetrated between Clinton and Knyphausen and 
in all probability have captured a large part of Clinton's 
command. 

But the mischief was done, and, without wasting more 
words on Lee, Washington rode forward toward the rear 
of the retreating troops and personally halted and re- 
formed them, establishing a line, north and west of the 

1 Dawson, 408. 



146 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1778 parsonage, between the two morasses. 1 Clinton mean- 
Battie of while had turned back all his own force and had sent to 
June 28 Knyphausen for a regiment of cavalry and a brigade of 

infantry. 2 With this combined force he deployed on 
both sides of the road from Monmouth to Englishtown 
and attacked the line which Washington had established 
between the two morasses. 3 But the main body had now 
arrived; and it went into action, Greene on the right, 
Stirling on the left and Washington himself in the centre, 
on the road. Severe fighting continued throughout the 
i to 5.3o p.m. blazing afternoon — so intense was the heat that many 
men on both sides dropped dead without being wounded. 4 
Clinton first tried to turn the American left, then their 
right; each time without success. Finally, Lieutenant - 
Colonel Monckton led his grenadiers in a fierce assault 
against Wayne, who was posted in an orchard on an 
eminence on the north side of the road, about 400 yards 
north of the parsonage. Monckton was killed and the 
attack failed. 5 

Toward sunset the British retired a short distance to 
reform and take up a strong defensive position with 
both flanks protected by small streams. Simultaneously 
Washington withdrew to the west side of the west morass 
or ravine, intending to reform his men and attack Clinton 

1 Most of the maps in Sparks's Writings of Washington are fairly accurate. 
But the one in Vol. V, p. 430, is very defective in topography and otherwise. 
It was copied into Lossing, Irving and other histories and was probably 
the cause of much of the difficulty expressed by various writers as to under- 
standing the battle of Monmouth. The accompanying map gives the 
topography as delineated on the maps of the U. S. Geological Survey; and 
the positions of the troops are based upon Dawson's and Carrington's 
analyses of the testimony at the court-martial of Lee. 

2 Clinton's Report, Dawson, 416; Carrington, Battles of American 
Revolution, 423-449. 

s Clinton's Report, Dawson, 416. 

* Sparks, V, 426, 427. 8 Lossing, II, 157. 





'LafayeliePa ) 
Position 
after the Retredt 



3 'A 1 / g ' 3/4 1 

Scale of one Mile 

THE M.-N. WORKS 









Gen.Lafayette'8"- \b X \ // 

Encampment *.\Capt. McLean 

SO Indians/^ 



«' 
V 



Picket i 



-Jib' Picket^S 



\ 



— 



Barren Hill 

May 20, 1778 




C0UrteS VuUs h h e efs:c?eTera r n O d the o r hiS° mPaDy ' MoNMOUTH F '° m ^^'^^V/o^ "^ ^ 

June 27, 1778 



THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 147 

on both flanks. But night came on before these disposi- ms 
tions could be perfected, and the attack was postponed 
until morning. 

When day broke the British had disappeared; 1 they j u .ie29 
had moved at midnight and were well on their way to the 
Middletown heights. Although in close contact with the cnnton 
enemy, the American troops had slept so soundly, ex- 
hausted with the intense heat and the battle of the 
previous day, that they had not heard the British as 
they moved away. In the broken country of the Mid- 
dletown heights there was no chance of successful as- 
sault, and Washington therefore did not pursue. Clinton 
reached Sandy Hook in safety, 2 and simultaneously Lord 
Howe arrived with his ships from the Delaware. On these 
the troops were transported up the bay to New York. 3 

Clinton reported his losses at 124 dead, 170 wounded 
and 64 missing; and he claimed that nearly half his dead . 
had perished from the heat. But Washington stated 
that the number of British buried — " according to the re- 
turns of the parties assigned to that duty" — was 249. 4 
He wrote to Arnold — who, on account of his wound re- 
ceived at Bemis' Heights, was unable to move with the 
army and had been sent into Philadelphia to take com- 
mand and perserve order there — that Clinton's losses 
during his retreat must have been at least 2,000, includ- 
ing 600 Hessians who had deserted during the march and 
gone back to Philadelphia, thenceforth to become good 
American citizens. Washington reported his own losses 
at 58 killed, 161 wounded and 131 missing. 4 

Washington's army remained a few days at English- 
town, and thence moved by easy marches through Bruns- 

1 Sparks, V, 427, 428, 429. 2 Clinton's Report, Dawson, 417. 

3 Mahan, 360. * Sparks, V, 428; Dawson, 415. 



148 



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 



July 21 

Court-Mart ial 
of Charles Lee 



Dec. 5 



1778 wick and Paramus to the Hudson, crossed the river at 
Haverstraw and established itself at White Plains. 

Charles Lee was promptly put in close arrest and 
brought to trial for disobedience of orders, misbehavior 
before the enemy and disrespect to the commander-in- 
chief. 1 The court-martial moved with the army, hold- 
ing its sittings from day to day for a period of six weeks. 
The court found him guilty of all three charges, and im- 
posed the ridiculously inadequate sentence of suspension 
from rank for twelve months. The proceedings went to 
Congress for ratification, and that body held it under 
consideration for nearly four months. Then, by a vote 
of 16 to 7 (Massachusetts, under the lead of Samuel 
Adams, and Georgia voting No; New Jersey, Maryland 
and Virginia being divided and casting no vote, and six 
States, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, Pennsyl- 
vania, North Carolina, South Carolina voting Ay), Con- 
gress grudgingly directed the sentence to "be carried 
into execution." 2 Just as his sentence was expiring, 
Lee committed the heinous offence of writing a disrespect- 
ful letter to Congress, whereupon that body, without a 
Jan. io. 1780 roll-call, unanimously passed a resolution that they 
"have no further occasion for his services in the army of 
the United States." 3 Lee retired to his farm in Virginia 
and occupied the remaining six years of his life in 
making scurrilous attacks upon Washington and writing 
a blasphemous will. 4 

While Clinton was retreating from Philadelphia to New 
York — and for many weeks before — a French squadron 

1 Court- Martial of Charles Lee, printed by order of Congress, August 21, 
1778. Reprinted in 1823 and 1824. Jour. Cont. Cong., XII, 1287. 

2 Jour. Cont. Cong., XII, 1195. 

3 Jour. Cong., Ill, 421. 

4 Sparks, V, 552-558; VI. 309; Life and Memoirs of Charles Lee, 160 



THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 149 

of 12 ships of the line and 5 frigates, mounting 834 guns ms 
and carrying 4,000 soldiers, was on its way across the 
Atlantic. It had sailed from Toulon and after a voyage April 15 
of 84 days had arrived at the capes of the Delaware. 1 juiys 
Lord Howe, who commanded the British fleet and trans- 
ports, had been gone 10 days. 1 He knew that the French 
fleet was on the way, and he had thrown into the work of Arrival of the 
loading Clinton's transports and moving them to New 
York that necessary energy of which his brother Sir 
William had shown so great a lack. The commander of 
the French fleet was Comte d'Estaing, who had served in 
the army until his thirtieth year and then been trans- 
ferred to the navy "with the premature rank of rear- 
admiral." He lacked the sailor's training, and his cap- 
tains were jealous of him. 2 

After sending the French minister up the Delaware in July 11 
one of his ships, d'Estaing sailed northward and anchored 
in the ocean just south of Sandy Hook. Washington 
sent his aides, 3 first Laurens and then Hamilton, to wel- 
come d'Estaing and explain his views as to co-operation. 
Lord Howe, having carried Clinton's army to New York, 
hastened back to his ships and anchored inside the Hook. 
The two fleets were in plain view of each other, across the 
low narrow strip of sand just south of the Hook. Lord 
Howe had only 9 ships of the line to d'Estaing's 12, and 
534 guns to his 834; but he was a sailor — as d'Estaing 
was not 4 — and he was determined to dispute the entrance 
of the French fleet to the last. 

D'Estaing remained there eleven days. In letters to 
Washington and to Congress, filled with profuse com- 

1 Mahan, 359, 360; Sparks, V, 440. 

3 Chevalier, Hist, de la Marine Francaise, quoted by Mahan, 371. 

3 Sparks, VI, 1-5. 4 Mahan, 360, 363, 364. 



150 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1778 pliments, he explained the difficulty of crossing the bar, 
and said that he offered the pilots 50,000 crowns 1 if they 
would promise success. But Mahan says that "d'Es- 
taing's heart failed him under the discouragement of the 

juiy 22 pilots; he gave up the attack and stood away to the 

southward." Mahan intimates that with Nelson or 
Farragut in d'Estaing's place, the result might have 
been very different. Probable it is that if d'Estaing 
had smashed the British fleet in New York and united 
his 4,000 soldiers to those of Washington on the north 
side of Harlem River, Clinton's army — on Manhattan 
Island and without ships — would have been caught like 
rats in a trap, and not a man would have escaped. 

Attack on It had been arranged between d'Estaing and Wash- 

ington's aides 2 that if it was not feasible to cross the bar 
at Sandy Hook a combined land and naval movement 
should be made against Newport, where General Pigott 
was in command of about 3,000 men, part of those who 
had captured Newport under Clinton in 1776. 3 D'Estaing 

jm y 29 sailed thither and at the end of a week anchored off Point 

Judith. 4 Sullivan had been in command at Providence 
since the adjournment of the court which had inquired 
into his conduct at the Brandywine and on Staten Island 

juiy 17 and had acquitted him. He had about 1,000 Continentals 

under his command, and Washington wrote to him "to 
apply in the most urgent manner in my [his] name" to 
the New England States to raise 5,000 militia — or more. 
The militia turned out so promptly that within thirty 
days Sullivan had 7,000 of them, with John Hancock at 

jmy 22 their head. Washington then put Lafayette in com- 

1 Sparks, VI, 12. 

2 Sparks, VI, 12; Sparks, Letters, II, 155, 159. 

3 Page 62, ante. * Mahan, 361. 



THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 151 

mand of two brigades and directed him to march to ms 
Providence; and a few days later he sent Greene to Juiy27 
Rhode Island (his own State) and instructed Sullivan that 
his entire force, Continentals and militia, was to be 
divided into two divisions, of which Greene would com- 
mand one and Lafayette the other. 1 

The result of these dispositions was to assemble a force 
of about 10,000 men under Sullivan's command. Un- 
fortunately they did not arrive until about ten days after 
d'Estaing; and when d'Estaing sailed into Narragansett 
Bay, between Newport and Jamestown, and was pre- Aug. 8 
paring to land his soldiers a few miles north of Newport, 
and join Sullivan who had brought his troops to the 
same point, Lord Howe appeared off Point Judith. 2 
With his customary energy he had sailed from New York 
for Newport as soon as he heard that d'Estaing had gone 
there. When the latter saw the masts of Howe's ships 
in the distance, he promptly decided to fight the British 
fleet before aiding Sullivan. Sullivan protested, but the 
French captains were a unit in insisting upon it; and 
when the wind changed to the north-east d'Estaing Aug. io 
sailed out to meet Howe. 3 He carried his 4,000 soldiers 
with him; but why he should have wished to be encum- 
bered with them in a naval action has never been ex- 
plained. The two fleets manoeuvred off Block Island Aug. 12 
for the weather-gage for nearly two days, and then a 
furious gale arose and scattered both French and English 
ships. Several ships were dismasted, and the damage 
was so serious that Howe had to return to New York. 
D'Estaing came back to Newport, but only to announce Aug. 20 

1 Sparks, VI, 6. 

2 Mahan, 361-364; Sparks, 29, 40, 41; Sparks, Letters, II, 176-179. 

3 Sparks, VI, 29. 



152 



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 



1778 



Aug. 22 



Dissension 
Between the 
Allies. 



Aug. 24 



Aug. 15 



Aug. 28 



his intention of proceeding to Boston for repairs. 1 Greene 
and Lafayette urged him to land his troops and attack 
the British; after that he could refit his squadron either 
in Newport or in Boston. But d'Estaing would not 
yield, and sailed away. 2 

Bad blood was thus stirred up between the allies at the 
very start. Washington, with his usual calmness and 
good judgment, tried to restore good feeling; and Greene 
and Lafayette ably seconded his efforts. But Sullivan 
was so angry that he was most indiscreet. He not only 
filed a written protest with d'Estaing, but he published 
an order to his troops expressing the hope that America 
would be "able to procure with her own arms that which 
her allies refused to assist her in obtaining." 2 When 
the militia read this they made up their minds that the 
expedition would fail and that they might as well go 
home; and more than 5,000 of them went off within a 
few days. 

When d'Estaing had gone out to meet Howe, Sullivan 
had decided not to delay his operations; 3 and he ad- 
vanced his men to within two miles of the British lines 
just north of Newport. During the ensuing week he 
prosecuted siege operations against the British redoubts 
and lines in the vicinity of Easton's Pond, and for several 
days a vigorous artillery fire was exchanged between the 
two lines. But when d'Estaing's fleet sailed away and 
the militia went home there was nothing for Sullivan to 
do but to extricate himself from his difficult position as 
best he could — and without delay. Accordingly he re- 
treated during the night to the northern end of the 
island, and there took position in the lines which had 



Mahan, 362-364. 
Sparks, V, 41, 45, 47. 



Sullivan's Report, Dawson, 439. 




American Forces in Blue 
British Forces in Red 
First Position in battle „ 
Setond Position in battle C3 



Major Lee 1 



auxhall Bridge 



Gen.Knyphausen 



4l 



Battle of Springfield 
June 23, 1780 



»i» 



V V 



Gen.Mathew 



Connecticut Farms ., 
burned at first attempt 
ctgpinst Morristowy 
^~June 7, 17S0 



A. British Fort on Castine Pen. 

B. Fort erected by British naval 
commander to protect 
communications after 
driven to 3rd position 

C. Battery captured by 
Americans July 28 r 

D. Batterv engaged July 27 

E. British Camp 

F. Americans land and establish 
intrenchments, July 28 

G. Naval action July 2-5 
British tieet to 1. 

H. Battery causes British fleet 
to withdraw to J. July 28 




Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company. Publishers, Cleveland, Oh 
From Avery's History of the United States and Its People 



Penobscot 
Tulv 2C. I77Q 




British 
ONG ISL** 



' 



New London 
Sept. 7, 1 78 1 







.Advance of 
British Army from Staten Island 

Springfield 
June 23, 1780 




Newport 
Aug. 29, I77 8 




Bridge of; 
Boats/ 



entrenchment^ th rown 

up by Knyphausen after 

his retregfof June 7, 

Newark Bay 



STATEN V ISLAND 




it . 

Part orSritisk ' " ^=i^J^± 
Enr.amnmerit~~ ~.^ VU^» 

around New York ^ JyJ a^J, 



THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 153 

originally been fortified by the British, just south of ms 
Butt's Hill. 1 At daylight Pigott moved after him in Battle of 
two columns, the British on the east road and the Hes- 
sians on the west road. As soon as he came up with Aug. 29 
Sullivan's outposts and "light parties," skirmishing 7 a.m. 
began. These were driven back and then Pigott made 
a vigorous attack by the west road against Sullivan's 
right flank, which was commanded by Greene. The 9 a.m. 
firing continued here for several hours and the British 
brought their entire force into action and supported it by 
a flanking fire from some ships in the bay. 2 But Greene 
had two veteran brigades — Glover's famous Marblehead 
fishermen and Varnum's Rhode Island regiments which 
had marched to Cambridge more than three years before 
and been in constant service ever since; in addition 
to these was Cornell's militia and a regiment of Rhode 
Island negroes commanded by Christopher Greene. 
They all made a good defence, and the whole force of 
British and Hessians could not dislodge them. During 
the afternoon the firing ceased. Both armies remained 
within a short distance of each other during the night 
and following day. 3 Pigott sent back to Newport for Aug. 30 
his artillery and intended to attack again as soon as it 
arrived. 4 But during the morning Sullivan received a 
letter from Washington telling him that Lord Howe had 
sailed from New York with reinforcements; and later in 
the clay report was received that the British fleet had 
been sighted off Block Island. He decided to withdraw 
to the main-land, and during the night succeeded in doing 
so without loss, a portion of his force crossing to Bristol, 

1 Sullivan's Report, Dawson, 439. 2 Pigott's Report, Dawson, 442. 

3 Sullivan's Report, Dawson, 440, 441; Sparks, Corr., II, 179-204. 
* Pigott's Report, Dawson, 442, 443. 



154 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1778 but the greater part to Tiverton. His losses were 30 

killed, 137 wounded and 44 missing; and those of Pigott, 

38 killed, 210 wounded and 12 missing. 1 

Aug. 31 Within a few hours of Sullivan's retreat to Tiverton, 

Lord Howe's fleet, carrying Sir Henry Clinton and 5,000 

of his men, dropped anchor in Newport harbor. This 

increased the strength of the British garrison to about 

11,000 men. The rest of Sullivan's militia now went 

home, and with his 1,200 Continentals he withdrew to 

Providence. Clinton made no attempt to follow him, 

but taking part of his men on the ships, he harried the 

towns along the shores of Long Island Sound. 2 

Nov. 4 D'Estaing finally completed the repairs of his ships at 

Departure Boston and then sailed for Martinique, still keeping his 

Fleet? renc 4,000 soldiers with him. 3 And on the same day Clinton 

despatched from New York to St. Lucia the 5,000 men 

which he had been ordered to send there. During the 

winter Lafayette, after vainly endeavoring to secure 

jaa. li, 1779 Washington's approval to a project for the reconquest of 

Canada, sailed back to France. 4 

The close of the year thus saw the French and English 
renewing their ancient strife, and the seat of war trans- 
ferred to the West Indies. 

The French alliance, which many thought would 
promptly end the war, brought at first little but distrust 
and recrimination. Whether the French admiral had 
instructions similar to those given the minister of France 
— to be guided by French and not entirely by American 
interests — is not known; but Gerard had been his guest 
on his flag-ship for twelve weeks, and it is probable that 

1 Sullivan's Report, Pigott's Report, Dawson, 438, 444. 

2 Sparks, VI, 63. 

3 Mahan, 365. * Sparks, VI, 190, 545-556. 



THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 155 

d'Estaing knew his instructions. 1 To have brought peace ms 
so quickly and without an attempt to regain Canada for 
the French would perhaps not have accorded entirely 
with the French plans. Nor have we the slightest ground 
to complain of this. Every nation must act for its own 
interests first, and even exclusively. It was our good 
fortune that it was the interest of France to aid America 
in order to injure Great Britain; and its aid was of im- 
mense value in enabling America to gain what it desired. 2 

The military operations of the next four years at the 
North were of minor importance and can only be briefly 
summarized. 

The British army occupied New York and Newport 1773-79 
during the first winter; and Washington disposed his c a m P at 
troops in cantonments at Middlebrook (now Bound Brook) 
Elizabeth, Ramapo, West Point, Fishkill and Danbury. 3 
They were dispersed in this fashion for the purposes of 
subsistence, but they were in supporting distance, and 
could be concentrated quickly if Clinton made any move 
into New Jersey, up the Hudson or into New England. 
The cantonments formed a semicircle of forty miles' 
radius around Clinton at New York; and they guarded 

1 Mahan, 359. 

2 Lafayette's plan for the reconquest of Canada was submitted by him to 
Congress, and received the formal approval of that body October 22, 1778. 
Precise instructions were sent four days later to Franklin to govern his 
conduct as minister in France; and among these instructions were the 
complete plans for the invasion of Canada. At the same time Congress 
asked Washington for his views on the subject. In a far-sighted letter, 
dated November 14, 1778, he replied, opposing the project with such un- 
answerable arguments that it was abandoned. In this letter Washington 
uses these words — as true and as significant to-day as the day they were 
written — " It is a maxim, founded on the universal experience of mankind, 
that no nation is to be trusted further than it is bound by its interest." 
Sparks, VI, 107, 110; Jour. Cont. Con^., 1039-1048. 

3 Sparks, I, 306; VI, 124, 135, 153, 158, 167. 



156 



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 



Oct. 

Capture of 
Stony Point 



1779 
May 31 



1778 the vital points in the Highlands of the Hudson through 
which communication was kept up between New Eng- 
land and the Middle States. The fortifications in the 
Highlands were meanwhile strengthened, West Point 
being the centre of the system instead of the forts eight 
miles below which had been captured by Sir Henry 
Clinton. An outpost, however, was planned at Stony 
Point, and this was in process of fortification when 
Clinton attacked and captured it. At the same time he 
took possession of the fort at Verplanck's Point on the 
opposite side of the river. 1 

For this purpose Clinton had brought about 6,000 men 
up the river; 2 and the possession of Stony and Verplanck's 
Points cut off King's Ferry, which connected the two points 
and which had been the usual and most convenient place 
for crossing the Hudson. An attack on West Point was 
likely to be the next move of Clinton. 3 
Washington therefore left Middlebrook, which had been 
June 6 his head-quarters for the last six months, and moved first 

June 25 to the Clove (near Haverstraw), then to New Windsor 

juiy 21 (Newburg) and finally to West Point, where he remained 

until the close of the year. Nearly 5,000 of his Conti- 
nental troops had recently been sent under Sullivan to 
punish the Indians who had committed the massacres in 
the Wyoming valley of Pennsylvania during the preceding 
summer. 4 This left him not more than about 8,000 men. 
This was insufficient for an attack on New York, for which 
there was a tempting opportunity had he had sufficient 
force, or had d'Estaing with his fleet and his soldiers 

1 Clinton's Report, Dawson, 526; Sparks, VI, 269. 

2 Clinton's Report, Dawson, 345. 

3 Sparks, VI, 164, 264, 272, 304. 

4 Sullivan's Indian Expedition, 1779, published by the State of New 
York, 1887. 



THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 157 

been in that vicinity instead of in the West Indies. The 1779 
most that Washington could attempt, therefore, was the 
recapture of Stony and Verplanck's Points. The former 
was intrusted to Wayne 1 and the latter to McDougall. 2 
Through some misunderstanding or miscarriage of orders 
McDougall made no serious attempt ; but Wayne carried 
out his part of the project in the most brilliant manner. 

For this attack Washington placed under Wayne's Recapture of 
command the light infantry of the army, about 1,200 in 
number, and after reconnoitring the approaches in person 
he gave Wayne instructions to make the attack with un- 
loaded muskets and to rely solely on the bayonet. As 
the usual hour for such enterprises was just before dawn, 
and on that account the watch was more strict at that 
hour, Washington enjoined Wayne to make the attempt 
about midnight. Muhlenberg's brigade of about 300 men 
was to follow Wayne and be in position to reinforce the 
attack, if necessary; or to form a rallying-point in the 
retreat, if the enterprise should prove unsuccessful. 

Wayne began his march from Fort Montgomery at July 15 
noon ; and crossing the mountains in rear of Stony Point 
he arrived within a mile and a half of the enemy's lines 
at 8 o'clock; 3 here he formed his troops in two columns, 

1 Sparks, VI, 289. 2 Ibid., VI, 288, 298, 299. 

3 Washington was generous enough to report to Congress (Sparks, VI, 
298) that Wayne " improved upon the plan recommended by me [him] and 
executed it in a manner that does signal honor to his judgment and to his 
bravery." 

Wayne's Order of Battle, drawn up by him on July 15 and submitted 
to Washington before it was read to his troops late that evening, is a model 
for a document of that kind — clear, definite, explicit, brief but lacking in 
no detail. It contained two paragraphs which showed the serious nature of 
the business on hand; and the understanding by his men of this serious- 
ness was possibly one of the chief causes of the brilliant success which 
followed. 

"If any soldier presumes to take his musket from his shoulder to fire 
or beyin the battle until ordered by his proper officer, he shall be instantly 



port, July 17 



158 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1779 each preceded by an advance guard of about 150 volun- 
teers, and in front of these a party of 20 picked men and 
an officer. 1 After carefully reconnoitring the ground 
over which the advance was to be made, Wayne placed 
himself at the head of the right column, and shortly 
juiy i6 after midnight both columns moved forward. 1 Not a 

Wayne's Re- shot was fired on the American side. Wayne "gave the 
troops the most pointed orders not to fire on any account, 
but place their whole dependence on the bayonet, which 
order was literally and faithfully obeyed. Neither the 
deep morass, the formidable and double rows of abatis 
nor the strong works in front and flank could damp the 
ardor of the troops, who, in the face of the most tremen- 
dous and incessant fire of musketry, and from cannon 
loaded with grape-shot, forced their way at the point of 
the bayonet through every obstacle, both columns meet- 
ing in the centre of the enemy's works nearly at the same 
instant." Wayne was wounded at the abatis, but his 
men pressed on into the fort, and all of the garrison who 
had not been killed or wounded were taken prisoners. 1 

Wayne's loss was 15 killed and 83 wounded. The 
British lost 19 killed, 74 wounded, 58 missing and 472 
prisoners — 623 in all. 2 The captured cannon were ap- 

put to death by the officer next to him; for the misconduct of one man is 
not to put the whole troops in danger or disorder, and be suffered to pass 
with life. . . ." 

After promising rewards to the first five men to enter the works, he adds: 
"But should there be any soldier so lost to every feeling of honor as to 
attempt to retreat one single foot, or to skulk in the face of danger, the 
officer next to him is to immediately put him to death, that he may no 
longer disgrace the name of a soldier or the corps or State he belongs to. 

"As General Wayne is determined to share the danger of the night, so 
he wishes to participate in the glory of the day in common with his fellow- 
soldiers." 

1 Wayne's Report, Dawson, 525. 

2 Wayne's Report, Clinton's Report, Dawson, 527; Johnston, Stony 
Point, 206. 



•■ 


J-'-. •• .- N 


A. Right Column under Wayne 

B. Left Column under Murphy 


*\\k ^7*1 Verplancks A 
Fort LofSy^^r -/£\_ • y2t' 


and Butler 
C. British guard at Causeway 


D. Reserve under Muhlenberg 


s 




s 

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/ 

A,'' 
/ HUDSON 


II V \ 




RIVER 

StonxPoint 




&JZ**s 






- *}^s^*^»-*^' 






M.-N. WORKS 



Stony Point 
July 1 6, 1779 




Huntington / 

-I 



Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company, 
Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio 



From Avery's History of the United States 
and Its People 



Tryon's Raid 



THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 159 

praised at $158,640 and that sum was distributed by 1779 
order of Congress 1 among the officers and men of the 
storming party, in proportion to the pay of each; and 
the further sum of $1,500 was divided among the first 
five men to enter the works. Congress also ordered 
three medals to be struck in honor of Wayne, and of 
Fleury and Stewart who commanded the two columns. 

Sir Henry Clinton immediately brought reinforcements July 17 
from New York up the river to Dobb's Ferry; and Wash- 
ington made a personal examination of Stony Point. He 
was convinced that it could not be held by less than 
1,500 men; 2 it was nearly 20 miles, following the winding 
roads through the mountains, from his main position at 
West Point. He therefore determined to evacuate the Evacuation of 
post, and the cannon and stores were removed and the 
works destroyed during the following night, the troops July is 
retreating to West Point. Clinton brought up his whole 
force from Dobb's Ferry and regained possession of 
Stony Point the next morning. 3 He retained possession July 19 
of it only a short time, however. Finding that he could 
not draw Washington into a general engagement south 
of the Highlands, and not feeling any confidence in his 
ability to capture West Point, he soon afterward deter- 
mined to transfer the war to the south and to accompany 
the expedition himself." In anticipation of this he with- 
drew his troops from both Verplanck's and Stony Points. 
In the following month Major Henry Lee, who com- Oct. 21 
manded the " Light Horse," requested permission to capture of 
attack the British post at Paulus or Powle's Hook on 
the Jersey shore (just behind the present site of the Jersey 

1 Jour. Cont. Cong., XIV. 890-891. 2 Sparks, VI, 300, 301, 302. 

s Clinton's Report, Dawson, 526. 

4 Stedman, II, 152; Sparks, I, 328; Clinton to Germain, Sparks, VI, 327. 



1G0 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1779 City station of the Pennsylvania Railroad). Lee had been 
in the supporting party at Stony Point and he was keen 
to undertake a similar enterprise on his own account. 
After some hesitation 1 Washington gave his consent, 
but stipulated that not more than 300 men should be 
engaged, and that no attempt should be made to hold 
the post. The purpose was to surprise the garrison and 
bring off as many prisoners as could be secured. 

Aug. is, Lee set out from Paramus (now Ridgewood), 21 miles 

north-west of Paulus Hook, with part of his command 

4 p.m. and was joined by the rest at Hackensack. Through 

the treachery or ignorance of a guide several hours were 
lost during the evening and part of his men were sepa- 
rated from him. With the remainder, something less 
than 300 in number, he reached the marsh, which sepa- 
rated the fortified position on the Hook from the main- 

Aug. i9. land, not long before dawn. The tide was rising, the day 

would soon break and the ammunition was ruined in 
wading through the marsh. Not a moment was to be 
lost, and the men rushed forward — as at Stony Point — 
without firing a shot. They cleared the abatis, crossed 
the ditch and entered the works. There was a short 
hand-to-hand fight, in which it is said that Lee lost only 
2 killed and 3 wounded, whereas the British loss was 
about 50, and then the greater part of the garrison sur- 
rendered. Daylight was coming on and Lee immediately 
began his retreat, bringing with him 158 prisoners. On 
his way back he was attacked in flank by a portion of the 
British garrison which was on a foraging expedition near 

Aug. i9. Weehawken; but Lee beat them off and arrived in safety 

at the Hackensack Bridge, after twenty-seven hours of 
continuous marching and not a little fighting. Here a 
'Sparks, VI, 317, 318. 



3.30 A. M. 



11.00 A. M. 



THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 161 

supporting brigade under Lord Stirling received him, 1779 
and the next day the entire force returned to Para- Aug. 20 
mus. 1 

Lee's exploit was justly applauded and he received the 
thanks of Congress 2 and a gold medal. Its military im- 
portance was that which results from an " insult" to the 
enemy and from the encouragement it gave to our own 
army. 

Stony Point and Paulus Hook were the only two mili- 
tary events of the year at the North. Clinton had, in- May 9 
deed, sent a marauding expedition of 2,500 men, under Marauding 
Matthews, into the Chesapeake, which captured Norfolk, Virginia and 
destroyed a number of ships at Suffolk and carried away 
a considerable quantity of stores, including 3,000 hogs- 
heads of tobacco. 3 Later a similar expedition, under 
Tryon, was sent along the Sound ; it destroyed the ship- July 5 
ping and set fire to the towns from New Haven to Nor- July 11 
walk. 4 These raids angered the population, but had no 
effect whatever on the issue of the contest. 

On the other hand, about 1,000 Massachusetts militia Penobscot 
undertook an independent expedition against Castine, xpe 
at the mouth of the Penobscot 5 River in Maine, where 
about 800 British troops had been sent from Halifax to 
cover parties engaged in getting masts and spars for the 
British ships. The expedition was a failure, the naval j u i y 25 
and military commanders quarrelled, the attack was re- Aug. 11 
pulsed, a portion of the British fleet arrived from New 
York, the ships (24 transports and 20 armed vessels 
carrying 344 guns) were burned and the members of 
the expedition made their way home through the wilder- 

1 Lee's Report, Dawson, 549-552. 

2 Jour. Cont. Cong., XV, 1100. 3 Sparks, VI, 261, 262. 
4 Tryon 's Report, Dawson, 514; Sparks, VI, 285, 293. 

8 Sparks, VI, 307, 350; Stedman, II, 147, 151. 



162 



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 



1779 



Dec. 7 

Winter Can- 
tonments for 
1779-80 



March 9 



ness, in small groups amidst terrible hardships, during 
the autumn. 1 

This expedition was undertaken without consulting 
Washington, 2 and is an example of that lack of central 
control which prevented the successful application of our 
military resources during the Revolution. 

As winter came on Washington moved his head-quar- 
ters to Morristown. Sullivan's force had returned from 
the Indian campaign, but it was necessary to send a con- 
siderable reinforcement to the South. His little army 
was disposed in cantonments — much as in the preceding 
winter — at Morristown, in northern New Jersey, in the 
Highlands and in Connecticut. 3 It was a winter of ex- 
treme severity, North River and a part of New York Bay 
being closed with ice strong enough to bear artillery. 4 
The sufferings of the men for lack of food and clothing 
were but little inferior to those at Valley Forge two 
years before; and it soon became necessary to resort to 
impressment in order to obtain food. The ever-present 
difficulty of obtaining recruits gave Washington the great- 
est anxiety, and in several of his letters he expressed 
the opinion that the prospect of final success was never 
so discouraging as at that time. Congress had consoli- 
dated 5 the 104 battalions (16 Continental and 88 State 
"lines") into 80 battalions. The return of October 
showed a paper strength of 27,099, of whom 14,998 were 
enlisted for the war and the others for various periods 
which would expire during the coming spring and summer. 
Washington urged an annual draft to fill up the battalions, 
the payment of a Continental bounty to such of the 



1 Thacher's Military Journal, 170; Stedman, II, 152. 

3 Sparks, VI, 350. 3 Ibid., 408, 411, 420, 438. 

4 Kapp, Kalb, 183. 6 Jour. Cont. Cong., XIII, 298. 



THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 163 

drafted men as would enlist for the period of the war, 1779 
and the abolition of State, county and town bounties. 1 
The States and towns, however, continued to exercise 
their own judgment about bounties, and there was much 
dissatisfaction among the men who three years before 
had enlisted for the war. The recruiting was never thor- 
oughly organized and systematized; but a certain num- 
ber of recruits was obtained by Washington's incessant 
appeals. 

On the British side, Newport was abandoned, and the Evacuation of 
only post retained was New York. Cornwallis arrived Oct. 25 ' 
with reinforcements, and these, added to the troops 
brought from Newport, carried the garrison of New York Dec. 1 
to 28,756. Of these 13,848 were British regulars, 10,836 
were Hessians and 4,072 were Provincials. Washington 
had only 10,400 effective in all his cantonments; 2 but 
Clinton did not feel strong enough to attack him. He 
preferred the plan of sending a large part of his force to 
the South. 

Some months after Clinton had gone to the South, 1780 
Knyphausen, who was left in command at New York, offensive 

, . . , ~ 1 • -nt t 9 Movement in 

determined on an offensive movement in New Jersey/ New jersey 
He had heard that two regiments at Morristown had 
mutinied because they had received neither food, cloth- 
ing nor pay, and that the population of New Jersey were 
disaffected to the American cause. He thought that if 
the British troops appeared in New Jersey the people, 
the militia and possibly the mutinous regiments would 
rally to their support. He therefore took two brigades, 
Matthews' and Stirling's, with about 5,000 men, crossed 
the Kills from Staten Island to Elizabeth and marched 

1 Sparks, VI, 402, 403. 2 Ibid., V.. 543; VII, 6. 

3 Stedrnan, II, 240, 241; Sparks, VII, 76. 



164 



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 



1780 



June 7 



Skirmish at 
Springfield 



Battle of 
Springfield, 
June 23 



toward Morristown. But he was quickly undeceived as 
to the temper of the inhabitants. They fired upon his 
troops from their houses and from the woods; Stirling 
was fatally wounded; the militia gathered quickly in 
front of him, and when after a march of eight miles he 
reached the village of Springfield, he found one of the 
regiments which had mutinied drawn up in line to op- 
pose him. Only a few shots were fired, and then the 
British column began a retreat, which seems to have been 
unnecessarily precipitate, to Elizabeth. They would 
have crossed to Staten Island, but the low tide prevented 
their getting their cavalry to the bridge of boats which 
they had built across the Kills where it joins Newark Bay. 
They therefore stopped on the Jersey shore, and threw 
up intrenchments, in the nature of a bridge head, for 
their protection. 1 

A few days later Clinton returned to New York from 
South Carolina, and he determined to do something to 
redeem this fiasco. He therefore put some of his troops 
on transports and made a feint of moving up the Hud- 
son. Washington promptly started toward Ramapo and 
the Clove with a part of his force, leaving Greene in com- 
mand at Morristown. Greene with about 1,000 Con- 
tinentals and the Jersey militia under Dickinson took 
position behind the stream at Springfield, about 10 miles 
in advance of Morristown. 2 

Knyphausen left Elizabeth early in the morning with 
about 5,000 infantry, a considerable body of cavalry and 
18 pieces of artillery. Marching rapidly, he soon reached 
the Elizabeth River, about 3 miles east of Springfield, 
and there divided his force into two columns; sending 

^tedman, II, 240, 241; Sparks, VII, 76. 

2 Ibid., II, 243, 244; ibid., VII, 85, 87, 506-508. 



THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 165 

Matthews forward on the road to Springfield, while he mo 
himself took the Vauxhall road on the right, intending to 
turn Greene's left flank. Greene sent Henry Lee with 
his cavalry and a regiment of infantry to defend the 
Vauxhall bridge, and posted the rest of his Continentals 
at the two bridges in front of Springfield. The militia 
were placed on the flanks. While these troops were far 
inferior in strength to the British force, they made so 
spirited a defence at the bridges that they delayed the 
advance of Knyphausen until late in the afternoon, and 
gave Greene time to withdraw his force to a strong posi- 
tion in front of Short Hills, where the Vauxhall and 
Springfield roads came together. Here he awaited an 
attack; and a brigade, sent back by Washington as soon 
as he heard of the fight, was momentarily expected. But 
instead of attacking, the British set fire to the houses in 
Springfield and late in the afternoon began a hasty 
retreat — so rapid that Stark's brigade, which was sent 
in pursuit, was unable to overtake them. 

Greene's loss was 13 killed, 62 wounded and 9 missing. 
The loss of the British was supposed to be somewhat 
larger, but was never accurately known. 

Knyphausen remained at his bridge head near Eliza- 
beth until midnight and then crossed over to Staten 
Island, taking up his bridge of boats at daylight. 1 The June 24 
British troops never again attempted any serious opera- 
tions in New Jersey. 2 

Washington did not return to Morristown. He thought 
that Clinton would attack the forts in the Highlands, 
and he moved his army to the northern part of New 
Jersey; and moved his own head-quarters, in succession, 

1 Sparks, VII, 506-508; Dawson, 596-600. 
1 Stedinan, II, 244. 



166 



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 



1780 



July 26 

Washington to 
President of 
Congress, April 
14, 1779 



March 16, 1779 



Nov. 24, 1779 

Arnold in 
Command at 
West Point 



Aug. 4 



Arnold's 
Treason 



Feb. 3, 1779 
May 1, 1779 



Jan. 20. 1780 



to Ramapo, to Peekskill and to West Point. Greene, 
worn out with the vexatious relations with Congress in 
his uncongenial and thankless task as quartermaster- 
general, finally resigned that post 1 and resumed his 
duties in the line, being now second in command to 
Washington. Washington, conscious of his own strength 
and rectitude, waived all consideration of the innuendoes 
and unjust criticism of him which Gates was constantly 
sending to his friends in Congress. He had offered 
Gates the command of Sullivan's expedition against the 
Indians, which Gates curtly declined. As the com- 
mand in the Highlands seemed now the most important 
station in the army, Washington offered this to Gates; 2 
he again declined, and obtained leave to retire to his 
estate in Virginia. Arnold then applied for the com- 
mand at West Point and his application was supported 
by some members of Congress. After considering the 
application for several months, Washington granted it, 
and Arnold took command. 3 

This application was made with treasonable intent, 
for, as was afterward learned, Arnold had been in corre- 
spondence with Clinton under an assumed name for nearly 
eighteen months. While in command at Philadelphia, 
he lived beyond his means and got into debt; 4 he also 
gave offence to the Council of Pennsylvania and they pre- 
ferred charges against him. Washington promptly or- 
dered a court-martial, but the council were slow in pro- 
ducing their witnesses, and the trial dragged through the 
year. It was finally concluded, and the court found him 
censurable on two of the charges and sentenced him to a 



Sparks, VII, 91, 131, 150, 304, 512, 515. 

2 Ibid., VI, 188, 189, 214-223, 409. 

3 Ibid., VII, 95, 139, 140, 265, 521. 



Arnold, 239. 




ourtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company 
Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio 



From Avery's History of the United States 
and Its People 



Arnold's Treason 
Andre's Capture 
Sept. 20-25, 1780 



Sept. 21 



THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 167 

reprimand. 1 While he was a brave and skilful soldier, i?8o 
his mind was ill-balanced; and brooding over his griev- 
ances and the slights which he fancied had been put upon 
him ever since the capture of Ticonderoga in 1775, he 
thought he would duplicate the parts which had been 
played in the past by Monck and by Marlborough 2 — to 
their great profit — and would deliver the American army 
into the hands of the British and restore the allegiance of 
the Colonies to the British crown. 

When Clinton learned the identity of his anonymous Meeting of 
correspondent he turned him over to Andre, his adjutant- Andre, 
general. The correspondence continued, and at Arnold's 
request and under his passport Aiidre went up the river, 
and met Arnold late at night, on the west shore a few 
miles below Stony Point. Arnold delivered to him vari- 
ous documents, some of them in his own handwriting 
— a detailed statement of the troops, 3,086 in number, 
stationed at various posts in the Highlands; a complete 
description of the forts in the Highlands and the arma- 
ment and ordnance stores at each; the standing orders 
to the garrison as to what they should do in case of 
attack; and a copy of the proceedings of the council of 
war held at West Point a short time before. 3 What 

1 The language which Washington used in this reprimand is classic. 
"Our profession is the chastest of all; even the shadow of a fault tarnishes 
the lustre of our finest achievements. ... I reprimand you for having 
forgotten that in proportion as you have rendered yourself formidable to 
our enemies, you should have been guarded and temperate in your de- 
portment toward your fellow-citizens. Exhibit anew those noble qualities 
which have placed you on the list of our most valued commanders. I will 
myself furnish you, so far as it may be in my power, with opportunities of 
regaining the esteem of your country." (Arnold, 261.) 

2 Monck delivered the Roundhead army to Charles II ; Marlborough 
deserted during the night from James II to William of Orange, and aided 
in establishing William on the throne. See Wolseley's Marlborough, where 
the question of Marlborough's honor is discussed at length. 

3 All the essential letters are given in Sparks, VII, 520-552. 



168 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1780 plans were verbally discussed at this midnight meeting is 
not a matter of record; but it was universally believed, 
and doubtless correctly, that they included the details 
of an attack by Clinton and a surrender by Arnold; and 
that this would take place either during the next two days 
or later, during an expected movement of Washington 
against New York, concerning which Washington was at 
that moment in conference with Rochambeau at Hartford. 

,. 22 The next morning Arnold returned to his head-quarters 

at the Robinson house, opposite West Point, and Andre 
started to return to New York. He was captured near 
Tarrytown with the above-mentioned documents in his 
boots. The officer to whom Andre was brought sent word 
of the capture to Arnold, and despatched the documents 
by messenger to meet Washington on the road back from 
Hartford. Arnold received the intelligence while at break- 
fast. He immediately left the house and escaped in his 
barge, which rowed him down the river below Verplanck's 
Point, where he arrived safely within the British lines. 

Washington arrived at the Robinson house, on his 
return from Hartford, an hour after Arnold had left. He 
crossed to West Point and inspected the works, and re- 
turned to the Robinson house about noon. There the 
messenger, who had missed Washington on the road, 
arrived with the documents and a letter from Andre. 
Hamilton was at once sent off in the hope of capturing 
Arnold, but the latter had so many hours the start that 
pursuit was fruitless. Simultaneously orders were sent 
to Greene, who had been left in command of the army at 
Tappan during Washington's absence, to march the left 
wing to King's Ferry so as to be in position to dispute 
any attempt of Clinton to come up the river. 1 

1 Sparks, VII, 520-552; also VII, 205, 212, 214-221, 235, 241, 256. 



THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 169 

The unfortunate Andre 1 was first brought to West 1780 
Point and then to Tappan. A board of fourteen general Trial of Andre. 
officers, with Greene as president, and including Stirling, 
Lafayette, Steuben, James Clinton, Knox, Glover and 
Stark, was convened to try Andre. The board found sept. 29 
that "under a feigned name and in a disguised habit he 
passed our works," . . . that he was captured "in a dis- 
guised habit," while on his way to New York, and "when 
taken he had in his possession several papers which 
contained intelligence for the enemy." The board was 
therefore of opinion that he "ought to be considered a 
spy from the enemy, and that agreeably to the laws and 
usage of nations, it is their opinion he ought to suffer 
death." Washington approved the sentence, and Andre Death of 
was hanged. Appeals were made by Arnold and Clin- 12 M . ' 
ton, 1 and the latter sent up the tory chief -justice to 
argue that Andre was not a spy; it is said that Arnold 
offered to Clinton to take Andre's place, but Clinton de- 
clined to allow it; and Andre himself, in a touching letter, 
appealed for the privilege of being shot instead of dying 
"on a gibbet." 1 But there was too much at stake; the 
proof of his being a spy was incontrovertible, and Wash- 
ington — deeply affected as he was — was inflexible that 
he should die the death of a spy. 

Forty years later his body was disinterred, carried to 
England and buried in Westminster Abbey near a monu- 
ment which had already been erected to his memory, in 
the company of England's greatest men. The author of subsequent 
his misfortunes, the man who tempted him, received for Arnold 
his treason a commission as brigadier-general in the 
British army, and fought against his former comrades 
during the campaign in Virginia. He was then brought 

1 Arnold, 307, 311, 335, 343, 348; Sparks, VII, 534, 540, 542, 543. 



170 



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 



1780 

New London 
Massacre, 
Sept. 7. 1781 



Feb. 6, 1778 



north and led an expedition of tories and Hessians against 
New London, not many miles from his birthplace. It 
was the last engagement of the war at the North. He 
captured Forts Trumbull and Griswold, burned the town 
and massacred the garrison. Soon after he was sent to 
England, and received £6,315 in money for himself, a 
pension of £500 a year for his wife and £100 a year for 
each of her children. Subsequently the King gave him 
a grant of 13,400 acres of land in upper Canada. He re- 
mained in the British army until his death twenty years 
later; but the British officers despised him; he fought a 
duel in resentment of their insults, got into debt, lost 
his fortune and died in poverty. 1 It is said that he died 
in the uniform of an American major-general, which he 
had on at the time he escaped from the Robinson house 
and which he had always preserved. 

The actual damage which he succeeded in doing to the 
American cause was slight; but it was not for lack of 
intention. His name has been a synonym for infamy 
during 130 years, and it seems probable that it will so 
continue so long as history is written. 

Meanwhile, what of the French alliance? What were 
the French ships and soldiers doing during the two years 
and more which had elapsed since the signing of the treaty? 
The answer, in brief, is that they were fighting the com- 
mon enemy, England, in the West Indies. They thus 
created a diversion by causing British ships and soldiers 
to be sent from New York to St. Lucia and elsewhere; 
and to this extent they aided the American cause. But 
while the French were primarily concerned with French 
interests, Washington was keenly alive to American in- 
terests. He thought that as much harm could be done 

1 Arnold, 348, 363, 378, 389, 393, 395. 



THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 171 

to England, and more benefit conferred on America, if mo 

the French would concentrate their strength at New York. 

If they could command the sea and land only a few of 

their troops, he pledged himself to "bring 25,000 effective 

men into the field"; and with these he felt confident 

that he could capture the city and its garrison and put 

an end to the war. All through the year 1779 he tried May i, 1779 

to bring this about. He had conferences with Gerard, sept. ie 

the French minister, and his successor, Luzerne. He Oct. 4 

wrote to d'Estaing; he called on the governors of the Oct. 2 

nearest States for 12,000 militia and they began to as- sept. 13 

semble; he stationed Henry Lee, and later Duportail Oct. 10 

and Hamilton, on the Jersey coast with letters to be 

handed to d'Estaing as soon as he reached the Delaware 

capes. 1 

But d'Estaing never came. Although he had written Movements of 
that he would be on the coast of Carolina in May, he re- 
mained in the West Indies to capture St. Vincent and j une 16 
Grenada. Then he went to San Domingo and thence j u iy4 
to Georgia. But instead of making short work of the 
British there as he had anticipated, and then proceed- 
ing to the Delaware and New York, he became involved Oct. 9 
in a siege at Savannah, and finally in an assault, in which 
he was repulsed and wounded. Then he sailed away to Oct. 20 
France. 2 Washington heard of this at the close of the 
year; he dismissed the militia and put his Continentals Nov. 20 
into cantonments as previously stated. It was a bitter 
disappointment. 

A few months later Lafayette rejoined Washington at May 10. i7so 
Morristown, after an absence of sixteen months in France. 
While the responsible French ministers had an eye single 

1 Sparks, VI, 61, 62, 237, 368, 371, 373, 378, 409, 540. 
'Mahan, 367, 376; Sparks, VI, 320, 361, 368, 409. 



172 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1780 to the interests of France as they understood them, and 
used their ships and their men to protect their interests 
in the West Indies rather than in an attack upon New 
York — this enthusiastic young nobleman cared nothing 
about the West Indies, but was wholly and disinterestedly 
devoted to America, and to Washington personally. It 
was due chiefly to his persistent and persuasive appeals 
during his absence in France that the King was induced 
to send a new and larger expedition to America, and to 
give explicit instructions to its commander that he was 
to act under Washington's orders. 1 
Arrival of The expedition consisted of 7 ships of the line under 

Second French , „, . , ■ « • 11 ■ 

Expedition de Ternay convoying transports carrying 6 full regiments 
May 2 (6,000 officers and men) under Rochambeau. It sailed 

juiy io from Brest and landed at Newport. It was to be followed 

by a second expedition of 4 regiments; but this was block- 
aded in Brest by a British squadron and never arrived. 2 
Lafayette had brought to Washington full information 
in regard to the French expedition and copies of the in- 
structions; which were that the French troops should 
act as a unit, under Washington's orders, should "co- 
operate in the most effectual manner" and that the plan 
of campaign should be left to Washington. Before 
Rochambeau arrived Washington had prepared his plan 
— which was an attack on New York — had completed his 
own arrangements for supplies and for calling out a large 
juiy is body of militia. He sent Lafayette to confer with Ro- 

chambeau, carrying with him detailed instructions, both 
written and verbal, in regard to the movement against 
New York. 3 This was to begin immediately, and the 

1 Sparks, VI, 368, 497, 545-556; VII, 511. 

2 Ibid., VII, 171, 176, 520; Mahan, 382, 394. 

3 Ibid., VII, 142, 171, 496-498, 510. 



THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 173 

allied troops were to meet just north of the Harlem River i?8o 
about August 5. 

But this plan was upset by the British naval com- 
manders. It was a fundamental part of the plan that 
the French should have a naval superiority. 1 They had 
this when de Ternay arrived. But within ten days they 
lost it. De Ternay had been followed across the Atlantic jm y 13 
by six British ships under Admiral Graves, who arrived 
at New York a few days after de Ternay reached 
Newport. 2 This restored the British superiority on the 
sea; and the combined fleet under Admiral Arbuthnot 
promptly sailed for Newport and anchored off Point Juiy2i 
Judith. 

Clinton followed this with 6,000 troops which left New 
York and proceeded down the Sound with the intention 
of attacking Newport. But Washington instantly met 
this move by crossing his army from New Jersey at 
Dobb's Ferry, and marching down toward Kingsbridge 
to attack New York. Clinton thereupon returned to j u i y 3i 
New York, the British fleet, however, still remaining off 
Point Judith, blockading the French and intercepting or 
turning back their despatch-boats. News of Clinton's 
movement reached Rochambeau and he immediately 
called upon Heath, who commanded in New England, 
for militia to aid in his defence. Several thousand turned 
out quickly and went to his assistance on Rhode Island. 3 

Within a month after its arrival, therefore, the French French Army 

t • <• 1 »aa p f • t ttt 1 • . ar *d Navy 

expedition of 1780, far from aiding Washington in any Blockaded in 
offensive movements, found itself cooped up in New- 

1 "A naval superiority being essential to every enterprise in these States," 
Washington to Guicken. (Sparks, VII, 196.) "A decisive naval superiority 
is to be considered as a fundamental principle," Washington to Lafayette. 
(Sparks, VII, 509.) 

2 Sparks, VII, 113, 127, 169. 3 Ibid., VII, 113, 127, 131, 138. 



174 



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 



1780 



Sept. 21 



The Revolu- 
tion Nearly 
Exhausted 



March IS 



port and relying on the New England militia for its 
protection. 

After Clinton had returned to New York the militia 
were gradually sent home ; but the British fleet remained 
on the blockade. Washington went to Hartford and 
discussed the situation with de Ternay and Rochambeau. 
All were agreed that the French army could not leave its 
fleet until sufficient ships should arrive to establish their 
naval superiority; and while there was a large French 
fleet in the West Indies at all times during the years 
1780 and 1781, yet for various reasons no part of it came 
to America until late in the summer of the latter year. 1 

Nothing, therefore, could be done. The French army 
remained inactive at Newport for eleven months after 
its arrival. 2 

During this time the Revolution came near to expir- 
ing from sheer exhaustion. Its credit was exhausted; 
paper money had been issued by Congress to the extent 
of $241,000,000 and by the States to $209,000,000; and 
no provision had been made for its redemption. 3 Con- 
gress attempted to fix its value at 40 to 1 in specie, but 
the market rate was soon 1,000 to 1/ and finally it had 
no value whatever. 5 Having neither money nor credit, 
Congress then attempted to collect supplies from the 
States in kind. The response was such as each State 
saw fit to make. 6 What was furnished, together with 



1 Sparks, VII, 195, 203, 207, 509. 
Lossing, I, 316-321. 



2 Rochambeau, 391. 
4 Jour. Cong., 442. 
8 Fiske, Amer. Rev., II, 197, 198. 

6 Washington wrote to Congress (April 3, 1780) that this system "has 
proved in its operation pernicious beyond description"; and to Joseph 
Jones in Congress (May 31, 1780): "One State will comply with a requisi- 
tion of Congress; another neglects to do it; a third executes it by halves; 
and all differ either in the manner, the matter or so much in point of time 
that we are always working uphill." (Sparks, VII, 13, 67.) 



THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 175 

what was obtained by impressment was barely enough to 1780 

keep the troops from starving. In clothing there was a 

similar destitution; and in powder the supplies were so 

low that Washington endeavored through Lafayette to 

negotiate a loan 1 from the French of 30,000 pounds of 

this indispensable article. As to recruiting, matters were 

in the same unsatisfactory condition that they had been 

in for the last five years. The 104 battalions authorized 

in 1776 had been consolidated into 80 battalions in 1779, March 9, ms 

and were now further consolidated into 50 regiments of Oct. 3, i78o 

infantry, with 4 regiments of cavalry, 4 of artillery and 1 

of artificers. 2 Their organization was to be substantially 

that which had been prepared by Steuben and approved 

by Congress in 1778; enlistments were to be for the war; 

but if the States could not fill up their quota with recruits 

for the war, then they were recommended to fill them up 

with recruits enlisted for one year. 3 

Resolutions were passed at intervals of a few months, May 20 
sometimes " requiring" and at others " requesting" or sept. 21 
"recommending" the States to fill up their quota. 4 If Oct. 3 
this had been done the strength of the army (including Dec. 22 
officers) would have been 35,850 infantry, 2,720 artillery ineffective 
and 2,020 cavalry. 5 But it was not done. The regi- Recruiting 
ments seldom had more than one-third of their author- 
ized strength. The response, by States or individuals, 
to the resolutions of Congress was feeble. The war had 
been in progress nearly six years, and ardor for enlist- 
ment was greatly diminished. The French alliance was in 
itself a detriment to recruiting. The average man could 

1 Sparks, VII, 118. 2 Jour. Cong., Ill, 223, 432, 532, 538. 

3 On Washington's recommendation this was modified, October 21, so 
as to provide "that the whole of the troops be enlisted for the war"; but 
the States continued to enlist recruits for one year. (Jour. Cong., Ill, 538.) 

* Jour. Cong., Ill, 458, 521, 532, 557. 5 Ibid., Ill, 538. 



176 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

i78i not comprehend the importance of the command of the 
sea, and he could not understand why more soldiers were 
required when 6,000 well-trained and well-equipped French 
infantry were doing nothing at Newport. Finally the 
sufferings and destitution of the half-starved and half- 
naked men who had enlisted were not such as to tempt 
others to share their fate. This winter the troops 
were cantoned, as before, from Morristown, through the 
Highlands, to Connecticut. 1 It was the fourth winter, 
counting from Valley Forge, in which each time the 
suffering had been almost beyond endurance. 

At last the troops resolved that they would stand it no 
longer, and a mutiny broke out. The six Pennsylvania 
Jan. i, regiments, forming Wayne's division, stationed at Morris- 

town, began the new year by parading under arms, and 
under command of their sergeants marched off toward 
Mutiny of the Philadelphia. In attempting to control them one officer 
LinT sy v< was killed and several were wounded. Wayne, who not 
only at Stony Point but at Monmouth and elsewhere had 
shown the most intrepid courage, rushed in among his 
men and drew his pistol; but they merely placed their 
bayonets against his breast and would have killed him 
if he had persisted. They marched off; and the next 
day he followed and overtook them at Princeton. They 
stated their grievances — no pay for the last twelve 
months, insufficient food and clothing, expiration of ser- 
vice (on the ground that they had enlisted for three 
years or the war, and were held for the war after the 
three years had expired). Wayne was powerless to 
give any relief in these matters, and the men continued 
their march to Trenton. Three emissaries, despatched 
by Clinton as soon as he heard of the trouble, attempted 

1 Sparks, VII, 313, 318. 



THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 177 

to induce them to go over to the enemy. But they in- mi 
dignantly turned these over to Wayne, and after a sum- Jan. 10 
mary trial assisted in hanging them. At Trenton they 
were met by a committee of Congress, by the President 
of Pennsylvania and by a force of 1,000 men under St. 
Clair, sent by Washington to oppose their crossing the 
Delaware. They stated their case, and the committee 
promised them prompt payment of portion of their pay, 
immediate supply of certain specified articles of clothing 
and discharge forthwith of all those who had not enlisted 
for the entire war — the term of enlistment to be estab- 
lished by each man's oath. They were practically all 
discharged, and their arms and ammunition were sent 
to Philadelphia. They were then asked to re-enlist for 
the war, receiving the bounties then paid to recruits; and 
almost all of them did so within ninety days. 1 They 
were soon sent to Virginia and rendered good service in 
the Southern campaign. 

The success of this mutiny led to another — the three 
regiments of New Jersey, stationed at Pompton. They Jan. 20 
similarly marched off one evening, under their sergeants, Mutiny of the 

Ngw Jersey 

for Trenton. But Washington, who had by this time Line 
satisfied himself that he could rely upon the main body 
of his troops, determined to handle this affair in a differ- 
ent manner. He placed a detachment of New England 
troops under command of Major-General Robert Howe, of 
North Carolina, and directed him "to compel the muti- 
neers to unconditional submission/' and "to grant no 
terms while they are with arms in their hands in a state 
of resistance." Howe carried out these instructions to 
the letter. He surrounded the camp of the mutineers at 
Ringwood, disarmed them, selected one ringleader from 

1 Sparks, VII, 350, 359, 364, 387, 436. 



178 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

i78i each regiment, tried them by summary court and hanged 
Jan. 28 them on the spot. The others promptly submitted and 

returned to duty. 1 

Washington had repressed these outbreaks with a stern 
hand, but at the same time he wrote to the governors 
of States calling upon them to take steps to redress the 
well-founded grievances of the men in the matter of pay, 
clothing and food, 2 with the result that their conditions 
were to some extent improved and a few dollars in real 
money were paid to them. 

He realized, however, that the country was nearly at 
the end of its resources, or, as he expressed it (in the 
letter to Laurens), "the people are discontented; but it is 
with the feeble and oppressive mode of conducting the 
war, not with the war itself." 3 

In order to bring the war to a close it was essential to 
raise some hard money. For this purpose Lieutenant- 
Colonel John Laurens, of South Carolina, one of his aides, 
was selected; and Congress appointed him a special 
minister to France. 4 Washington gave Laurens a letter 
Jan. 15 of instructions, written in that clear, impressive and 

Mission to forcible style of which he was so complete a master. In 
this he set forth the actual situation in America, the 
cause of her financial difficulties, the great natural re- 
sources which would enable her to repay a loan and the 
imperative need of two things — a loan of money and "a 
constant naval superiority on these coasts." With this 
Feb. 13 letter 5 Laurens sailed from Boston; he landed there on 

Aug. 25 his return six months later. Vergennes was of opinion 

1 Sparks, VII, 380, 386, 560-566. 2 Ibid., 381. 

8 Sparks, VII, 373. 4 Ibid., 368. 

6 The original, in Washington's handwriting, is in the Archives of the 

Foreign Office in Paris. A complete copy is printed in Sparks, VII, 
368-373. 



THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 179 

that the manner in which he pressed his case savored more 1781 
of the camp than of diplomacy. 1 However that might 
be, he induced the French ministers to make a loan of 
6,000,000 francs; 2 he converted some of this promptly 
into arms, ammunition and clothing, all of which he 
brought back with him, together with 2,500,000 francs 
in hard cash. 3 His representations and Washington's 
letter also led to the sending of the French fleet from 
the West Indies to Yorktown, thereby establishing the 
French naval superiority, and enabling Washington to 
carry out his long-deferred plans for making the French 
alliance really effective. 

'Sparks, VII, 526; Diplomatic Correspondence of the Revolution, IX, 
211. 

2 Vergennes stated that the amount which the French King had ad- 
vanced to America, to the close of 1781, was 20,000,000 francs, exclusive 
of the cost of maintaining the French army and navy in America. 
(Sparks, VIII, 526.) 

3 The financial assistance of France was far more effective than its 
military co-operation. In the list of Combattants Francais de la Guerre 
Americaine, furnished by the French Government, and published by the 
United States Senate in 1905, there are more than 47,000 names — the offi- 
cers and men of 62 naval vessels and 13 regiments, who at one time or an- 
other landed on our shores or cruised in our waters. But like the American 
militia they came and went at their own will; the greatest number ashore 
at any one time was 8,400; they took part in two battles only, Savannah 
and Yorktown; their battle losses were 637 at Savannah and 186 at York- 
town. In a military sense they were more than offset by the German 
troops who fought with Great Britain. These numbered 29,867, of whom 
only 17,313 returned. Their effective strength from 1777 to 1782 was 
never less than 12,000. They were always subject to the orders of the 
British general, and, hirelings though they were, they fought well; they 
were in 9 principal battles and 11 minor engagements, and their killed 
and wounded numbered 2,200. (Lowell, 301; Sparks, V, 542-545.) 



CHAPTER VI 
CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 

1775 At the time of the Revolution, Boston was about as far 

removed from Savannah as it now is from Manila. By 
sea the distance was 1,100 miles; and the time, depend- 
ing on wind and weather, was from 8 to 30 days. The 
British controlled the sea and that avenue of communica- 
tion was not open to the Americans. By land, the roads 
were so bad that troops could not make the march in less 
than 60 days, and a courier riding "express" consumed 
fully 20 days. In fact the letters exchanged between 
Washington and Greene, after the latter had assumed 
command in the South, were usually 30 days old when 
they reached their destination. 

The Thirteen Colonies were divided, by topographical 
conditions as well as by political affiliations, into three 
groups, whose interests were by no means identical. 
The dividing lines were the Hudson River and the 
Potomac River and Chesapeake Bay. The four New 
England Colonies had a population of less than 750,000, 
and were engaged in agriculture and ocean commerce, 
with the beginnings of some struggling manufactures; 
the five Middle Colonies had a population of not quite 
1,000,000; they were almost wholly agricultural and 
furnished the food supplies; the four Southern Colonies, 
with a population of more than 1,000,000/ were also 

1 Census Report on Growth of Population, 1909, p. 9. 
180 



CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 181 

agricultural, but their chief product was tobacco (the 1775 
cotton planting being then only just introduced and the 
cotton-gin being not yet invented), and the greater part 
of this was raised for export. 

These elementary facts must be considered in order 
properly to understand the military events of the Revolu- 
tion. The Northern and Southern Colonies were so far 
separated that they were not within supporting distance; 
and by its command of the sea 1 England was able to move 
its troops in attack upon one or the other in one-fourth 
of the time that the Americans could move from one to 
the defence of the other. The Northern and Southern 
campaigns were therefore entirely distinct and separate ; 
and each section, for the most part, relied upon itself for 
its defence. Moreover, the lack of identity in interest 
between the three groups of Colonies produced jealousies 
in the small body of Congress, where the vote was always 
by States; and these jealousies prevented the utilization 
of the full military resources of the country. 2 While 
Congress did not possess any specific power to enforce 
its resolutions, yet in those matters where the States 
were in unanimous accord, the State government was 
quite ready to exert its sovereign power to carry these 
resolves into effect. But where there was only a narrow 
majority, each State carried them out or not as it saw 
fit; 3 and each State was keenly alert, both in Congress 
and in its own legislature, to see that the effect of any 
measure did not give to one State an advantage over 
another. Against this sectionalism, which applied to 

1 Sparks, VII, 169, 170, 196, 337, 371; Mahan, 397-400. 

2 Sparks, VII, 67, 167, 225, 298, 333, 391. 

3 " One State yields obedience, and another refuses it, while a third 
mutilates and adopts the measure in part only, and all vary in time and 
manner." (Washington to Custis, Sparks, VII, 442.) 



182 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1775 the assembling and movements of troops as well as to 
other matters, Washington's letters contain a series of 
protests, made year after year in temperate and judicious 
but none the less strong and forcible language. But they 
were all in vain. 
British pians As the State of Virginia contained nearly one-fifth of 
the colonies the entire population, and the four Southern States about 
forty per cent of it, the British constantly sought to de- 
tach these States from their allegiance to the cause of 
the United Colonies; hoping to accomplish this, first by 
conquest and after conquest by conciliation. The true 
military principle for suppressing the Revolution was to 
defeat, crush and disperse Washington's army, wherever 
it was, and to capture or kill Washington. Had the 
British adhered to this principle, and successfully carried 
it into effect, there is slight reason to doubt that the 
Revolution would, at that time, have failed. But they 
did not adopt this principle. Their plans were always 
based on acquiring territory and re-establishing piecemeal 
the authority of the crown. Thus they took New York 
and held it as their base of operations; captured Phila- 
delphia and then lost it; occupied Newport with a view to 
retaking Boston, but never carried out that part of the 
plan; tried to take Charleston and failed ; sent Burgoyne 
on an abortive expedition down the Hudson in the hope 
of detaching New England from the Central States ; and 
then abandoned all aggressive movements at the North 
and attempted to wear out the Revolution by petty 
raids into Connecticut, New Jersey and Virginia. Fi- 
nally, when the war had been in progress for four years 
without producing any substantial results except the 
establishment of a base at New York, it was determined 
to make the South the principal theatre of operations, in 



CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 183 

the hope that if the North could not be subdued, at least 1775 
its importance could be greatly diminished and its ex- 
pansion prevented by restoring the populous Southern 
Colonies to British allegiance, and thus creating a barrier 
on the south similar to that of Canada on the north. 1 

The war began at the South in much the same fashion 
as at the North. The attack at Lexington and Patrick 
Henry's eloquence caused the four Southern Colonies to 
break out into such open resistance that three of the 
royal governors found it necessary to seek refuge on 
British ships of war, and to write home asking that regular 
troops be sent to their assistance. Pending the arrival iamb 
of these there were conflicts with the militia. The first 
of these was in Virginia, at the Great Bridge over the va. 
Elizabeth River, about nine miles from Norfolk. 2 In 
this encounter the British were defeated and their com- Dec. 9 
manding officer fell, pierced by fourteen bullets. The 
militia pursued them and took possession of Norfolk. 2 
Soon afterward the royal governor, from his ships, called 1776 
on the town to surrender; and this being refused he bom- Jan. 1 
barded it for three days, set fire to it and reduced it to Jan. 4 
ashes. 3 

The next clash was in North Carolina, at Moore's Moore's Bridge. 

N. C. 

Bridge, over a branch of the Cape Fear River, near the 

site of the present town of Fayetteville. The contestants Feb. 27 

were about 1,500 tory militia, raised by the royal governor, 

1 There were ten principal battles at the North, with aggregate losses of 
about 24,000 men; and eleven at the South, with losses of about 18,000. 
In numbers, importance and losses the battles in the South were about 
equal to those at the North; the duration of the campaigns in each section 
was about the same — four years. The crowning victory at Yorktown was 
due in about equal measure to the previous campaigns on each side of the 
Potomac, and to the skill with which Washington profited by the results 
of both. 

2 Dawson, 122-126. s Dawson, 122-126. 



184 



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 



1776 



Arrival of 

Regular 

Troops 

Feb. 13 

May 3 

Jan. 



June 4 
June 9 



Preparations 
for the 
Defence of 
Charleston 

1775 

June 26 

Nov. 4 

Dec. 28 



May 



and 1,000 Colonial militia, called out by the Provincial 
Council and commanded by General Moore. It was dis- 
astrous to the tories; 30 of them were killed or wounded, 
their leader and 850 men were captured and the rest 
fled; the Colonials lost only two men slightly wounded, 
and they captured a large quantity of supplies, including 
1,500 rifles and a military chest containing £15,000 in 
specie. 1 

Meanwhile the regular troops which had been called 
for were on their way. Comwallis, with 7 regiments, 
convoyed by a squadron of 2 ships of the line and 6 
frigates mounting in all 230 guns, sailed from Cork and 
arrived at the mouth of the Cape Fear River. Clinton 
was already there, having been despatched from Boston 
with parts of 2 regiments. He was senior to Corn- 
wallis and took command of all the troops. He decided 
to proceed to the attack of Charleston, where he arrived 
outside the bar, and soon after landed part of his troops 
on Long Island. 2 

On the American side preparations were not lacking to 
defend the South. By successive resolutions Congress 
requested North Carolina to raise 2 battalions, South 
Carolina 3, Georgia 1, and Virginia 6 — all to be on the 
Continental establishment. 3 It was some time before 
these troops were raised, but meanwhile South Carolina 
was taking energetic measures for its own defence. 
Several months before Congress passed its resolutions the 
State had raised 4 regiments of its own; and having 
learned, by intercepted despatches 4 to the royal governor, 
first that it was intended to send regular troops to coerce 
the South, and later that Cornwallis with his 7 regiments 



1 Dawson, 128-134. 

3 Jour. Cont. Cong., II, 107, 325, 463. 



2 Ibid., 135, 140, 142. 
* Lossing, II, 543. 



CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 185 

was about to sail from Cork, the State began the con- i?76 
struction of elaborate fortifications to defend Charleston 
harbor. 1 These were not quite finished when Parker's 
fleet with Clinton's and Cornwallis's soldiers appeared 
off the bar. Simultaneously 2 battalions arrived from June 
Virginia and 1 from North Carolina, carrying the total 
strength of the garrison (including militia) to more than 
6,000 men. 2 Charles Lee, who had been sent from Boston 
by Washington, arrived at the same time and took com- 
mand. The fortifications were constructed on Sullivan's 
Island, on the north side of the entrance to the harbor; 
on James Island, on its south side; at Haddrell's Point, 
nearer to the city; and on the wharves of the city itself. 3 
In all they mounted nearly 100 cannon; and there was a 
good supply of powder on hand, part of which had been 
purchased in the West Indies a year before and part of 
it captured from a British supply ship at St. Augustine, 
by a cruiser which the gentlemen of Charleston had fitted 
out for that purpose. The principal fort was on the 
southern side of Sullivan's Island; and under the name 
of Fort Moultrie that point has ever since been strongly 
fortified. In 1776 its fort had 4 bastions and was made 
of soft palmetto logs and earth, with a deep ditch, and 
parapets 16 feet thick mounting 30 guns. It was large 
enough for a garrison of 1,000 men, but its defenders 
numbered only 344, the 2d South Carolina Regiment, 
under command of Colonel William Moultrie. 4 The 1st 
Regiment, Colonel Gadsden, was at Fort Johnson on 
James Island, and the 3d Regiment, Colonel Thomson, 
was on the eastern end of Sullivan's Island; he was to 

1 Moultrie's Memoirs of the American Revolution, I, 140. 

2 Marshall's Washington, I, 72. s Moultrie, I, 142, 146. 
4 Gordon, II, 283; Lossing, II, 544-546. 



186 



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 



177C 



Defence of 
Charleston 



June 4 
June 28 



June 28 

Attack on 
Sullivan's 
Island 



oppose any attempt of Clinton's men to cross the inlet 
known as the " Breach," which separated Long Island 
from Sullivan's. The rest of the defending force was 
distributed at HaddrelFs Point, where Lee had his head- 
quarters, and in the city. 1 

The soul of the defence was Moultrie. 2 Lee arrived 
three weeks before the attack began and gave a great 
many orders, most of them foolish; but his reputation 
was so great on account of his alleged services in various 
European armies that he was looked up to as a great 
soldier and cheerfully obeyed. He gave it as his opinion 
that Fort Moultrie would be a "mere slaughter pen" and 
would have to be abandoned; and in the orders which he 
kept sending to Moultrie, 3 he impressed daily upon him 
the importance of securing his retreat and his impa- 
tience that a bridge of boats, which he had ordered to be 
built, was not finished. Moultrie built the bridge as or- 
dered, but he remained in the fort; and he afterward 
wrote that he "never was uneasy on not having a retreat" 
because he did not imagine that the enemy could force 
him "to that necessity." 4 

Three weeks were spent by Parker and Clinton in 
getting the ships over the bar, landing the troops on 
Long Island and making other preparations. 5 Finally 
the attack was made. Two ships of the line and two 
frigates were to sail in under topsails and anchor off Fort 
Sullivan; three frigates were to pass them on the west 
and anchor between Fort Sullivan and the city where 



1 Gordon, II, 283. 

2 Fiske, Amer. Rev., I, 198, 199; Amer. Archives, 4, VI, 1191. 

3 More than twenty of these have been preserved. (Amer. Archives, 4, VI, 
1186.) * Lossing, II, 547. 

5 Stedman, I, 186; Lee's Report, Sparks, Letters, I, 243-247; Lossing, 
II, 548-550. 




•2 :! 4 



1. Actieou 
S. Bristol 

3. Experiment 

4. Solebay 
i. Sphynz 
(i. Syren 

7. Thunder BomTj 

5. Friendship 



Sullivan's Island (Charleston) 
June 29, 1776 



3° 



Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company, 

Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio 

From Avery's History- of the United States and Its People 



CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 187 

they could enfilade the fort and bombard its western side 1776 
which was not quite finished. A bomb-ship, or mortar- 
boat, escorted by the remaining frigate was to anchor 
south-east of the fort and bombard it from that side. 
Clinton's troops were to cross the "Breach" inlet from 
Long Island, in boats or by fording, drive back Thom- 
son's regiment and take the fort in the rear. 

The ships went in as ordered; but Clinton's men never 
got across the inlet. It proved to be full of sand-bars, on 
which the water was only a few inches deep, and the boats 
ran aground; and between these were deep holes where 
the men sank in up to their necks. Thomson's regiment 
also opened fire on them. They returned to Long Island 
and took no part in the battle. 

The action thus devolved entirely on the navy. For June 28, 
ten hours they bombarded the fort, and the fort replied 9 p A m. ' 
with equal spirit. In the middle of the action the flag- 
ship (Bristol) swung around so as to be exposed to en- 
filade, and Moultrie's men swept her decks so effectively 
that every man on them was killed or wounded. 1 The 
ships were at such close range that musketry fire was 
used with deadly effect. The mortar-boat was disabled 
early in the action ; and the three frigates, which were to 
pass the rest of the squadron and take position between 
the fort and the city, grounded on the " Middle Shoal" 
(where Fort Sumter was afterward built). Two of them 
got off after a few hours, but the third stuck fast, and was 
abandoned and blown up the following morning. 

After darkness had set in and the tide was running ebb, 
having made no impression on the fort Parker withdrew 
out of range to his former anchorage in the "Five Fathom 
Hole." He had lost 64 killed and 161 wounded; one of 

1 Parker's Report, Dawson, 141. 



188 



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 



1776 



July 19 



Aug. 1 



Results of the 
British Defeat 
at Charleston 



1777 



Feb. 19 
Feb. 5 



1778 



his ships had been struck 70 times, one was abandoned 
and the others were so seriously injured that it was 
several months before the repairs were completed. The 
loss in the fort had been only 17 killed and 20 wounded. 1 
Parker and Clinton remained for three weeks, repairing 
damages. Then Clinton sailed north convoyed by the 
one frigate that was in condition to go to sea. He ar- 
rived on Staten Island in time to take part in the attack 
on New York. 2 

The defence of Charleston was a brilliant victory. 
Seven newly organized regiments, which had never before 
been under fire, had beaten off 7 regiments of regulars 
and 8 ships of war whose guns outnumbered 6 to 1 those 
of Fort Sullivan. It inspirited the South, cheered the 
whole country and disheartened the British. They made 
no further movements in the South for two and a half 
years. The Continental battalions of the four Southern 
States, which in 1777 were increased to 31 in number, 3 
were duly organized; and in the absence of military 
operations near their homes they were available for ser- 
vice under Washington. The entire quota of Virginia 
and North Carolina (24 battalions) were ordered to join 
Washington; they were engaged in the battles around 
Philadelphia, and they remained with him until the 
British began anew their attack on the South. 

This renewal began in the winter of 1778-79. Wash- 
ington was then at Middlebrook, 4 with his troops in can- 
tonments through the Highlands to Connecticut. Clinton 
had 27,803 men 5 (exclusive of officers) at New York and 
5,789 at Newport. Before leaving Philadelphia he had 



1 Lee's Report, Dawson, 139. 

3 Jour. Cont. Cong., VII, 90, 133. 

8 Sparks, V, 542. 



2 Sparks, IV, 27. 
* Ante, p, 155. 



CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 189 

received instructions, due to the French alliance, to ins 
send 5,000 men to St. Lucia and 3,000 to Georgia or 
Florida; to abandon offensive operations at the North; 
and in the following winter to make an attack on the 
Southern Colonies. "Georgia should be first taken, and 
the passage into South Carolina will then be compara- March 8 
tively easy." * March 21 

The retreat to New York and the operations at New- 
port delayed for several months the execution of these 
orders; but toward the close of the year these expeditions 
left New York for their destinations, the first for St. Nov. 4 
Lucia and the second for Georgia. The latter consisted Nov. 27 
of 2 British battalions, 2 Hessian battalions, 4 battalions British Troops 

7 Sent to 

of New York tories under Cruger and De Lancey and a Georgia 
detachment of royal artillery — numbering in all about 
3,500 men, and commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Archi- 
bald Campbell of the 71st Highlanders. Convoyed by 
a British squadron under Commodore Hyde Parker, it 
arrived safely at Tybee Island, at the mouth of the Dec. 23 
Savannah River. 2 

These movements were not made without the knowl- Partisan 
edge of Washington and of Congress; and it was also in Georgia 
known that the predatory warfare which had been car- 
ried on during the last two years between the Georgia 
loyalists who had taken refuge in Florida, on the one 
side, and the Colonial militia of Georgia and South Caro- 
lina under Major-General Robert Howe, on the other 
side, had resulted adversely to the latter; and that the 
former were now preparing to invade both Georgia and 
South Carolina. Congress thereupon passed resolutions 
requesting the Governor of Virginia to forward 1,000 men Oct. 17 

1 Germain to Clinton, Sparks, V, 549. 

2 Campbell's Report, Dawson, 477. 



190 



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 



1778 and the Governor of North Carolina to send 3,000 men, 
sept. 25 for the defence of the other two Southern States; and at 

the same time directed Howe to repair to Washington's 
head-quarters and Lincoln to take his place as commander 
of the Southern Department. 1 These resolutions were 
passed without consulting Washington, but he fully con- 
curred in the selection of Lincoln in whom he had the 
Dec. 19 highest confidence. When Lincoln arrived at Charleston 

situation at the situation was as follows: Campbell with 3,500 men 
when Lincoln on transports was approaching the mouth of the Savannah 
mand River; Prevost with 2,000 men was moving north from 

Florida, part of his force marching by land and part of 
them being transported by water; these two forces were 
to effect a junction and under Prevost's orders were to 
conquer Georgia first and then South Carolina; 2 Robert 
Howe, with about 1,000 (1st and 2d Georgia, 3d and 
4th South Carolina and some Georgia militia) was at 
Fort Sunbury (the site of Fort McAllister in the Civil 
War), about 20 miles south of Savannah; Lincoln was 
at Charleston, with perhaps 1,500 men (1st and 2d South 
Carolina and some militia); the North Carolina and 
Virginia troops were assembling, and part of them were 
on the march but none of them had yet arrived. 3 
About Dec. 25 Howe heard of the arrival of Campbell off the Savannah 
River and of the approach of Prevost from Florida at 
the same time. Leaving part of his force at Sunbury, he 
quickly marched back to the defence of Savannah. On 
arriving there he posted his little force as follows: the 
Georgia regiments on the east of the town with their 
left flank on the river; the South Carolina regiments 
across the road leading into town from the south-east, 

1 Jour. Cont. Cong., XII, 950, 951, 1021; Sparks, VI, 74, 83. 

2 Germain to Clinton, Sparks, V, 549. s Lossing, II, 525. 



CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 191 

their right flank protected by a swamp, and one com- ms 
pany in advance on a hill about two miles down the river; 
the Georgia militia in observation on the main road lead- 
ing into town from the south. 1 
While Howe was making these dispositions, Campbell capture of 

, . , . . Savannah 

had reconnoitred the river and captured some citizens 
who gave him quite accurate information in regard to 
the situation at Savannah and the small force opposed 
to him. He decided to attack without waiting for a 
junction with Prevost. Accordingly the ships came 
over the bar, sailed up the river with a flood tide and 
anchored about two miles below the city. At daybreak Dec 2s 
the debarkation began, and the first troops who landed Dec 29 
climbed the bluff (where Fort Jackson was afterward 
built) and were received by a smart fire from the com- 
pany of the Carolina regiment, in which 3 Highlanders 
were killed and 5 wounded. But this company was 
completely outnumbered and driven back and the de- 
barkation then proceeded. When this was completed, 2 p.m. 
Campbell moved forward to within 1,000 yards of Howe's 
position; he then made a feint against Howe's left, near 
the river, and at the same time sent his light infantry 
supported by one of the New York toiy battalions accom- 
panied by a negro guide, who led them along a blind path 3 p. m. 
through the swamp on Howe's right. These came out 
of the swamp on the main Ogeechee Road, and brush- 
ing aside the Georgia militia they were directly in rear 
of Howe. Simultaneously Campbell attacked Howe in 
front. Completely overpowered by such superior num- 
bers, Howe and the two Carolina regiments made their 
escape through the town and across the swamps to the 
west of it. But the Georgia troops, who were on 

1 Dawson, 474; Campbell's Report, Dawson, 478. 



192 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1778 Howe's left, were less fortunate and were nearly all 
captured. 

Campbell's losses were only 7 killed and 19 wounded; 
he captured 38 officers and 415 men, besides 45 cannon, 
23 mortars and a large amount of ammunition and stores. 
He states that 83 Americans were found dead in Savannah 
and 11 wounded; a considerable number were drowned 
in attempting to escape through the swamps. 1 

The British victory was complete. Howe was tried 
by court-martial, 2 but was acquitted and served under 
Washington until the close of the war. 3 

Meanwhile Prevost was marching north through Geor- 
gia. 4 He met with slight resistance at Fort Sunbury, 

1779 and captured the place and its garrison of 200 men with- 
jan. 6 out difficulty. Then he pressed on to Savannah, effected 
Jan. 19 his junction with Campbell, took command of the united 
conquest of forces and promptly sent Campbell up the river 120 miles 

to Augusta. This place was also taken without serious 
Jan. 29 opposition, the Provincial militia retreating as Campbell 

approached. Leaving a garrison at Augusta, Campbell 
proceeded to establish posts at various places in western 
Georgia. 5 

Within six weeks from the time Campbell landed at 
Savannah the conquest of Georgia was complete, and the 
royal governor was requested to return from England 
and resume his government. 6 

1 Dawson, Campbell's Report, 477-479. 
3 Sparks, V, 451. 

3 Ibid., VI, 299; VII, 74-88, 94, 363, 382, 563; VIII, 457. 

4 If contemporary accounts are to be relied upon, the damage to private 
property on this march, and the one which soon followed it from Savannah 
to Charleston, was even greater than that on the more famous march 
through Georgia eighty-six years later. (See Gordon, III, 259, 261.) 

5 Stedman, II, 106-108. 
8 Lossing, II, 528. 




Movements of American 
forces are shown in blue 
and of French auxiliaries 
in black lines; British are 
shown in red. 

Operations in 177S and 1779 are 
designated by broken lines. 

Operations in 1780 in 
continuous lines. 

Gen. Gates > 

Sir Henry Clinton and 
Earl-Cornwallis 



32 Movements of partisans and ^r-ir ^*V|^?^tiH fjaZff^ Tr- 
of small bodies of troops ^MXSSSSJffi^^ 



are shown in fine lines 
Arrows indicate direction 



and Frent 
Sept. 10 to Oct. 19, lff^ 
Evacuated Jul^.fij: 
« Battles and skirmishes S^uiujui-y 

Captured, 

BUFFALO. N. Y. 



Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company^ 
Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio 



From Avery's History of the United States 
and Its People 



South Carolina 
1779-1780 



CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 193 

Lincoln, however, was not disposed to give up South 1779 
Carolina without a struggle, and he even contemplated 
an attempt to reconquer Georgia. 1 Additional militia 
had come in and the North Carolina regiments were be- 
ginning to arrive. With these and the troops which he 
had found at Charleston on his arrival, he made up a 
force of about 3,500 men, of whom 1,000 were counted 
as "regulars" because they were on the Continental 
establishment, 1,400 were armed militia and 1,000 were 
unarmed, undisciplined and untractable men. With Defence of 
this force he marched toward Savannah, but it fell before Carolina 
he arrived, and picking up the remnants of the garrison 
which had escaped with Howe, he took post on the east Jan. 3 
bank of the river, at the hamlet of Purysburg, about 15 
miles above Savannah. 

Nearly opposite to him, at the hamlet of Ebenezer, 
was Prevost, whose force of more than 5,000 men, the 
greater part of them British regulars, was stationed at 
various points along the river from Savannah to Augusta, 
with some outlying posts in the western part of the 
State. 2 

Notwithstanding the odds against him, the stout- 
hearted Lincoln proceeded with his plans, not only to 
defend South Carolina but to recapture Georgia. Some 
preliminary skirmishes, resulting favorably to the Ameri- 
cans, confirmed his intentions in this respect. At Beau- Action at 
fort, on Port Royal Island, a force of four companies of 
regulars, sent by sea to capture that island, was met and Feb. 3 
defeated by the militia which Moultrie brought out from 
Charleston to oppose them. Ten days later, in the upper 

1 Lincoln to Washington, Sparks, Letters, II, 245. 
2 Lossing, II, 552; Gordon, III, 229; Marshall, II, 296; Dawson, 480; 
Life of Lincoln. 



194 



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 



1779 

Engagement 
at Kettle 
Creek 

Feb. 14 



Lincoln Takes 
the Offensive 



Feb. 27 



part of Georgia, 160 miles from the sea-coast, the tory 
militia under Colonel Boyd had a collision with the Pro- 
vincial militia under Colonel Andrew Pickens. The 
locality was on Kettle Creek, Wilkes County, beyond 
Augusta. Boyd was severely wounded, more than 40 of 
his men were killed, a large number wounded, 75 were 
captured and the rest dispersed. The captives were 
all tried for treason and 5 of them were hanged. Pickens 
lost only 9 killed and 23 wounded. 1 The tory militia of 
the Carolinas never afterward assembled in sufficient 
numbers to give any trouble. 

Encouraged by these successes, Lincoln, whose force 
had increased to between 6,000 and 7,000 men by the 
arrival of North Carolina and Virginia troops and the 
gathering of militia, now felt strong enough to take the 
offensive. For this purpose he sent Ashe with 1,500 
men up the east bank of the river to attack Augusta. 2 
Prevost then realized that his force was too much scat- 
tered; he drew in the outlying garrisons in the upper 
part of the State, and uniting them with that of Augusta 
under Campbell marched them all down the west bank 
of the river, intending to concentrate his entire force at 
Ebenezer. 3 When Lincoln heard of this he ordered 
Ashe to follow Campbell down the west bank; and Ashe 
did so, going into camp in the angle between Briar Creek 
and the river, about 53 miles above Savannah. 

Then Prevost planned and carried out an admirable 
counter-stroke. He sent his younger brother, Lieutenant- 
Colonel Prevost, with portions of the 60th and 71st 
Regiments, some light infantry, a troop of cavalry and 
some Provincials — in all about 900 men — to make a 



1 Dawson, 481. a Ibid., 487. 

3 Ibid., Lincoln's Report, 492; Prevost's Report, 493. 



CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 195 

detour of about 50 miles, crossing Briar Creek far above 1779 
Ashe's camp and coming down on his rear. In order to 
divert Ashe's attention from the real movement a demon- 
stration was made against his front by one battalion of 
the 71st Regiment. 

The movement was carried out as smoothly as at an Battle of 
annual manoeuvre. Ashe was completely surprised and March 3 
ignominiously defeated. Only 450 of his men rejoined 
Lincoln's army. The rest — more than two-thirds of the 
whole force — were lost. About 150 were killed or 
wounded; as many more were drowned in attempting 
to cross the river; 27 officers and nearly 200 men were 
taken prisoners; nearly 600 succeeded in escaping and 
went home. Young Prevost lost 5 killed and 11 wounded. 1 

Ashe was tried by court-martial and severely cen- 
sured; he was soon after taken prisoner, contracted 
small-pox and died. He was a patriot of the highest 
character, but without military experience or instinct. 2 

This brilliant action of the British destroyed the pos- Lincoln Ad- 
sibility of recovering Georgia at that time. But Lincoln, Augusta 
whose courage and determination were perhaps greater 
than his military skill, did not think so. He determined 
to cross the Savannah River, cut off the enemy's com- 
munications with the back country and protect the leg- 
islature which had been summoned to meet at Augusta. 3 
Leaving about 1,000 men under Moultrie on the lower 
river, at Purysburg and the Black Swamp, with the other 
4,000 men of his command he marched up the river, A P rii23 
crossed it and moved on toward Augusta. 3 In so doing 
he uncovered the road to Charleston, unless Moultrie 
could hold Purysburg. 

1 Dawson, 489-491; Lincoln's Report, 493; Prevost's Report, 494. 

2 Dawson, 494. 3 Ibid., 495, 496. 



196 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1779 As soon as Prevost detected the movement he advanced 

April 29 against Purysburg, intending at first only to make a 

demonstration which would bring Lincoln back. But 
as Moultrie's force was too small to oppose him, and as 
Prevost met less resistance than he had anticipated, he 

prevost Ad- pushed on to Charleston, driving Moultrie before him. 

chartestoa Expresses had been sent to Lincoln begging him to re- 
turn; but he believed that Prevost's movement was only 
a feint and he was not to be deterred from his intention 
of going to Augusta. 

May io Finally, Prevost crossed the Ashley River and appeared 

before Charleston. The situation there was desperate, 
but the people were energetic; the fortifications had all 
been on the side toward the sea, but during Prevost's 
advance lines were laid out on the land side, between the 
Ashley and Cooper Rivers, and their construction vigor- 
ously pushed; the slaves were armed; the entire able- 
bodied population turned out as militia. Fortunately, 

Feb. 2 Pulaski's Legion, 1 which had been ordered by Congress 

from New Jersey to the South, had just completed its sixty 

May ii days' march, and arrived at the same time as Prevost. 2 

May 12 The next day Prevost summoned the town to surren- 

der, and some rather discreditable proposals were put for- 

1 Pulaski was a Polish revolutionist who had been obliged to flee from 
his own country in 1771, and after serving in the Turkish army had come 
to America in 1777. Congress made him a brigadier-general, and he 
served at the Brandywine and Germantown. By resolution of March 28, 
1778, Congress authorized him to raise and command "an independent 
corps of 68 horse and 200 foot, the horse to be armed with lances and the 
foot to be equipped as light infantry." It was called "Pulaski's Legion," 
and was independent of and additional to the regular military establish- 
ment planned by Steuben and adopted by Congress, May 27, 1778. Con- 
gress considered this legion as under its special orders, and by frequent 
resolutions ordered it from one point to another. (Jour. Cont. Cong., X, 
291; XII, 983; XIII, 132.) 

2 Dawson, 496-498. 



CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 197 

ward by the defenders that South Carolina should remain 1779 
neutral during the rest of the war and its status be de- Charleston 
termined by the treaty of peace when made; Prevost surrender 
rejected this and demanded an unconditional surrender. 
This was refused, and the town prepared to receive an 
assault. 1 

Prevost, however, did not assault. Lincoln was al- 
ready marching to the relief of Charleston; he had per- 
sisted in his intention of going to Augusta, but the news 
he received there from Charleston convinced him that 
Prevost intended something more serious than a feint, 
and he was now hurrying back with all possible speed. 
Prevost intercepted a letter from Lincoln to Moultrie 
telling of his approach, and he also knew of Pulaski's 
arrival ; his force was less than 3,000 men, far inferior to 
that of Lincoln; the defenders' trenches were strong, and 
could not be carried without heavy loss. 

Prevost therefore determined to withdraw from Prevost with- 
Charleston. 2 As Lincoln was advancing by the road Charleston 
from Savannah, Prevost was forced to retire by the 
islands which, with numerous marshes and inlets, form 
the sea-coast from Charleston to Savannah. He had 
abundant shipping to facilitate such a movement. He 
therefore crossed the Ashley River during the night, May 13 
marched over to Stono Inlet, crossed that and estab- 
lished himself on John's Island. To protect his position 
and permit him to withdraw gradually and without 
molestation to Savannah, a bridge-head was constructed 
on the main-land at Stono Ferry. It consisted of three 
strong redoubts, with heavy abatis in front; and in its 
rear was a bridge of boats to John's Island. 



l iD^ 



1 Gordon, III, 257; Lossing, II, 554; Marshall, 1,299; Stedman, II, 112. 

2 Dawson, 498, 499; Stedman, II, 112-115. 



198 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1779 The troops were gradually sent back through the Sea 

Islands to Savannah, until finally only the rear guard re- 
mained at Stono Ferry. It consisted of one battalion of 
the 71st Highlanders, the Hessian regiment Von Trum- 
bach, a detachment of artillery and ( some Carolina 
loyalists — in all about 900 men. All the boats but one 
had been taken away in connection with the withdrawal 
of the other troops through the Sea Islands, and this 
rear guard was thus in a somewhat perilous position. 

Lincoln determined to attack and if possible capture it. 
He now had between 6,000 and 7,000 men in Charleston, 
but he only brought 1,200 men into action. His plan 
was to send Moultrie, "with all the troops that can be 
spared from Charleston," to make a demonstration on 
James Island so as to prevent reinforcements from com- 
ing to the assistance of the rear guard, and if circum- 
stances were favorable to land his men on John's Island 
and cut off their retreat. The real movement was under 
Lincoln's own direction, and was an attack on the main- 
land against the bridge-head. 1 

June 20 Lincoln crossed the Ashley River soon after midnight 

and began his march across to Stono Ferry, a distance of 
about 8 miles. His left wing consisted of the South 

Battle of Carolina Continentals under Huger; his right, of the 
Carolina militia; in the reserve were the Virginia militia; 
and he had 6 pieces of artillery and a small body of 
cavalry. He had to advance through a dense growth 
of pine saplings on one flank and "an open forest of 
stately pines" on the other flank; and it was difficult to 
maintain connection between them. But a little after 
sunrise he approached the redoubts. The Hessians re- 
treated; but 2 companies of the Highlanders made 

1 Dawson, 499, 500; Lowell, 241; Lee's Memoirs, 130, 131. 



Stono Ferry 



7 A. M. 



CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 199 

such a stout defence that, according to Stedman, only 1773 
11 men succeeded in making their retreat, all the rest 
being either killed or wounded. 1 

The entire British force was then brought into action, 
and there was stiff fighting at close quarters, and some- 
times hand to hand with the bayonet, for about an hour. 
Then reinforcements from the western end of John's 
Island came in sight. It was to prevent this that Moul- 
trie had been sent by way of James Island; but through 
some misunderstanding there was delay in Moultrie's 
movements and he did not arrive in time. 2 

Lincoln therefore ordered a retreat, and he moved 
back to Charleston in good order. The British followed 
him a short distance and then abandoned the pursuit. 
The Americans lost 146 killed and wounded and 165 
missing. The British loss was 26 killed, 103 wounded 
and 1 missing. 3 

Lincoln did not again molest Prevost, and the latter 
retired slowly from island to island, and finally reached 
Savannah. An outpost was left at Beaufort, on Port 
Royal Island. 

The sickly season and intense heat put a stop to all 
military operations for the next two months. During 
this interval, Governor Rutledge, Lincoln, the French 
consul and the citizens of Charleston — all wrote letters 1 
to d'Estaing, begging him to come to their assistance. 
D'Estaing had promised to be on the American coast in 
May, but he stayed in the West Indies to capture St. 
Vincent and Grenada. 4 Then he sailed for Haiti, and 
there the letters from Charleston safely reached him. 5 

1 Stedman, II, 117. ' Dawson, 500; Prevost's Report, 503. 

* Dawson, 500; Prevost's Report, 503. 

4 Ante, p. 171. s Sparks, VI, 359. 



200 



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 



1779 
Sept. 4 

D'Estaing 
Returns to 
America 



Sept. 9 



D'Estaing 

Lands 



Sept. 12 



Sept. 13 



He decided to sail for Savannah. His arrival was so 
unexpected that off the mouth of the river he captured 
a British ship of the line, a frigate and two supply 
ships. 1 Prevost promptly called in his outlying detach- 
ments, at Sunbury and Beaufort, and prepared for de- 
fence; and Lincoln with equal alacrity marched toward 
Savannah. 

D'Estaing brought with him 6,000 soldiers and a 
squadron of 37 ships with over 2,000 guns. 2 Compared 
with this the British ships on the Southern coast were in- 
significant. Prevost had less than 3,000 men. 2 Lincoln 
had about 1,000 Continentals, 2 and a few months before 
he had gathered together nearly 5,000 militia. Adding 
these to the 6,000 of d'Estaing, Prevost was outnumbered 
4 to 1. With good leadership and prompt action there 
was now an opportunity to capture Prevost 's entire force; 
then proceed to the North, fight the British fleet, which 
was inferior to d'Estaing's, unite with Washington in an 
attack on New York and end the war. But these proved 
to be idle dreams; for the leadership was poor and the 
action was slow. 

D'Estaing had sent some of his ships in advance to 
Charleston to concert plans with Lincoln; when his 
main body anchored off Tybee Island; small vessels were 
arriving from Charleston to aid in landing his troops, and 
Lincoln was on the march from Charleston. 

It was decided to make the landing through Ossabaw 
Sound, about 12 miles south of Tybee Island; the troops 
came ashore at a plantation called Beaulieu, about 8 
miles due south of Savannah. D'Estaing landed only 
3,500 men, but with these he marched to Savannah the 
next day and demanded a "surrender to the arms of 

1 Dawson, 563; Stedman, II, 122-123. J Keim, 255. 



CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 201 

the King of France." * Prevost asked for twenty-four ms 
hours to consider it, his object being to gain time till 
the arrival of the Beaufort garrison; he then declined 
to surrender. Some skirmishing took place during the sept, ig 
next three days, and then Lincoln arrived, having crossed Lincoln joins 
the river several miles above Savannah. He brought savannah at 
with him, however, only 600 Continentals and 750 mili- 
tia. 2 His militia came and went at their own will, and 
rendered obedience — and not much of that — only to the 
State officials. On four days' notice it was probably not 
possible for Lincoln to despatch a larger force. 

Twelve days had now elapsed since d'Estaing's fleet Defence of 
had first been sighted, and during that time Prevost and 
his engineers and other officers had been working with 
tremendous energy. 2 The 4 men-of-war had retired up 
the river; their guns and sailors were being landed to 
take positions in the trenches; 2 of the ships and 4 
transports had been sunk in the river, blocking the 
channel below the town ; smaller vessels had been scuttled 
and a boom stretched across the river above the town to 
prevent fire rafts from coming down; gangs of 4,000 
negroes had been working in reliefs, night and day, under 
the direction of the soldiers, in throwing up redoubts and 
trenches, cutting timber and building abatis. 3 The line 
extended from the swamp on the west of the town 
around to the river on the east. It was about 1,100 
yards long, and there were five strong redoubts made of 
soft wood and earth and connected by trenches, with 
traverses at suitable intervals. In these were posted the 
regulars and Provincials which Campbell had brought 

1 Dawson, 563; Stedman, II, 123-124. 

2 Ibid., 564; ibid., II, 125-133; Lossing, II, 530. 

3 Ibid., 565; ibid., II, 125-133; Moultrie, II, 33; Gordon, III, 328-332; 
Lee's Memoirs, 55-60; Lossing, II, 528-531. 



202 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1779 from New York and Prevost from Florida. Prevost 
states their numbers at only 2,360 effective, but it is 
hard to reconcile this with the official reports of six 
months before when they numbered over 5,000, and in 
the meantime they had had no severe losses. Including 
the sailors, the volunteers from the transports and the 
negroes whom he armed, he probably had in the trenches 
fully 4,000 men. 

siege of Moultrie recorded his opinion that if the works had 

been assaulted the day after the Americans joined the 
French they would have been carried. D'Estaing and 
Lincoln thought differently, and decided on a siege. 1 
Artillery had to be landed from the ships and brought up 
from Beaulieu with insufficient transportation. A week 

se P t. 23 went by before ground was broken for the approaches 

and ten days more before the artillery opened fire. 

In the meantime Prevost had made two small sorties 
which were repulsed. This was of small consequence. The 
important thing was that he had gained in all eighteen 
more days for his negroes to work on the trenches and his 
sailors to mount their guns. When the allies made their 
junction he had only 12 guns in place; when their artil- 
lery was ready he had mounted 76 guns — pieces of 6, 9 
and 18 pounds. 

Oct. 4 Finally the cannonade opened and continued almost 

oct. 9 without interruption for five days. Some houses were 

damaged and a few persons injured in the town; but no 
harm was done to the trenches or their defenders. 

D'Estaing then became anxious. He was impatient 
to send some of his ships back to the West Indies and 
the rest to France. He had already been five weeks on 
the American coast. His engineers told him that it 

1 Prevost's Report, Dawson, 566. 




^Mar S^ □ □ □ □ □ 

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^5 V *.'H\ ^ v . II American \ 
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British 
French ^ 



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'French Camp 



100 200 300 

Scale of Yards 




Americans — 1 
British ^ m 

A. Wilkin's Battery, 16 Guns 
.B. Gibb's Battery, 9 Guns 

C. Ferguson's Battery, 6 Gnns 

D. Old Magazine, 6 Guns 

E. Citadel, 66 Guns 

F. Where garrison laid dowi 
arms 

G. Gadsden's Wharf, 7 Guns 
H.01d Indian Wharf, 5 Guns 
I. Governor's Bridge, 3 Gun 
1. 4 Gnus 

K. Darrell's, 7 Guns 
• Redoubts 

Vessels behind Boom 
L'A venture, 24 Guns 
Boston, 32 Guns 
LePolaque, 16 Guns 
Ranger, 20 Guns 
Providence, 32 Guns 
Five Galleys 




Charleston 
Harbor 

jAbff'oTt Johnson 



ings Pt 



urtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company 
Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio 



Cl. 



ery's History of the United States and Its People 



CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 203 

would take ten days more to complete the sap which was 1779 
about 300 yards from British trenches just south of the 
town. He would not wait. It was either raise the siege 
or make an assault. 1 He decided on the latter. 

The allied camp was about 1,200 yards south of the The Allies 
British lines ; the French on the right, the Americans on British Lines 
the left. The plan of assault was to send Huger with the 
South Carolina militia to make a demonstration against 
the works on the east or left of the British line; while 
the main attack was to be made on the opposite flank, 
in two columns. One of these, under Count Dillon, was 
to make its way along the base of the bluff and on the 
edge of the swamp, where it would be protected from 
British fire, and when near the river it was to climb the 
bluff and attack the Sailor's Battery, which formed the 
extreme right of the British lines. 1 The other column 
was to be led by d'Estaing and Lincoln and was to at- 
tack the Spring Hill redoubt, at the south-west angle of 
the lines, where the road from Augusta rose to the bluff 
from the causeway across the swamp. There were 3,500 
French and 850 Americans in the two columns. The 
troops were to move at 4 o'clock in the morning so as to 
make the assault at dawn. 

There was delay, however, in getting started, and it Oct. 9 
was broad daylight when Dillon, who had lost his way in 
the swamp, was discovered. He was not near enough 
to the bluff to be sheltered from fire, and after losing 
heavily he retreated to camp without having reached the 
enemy's lines at all. 

The other column made a fierce attack and was warmly 
received. That portion of the lines was commanded by 

1 Dawson, 565; Stedman, II, 125-133; Moultrie, II, 33; Gordon, III, 
328-332; Lee's Memoirs, 55-60; Lossing, II, 528-531. 



204 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1779 Lieutenant-Colonel Maitland, the competent officer who 
had so successfully defended the bridge-head at Stono 
Ferry four months before. A Charleston sergeant who 
had deserted the day before had told him of the prepara- 
tions for the assault, and while Maitland's force (one 
battalion of 71st Regiment, one battalion of 60th and a 
company of marines) was far inferior in numbers to the 
assailants, he was ready to make a vigorous defence. 

The attack was made with the greatest gallantry. Al- 
though the column was exposed to the direct fire of the 
Spring Hill redoubt and to the cross-fire of the works on 
either side of it, yet the men pressed on until the colors 
of France and Carolina were planted on the parapet. A 
desperate hand-to-hand encounter continued for fifty- 
five minutes. D'Estaing was twice wounded, although 
not severely. Pulaski was horribly mangled, receiving 
wounds from which he died in a few days. The troops 
that did not reach the parapet were crowded in the ditch 
and on the glacis; and the Highlanders came out of 
their trenches on the left of the redoubt and mowed 
down the assailants with a terrible enfilade fire. Three 
standard-bearers of the Carolina colors, two lieutenants 
and a sergeant were killed in succession on top of the 
parapet. 
Repulse of gut the British did not yield an inch. They had 

driven back Huger when he made his demonstration on 
the opposite flank, and they now began to bring reinforce- 
ments from that flank to support Maitland. The losses 
of the French and Americans were so heavy that they 
were finally forced to yield, and they retreated to their 
camps. 

The British loss was 40 killed, 63 wounded and 52 
missing. The allies lost 16 officers and 228 men killed 



CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 205 

and 63 officers and 521 men wounded, a total of 837 — 1779 
nearly six times as many as the defenders. 1 It was the 
severest fighting since Bunker Hill — a fierce assault and 
a splendid defence. The loss of officers, particularly the 
Americans, shows how gallantly they led their men, and 
seems to justify Moultrie's opinion that if the assault had 
been made when the allies made their junction three weeks 
before, and when the British works were only partially 
completed, it would have succeeded. 

The assault having been tried, and having failed, Lin- 
coln was for continuing the siege; but d'Estaing would 
not hear of it. He raised the siege at once and returned The Allies 
to his ships. Sending some of these to the West Indies, siege 
with the others he sailed for France 2 — on the same day Oct. 20 
that Washington wrote to Lafayette: "We have been in D'Estaing 
hourly expectation, for the last fifteen days, of seeing France 
Count d'Estaing off Sandy Hook." 3 Henry Lee and Du 
Portail and Hamilton were on the Jersey coast watching 
for d'Estaing's arrival in order that they might deliver 
the letters which Washington had addressed to him in 
regard to joint operations after his arrival. 4 But he did 
not come their way. 

When d'Estaing left Savannah Lincoln was, of course, 
forced to march back to Charleston. 

D'Estaing mismanaged affairs at Savannah as badly 
as he had at Newport in the previous year. The feeling 
against him was very bitter. The South was terribly 
disheartened; and the militia, which had been gathering- 
in large numbers at Charleston, went home. The British 
were correspondingly elated. 

1 Dawson, 565; Stedman, IT, 125-133; Moultrie, II, 33; Gordon, III, 
328-332; Lee's Memoirs, 55-60; Lossing, II, 528-531. 
3 Dawson, 569. s Sparks, VI, 383. * Ante, p. 171. 



206 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1779 When Clinton heard of d'Estaing's arrival on the 
oct. 25 Southern coast he recalled to New York the 6,000 men 
Clinton's ex- who had so long been doing nothing at Newport; and as 
uS sSIth soon as news arrived of d'Estaing's defeat and departure 

for France, he determined to leave Knyphausen in com- 
mand at New York, while he himself went to the South, 
taking Cornwallis with him as second in command, to 
try a second time to capture Charleston, believing that if 
successful he could complete the conquest of the South 
and restore the entire section to the British crown. He 
also planned to operate on an entirely different line from 
that which he adopted in 1776. Having now a base at 
Savannah, that was his destination; and from there he 
intended to move along the islands, following in an op- 
posite direction the route of Campbell in the summer of 
1779, and attack Charleston from the rear with his army, 
while the fleet assailed it in front. 1 

His expedition was of no small proportions — 90 trans- 
ports and supply ships, carrying 8 British and 5 Hessian 
regiments, besides Provincials and artillery and cavalry, 
in all about 8,500 men. They were convoyed by a fleet 
under Admiral Arbuthnot, consisting of 5 ships of the 
line and 9 frigates, with 650 guns and crews numbering 
probably 5,000 men. 2 
Dec. 26 The . ships sailed at a bad season, and off Hatteras 

1780 encountered the winter gales; so that it was more than 
Jan. 30 thirty days before the ships began arriving at Tybee 

Island. They had been scattered and dispersed on the 
voyage; an ordnance ship had foundered; a ship con- 
taining Hessians was driven across the ocean to be 
beached on the Cornwall coast of England; most of the 

1 Sparks, VI, 486; Lee's Memoirs, 62-75; Dawson, 570; Tarleton, 4, 35. 

2 Dawson, 570, 571. 



CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 207 

artillery and cavalry horses perished; the stores, of which i78o 
there was a plentiful supply, were damaged. 1 

After making a few of the most urgent repairs the fleet canton Lands 
sailed up to North Edisto Inlet and the troops were to n ar 
landed on John's Island about 30 miles south of Charles- Feb. n 
ton. Within a few days advance guards had crossed 
John's Island, and seized Stono Ferry, James Island, 
Wappoo Cut and the west bank of the Ashley River op- 
posite Charleston. Lincoln at that time had only 1,400 
Continentals and 1,000 militia. Clinton had more than 
8,000 regulars. Had he acted with the same celerity 
which Campbell displayed at Savannah the year before, 
he could have captured Charleston and its small garrison, 
conquered the whole of South Carolina and then marched 
northward to the Chesapeake. But whereas Campbell 
captured Savannah in six days from the time his ships 
arrived off the mouth of the Savannah River, Clinton 
did not cross the Ashley River and begin serious opera- March 29 
tions against Charleston until seven weeks after he was 
ashore. 

In the meantime he had brought 1,200 men from 
Savannah and had sent about half of his transports 
back to New York for reinforcements; and the lighter 
ships of Arbuthnot's squadron had crossed the bar and 
anchored in Five Fathom Hole, to the south of Fort 
Moultrie. 1 

Lincoln had been doing whatever was possible with preparation 
his slender resources. The lines across the peninsula, Charleston 
from the Cooper to the Ashley Rivers, were completed 
and strengthened. Washington had already sent all the 

1 Dawson, 570-578; Lee, 62-75; Tarleton, 1-84; Stedman, II, 176-195; 
Lowell, 244-247, 301; Eelking, 176-184. The reports of Clinton and 
Arbuthnot, the articles of capitulation and other official documents are 
given in full in Tarleton. 



208 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1779 North Carolina and Virginia Continentals which he had 
Nov. 23 in his army; 1 and these arrived while Clinton was mak- 
Dec io ing his preparations to cross the Ashley River, or during 

1780 the siege. The American squadron under Commodore 
Feb. 20 Whipple — 9 vessels and 248 guns — were at first disposed 

to contest the entrance of Arbuthnot's ships into the 
harbor; 2 but it was not deemed strong enough for that 

April 7 purpose, and it was therefore withdrawn to the city; 

some of the guns were carried ashore and placed in the 
trenches, and 4 of the frigates and several merchant- 
ships were sunk in the two channels on either side of 
Shute's Folly (where Castle Pinckney was afterward 
built) at the mouth of the Cooper River. Their masts 
were connected by boom and chains, and chevaux-de-frise 
were placed on their decks. The passage into the Cooper 
River was thus effectually blocked; and behind the bar- 
rier was the rest of the squadron — 5 vessels and 124 guns. 2 
Lincoln was thus enabled to preserve his communications 
with the main-land and keep open a route for the rein- 
forcements which were expected, or for a retreat, if that 
should be decided upon. 

Finally, Clinton had completed his preparations, crossed 
the Ashley River in force and opened Ins first parallel 

March 29 at 1,800 yards from Lincoln's works. A few days later 

April 8 Arbuthnot, with 7 frigates and 216 guns, ran by Fort 

Moultrie, with a loss of 27 men, and anchored between 
James Island and the city. 1 

April io Clinton and Arbuthnot united in a demand for sur- 

render, and Lincoln sent back a brief but spirited refusal. 
The siege then began in earnest. 3 Clinton had lost 60 

1 Sparks, VI, 415. 2 See foot-note, p. 207. 

3 The most complete account of the siege of Charleston is that given in 
Moultrie's Memoirs of the American Revolution, II, 65-106, and Tarleton, 
1-84. 



CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 209 

days in getting ready, and Lincoln had not been idle. 1780 
Charleston was now surrounded by a series of redoubts siege of 
and trenches, forming an irregular triangle whose three 
sides had a total length of nearly five miles. On the 
water sides were 9 batteries with 60 guns. 1 On the land 
side there was a large hornwork astride the main road, 
"the Citadel," with 66 guns; in front of this a strong 
line of trenches, extending from river to river, and with a 
redoubt at each flank like a bastion, giving a flanking fire 
in front of the trenches; in front of this again, a wet ditch 
or canal, with a dam to retain the water at low tide ; and 
in front of the canal a line of abatis and trous-de-loup. 

The siege was carried on according to the scientific 
rules of the day, under the able direction of the chief 
engineer, Colonel Moncrieff, who had gained great repu- 
tation at the defence of Savannah. There were first, 
second and third parallels; saps, double saps and flying 
saps; and a sortie, in which 15 of the enemy were killed 
and 12 taken prisoners. Finally, on the twenty-eighth Mays 
day, the counterscarp had been gained, the canal had 
been drained and the besiegers were ready to crown the 
scarp. Then Clinton sent a second summons to sur- 
render. Lincoln replied, proposing impossible terms in 
order to gain time. 

He was now nearly surrounded, and his communica- Charleston 
tions with the North were practically severed. These 
communications had been maintained through a post at 
Monck's Corners, 30 miles north of Charleston, which 
was occupied by a detachment of Continental cavalry 
and some militia under Huger. Against this Clinton 
sent about 1,400 men; and a portion of this force under 
Tarleton surprised Huger and dispersed his command, 

1 See foot-note, p. 207. 



210 



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 



1780 of which they captured about 100 officers and men and 
Apra 14 400 horses — the latter being very useful in replacing the 

horses of "Tarleton's Legion" which had been injured 
and thrown overboard on the rough voyage from New 
May 6 York. Tarleton then pressed north, and at the crossing 

of the Santee River he defeated the mounted militia 
which was gathering at that point, inflicting on them a 
loss of 41 killed and wounded and 67 taken prisoners. 1 

Lord Rawdon, 2 meanwhile, had arrived from New York 
with a reinforcement of 2,500 men, and had been as- 
signed to the command of all the force operating on the 
east of the Cooper River; he soon captured the works at 
Haddrell's Point, and Arbuthnot then landed sailors and 
marines to assault Fort Moultrie from the land side 
while he bombarded it with his ships from the water side. 
When these preparations were completed the fort was sur- 
rounded, and it surrendered with its garrison of 291 men. 
Lincoln was thus completely surrounded by a force 
which (including the reinforcements from New York and 
Savannah and the sailors who had been landed to man 
the siege-guns) numbered about 14,000 men. Further 
resistance was hopeless, and he signed the articles of 
May 12 capitulation which Clinton offered. The return of pris- 

oners, signed by John Andr6, deputy adjutant-general, 
numbers 7 generals, 290 other officers, 5,169 rank and 
file, including Continentals, militia and armed citizens — 
5,466 in all. The return of captured ordnance shows 
391 guns of different calibres, 5,316 muskets, 15 regimental 
colors, 33,346 rounds of small-arms ammunition, 8,394 
round shot, 376 barrels of powder — besides grape and 
case shot, cartridges, etc., by the thousand. 

1 See foot-note, p. 207. 

s Afterward Earl of Moira and Governor-General of India. 



April 18 



April 24 



Surrender of 
Fort Moultrie 



May 7 

Surrender of 
Charleston 



CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 211 

Lincoln's losses during the siege were 92 killed and 146 mo 
wounded; those of Clinton were 76 killed and 179 
wounded. 1 

It was the greatest disaster sustained by the American 
army during the war — or, in fact, at any time ; for on no 
other occasion (except at Harper's Ferry) have 5,000 men 
of the United States laid down their arms to an enemy. 2 

Lincoln was sent North on parole and immediately 
asked for a court of inquiry. 1 But it was never held. 
Washington was at first disposed to think that Lincoln 
should have retreated North as soon as the Arbuthnot 
ships crossed the bar; but when he learned all the cir- 
cumstances he held Lincoln blameless. 1 The latter was Nov. 7 
soon exchanged, resumed his military duties under 
Washington's direction, rendered excellent service for a 
year and was then appointed to the newly created office mi 
of secretary of war, 3 filling that office until after the Oct. 30 
treaty of peace had been signed. In fact, serious as was 
the disaster, there is but little ground for criticism of 
Lincoln and much for commendation. The idea of re- mo 
treating was fully discussed in two councils; at the second April 21 
of these, a large number of citizens broke in and declared A P ru 26 
that "if he attempted to withdraw the troops and leave 
the citizens, they would cut up his boats and open the 
gates to the enemy." The greater part of his force was 
militia and armed citizens ; his Continentals were from the 
Southern States, and disposed to render allegiance to 
State rather than Continental authority. 4 The command- 

1 See foot-note, p. 207. 

2 The surrender of 1 1,000 men under General White, near Harper's Ferry, 
on Sept. 15, 1862 was, in view of the magnitude of the struggle then in progress, 
comparatively unimportant. 

3 Jour. Cong., Ill, 471, 683; Sparks, VII, 102. 
* Moultrie's Memoirs, II, 97. 



212 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1780 ing general was the only Northern man in the army. 
If he had ordered a retreat his orders would not have 
been obeyed, and there would have been dissension on 
the part of the civil authorities which would have prob- 
ably carried the State back to its British allegiance. The 
prudent course of Lincoln preserved its adhesion to the 
United States. 

On strictly military grounds a retreat was out of the 
question. Clinton had 12,500 soldiers well equipped 
in every particular. Had Lincoln crossed the Cooper 
River with his 2,000 ill-equipped Continentals and at- 
tempted the long march — without adequate transporta- 
tion — to join Washington in New Jersey, he would prob- 
ably have been overwhelmed and destroyed before he 
reached the Santee. In place of that he made a sturdy 
defence — remarkably so, in view of the slender resources 
at his disposal — and in so doing he delayed the conquest 
of South Carolina for at least two months. 

Having taken Charleston, Clinton sent out detachments 

to occupy various points in the interior of the State. One 

of them under Tarleton, a most energetic cavalry leader, 

overtook, near the North Carolina boundary, the 3d 

Virginia Regiment, about 300 men under Colonel Buford. 

Action at the which was marching from Virginia to Charleston. The 

MiTy 29 WS ' engagement was short but destructive, the Americans 

losing 113 killed, 150 wounded and 53 prisoners; while 

Tarleton's losses were only 9 killed and 12 wounded. 1 

June 5 Believing that the State was now fully conquered, 

Clinton returned to New York, taking with him about 

one-third of his troops, 2 and leaving with Cornwallis, 

1 Dawson, 582-585; Tarleton, 30; Stedman, II, 193. 

2 Ante, p. 164; Sparks, V, 544. 



CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 213 

who hereafter commanded in the South, 6 British, 1 1780 
Hessian, and 6 Provincial regiments — in all 8,345 men. Return of, 
The main body was at Charleston, but there were strong 
detachments at Savannah and Augusta in Georgia; and 
there was a chain of posts in South Carolina, from Ninety- Disposition of 
Six on the West, through Rocky Mount, Camden and After the °° ps 
Cheraw, to Georgetown on the coast. 1 The intense heat Charleston. 
precluded active operations, and it was Cornwallis's in- 
tention to rest his troops during the summer, and as soon 
as the crops were gathered, and he could have the aid of 
the tory militia, to march northward and conquer North 
Carolina and Virginia. 2 

Active operations had now been in progress in the 
South continuously (except as interrupted by the summer 
heat) for about eighteen months. Savannah and Charles- 
ton, the two principal cities, had been captured; Georgia 
and South Carolina had been conquered and were every- 
where under British control ; the authority of the United 
States was not recognized nor were there any Continental 
soldiers — except prisoners of war — in any part of either 
State. Large numbers of the citizens had returned to the 
British allegiance; a greater number, however, adhered 
to the United States. Each side furnished its militia Ramsour's 
and they fought each other furiously; in one rough-and- j une 26 " 
tumble encounter with clubbed muskets, about 400 men Hanging Rock. 
on a side, more than one-third of the combatants were 
killed and wounded; in another of a similar character, 
with about 800 men on each side, the tory losses were 
fully fifty per cent, those of the Americans not being re- 
corded. 3 In a smart skirmish between 75 men under Williamson's 
Colonel Bratton, one of Sumter's partisan chiefs, and a s. a c., a juiyi2 

1 Dawson, 592; Tarleton, 87; Stedman, 195; Lee, 78. 

2 Tarleton, 86. 3 Dawson, 592-596, 601-603, 608-611. 



214 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1780 scouting party from "Tarleton's Legion" with some of 
the tory militia — 115 men in all — the latter was surprised 
and destroyed, only 12 men escaping. Soon after, Sum- 
Rocky Mount, ter himself, with 600 men, assaulted a British fortified 

S. C, July 30 , . , . ' . ,, . _ . . 

post but was repulsed with a loss ol 13 men, the de- 
fenders (New York volunteers) losing 12. Two days 
later, at a point about 60 miles distant, in the north-west 
corner of South Carolina, Colonel Clarke, of Georgia, with 
Green spring, 196 men, met and defeated Captain Dunlap, who was 
scouting with a detachment of 210 men — dragoons and 
mounted riflemen. The losses on each side were about 
Hanging Rock, 15 per cent. A week after that, Sumter, with 800 men, 
again attacked a British stockaded post just north of 
Camden. He was again unsuccessful and was forced to 
retreat, but only after a severe fight lasting nearly four 
hours, in which he had inflicted on the enemy a loss of 
about 130 men. 1 

These partisan encounters were soon succeeded by 

events of a more serious character. Four months pre- 

Aprii 3 viously Washington had ordered the Continental line of 

Maryland and Delaware with a regiment of artillery and 

12 guns to proceed to Charleston. Baron de Kalb, who 

had come from France with Lafayette, was assigned to 

the command. 2 The force numbered 2,000 men, and the 

transfer of such a body for a distance of nearly 800 miles 

Be Kaib was a serious matter. The troops started from Morris- 

tne south town and marched to Head of Elk, where the infantry 

April i6 embarked on boats and proceeded through Chesapeake 

May 3 Bay and James River to Petersburg, where it was joined 

June 6 by the artillery which had gone overland. Here De Kalb 

June 20 learned of the surrender of Charleston. He continued his 

march, however, and crossing the border of North Carolina 

1 Dawson, 604-605. J Sparks, VII, 7, 15. 



CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 215 

finally came into the theatre of operations and encamped i78o 
on Deep River, about 50 miles north of the British post July 6 
of Cheraw. He had called on the governors of Virginia 
and North Carolina for reinforcements of militia and for 
supplies of all kinds and transportation. But he received 
almost nothing; and, in fact, the States had little or 
nothing to give. More than once on their march the 
troops were in danger of starvation. 1 

The news of the fall of Charleston had reached Wash- June i 
ington, through his secret service in New York, 2 earlier Gates a p - 
than it did De Kalb, and he had at once informed Con- command the 
gress. That body, without consulting Washington, ap- Army, 
pointed Gates to command the Southern army. 3 Six 
weeks later Gates arrived at De Kalb's camp and took jui y 25 
command. 

De Kalb was an experienced soldier, and he had care- 
fully studied the situation and formed a definite, careful 
plan of operations. It was submitted to Gates, with the 
approval of all the senior officers. 4 But Gates declined 
to consider it and forthwith issued an order for the Juiy28 
army to march immediately against Camden, the prin- 
cipal British post. This march of about 120 miles was 
accomplished in about two weeks, and in the course of it 
Gates was joined by 1,200 North Carolina militia under 
Caswell and by a few small detachments from the North. 5 

His movements were not unknown to Rawdon, who 
commanded at Camden. He called in his outlying de- 
tachments, reported the facts to Cornwallis and urged 

1 Kapp's Kalb, 195-199. J Sparks, VII, G9. 

5 Jour. Cong., Ill, 465. 

4 Kapp's Kalb, 206-209; narrative of Williams, Johnson, I, 486. 

5 Dawson, 612-619; Tarleton, 102-153; Stedman, 204-218; Lee, 94- 
103; Kapp's Kalb, 220-238. The official reports are given at length in 
Tarleton. 



216 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1780 him to come in person with reinforcements from Charles- 
Aug. 13 ton. Comwallis did so, and arrived at Camden three 

days before the battle. 1 

The situation was then as follows : Gates was at Ruge- 
ly's Mills, 13 miles north of Camden, with a force which 
he imagined numbered 7,000 men, but in reality, as his 
adjutant-general informed him on the following morning, 
numbered 3,052 present fit for duty. They consisted of 
the Continentals of Maryland and Delaware, the militia 
of North Carolina and Virginia, 8 pieces of artillery, Ar- 
mand's Legion and Porterfield's Light Infantry. The 
militia had been recently assembled and had never been 
in action or received any military training. There were 
no less than 13 general officers present, the greater part 
of them belonging to the militia. With this force Gates 
intended to attack the British post at Camden, of which 
he had no adequate knowledge, either by reconnoissance 
or otherwise. He seems to have thought that he could 
repeat the brilliant capture of Stony Point, and his order 
for a night march was in some degree copied from Wayne's 
famous order. In the afternoon before the march he 
issued to his men a full ration of corn-meal and fresh 
meat, and, having no rum, he distributed (from the hos- 
pital stores just arrived from Virginia) a gill of molasses 
per man. 2 The food was hastily and badly cooked, and, 
washed down with molasses, it was more powerful than 
a compound cathartic. The men were in great distress 
during the night march and when the battle began were 
in an enfeebled, weak condition. 3 

Opposed to Gates, the force under Cornwallis should 
have numbered about 4,000; but the intense heat of 

1 See foot-note 5, p. 215. 2 See foot-note 5, p. 215. 

3 Narrative of Colonel Otho Williams, Johnson, I, 494. 



CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 217 

summer had produced a good deal of sickness; more than 1780 
800 were in the hospital, and, including the reinforcements 
which Cornwallis brought from Charleston, the morning 
report showed only 122 officers and 2,117 men fit for 
duty. About half the force was well-seasoned regulars, 
23d, 33d and 71st Regiments; there were two tory regi- 
ments raised in New York, the Volunteers of Ireland 
and the British Legion, who were almost as good as 
regulars, and two regiments of Carolina militia. Corn- 
wallis (like Gates) believed that the American army 
numbered 7,000 men. Nevertheless, he determined to 
attack them, relying upon the superior discipline and 
greater experience of his troops. 1 

Both armies, therefore, moved out at 10 o'clock at night, Aug. 15 
each intending to surprise the other. About 2 o'clock in Aug. ie 
the morning the advance guards came in contact at a 
point 9 miles north of Camden, where the road after 
crossing Saunder's Creek passes through an open forest of 
pines about a mile wide, flanked on each side by an im- 
passable marsh. Armand's Legion, at the first fire, was 
thrown back on the main body in some confusion. But 
Cornwallis did not pursue, as he did not wish to risk the 
uncertainties and accidents of a night engagement. He 
leisurely deployed his force, the light infantry, 23d and 
63d Regiments on the right, Irish Volunteers, Legion 
and North Carolina Regiment on the left, 71st in re- 
serve and Tarleton's cavalry in the rear; and when the 
deployment was completed he waited for daylight. 
Gates also deployed in similar manner, 2d Maryland 
and Delaware on the right, North Carolina and Virginia 
militia on the left and 1st Maryland in reserve. The 
distance between the lines was about 200 yards. 1 

1 See foot-note 5, p. 215. 



218 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1780 At daylight Cornwallis began the action by a vigorous 

Aug. i6 attack from his right. 1 The British regulars struck the 

Battle of Carolina and Virginia militia; the latter, in their weak- 
ened condition, due to the improper diet which Gates 
had prescribed, without any experience of battle and 
commanded by untrained officers, threw away their arms 
and fled. 1 Armand's foreign legion went with them, and 
they broke through the left flank of the 1st Mary- 
land, throwing that brigade into confusion, and, sweeping 
Gates with them, carried him off the field so that he was 
not again heard from for several days. But the Mary- 
landers restored order in their ranks, made a partial 
change of front to the left, arrested the British advance 
and, on the right, under the gallant leadership of De Kalb, 
took the offensive. Rawdon's Irishmen made a stout 
defence, and there was fierce fighting in the woods for 
nearly an hour. Then De Kalb fell, mortally wounded; 
the 23d and 33d Regiments turned the left flank of 
the Maryland brigades; and Cornwallis, perceiving that 
there was no cavalry opposed to him (Armand hav- 
ing fled), sent Tarleton with the cavalry of his legion 
still farther around their flank and in their rear. The 
whole line then gave way, and the retreat was soon 
a rout. 1 

The American force was destroyed. It lost all its 
artillery, all its baggage, all its supplies and nearly all 
its muskets and ammunition. 1 The militia scattered in 
every direction and in small groups worked their way 
home; the Delaware regiment was almost annihilated; 
the remnants of the 6 Maryland regiments, about 700 
men in all, came together at Hillsborough about ten days 
after the battle. 1 Gates covered the 60 miles to Char- 

1 See foot-note 5, p. 215. 




y of The Burrows Brothers Company, 

Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio 
Avery's History of the United States 
and Its People 



CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 219 

lotte on the day of the battle, and in the next 48 hours 1737 
another 100 miles to Hillsborough. night of 

Gates 

Cornwallis lost 68 killed, 245 wounded and 11 missing. 1 
Gates's army was thus destroyed; but Sumter and his Aug. is 
partisans were still intact a few miles away. On the day Aug. is 
before the battle Gates had sent him a reinforcement of 
400 men, and on the day of the battle Sumter had inter- 
cepted and captured a considerable amount of supplies Aug. ie 
and their escort which were coming up from Charleston 
and had nearly reached Camden. 1 Hearing of Gates's 
defeat, Sumter began his retreat northward to his home 
country in the Catawba settlements. Tarleton went Actional 
after him in hot pursuit, surprised him in his camp and Aug. is 
destroyed him. Sumter himself escaped without hat, 
coat or boots; of his men, 150 were killed or wounded, 
300 taken prisoners and the rest dispersed. The prison- 
ers and supplies which Sumter had taken two days before 
were recaptured. Tarleton's loss was only 6 killed and 
9 wounded. 1 

1 Dawson, 623. 



CHAPTER VII 
BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 

1780 The conquest of the South seemed now to be complete. 

Greene Ap- The only armed force of the Americans south of New 

pointed to — «/\ • 

command the Jersey was the remnants of Gates s army, about 700 in 

Southern ~ \ J . 

Army number, which were assembling at Hillsborough, m the 

northern part of North Carolina. Nevertheless, Con- 
gress did not despair. As usual when disasters came 
thickly it turned to Washington. Having itself chosen 
the three commanders, Howe, Lincoln and Gates, under 
whom Savannah and Charleston, Georgia and the two 
Carolinas had been lost, it now called upon Washington 
to select a commander for the Southern army. 1 Wash- 
ington selected Greene, 2 who, in the language of John 
Fiske, "in every campaign since the beginning of the war 
had been Washington's right arm; and for indefatigable 
industry, for strength and breadth of intelligence, and 
for unselfish devotion to the public service, he was scarcely 
inferior to the commander-in-chief." 3 

Oct. 22 Greene received his orders 4 and letters from Washing- 

ton while in command at West Point after Arnold's 
treason, and in accordance with his instructions pro- 
ceeded immediately to Philadelphia for conference with 
Congress. Steuben was sent with him, 5 to be second in 

1 Jour. Cong., Ill, 534. 2 Sparks, VII, 257. 

3 Fiske, American Revolution, II, 250. 4 Sparks, VII, 271, 272. 

6 Fiske, 11,251. 

220 



BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 221 

command, and to be president of the court which Greene 1780 
was ordered to convene to inquire into Gates's conduct. 

Congress approved and ratified Washington's selection Oct. 30 
and adopted resolutions conferring upon Greene extraor- 
dinary powers. His army was to consist of all the Con- Oct. 3 
tinental regiments raised or to be raised from Delaware Oct. 21 
to Georgia, inclusive (the number of such regiments 
having been fixed by previous resolutions at 24, with an 
authorized strength of 36 officers and 681 men each); he 
was to organize and employ his army as he should judge 
most proper, subject to the control of the commander- 
in-chief, whose control at a distance of 800 miles, with 
no railroads or telegraph, was merely nominal ; he was to 
have all the powers heretofore conferred upon Gates in 
regard to appointments and promotions, and in addition 
was to have the power 1 of making exchanges of prisoners, 
which hitherto had been conferred only upon Washington ; 
the legislatures and governors of the six States above 
named were " earnestly recommended" to "afford every 
assistance and support, in men, clothing, money, arms, 
intrenching tools, provisions and other aids and supplies"; 
and the heads of the several staff departments were 
" directed to furnish" on his order "such articles as, upon 
inquiry, he shall find cannot be obtained in the Southern 
Department." 2 In short, every power that Congress 
could put on paper was given to him. He was to carry 
on the Revolution in the distant South and regain the 
conquered States. 

Had Congress been in position to make good its reso- 
lutions, Greene's task would have been an easy one. 
But the 24 regiments of the Southern States, from Dela- 
ware to Georgia, with an authorized strength of 17,000 

1 Jour. Cong., Ill, 538, 540, 541. 2 Ibid., Ill, 541. 



222 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1780 men, had no existence, except in the remnants of Gates's 
army at Hillsborough. That of Georgia had never been 
raised; those of the two Carolinas and most of those of 
Virginia had been captured at Charleston. 

Greene undertook the task in a hopeful if not confident 
spirit. 1 He left an agent at Philadelphia to see that sup- 
plies were sent to him in case Congress had any; and on 
his way south he left Steuben in Virginia to organize all 
the troops that Governor Jefferson would call out, both 
Continental and militia, and forward them to the South. 
Several of the best officers in the army made applica- 
tions to go with him — Steuben, 2 Lafayette, 3 Henry Lee 3 
(father of Robert E. Lee) and John Laurens. 3 Wash- 
ington had different plans for Lafayette, but the others 
were sent. 4 On his arrival at the South, Greene soon 
gained the loyal and hearty support of the famous 
partisan leaders — Morgan, Marion, Sumter, Pickens and 
William Washington. 
Dec. 4 When Greene took command at Charlotte, the paper 

strength of his "army" was 2,307, of whom 1,482 were 
Greene present, and not quite 800 were equipped and fit for duty. 5 

command He succeeded, with Steuben's efficient help, in increasing 
this, within three months, to 4,441 present for duty, of 
whom 1,651 were Continentals, although most of them 
were new levies who had never been in battle. 6 It never 
again reached that number. This was the force, aided 
by the partisans of Sumter and others, which varied in 

1 G. W. Greene, III, 35; letter to Congress. 
3 Kapp, Steuben; Sparks, VII, 316, 361, 404. 

3 Sparks, VII, 316; Sparks, Letters, III, 140. 

4 Laurens on arriving at Philadelphia was selected for the special mission 
to France (ante, p. 178), but he joined Greene as soon as he returned. 

5 Greene to Lafayette, G. W. Greene, III, 70; Gordon, IV, 27. 

6 G. W. Greene, III, 190; Gordon, IV, 54. 



BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 223 

numbers at various times, from nothing to perhaps a mo 
maximum of 2,000, with which Greene reconquered the 
South. The returns in the British Record Office show 
that in 1781 and 1782 the British force in the Caro- 
linas and Georgia varied from a minimum of 8,141 to a 
maximum of 10,859* — effective, fit for duty, exclusive 
of officers and non-commissioned officers. About three- 
fourths of them were regulars, British and Hessians, and 
the rest were tory regiments from New York and New 
Jersey, which had seen four years' service, and were fully 
as well organized as and infinitely better equipped and 
supplied than the few Continentals in the Southern 
army. 

f In the interval between the battle of Camden and the Aug. i6 
date when Greene assumed command, Cornwallis had Dec - 4 
not been idle. He had marched, unopposed, into North Sept - 8 
Carolina as far as Charlotte; and Clinton had sent 3,000 Sept - 22 
men under Leslie from New York to the Chesapeake, 2 0ct- 16 
there to act under Cornwallis's orders and either effect a 
junction with him as he marched north, or to create a 
diversion in his favor and prevent the sending of reinforce- 
ments to the South. These plans miscarried; for, soon cimton sends 
after Cornwallis reached Charlotte and before Leslie had to the south 
sailed from New York, a force of backwoodsmen, between 
900 and 1,500 strong, who lived in the mountains from 
Virginia to Georgia, suddenly appeared almost as if they 
had sprung out of the ground, and surrounded a party 
of regulars and tory militia, about 1,100 in number, on 
King's Mountain. This force was commanded by Major 
Ferguson, of the 71st Regiment, a gallant and skilful 
officer. He had been posted in the foot-hills of the Alle- Battle of 
ghanies, on Cornwallis's left flank, about thirty miles from Mountain 

1 Sparks, V, 542. 2 Tarleton, 170, 199; Sparks, VII, 269. 



224 



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 



1780 



Oct. 7 



Oct. 14 



Results of the 
Battle of 
King's 
Mountain 



Charlotte. He was to keep down the patriot militia in 
that neighborhood. Hearing of the approach of Colonel 
Williams and the others, he took a defensive position on 
the top of King's Mountain, a wooded hill just north of 
the boundary between North and South Carolina. Here 
he was surrounded by the mountaineers about 4 o'clock 
on an autumn afternoon. The battle was not very 
scientific, but it was effective. Dismounting from their 
horses, these frontiersmen climbed the hill on all sides, 
using their hunting rifles with great effect. Ferguson 
made a gallant defence. Three times he beat them back, 
using the bayonet. After an hour of hard fighting Fer- 
guson was killed and his men surrendered. He had lost 
224 killed and 163 wounded; 716 were taken prisoners. 
On the American side 28 were killed (including Williams) 
and 60 wounded. 1 The Americans dispersed almost as 
quickly as they had gathered. 

The news of this extraordinary action spread fast in 
all directions; it brought out the militia of North Carolina 
and the new levies in Virginia ; it carried discouragement 
to the tories in both Carolinas. It took place on the edge 
of Mechlenberg County, where the hostility to Great 
Britain was fierce, and whence a declaration of indepen- 
dence had been launched a full year before that of Phila- 
delphia. Surrounded by such a hostile population, dis- 
appointed in the hopes he had formed that North Carolina 
would rally to his support as he advanced and stunned 
by the blow at King's Mountain, where 121 of his regu- 
lars and nearly 1,000 of his militia had been destroyed, 
Cornwallis not only halted his invasion but retreated, 
in some haste, to South Carolina. He marched back 90 
miles, and took station at Winnsboro, between Camden 

Dawson, 628-632; Tarleton, 164, 192-196. 



BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 225 

and Ninety-Six. Here he fell ill of a fever which incapac- i78o 
itated him for several weeks. During this time Rawdon Oct. 24 
was in command, and he received a letter from Clinton 
advising him that Leslie had sailed for the Chesapeake 
and was to act under Cornwallis's orders. Rawdon at Leslie sent to 

. Reinforce 

once wrote to Leslie 1 requesting him to come by water to cornwaiiis 
the Cape Fear River in North Carolina. Leslie was de- 
layed by gales and did not reach the Cape Fear River in 
less than six weeks. On arriving there he found instruc- Dec. 14 
tions from Cornwallis to come to Charleston, where he i78i 
arrived safely, and thence marched to Camden. 2 He Jan. 4 
brought with him 2,500 men — a brigade of the Guards, 
the regiment of Bose, the Hessian Yagers and some 
Provincials. This carried Cornwallis's strength, accord- 
ing to Clinton, to 11,306 effective, 3 exclusive of officers. 
The number of posts which he felt obliged to occupy 
made it impossible to take more than 4,000 men when he / 
resumed his march into North Carolina. 
Until Leslie arrived at Camden, nearly three months Actional 

' . . Fish Dam 

after King's Mountain, Cornwallis remained idle at Ford, 

° ' . Nov. 9 

Winnsboro. The partisan troops, however, were inces- 
santly on the move — Sumter in the Catawba district 
and Marion, "the Swamp Fox," on the lower Pedee. The 
latter penetrated to within a few miles of Georgetown 
but was driven back into the swamps. Sumter was at- 
tacked, 4 at a point on the Broad River about 25 miles 
north-west of Winnsboro, but held his own. Then the 
ever restless Tarleton was recalled from his pursuit of 
Marion in the low country and sent to destroy Sumter. Action at 

J Blackstocks, 

Tarleton was worsted, losing more than 100 men; the Nov. 20 

Sparks, VII, 347. 2 Tarleton, 184, 243. 

3 Clinton-Cornwallis, I, 282. 

* Dawson, 633; Lee, 112; Tarleton, 173, 200. 



Greene Takes 
the Offensive 



226 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1780 success, however, was counterbalanced by the fact that 
Sumter was wounded ' and was not able to take the 
field again for several weeks. 

While Cornwallis was at Winnsboro waiting for Leslie, 
Greene had taken the offensive. He was so inferior in 
numbers to Cornwallis that battle was out of the question 
until he could raise and equip a larger force; his only 
plan now was to carry on a partisan warfare, threatening 
Cornwallis's flanks, breaking up his communications and 
Dec. i6 intercepting his supplies. 2 In pursuance of this plan he 

divided his force, small as it was, and sent Morgan with 
about 600 men — Maryland line, Virginia militia and the 
remnants of the 1st and 3d Dragoons under William 
Washington — to cross the Catawba, join Sumter and other 
partisans and move South, threatening Ninety-Six and 
Augusta. 3 The rest of his force, about 1,100 in number 
under Huger, was sent to the Pedee and took position at 
Cheraw, where Rawdon had maintained a post prior to 
the battle of Camden. In this position they supported 
Marion, threatened Camden and were nearer to Charles- 
ton than Cornwallis was at Winnsboro. Greene accom- 
panied Huger 's column. 

It was a risky movement, for the two detachments 
were 140 miles apart, with Cornwallis between them, 
and a good chance for him to beat them in detail. If 
Cornwallis attempted this Greene expected by a rapid 
retreat to unite the two detachments in North Caro- 
lina, 4 and he sent his chief engineer, Kosciusko, and his 
quartermaster, Carrington, back to reconnoitre the fords 

1 Dawson, 635-637; Lee, 114; Tarleton, 173-180. 
a G. W. Greene, III, 130; Greene to Washington, Sparks, Letters, III, 
189, 214, 217, 225. 

3 Johnson, I, 346. 

4 Greene to Varnum, Johnson, I, 350. 



reerosse, *./>■«- 

N ! J -VA 




Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company 
Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio 



THE MATTHEWS-NORTHHUP WORKS, BUFFALO, N. V. 



From Avery's History of the United States 
and Its People 



Campaign of 1781 



BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 227 

on the various rivers, 1 collect boats and obtain wagons mo 
for transporting them from one river to the next. While 
at Cheraw, Lee's Legion arrived from the North and 
was sent to join Marion and make another demonstration 
against Georgetown. 

Meanwhile, Clinton, at New York, was supporting itsi 
Cornwallis by every means in his power, in the hope of Jan. 12 
making a complete job at the South. As soon as he 
heard that Leslie had been ordered from the Chesapeake 
to Charleston, he sent another expedition to the Chesa- 
peake 2 — 1,600 men under Benedict Arnold, now a briga- 
dier in the British service. Arnold arrived at Hampton i78o 
Roads, went up the river to Jamestown, marched 800 Arnold sent 

' L to Virginia 

men to Richmond and burned the town. His instruc- 
tions were to cut Greene's communications and destroy 
his supplies at Petersburg; but Steuben rallied the Vir- 
ginia militia and Arnold retreated down the James River 
to Portsmouth and waited for reinforcements from New 
York. This movement into Virginia led Washington to 
send Lafayette thither with 1,200 men. 3 The entire en- Feb. 20 
ergies of both sides were thus concentrated on the South. 
The successive reinforcements of the British were all 
placed under Comwallis's orders, and those of the Amer- 
icans under Greene; but the distance was so great and 
the means of communication so slow that the Virginia 
campaign was carried on by the local commanders inde- 
pendent of their nominal chiefs. 

To return to Cornwallis : the audacity of Greene's move- 
ments — dividing his inferior force — had the desired effect. 
It led Cornwallis to scatter his forces. Had Cornwallis 

1 The military importance of these rivers, which played so important a 
part in Sherman's campaign in 1865 as well as in Greene's campaign of 
1781, is evident from a glance at the map. 

2 Sparks, VII, 348. 3 Ibid., VII, 417-423. 



Dec. 30 
1781 

Jan. 3 
Jan. 7 
Jan. 19 



228 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1730 quickly concentrated and attacked first one and then 
the other of Greene's detachments, he might have de- 
stroyed both. Instead of this he sent Tarleton to attack 
Morgan; directed Leslie to march to Camden to protect 
that post against a possible attack by Huger; and kept 
his main body at Winnsboro, which was 70 miles from 
Tarleton on the one side and separated by a deep river 
(Wateree) from Leslie on the other side. Instead of his 
beating Greene in detail, Greene's right wing under Mor- 
gan destroyed Cornwallis's detachment under Tarleton. 
i78i Tarleton crossed the Broad River, and moving rapidly 

Jan. 2 up its western branches he came in contact with Morgan 

Jan. i6 at the Cowpens — an enclosure for cattle just south of the 

line between North and South Carolina and about 20 
miles west of King's Mountain. Morgan had about 1,000 
men, the force with which he left Charlotte having been 
increased by about 400 militia. Tarleton's command 
numbered about 1,000 men — British Legion and parts of 
the 7th, 16th and 71st Infantry and 17th Dragoons. 1 He 
reconnoitred Morgan's position and found that he was 
posted in an open wood, his flanks unprotected and the 
Broad River at his back. Tarleton was of opinion that 
the position was very advantageous for him and disad- 
vantageous for Morgan. He anticipated an easy victory. 
Morgan, however, thoroughly understood the troops 
under his orders, and as a commander of light troops 
he was unexcelled — perhaps unrivalled. He posted his 
force in three lines: in front, 150 expert riflemen; then 
about 315 militia, many of whom had served in the Con- 
tinental line; in rear of these, on a slight eminence, the 
Maryland regulars who had survived Camden, and more 
militia, about 430 in all ; behind this eminence the cav- 

1 Tarleton, 250; Johnson, 367. 



BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 229 

airy, 125 strong, under William Washington. The men i78i 
had slept well, had eaten a good breakfast and were in 
fine spirits. Morgan had harangued them in satisfactory 
fashion, and had instructed them to reserve their fire 
until the enemy was within 50 yards, then to take careful 
aim at those who wore epaulets, and while continuing 
their fire to retire to the second line of militia, which was 
under command of Pickens. After firing two rounds, 
carefully aimed, Pickens's line was to retire to the left 
of the regulars. All these orders were carried out with 
remarkable exactness. 

Tarleton began his march during the night and made Jan. n, 
such slow progress that five hours elapsed before he came 
in sight of the first line of the militia. He then deployed; 8 A * M 
light infantry and legion infantry to the right, 7th In- 
fantry to the left with the 71st in reserve behind its left 
flank, legion cavalry in the second line and a troop of 
dragoons on each flank. In this order they advanced, Battle of the 
without firing. At 50 yards the militia delivered their 
fire with murderous accuracy and fell back as ordered; 
the British returned the fire and continued their advance, 
the 71st being brought into line on the left of the 7th. 
An attempt was made by the dragoons on the right to 
turn Morgan's left flank, but William Washington with his 
cavalry came out from behind the eminence where he 
had been under cover and drove them back. The British 
continued to advance, and soon came on the main line — 
the Marylanders. These received them with very delib- 
erate fire, delivered kneeling, and aimed low. The 71st 
outflanked the American right, and to meet this an order 
was given to the companies on the right to change front. 
This was not well executed, and the whole line began to 
retreat. Tarleton thought the day was won and sent 



230 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

i78i orders to the legion cavalry to come up on the left and 
charge. Before this could be done Morgan gave an order, 
"Face about and fire once more." This was performed 
with great coolness, and simultaneously the militia which 
had retreated as ordered at the beginning was just fin- 
ishing a complete circle of the whole battle-ground and 
coming up on the American right. The British were 
staggered at first and then ran. They were experienced 
troops, most of whom had served throughout the war and 
been in many battles. A panic set in quite similar to 
that which seized the Americans at Germantown, and 
their officers could not stop them. More than half the com- 
mand surrendered and the rest fled. William Washington 
charged in pursuit, but Tarleton managed to collect 14 
officers and 40 horsemen and checked the pursuit suffi- 
ciently to enable him to escape and rejoin Cornwallis. 

The battle lasted less than an hour. Tarleton lost 100 
killed, 229 wounded and 600 prisoners not wounded, 
about 85 per cent of his entire command. The firing at 
the epaulets was very effective, for 39 of his officers were 
killed or wounded. Morgan's loss was only 12 killed and 
60 wounded. 1 

This was one of the most interesting battles of the 
whole war. It shows what can be done with militia 
provided they are good marksmen and are commanded 
by competent officers who understand them. Morgan, 
Pickens, William Washington and Clarke, of Georgia, 
were all experts in their respective lines. 
Jan. 4 It had been suggested by Tarleton two weeks before 

the battle that while he advanced against Morgan's front 
the main body under Cornwallis should simultaneously 
advance to King's Mountain to cut off his retreat. 

1 Dawson, 646-653; Tarleton, 214, 250; Johnson, 370-384. 



BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 231 

Cornwallis replied: "You have . . . understood my i78i 
intentions perfectly." l But Cornwallis did not do his Jan. 5 
part. He seems to have been nervous about his right 
flank, which was threatened by Huger and the main 
body of Greene's little army on the Pedee. Cornwallis 
moved a few miles from Camden and then waited a week 
until Leslie had crossed the Wateree. He then slowly Jan. 14 
moved northward, but on the day of the battle instead 
of being at King's Mountain in Morgan's rear he was 25 
miles to the south. Had he been in rear of Morgan, he 
might have destroyed him or driven him westward into 
the mountains, notwithstanding Morgan's victory over 
Tarleton, for Cornwallis outnumbered Morgan nearly 
four to one. 1 

Morgan had no illusions as to his position after the Morgan Re- 
battle. He buried the dead, left the wounded of both Catawba 
sides under a flag of truce and, picking up his captured 
cannon, ammunition, 800 muskets and prisoners, before 
noon he began his retreat and crossed the Broad River. 
He was so encumbered with prisoners and captured stores 
that his progress was slow, but it was fast enough to 
keep ahead of Cornwallis; and at the end of a week he 
had marched nearly 90 miles and had passed the Catawba. 
The next day Cornwallis arrived at Ramsour's Mill (now Jan. 24 
Lincolnton) on the Little Catawba, 20 miles to the rear. Jan. 25 

It was a week before the news of Morgan's victory j an . 24 
reached Greene, on the Pedee. He also learned that 
Morgan was retreating and Cornwallis advancing, and he 
saw that the thing to do was to unite Huger and Morgan 
as quickly as possible. He therefore called in Lee, who Jan. 25 
was scouting on the sea-coast near Georgetown, and or- 
dered Huger to march to Salisbury; and personally he 

tarleton, 246. 



232 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

i78i rode across the country, 125 miles, with only an aide 
and three orderlies, and joined Morgan on the Catawba. 1 

Greene joins Comwallis was on the opposite side of the river, delayed 

Jan. 30 ' in crossing by a sudden rise of the river. When he had 

arrived at Ramsour's Mill and realized that Morgan was 
20 miles ahead of him, he made up his mind to divest 
himself of everything that could impede rapid move- 

jan. 26 ments. He spent two days in burning up all his tents, 

Jan. 27 baggage and extra clothing and supplies, keeping only 

his ammunition, hospital stores and such rations as could 
be carried on the person. The destruction of the rum, 
then the choicest article on the ration list, seemed to the 
officers to be an extraordinary act of self-abnegation. 
He also destroyed all his wagons except a few which 
were to be used for the sick and wounded, and he 
mounted some of his infantry on the horses thus made 
available. 

£fm eat t0 the Then began a retreat 2 (on the American side), one of 
the most memorable in the annals of war 3 ; the numbers 
were small but the stake was great, and there was abun- 
dant military skill on both sides. 

Jan - 29 Leaving Ramsour's Mill (Lincolnton), Cornwallis ar- 

rived at the Catawba on the afternoon of the second day. 
It was too late for a crossing, and during the night came 
the rise in the river due to a winter's rain. Cornwallis 
had no boats and it was necessary to wait for two days 

Jan. 29 for the river to subside sufficiently to be fordable. Dur- 

ing this interval Greene arrived and immediately made 

1 Johnson, 394-403. 

2 Gordon, IV, 36^5; G. W. Greene, III, 151-175; Johnson, 403- 
432; Greene to Washington, Sparks, Letters, III, 225, 233; Tarleton, 
218-229, 249-264; Stedman, 325, 333. 

3 " Every measure of the Americans, during their march from the 
Catawba to Virginia, was judiciously designed and vigorously executed." 
(Tarleton, 229.) 




Greene before 

Cornwallis ) 

Greene's return to 

South Carolina , 
Earl Cornwallis - . s 
Lord Rawdon 



Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company, 
Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio 



From Avery's History of the United States 
and Its People 



Retreat to the Dan 
Jan. -Feb., 1 781 



the Catawba 



BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 233 

the following dispositions: Pickens with the militia was i78i 
to take the Cowpens prisoners through the mountains to 
Charlottesville, where the Saratoga prisoners were now 
kept; Morgan was to retreat at once to the Yadkin; the 
fords on the Catawba were to be watched by 300 North 
Carolina militia under Davidson, who had just joined the 
army; Huger was to hasten his march to Salisbury. 

The next day the river had fallen sufficiently to be ford- Feb. 1 
able, and Cornwallis forced a passage at two fords, dis- Passage of 
persing the militia, but only after they had inflicted on 
him a loss of 4 killed and 36 wounded and their own 
leader, Davidson, had been killed. He pushed forward 
during the afternoon, and one of Tarleton's scouting 
parties came near capturing Greene, who had remained 
with the militia until they dispersed and had then ridden 
rapidly toward Salisbury. He stopped to pass the night Feb. i 
at Carr's house, and from there wrote to Huger counter- 
manding his orders of the previous day in so far as to 
require him to keep on the east side of the Yadkin and 
not to attempt to reach Salisbury. It was evident that 
a junction with Morgan there was impossible. 

Morgan, having a day's start, easily reached the Yad- Feb. 2 
' kin before Cornwallis could come up with him. The Feb. 3 
river was swollen with rains, but Carrington was there 
with the boats, on which the foot troops and supplies 
were ferried across, while the mounted men swam their 
horses. Greene joined him during the crossing, and just 
as it was completed toward sundown the advance of 
Cornwallis 's army came up. They had no boats and 
could not cross. All they could do was to bring up their 
artillery and bombard the American bivouac; the troops 
were easily put under shelter, and the only harm done 
was to shatter the hut in which Greene was writing his 



234 



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 



1781 



Passage of 
the Yadkin, 
Feb. 8 



Feb. 8 
Feb. 9 



Feb. 11 



Feb. 14 



despatches — one of which directed Huger to leave the 
Yadkin and march for Guilford. 

Cornwallis was thus forced to move twenty-five miles up 
the Yadkin where the fords were more shallow, and this he 
did during the next few days. His intention was to put 
himself between Greene and the fords on the upper Dan, 
believing that Greene could not cross the lower Dan and 
that he could thus force him to fight at a disadvantage. 
As this movement developed Greene, with Morgan, re- 
tired slowly to Guilford (near Greensborough) and there 
was joined by the rest of his army under Huger and Lee. 

His army being reunited, Greene was disposed to 
accept battle. He carefully selected a good position at 
Guilford. Unless he could rally the militia he was still 
too weak in numbers to expect success. His efforts to 
bring out the militia were fruitless; moreover, every 
day's retreat brought him nearer to Steuben and rein- 
forcements in Virginia, and carried Cornwallis farther 
from his base. A council of war decided unanimously 
against a battle. 1 

Greene therefore determined to continue the retreat 
and put himself behind the Dan. Carrington had already 
collected the boats on that river in the vicinity of Boyd's 
Ferry; Kosciusko was sent there to throw up trenches 
to defend the crossing; a body of 700 picked men under 
Williams was sent to get in front of Cornwallis and retard 
his advance as much as possible. With the main body 
and the supplies Greene left Guilford, and three days 
later crossed the Dan at Boyd's Ferry, about 10 miles 
above the junction of the Dan with the Roanoke, and 
about 30 miles below the present city of Danville. The 
following day Williams, who had carried on a continuous 

1 Johnson, II, 425. 



BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 235 

series of skirmishes with Tarleton for the last four days, i78i 
also safely crossed the river, his men in the boats and the 
horses swimming as at the Yadkin. Cornwallis's own Feb. 15 
letter accurately describes the movement: "I tried by Greene 
a most rapid march to strike a blow either at Greene Dan uto e 
(Huger) or at Morgan before they got over the Dan, but 
could not effect it." 
What was now to be done? Cornwallis was 230 miles comwains 

• iiii t^ Retires to 

from his base; he had no boats to cross the Dan or the Huisborough, 

Feb. 20 

Roanoke on Greene's left flank. If he attempted to 
cross higher up Greene would meet him at whatever 
point he selected, and the crossing would be difficult if 
not impossible. Should it succeed Greene would retreat 
into Virginia and soon effect a junction with Steuben, 
and then Cornwallis would be outnumbered. Cornwallis 
therefore decided to march back into North Carolina, 
occupy Hillsborough, where the Provincial legislature had 
lately been in session, " raise the royal standard" and try 
to gather the tory militia. His army soon reached Hills- 
borough. It was exhausted with its long march, during 
which it had lost about 250 men; and the lack of sup- 
plies which had been burned up at Ramsour's Mill four 
weeks ago was now keenly felt. 

Greene's army was also exhausted with the long march 
in the dead of winter, over roads alternately frozen and 
deep in mud, with a succession of snow-storms and rains, 
which inflicted a greater hardship on his men than on the 
British, because they were insufficiently clad, had neither 
tents nor blankets and many of them were barefooted. 
His army was intact and by no means despondent. Re- 
inforcements from Steuben speedily began to arrive. 

In the face of extraordinary difficulties, Steuben had 
raised and equipped 400 Continentals, and the militia of 



236 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

i78i the southern counties of Virginia at last realized their 
Greene danger and began to assemble. Pickens had returned 

Receives Rein- ,. . , . . , . . TT . . . , , . 

forcements irom taking the prisoners to Virginia and was now back 
on the Catawba rallying the militia which had dispersed 
at the crossing of that river. The Governor of North 
Carolina was using every effort to bring out the militia 
in other parts of the State. From all of these sources 
Greene's army, which numbered only 1,430 when it 
crossed the Dan, was increased within the next three 
weeks to 1,715 Continentals and a force of militia which 
has been variously estimated at from 2,800 to 3,900 
men. His total force at the battle of Guilford was be- 
tween 4,500 and 5,700 men. 1 His own returns, two days 
before the battle, give the number as 4,444. 2 
Feb. is He moved in pursuit of Cornwallis before the reinforce- 

Feb. 23 ments began to arrive. The day after Cornwallis left 

the Dan to march to Hillsborough Greene sent Williams 
across the river, and he followed with the main body 
a few days later. In scouting around Hillsborough Lee 
(whose legion was part of Williams's command) fell in with 
the first body of tory militia which responded to Corn- 
Destruction ot wallis's proclamation. It numbered 300 men, was corn- 
Tories, manded by Colonel Pyle, was marching from Guilford to 
Hillsborough and was about midway between the two 
hamlets. By a stratagem Lee got in immediate contact 
with it before his identity was discovered; when the firing 
began Lee's men cut the tories to pieces, 90 of them being 
killed, nearly all the rest wounded and only a few escap- 
ing. 3 Lee did not lose a man. The news of this encoun- 
ter travelled fast and it put a decided damper on rallying 
Feb. 26 to "the royal standard." The next day Cornwallis left 

1 Schenck, 310-312. 2 Gordon, IV, 54. 

3 Dawson, 658-660; Lee, 154-157; Tarleton, 231-233. 



BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 237 

Hillsborough and marched westward to meet Greene. i78i 
The two armies came in touch on the Haw River. Both March 2 
were anxious for battle, but Greene wanted to postpone it 
until his reinforcements arrived. Constant manoeuvring 
followed for ten days, and there was a smart skirmish 1 in Action at 
which about 50 men were lost on each side. Finally the March 6 S 
reinforcements arrived, and as soon as he could organize 
them Greene marched to Guilford, intending to accept March 10 
battle on the ground which he had carefully selected 
during his retreat. His force numbered, as already stated, 
between 4,500 and 5,700 men; but of these less than 500 
had ever been in battle. Cornwallis's return gave 2,253 March 14 
fit for duty, exclusive of officers. Every man (except the 
North Carolina regiment which was left with the baggage 
on the day of the battle) was a veteran regular who had 
been in most of the battles at the North as well as at 
Savannah, Charleston and Camden. Relying on the 
superior quality of his troops, as at Camden, Cornwallis 
did not hesitate to attack. 

The dispositions of the troops on both sides were quite 
similar to those at the Cowpens. Greene had, in fact, 
recently received a letter from Morgan 2 giving his advice 
in regard to the handling of the militia. 3 Greene had the 
highest regard for Morgan and adopted his suggestions. 
He posted 4 the North Carolina militia in a line across 
the Salisbury road about a mile from Guilford, with ex- 
pert riflemen on each flank, the Delaware battalion and 
Lynch 's Virginians on the right and the legion infantry 
and Campbell's Virginians on the left. About 300 yards 

1 Dawson, 661-663. 

2 Morgan was obliged by ill health to leave Greene's army in Febru- 
ary. He joined Washington just before the surrender at Yorktown. 

3 Schenck, 321. 

* Greene's Report, Tarleton, 312-317. 



238 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

i78i behind them was a line of Virginia militia, with William 
Washington's cavalry on their right and Lee's on their 
left. The third line was about 550 yards in rear of the 
second and was composed of the Continentals, 2 Virginia 
regiments on the right and 2 Maryland regiments on the 
left, posted on a slight eminence some distance in front 
of the Court-House. The only fault in these dispositions 
seems to have been in having the lines too far apart, 
about twice the distance they were at the Cowpens. 
Doubtless this was made necessary by the nature of the 
ground, which was heavily wooded, with occasional clear- 
ings of a few acres for cultivation. There was one such 
clearing in front of the main line and another in front of 
the advanced line, and it was thought that the North 
Carolina militia, posted in the woods behind this latter 
clearing and their flanks held by expert riflemen, would 
make a good resistance although they had never before 
been under fire. 
Battle of Cornwallis had been encamped for two days on the 

March is Salisbury road, about twelve miles south-west of Guilford. 
Hearing of Greene's movement to that point, he left the 
North Carolina regiment with the baggage and with his 
2,000 regulars broke camp at daylight and marched 
toward Guilford. After marching eight miles his ad- 
vance under Tarleton came in contact with Lee and a 
skirmish ensued, Lee falling back to the main body and 
taking post on the left flank as above stated. About noon 
Cornwallis came in sight of the American lines and at once 
deployed: Leslie's brigade (71st and Bose) to the right, 
Webster's brigade (23d and 33d) and Yager's to the left, 
O'Hara's brigade (Guards) in reserve, two pieces of artillery 
on the road in centre and Tarleton's cavalry in the rear. 1 

1 Cornwallis's Report, Tarleton, 303-310. 



Guiliord 



BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 239 

The battle 1 opened with a cannonade from the two mi 
3-pounders which lasted twenty minutes. Then the 1.30 p.m. 
whole line advanced with admirable steadiness across the 
first clearing. The air was sharp and frosty and the 
British bayonets glistened in the sun of a cloudless day. Battle of 
The North Carolina militia had no bayonets. They were 
armed with hunting-rifles and powder-horns. It took 
three minutes to load. They delivered their first fire at 
150 yards. When they had reloaded the Highlanders 
were within 40 yards; the militia fired their second 
round, leaning their rifles on the rail-fence at the edge 
of the clearing. Both rounds were carefully aimed and 
were effective. But still the British line came on. It is 
claimed — and also disputed — that Greene had given the 
North Carolina militia the same order that Morgan gave 
at Cowpens, to fire two rounds and then retire to the next 
line. Whether they had this order or not they retired, 
not to the second line, but far beyond the battle-ground. 
They ran through the intervals of the Virginia militia and 
past its left flank, and most of them were not again 
heard of. 

The flanking parties did not take part in the flight, 
and Leslie's brigade wheeled to the right against Lee and 
Campbell and Webster's to the left against Kirkwood 
and Lynch; O'Hara's brigade moved forward into the 
gap thus created. Kirkwood and Lynch fell back slowly, 
contesting their ground, and took post on the right of 
the Continentals; William Washington's cavalry with- 
drew to the rear of the Continentals ; Lee and Campbell 
did not yield at first, and it was only after the 1st Bat- 
talion of the Guards had been brought up on the right 

'Tarleton, 269-279; Stedman, II, 337-347; Johnson, II, 1-22; Lee, 
170-180; Dawson, 663-G70; Sehenck, 292-3S7. 



240 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

i78i of the Bose regiment that they were forced back up the 
slope of a hill just behind their first position. The action 
continued here, quite separate and apart from the main 
battle, for nearly two hours, and in the course of it Corn- 
wallis personally led the Guards battalion and had his 
horse shot under him. 
March isth, The North Carolinians having broken and run, O'Hara's 
Guilford brigade advanced through the woods, with Webster on 

its left and the 71st on its right, and fell upon the Vir- 
ginia militia — the second line. But they made a good 
defence, until their right flank was enveloped by the 
British left, when it gave way; and soon after Stevens, 
who commanded the left brigade, was badly wounded. 
Then the whole line gave way and retreated past the left 
of the Continentals. 

Within half an hour after the battle opened the militia, 
whether their numbers were 2,800 or 3,800, were all gone 
except the gallant riflemen from Virginia under Lynch 
and Campbell, many of whom were old soldiers, but whose 
numbers did not exceed 200 men. The North Carolinians 
had lost 11 and the Virginians 46, killed and wounded, 
and had inflicted probably an equal loss on their oppo- 
nents. The hard fighting of the day was yet to come, 
and the numbers were about equal — 2,000 on each side. 
3 p. m. The British troops continued their advance through 

the woods and came to the second clearing. Three sepa- 
rate and somewhat disjointed attacks were made across 
this and against the four Continental regiments posted 
on the rising ground in the woods on the opposite side. 
Two of them were repulsed — the first by Webster's bri- 
gade, against the centre of the line between the Virginia 
and Maryland brigades. He was driven back with heavy 
loss, Webster himself being mortally wounded and his 



Guilford 



BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 241 

brigade forced back across the clearing and separated i78i 
from O'Hara. The second was by two battalions of the 
Guards under O'Hara. They struck the left flank — the 
2d Maryland, a new regiment — and it fled almost with- Battle of 
out firing a shot. Then the 1st Maryland wheeled to the 
left and took them in flank, and they were driven back 
in great confusion, one battalion losing nearly half its 
strength and O'Hara being wounded. They were pur- 
sued by the 1st Maryland and by William Washington's 
cavalry. Colonel Stewart of the Guards was killed, and 
their retreat was only checked by Cornwallis in person, 
who brought the two 3-pounders along the road to the 
edge of the clearing and ordered them to fire grape over 
the heads of his own men, many of whom were wounded 
by it. 

If at this moment Greene had followed up his sue- March 15, 
cess by a vigorous attack with the three regiments which 
now remained to him, he might have defeated Cornwallis. 
The attack might have failed, and if so he would have 
lost his whole army and the war in the South would have 
ended — for there were no more reinforcements to come 
from the North. He had previously made up his mind 
never to risk the total destruction of his army, and he 
abided by this determination. He therefore reformed 
his men in their first position on the wooded hill; and 
Cornwallis brought up the 71st and the battalion of the 
Guards which had been fighting against Lee and Camp- 
bell on the extreme right, reformed his lines and prepared 
for a final assault with the seven battalions which he now 
had. As he began to move forward Greene decided to save 
his army while it was still in his power to do so. He placed 
the 1st Virginia, which had not been engaged, in position 
to cover his retreat, and retired in good order. Corn- 



3.30 p. M. 



242 



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 



1781 



March 16 



March 17 



Cornwallis 
Retreats to 
Wilmington 



March 18 



March 28 



wallis followed him only a short distance, and before 
morning Greene had taken a good defensive position be- 
hind the Haw River, about ten miles from the battle- 
field. He had lost 78 killed and 183 wounded; when the 
returns were made up, 1,046 of the militia were missing; 
the others had straggled into camp. He had inflicted 
upon Cornwallis a loss of 93 killed, 413 wounded and 26 
missing, nearly 30 per cent of his strength. 1 

The retreat to the Dan and the battle of Guilford were 
to the South what the retreat through New Jersey and 
the battles of Trenton and Princeton were to the North. 
They turned the tide; and each attracted equal atten- 
tion in Europe. Greene lost the battle but won the cam- 
paign, and the first step toward Yorktown was taken. 
Cornwallis's losses were so great and his situation so pre- 
carious at such a distance from his base that a retreat 
was imperative. The only question was in what direc- 
tion he should go. The distance to Camden was about 
160 miles. To return there was to acknowledge the total 
failure of his campaign. The distance to Wilmington 
was about 200 miles. There he would have the support 
of the British ships; and possibly he might draw Greene 
after him, and after he had refitted his army engage him 
in battle again and meanwhile the posts in South Caro- 
lina would be safe. 2 

He determined to retreat as far as Cross Creek (Fay- 
etteville) where he had ordered supplies to be sent from 
Wilmington. Giving his men two days' rest and aban- 
doning his wounded, he began his march. Greene in- 
stantly started in pursuit. He came up with Cornwallis's 
rear at Ramsay's Mill, on Deep River, but did not feel 

1 Dawson, 669, 670. 

2 Tarleton, 27S, 322-327; Stedman, II, 350-353. 



BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 243 

strong enough to attack him. Cornwallis then went on i78i 
unmolested to Cross Creek, and finding no supplies there A P ni 7 
continued his retreat to Wilmington. 1 

Greene did not follow him beyond Deep River. Corn- 
wallis being out of the way, he decided to march to South 
Carolina and endeavor to regain that State. 2 

He remained at Ramsay's Mills a week, reorganizing March 29 
his army and perfecting his plans. The Virginia and Aprils 
North Carolina militia had been called out for six weeks and 
their time was up; they had been with him just twenty- 
three days, and they had been of real service for they had 
enabled him to fight the battle of Guilford even though 
they had failed at the critical moment. He released 
them all with thanks and sent them home. His army 
was then reduced to the four Continental regiments — 1st 
and 2d Virginia, 1st and 2d Maryland, Lee's Legion and 
William Washington's dragoons — in all about 1,450 men. 
Under a curious order of the " Council Extraordinary" 
which then administered so much of the Provincial gov- 
ernment as existed in North Carolina, all of the six weeks' 
militia who had fled from Guilford were " sentenced to 
twelve months' duty as Continentals." 3 An effort was 
made to round them up, and later a few hundred of them 
joined Greene and did good service, as did other skeleton 
regiments which were raised as speedily as possible in 
North Carolina. The force with which Greene began his 
march into South Carolina was less than 1,500 men. 

He designed to aid these to the utmost by utilizing fully 
the partisan corps under Sumter, Marion and Pickens. 
While Greene was not as successful as Morgan in getting 
the most out of the militia on the battle-field, he was 

'Tarleton, 278, 322-327; Stedman, II, 350-353. 

2 Greene, Letters, Johnson, II, 37-40. 3 Schenck, 394. 



244 



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 



1781 



Greene 
Marches to 
South 
Carolina 



far more successful than any other commander at the 
South in securing the co-operation of these irregular 
leaders, who abhorred discipline, considered obedience 
as synonymous with servility and made it a practice 
to submit their plans to their followers for approval 
before putting them into execution. Notwithstanding 
these eccentricities they rendered valuable service. 

Sumter was now on the Broad River, recovered from 
his wound and recruiting his men; Marion was hiding in 
the Pedee swamps, but ready to emerge when conditions 
were favorable; Pickens was on his familiar ground in 
western South Carolina. Greene communicated with all 
of them, requesting their assistance, and they cheerfully 
gave it — sometimes according to Greene's plans and 
sometimes according to their own. 

On the British side, Rawdon had been left in command 
when Cornwallis marched North. He was at Camden, 
whose garrison was 1,400 men, of whom 500 were at the 
moment detached in the hope of catching Marion. In ad- 
dition to the two main posts of Charleston and Savannah, 
there were others at Augusta, Ninety-Six, Fort Granby, 
Orangeburg, Fort Motte, Fort Watson and Georgetown, 
whose garrisons varied from 120 to 630 men. Exclud- 
ing Charleston and Savannah, Rawdon had about 3,500 
effective men in the various other posts, and in the two 
States 8,U1. 1 

With his 1,500 Continentals and such assistance as he 
could get from the partisan leaders and any militia that 
might join him, Greene set out to capture these posts 
and reconquer South Carolina. With the main body 
he marched to Camden; he kept Lee on his left flank, 
to give warning if Cornwallis should come toward South 
'Sparks, V, 545. 



BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 245 

Carolina, and if not then to effect a junction with Marion i78i 
and attack Fort Watson, below Camden; Sumter was 
requested to join the main body at Camden, and Pick- 
ens to advance against Ninety-Six on his right. 

Greene marched to Camden, 140 miles in 14 days, of April 6-20 
which 3 were spent in collecting boats to cross the Pedee. 
During this time Lee had joined Marion at a ferry lower A P ru 14 
down on the Pedee, and the two had proceeded to besiege 
Fort Watson, a stockaded post on the Santee about half- 
way between Camden and Charleston. After a siege of 8 capture of 
days the place was captured 1 by the expedient of cutting 
trees and erecting (during the night) a tower, from the 
top of which a plunging fire was delivered inside the 
stockade which rendered it untenable. Its garrison of April 15-23 
120 men was captured, with the loss to Marion and Lee 
of 2 killed and 4 wounded. They then moved to the High 
Hills of Santee in the hope of intercepting Colonel Watson, 
who with 500 men of the Camden garrison had been sent 
to catch Marion in the Pedee swamps and after a fruit- 
less chase was now returning to his post. He managed 
to evade Marion and Lee and joined Rawdon at Camden, 
but not until after the battle had been fought. 

Greene had approached Camden from the north and May 7 
had hoped to surprise it, but the tories gave warning of A P ru 20 
his approach. Not having men enough either to assault 
or to surround and besiege it, he retired to a rising ground 
about two miles north of the village and took up a de- 
fensive position. The ground was wooded — like nearly 
all of the battle-grounds in the Southern campaign. Its 
right was protected by the Wateree, its left by a rivulet 
and swamp ; the high-road from Camden to the Waxhaws 
passed through the centre. The troops were disposed as 

Dawson, G72; Lossing, II, 501. 



246 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

i78i follows: the 2 Virginia regiments on the right, the 2 
Maryland on the left and 2 guns on the road between 
them; a body of North Carolina militia which had just 
joined were placed in the second line, thus reversing the 
dispositions made at the Cowpens and at Guilford. 
William Washington's cavalry was in rear of the left and 
the Delaware battalion was stationed as an outpost at the 
foot of the hill about 500 yards in advance of the main 
line. The men bivouacked in this order night and day, 
expecting an attack. Greene's strength, Lee's Legion 
being detached, was 1,174 Continentals and 248 North 
Carolina militia. 1 
Battle of Hob- Rawdon decided to attack without waiting for Watson, 

kirk's Hill . . 

April 25 ' as he feared that Marion and Lee might join Greene if he 
delayed. Marching out of his fortified village early in 
the morning, he circled to the right through the woods in 
order to approach the hill from the south-east where the 
slope was least steep. He had 1 regular regiment — 
63d — and 3 regiments of New York tories (Volunteers of 
Ireland, King's American and New York Volunteers), 
with a detachment of South Carolina tories and a few 

ioa.m. dragoons. As he came in contact with the Delaware 

battalion he deployed with 3 regiments in the first line 
and moved forward to attack the hill. 

Greene seems to have been overconfident, and instead 
of waiting to receive the attack in his chosen position on 
the crest of the wooded slope he took the offensive. 
Rawdon's front being narrow, he endeavored to envelop 
him on both flanks while he made a vigorous attack on 
his centre. Campbell with the 1st Virginia was to turn 
his right flank, Ford with the 2d Maryland his left; 

1 Johnson, II, 72-95; Stedman, 356-362; Dawson, 680-684; G. W. 
Greene, III, 239-255. 



, v ':'' 




Hob kirks 



, ',1 V? 

Brig. <■ tfn'l llutfer 
i. Col. Campbell u. Col. H 

Virginia Uii^TT^ 



^rg 



„ Col. Washington jfe 

i-Tit Toil 












. 







L'uu\ .descents 



| British H Americans 

□ Original Column of attack 
H Formation for assault 
■H Final Position 
■i American 1st Position 
d American 211. 1 Position 



•--, \ yO t * \ N/ <"i \ 

Col. <\* \ L * \ >v S * 

^Washington* \ \ ' + * S^ \ ' 

g ^ N T. \ <V< V 

i Thickets icith V s v ./\ ^y\ ^ Sv 

o jew trees * <^0c \\ v 



Hobkirk's Hill (Camden) 
April 25, 1 78 1 



.AAA. 
\ j&4~ A" 



A. Spring 

it. Stockade Fort 

C. Jail, fortified 

1). Court House 
E. Star Redoubt 
K. Mine 




-^.4= 




<;. Ain.-i Icau Campa 

II. Stockade 

I. Covered way from 

1 to Fort 
K. Abatis 



Ninety-Six 
May zz-June 5, 1 -Si 

36 

Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company . Publishers, Cleveland, ' >hio 
From Avery's History of the United State-, and Its People 



BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 247 

Gunby with the 1st Maryland and Hawes with the 2d i78i 
Virginia were to charge with the bayonet against his 
centre; the artillery were to use grape; and William 
Washington with his cavalry was to sweep around his 
left flank and attack him in rear. 

It was too ambitious a programme. Rawdon quickly 
extended his front by bringing up the Irish regiment, 
and in the sharp fighting which ensued Captain Beatty 
of the 1st Maryland was killed, his company began to re- 
tire and Gunby ordered the regiment to fall back to 
reform. In doing so this regiment — which had fought 
so gallantly at Camden, the Cowpens and Guilford, and 
in nearly every battle since Long Island — became de- 
moralized and could not be rallied. Rawdon 's men 
charged up the hill, and the 2d Maryland, seeing the 
retreat of the 1st, and their colonel, Ford, being mortally 
wounded, also began to retreat; and this brought Raw- 
don on the left flank of the Virginia regiments. Greene 
saw that the day was lost and immediately withdrew the 
Virginia regiments and the artillery. His little force re- 
treated five miles and took up another position, but Raw- 
don did not pursue. He returned within his lines at 
Camden that same afternoon. 

Greene's losses were 19 killed, 115 wounded and 136 
missing, and Rawdon's about the same, 258 killed, 
wounded and missing. 1 

Thus Greene lost his second battle, and he was 
somewhat disheartened, writing to Luzerne, the French 
minister (in a vain appeal for help from the French 
soldiers cooped up in Newport): "We fight, get beat, May io 
rise and fight again." 2 As at Guilford, the ultimate 
advantages were all on his side; for Rawdon, unwill- 

1 Dawson, 684. » See also Sparks, Letters, III, 299. 



248 



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 



i78i ing to risk a second engagement, soon retreated to 
Charleston. 1 

May 7 At the time of the battle, Pickens on the extreme right 

was approaching Ninety-Six; Marion and Lee on the left 
were at the Santee Hills, trying to intercept Watson on 
his return from Georgetown to Camden; and Sumter, in- 
stead of joining Greene as requested had started on an 
independent expedition against Fort Granby (Columbia). 
Watson managed to elude Marion and join Rawdon in 
Camden. Greene then sent Lee against Fort Granby, 
Marion against Fort Motte, 30 miles south of Camden, 
and with his main body retired 6 miles to Rugely's Mill. 
Rawdon was thus surrounded and every one of his 
posts threatened. Notwithstanding the reinforcement 
brought by Watson, he did not feel strong enough to at- 
tack Greene, and he decided that his only safety was in a 
retreat to Charleston. He therefore burned the stock- 
ades at Camden and such stores as he could not carry, 
and retreated to Monck's Corner, about 30 miles from 
Charleston. 

While he was on his retreat Marion surrounded Fort 
Motte. 2 This was a post, garrisoned by 150 men, at the 
point where the Congaree and Wateree Rivers unite to 
form the Santee. With Fort Watson, lower down on the 
Santee, it maintained the communications between Cam- 
den and Charleston. The post consisted of an old colo- 
nial mansion, in a commanding situation, which had been 
fortified. It was captured by the novel expedient of 
shooting arrows carrying firebrands against the dry shin- 
gles on the roof, by which the house was set on fire. The 

May 12 garrisoned soon surrendered. 3 

1 Stedman, II, 361. 

2 Dawson, 689-692; G. W. Greene, III, 278. 3 Lossing, II, 480. 



May 10 



Rawdon 

Evacuates 

Camden 



May 24 



Capture of 
Fort Motte 



BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 249 

Lee then went on to Fort Granby, where Sumter had i78i 
abandoned his attack in favor of a more promising expedi- capture of 
tion against Orangeburg, about thirty miles to the south. May n 
Rawdon had already given orders for the evacuation of 
Orangeburg, but Sumter arrived before the order was 
executed, and with slight difficulty captured the garrison 
of 350 men. He then retraced his steps to Fort Granby capture of 
and on his arrival was annoyed to find that Lee had ar- May 15 
rived the day before and had compelled its surrender, with 
its garrison of 240 men. Sumter felt that Lee had stolen 
his glory and complained to Greene of Lee's conduct, 
stating that he considered it "for the good of the public 
to do it without regulars." ! Greene replied that Lee had 
acted in accordance with his orders; whereupon Sumter 
sent in his resignation. Greene diplomatically persuaded 
him to withdraw it, and he afterward rendered excel- 
lent service, in co-operation with Lee, in the vicinity of 
Charleston. 2 

All the interior posts in South Carolina were now capt- May 9 
ured except Ninety-Six. As soon as Rawdon evacuated 
Camden, Greene marched rapidly toward Ninety-Six, 
sending Lee some North Carolina militia, who had just 
arrived, to join Pickens who had collected a considerable 
body of militia in the vicinity of Augusta. On his way May 21 
Lee captured a large amount of supplies collected for dis- 
tribution to the Indians at a point on the Savannah 
River, about twelve miles below Augusta. He then 
crossed the river and late on the same day joined Pickens 
on the west side of Augusta. 

This village was defended by two stockaded forts, one siege of 
in the village and the other about half a mile up the river. May 22 to 
Its garrison numbered 630 men, under Lieutenant-Colonel 

: Johnson, II, 122. 2 G. W. Greene, III, 290, 295, 298. 



250 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

i78i Browne. The garrison of the upper fort was composed of 
Georgia loyalists. They attempted to escape to the main 
fort and nearly half of them were killed by the Georgia 
militia of Colonel Clarke. The siege of the principal 
fort lasted fourteen days. Browne made a stiff defence. 
To the first summons to surrender he returned a spirited 
refusal. He made two vigorous sorties. The besiegers 
finally won by the same device as at Fort Watson — a 
wooden tower from which to deliver a plunging fire within 

June 5 the stockade. Browne was finally forced to yield, and 

signed articles of capitulation in which his garrison was 
definitely surrendered as " field prisoners of war." * 

siege of Pickens and Lee hastened to join Greene, who had 

May 22 to ' begun the siege of Ninety-Six. This place had been elab- 
orately and somewhat curiously fortified with stockades 
and deep ditches. Its garrison numbered 550 men, a 
tory regiment from New York, another from New Jersey 
and some South Carolina loyalists — all commanded by 
Lieutenant-Colonel Cruger, of New York. He also made 
a spirited defence. Greene had only 984 men — prior to 
the arrival of Pickens and Lee — and it was impossible to 
surround the place. His engineer, Kosciusko, opened 

May 23 his first parallel at 70 yards. Cruger punished this " in- 

sult " the next morning by a vigorous sortie supported by 
the fire of three 3-pounders. The intrenching party was 
routed and lost most of their tools. Kosciusko then began 
a new first parallel at "a more respectful distance," 400 
yards, and from this the besiegers gradually worked their 
way up to the ditch of the Star Fort. There were con- 
stant sorties; there were the same devices of a wooden 
tower for plunging fire and arrows carrying firebrands 
to set fire to the beleaguered buildings; the source of 

1 Dawson, 673, 679; G. W. Greene, 300-302; Stedman, II, 363. 



BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 251 

water supply was captured, and the besieged suffered 1781 
terribly from thirst. 1 

While the siege was in progress reinforcements from j une 3 
Ireland arrived at Charleston, three full regiments, 3d, 
19th and 30th, and a number of recruits for the Guards. 
Rawdon determined to march to the relief of Ninety-Six. 
Marion was operating near the coast, and hearing this 
news sent a courier to notify Greene, who in turn sent 
explicit instructions to Sumter and Marion to place them- 
selves in front of Rawdon and retard his advance, as 
Williams and Lee had so skilfully done on the Dan. 
Rawdon managed to evade them, and was approaching 
with 1,800 infantry, 200 cavalry and a body of South Caro- 
lina loyalists. To conclude the siege before his arrival Assault at 
was impossible, and Greene determined on an assault. June fs u 
Campbell with picked detachments from the Virginia 
and Maryland regiments was to attack the Star Fort, 
and Lee with the legion infantry the redoubt; the rest 
of the command was to man the wooden tower and the 
trenches from which they were to concentrate their fire 
on the Star Fort. Axes were provided to cut down the 
abatis, fascines to fill up the ditch and long poles with 
hooks to pull down the sand-bags of the besiegers' trenches. 
At noon the assault began, preceded by an hour's can- 
nonade from Greene's four guns. The storming parties 
rushed forward and gained the ditch. Then the besiegers 
poured into the ditch from the sally-port of the main 
stockade. A desperate hand-to-hand struggle resulted 
and the assailants were driven out. Lee was more suc- 
cessful and carried the redoubt, and was preparing to 
attack the village stockade from the rear. Greene, how- July 20 

Dawson, 692-697; Stedman, 364-373; G. W. Greene, 303-317; 
Johnson, II, 138-154. 



252 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

i78i ever, adhering to his resolution never to submit his little 
force to the risk of total destruction, decided not to renew 
the assault, but to raise the siege, and preceded by his 
wounded he moved across the Broad River in the direc- 
tion of Charlotte. 

He had again lost the battle, but won the campaign, for 
Ninety-Six was speedily evacuated and never again occu- 
pied by the British. 

His losses during the siege were 57 killed, 70 wounded 
and 20 missing. Cruger lost 27 killed and 58 wounded. 1 

June 21 Rawdon arrived the following day after an exhausting 

march of 180 miles. As quickly as possible he started 
in pursuit of Greene, but finding that the latter had 
crossed the Broad he returned to Ninety-Six and made 

Evacuation of preparations for its evacuation. Leaving Cruger there 

juiy 3 to arrange for the departure of the numerous loyalists 

residing in the vicinity, Rawdon marched first to Fort 

juiy 14 Granby and then to Orangeburg, where he was joined 

by the 3d Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart, from 
Charleston, and soon after by Cruger, from Ninety-Six. 
This carried his strength to nearly twice that of Greene; 
and the latter decided on account of the intense heat to 
march his men to the high hills of Santee, about 30 
miles below Camden, for a short but much-needed rest. 

juiy 20 Leaving Stewart in command in Orangeburg, Rawdon 

took 500 men and returned to Charleston, pursued by 
Sumter and Marion and Lee to within 5 miles of the city. 
Rawdon then left for England on leave of absence, but 
his ship was captured by de Grasse and he was carried 
a prisoner to Yorktown. Stewart followed Greene and 
went into camp facing him, with the Congaree between 
them. Greene's main body was on the Santee Hills; 
^tedman, II, 373. 



BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 253 

Sumter took station on his right near the site of Fort i78i 
Granby (Columbia), Marion (who had captured George- capture of 
town while Greene was at Ninety-Six) on his left at Nel- June 20 
son's Ferry on the lower Santee, and Pickens returned to 
his old recruiting-ground near Ninety-Six. 1 

It was not quite eight months since Greene had taken 
command at the South. At that time everything south 
of North Carolina was in the enemy's possession. Now 
they had lost all of Georgia except Savannah and all 
but a small portion of South Carolina. In the interval 
Greene's little army had marched 950 miles, fought 3 
battles and a score of minor engagements, conducted 5 
sieges, captured 9 posts and taken nearly 3,000 prisoners. 
His army had no organized commissariat or transport 
system, no tents or camp equipage, and only insuffi- 
cient clothing. He had no base of supplies, but lived 
off the countiy which, although in the main friendly 
to him, was filled with a very substantial minority of 
intensely bitter loyalists. The enemy outnumbered him 
three to one, and was composed of the best British 
regulars and Hessians, the well-organized and veteran 
tory regiments of New York and New Jersey and a nu- 
merous body of local partisans, all well equipped and sup- 
plied, and supported by an ample military chest of ready 
money. 

Battles were lost because the troops lacked training 
and that steadiness which only experience under fire will 
bring; but the campaigns were won by tireless marches 
skilfully planned and directed. These were carried on, 
with extraordinary fortitude on the part of the men, 
through the snows and cold rains of the winter and the 
fierce heat of a Southern summer. 

'Stedman, II, 372-383; Johnson, II, 162-178. 



254 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

i78i Greene gave his little army six weeks' rest in the com- 

Aug. 23 paratively salubrious region of the Santee Hills. Dur- 

ing that time he received some fresh levies from North 
Greene Carolina (the Guilford runaways, " condemned" to twelve 

offensive months, service as Continentals), carrying his strength 
to something over 2,000 men. He then resumed the 
offensive, and marched to attack Stewart. 
Aug. 28 It would have been difficult, if not impossible, to have 

forced a passage of the Santee; and Greene therefore 
made a circuit of about ninety miles, crossing the Wateree 
near Camden and the Congaree below Fort Granby 
(Columbia), and picking up the militia of Pickens and 
Henderson (formerly Sumter) on his march. Having 
thus crossed the rivers, he approached Stewart from the 
north-west, and the latter retired about forty miles to 
his depot of supplies at Eutaw Springs. 
se P t. 7 Greene slowly followed him, and a week later was 

joined by Marion on his return from a very successful 
raid on the Edisto near Charleston. The next day 
Greene moved forward in two columns, ready for deploy- 
ment as soon as the enemy was encountered. He had 
2,300 men of whom 1,254 were Continentals and the rest 
militia. 

Stewart had an equal number, but all veterans; 6 regi- 
ments — 3d, 63d, 64th, Grenadiers, New York Volunteers 
and New Jersey Volunteers. They were encamped in a 
clearing, on both sides of the main road, a few hundred 
yards from the Santee; and in rear of the camp was a 
sept, s substantial brick house and palisaded garden which 

8 a. m. played a very important part in the battle. 

About four miles from the camp Lee's cavalry came 
in contact with a "rooting" party (sent out to dig sweet- 
potatoes) and its escort. There was a skirmish in which 




From Avery's History of the United States 
and Its People 



Eutaw Springs 
Sept. 8, 1 78 1 



BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 255 

about 40 prisoners were taken and the rest rushed back i78i 
to camp to give the alarm. Stewart promptly formed 
his men in a single line, 3 regiments on each side of the 
road and 2 pieces of artillery on the road. 

Greene moved forward and, as he approached the Brit- Battle of 
ish position, deployed in two lines; the militia in front, springs, 
Marion on the right and Pickens on the left and the North faep ' 
Carolina militia in the centre; the Continentals in the 
second line, the two new North Carolina regiments on the 
right, the 1st and 2d Virginia in the centre, 1st and 2d 
Maryland on the left ; two pieces of artillery in the centre 
of each line; Lee's Legion on the right flank and Hender- 
son's (Sumter's) partisans on the left; William Washing- 
ton's cavalry and the Delaware battalion in the rear. 

The firing began at 150 yards and was soon very heavy. io A . m. 
The militia, under the guidance of Marion and Pickens, 
fought well and held their ground for some time; and 
when they were forced back Sumter's two North Caro- 
lina regiments came into line with them and the ground 
was regained. Soon afterward they were again forced 
back, and Greene then ordered Campbell and Williams 
with the Virginia and Maryland regiments to move for- 
ward without firing, relying on the bayonet; and at the 
same time sent Lee and William Washington to charge 
with their cavalry on both flanks. There was soon des- 
perate fighting along the whole line. William Washing- 
ton came to grief. In the wooded ground his dragoons 
were defeated with a loss of nearly half their strength, 
their leader himself being wounded and taken prisoner. 
The infantry and Lee's cavalry on the right were en- 
tirely successful. They drove the British regiments (after 
a desperate struggle, in which Campbell was killed and 
Henderson and Howard were wounded) to and through 



256 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

i78i their camp. Stewart succeeded in rallying his men at 

sept. 8 the cross-roads in rear of his camp, and a portion of them 

Battle of took refuge in the brick house and the adjoining garden; 

sprigs and from the windows of the house and from the shelter 

of the stout garden fence they poured a very destructive 

fire upon the infantry of Lee's Legion and Kirkwood's 

Delaware battalion, who had followed to the door. 

The Virginia and Maryland regiments stopped in the 
camp. It was filled with abundant supplies, including 
rum. It was so long since the Continentals had seen such 
delicacies that the temptation to partake of them was 
irresistible — especially as they thought the victory was 
already theirs. 
12 M The battle however, was not won. The little party in 

the brick house was keeping up a vigorous fight against 
the Delaware battalion and Hampton's regiment of 
Sumter's men; the four pieces of artillery were brought 
into action at close range, but they were unable to make 
any impression on the walls. Finally Major Marjoribanks 
came out of the garden and made a bold and successful 
attack (in which he was mortally wounded), turning 
Hampton's left flank and capturing three of the four 
pieces of artillery. Meanwhile the Continentals were 
enjoying the good things in camp, but Stewart was re- 
forming his men at the cross-roads. He soon renewed 
his attack and the Continentals were in no condition to 
receive it. They began to fall back and Greene ordered 
a retreat, bringing off his own wounded as well as his 
prisoners. 

It was a bloody battle; 1 the Americans lost 120 killed, 
375 wounded and 8 missing; the British, 85 killed, 351 

1 Stedman, II, 377-381 ; Gordon, IV, 168-171 ; G. W. Greene, III, 391- 
405; Johnson, II, 220-237; Dawson, 711-720. 



BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 257 

wounded and 430 missing — a total of nearly 40 per cent i78i 
of their strength. 

Both sides retreated, Greene on the night of the battle, Results of 

~ , ., ., the Battle 

about 7 miles, and Stewart the next day 14 miles, 
leaving behind him a portion of his wounded and 1,000 
muskets and destroying such stores as he could not 
carry away. As soon as Greene learned that Stewart sept. io 
had retreated he started in pursuit, but the latter was 
soon joined by a reinforcement from Charleston, and 
Greene returned to the Santee Hills. 

Thus for the fourth time Greene failed to gain a vic- 
tory in battle; the British rum unfortunately deprived 
him of it at the very moment of success. Again, as on 
the previous occasions, the advantages of victory were 
on his side, for the British retired to the vicinity of 
Charleston. Greene gave his men another short rest at 
the Santee Hills and then moved down to the Ashley in Action at 

Dorchester, 

pursuit. After a sharp skirmish at the beginning of Dec. i 
winter he drove them within their lines at Charleston; 
and, although the garrison was many times superior to 
him in numbers, he maintained a strict blockade until 
the city was evacuated. 

There was no serious fighting at the South after Eutaw Re-estabiish- 

. meat of the 

Springs. The Carolinas and Georgia were recovered and American 

i v i i mi Government 

the American governments were re-established. The two in the south 
British garrisons remained quietly within the limits of 1782 
Savannah and Charleston until they were evacuated and July n 
the troops carried by sea to New York. Dec - 14 

This eleven months' campaign — January to December, 
1781, from the Catawba to the Dan and from the Dan 
back to Charleston and Augusta — received at the time 
the enthusiastic commendation of Washington and his 
comrades on the one side and of Tarleton and Stedman 



258 



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 



1781 

Comments 
on Greene's 
Southern 
Campaign 



on the other. It has always been considered one of the 
most brilliant in American annals, and it has been quite 
as much praised by English as by American writers. 
Though the numbers on each side were small, yet from 
the military stand-point it is full of interest and instruc- 
tion and well repays examination in all its details. 
The marches, the manoeuvres, the sieges, the raids and 
the scouting by both Lee and Tarleton, the improvised 
pontoon trains, the proper use of the topography of the 
country for defence and offence — were all admirable. 
There was but little artillery on either side, but it was 
well handled. The four battles were fiercely contested 
and the percentage of loss on both sides was large. The 
British had the advantage of well-trained and well-armed 
troops, but this was more than counterbalanced by the 
superiority of the American generalship. In only one 
respect can Greene be criticised, and whether the criticism 
is just or unjust it is hard to say. He lost every battle. 
Morgan, under similar circumstances, gained a great vic- 
tory. If Greene had possessed the same temperament as 
Morgan or Wayne he would probably, both at Guilford 
and at Eutaw, have made one more effort and risked 
everything on the result of it. If unsuccessful, he would 
have been destroyed; if successful, he would have hast- 
ened by a few months what he finally accomplished. 
The general opinion is, and it is probably well founded, 
that the circumstances did not justify the risk, and that 
his prudence — in saving his little army while there was 
yet time and after he had, in each case, inflicted such a 
loss on his adversary as to compel the adversary's re- 
treat — was not the least of the many exhibitions of good 
judgment which characterized the whole campaign. 



CHAPTER VIII 

YORKTOWN 

When Cornwallis, retreating from Guilford, reached "81 
Wilmington, he was in great perplexity. His letters were 
somewhat pathetic. To Phillips: "My situation here is April 24 
very distressing; Greene has taken the advantage of my 
being obliged to come to this place, and has marched 
to South Carolina." 1 To Clinton: "My present under- A P ni23 
taking sits heavy on my mind." 2 To Germain: "If 
we are so unlucky as to suffer a severe blow in South 
Carolina . . . this might enable General Greene to hem perplexity of 
me in among the great rivers and by cutting off 
our subsistence render our arms useless. And to re- 
main here for transports to carry us off . . . would 
be as ruinous and disgraceful to Britain as most events 
could be." 3 

His view was that if the war was to be offensive it AprU22 
should be in Virginia; if defensive, at New York. In 
either event he had no hope of saving the Carolinas. 
He was by no means sure that Clinton would approve 
his views. He very much desired Clinton's instruc- 
tions, but it would take six weeks or more to obtain 
them, and he could not wait that long. He had al- 
ready wasted two weeks in thinking about it, and when 
he received definite information that Phillips had been 

1 Clinton-Cormvallis, I, 428. a Ibid., I, 424. 

3 Ibid., I, 421,422. 

259 



2G0 



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 



1781 



Decides to 
March to 
Virginia 

April 24 



May 20 

Situation in 
Virginia 





1780 


Oct. 


15 


Nov 


. 25 


Dec. 


20 




1781 


Feb. 


24 


Feb. 


15 


March 10 


March 16 



ordered to Virginia he decided to march thither and 
join him. 1 

' Having made his decision, Cornwallis marched from 
Wilmington; and following what is now the line of the 
Wilmington and Weldon Railroad, through Goldsborough 
and Weldon, he reached Petersburg — 223 miles — at the 
end of four weeks. 2 Here he found that Clinton had bent 
every effort to send a sufficient force into Virginia, via 
the Chesapeake, to cut Greene's communications, and 
that Washington had stripped his little army of every 
man that could be spared, in order to keep these com- 
munications open. 

Clinton first had sent Leslie with 2,500 men to Hamp- 
ton Roads; and when Cornwallis had taken these to 
Charleston, Clinton had sent Arnold with 1,600 men to 
take their place. Then Washington sent Lafayette with 
1,200 men to join Steuben, and at the same time ordered 
Wayne with 1,000 men to follow Lafayette, although 
Wayne was unable to march until three months later. 
Clinton met this by sending Phillips with 2,600 men to 
reinforce Arnold, and Washington persuaded Rocham- 
beau to send 1,200 of the French troops at Newport to 
reinforce Lafayette. They never reached him because 

1 This decision was approved by Germain, but Clinton maintained that 
it was the cause of the loss of his army and the disastrous termination of 
the war. His view was that Cornwallis should have gone back to South 
Carolina, collected his forces, which largely outnumbered Greene's, and 
beaten him in battle; to which the troops in Virginia would have con- 
tributed by cutting off Greene's communications with the North. Corn- 
wallis maintained that Greene had made it impossible for him to march 
back to South Carolina, and that Virginia was the place for the final struggle. 
The controversy was maintained, so long as Clinton lived, in almost endless 
Narratives and Replies, which by the industry of Mr. B. F. Stevens were 
collected, arranged and printed so that every one can now read both sides. 
Clinton-Cornwallis, I and II. 

2 Tarleton, 291. 




a oo 
o - 

c5 c ' 



^2 

a- 2 




YORKTOWN 261 

the squadron convoying them was met and defeated by i78i 
a British squadron, and thereupon they returned to New- 
port. Finally Clinton sent three more regiments (1,500 May 23 
men) to reinforce Phillips/ and these arrived at Peters- 
burg a few days after Cornwallis reached that point. 2 

Clinton had thus sent 5,700 men to Virginia 3 ; Washing- 
ton could only send 1,200. Cornwallis brought 1,500 
with him, carrying his total strength to 7,200. Lafayette 
had gathered a few hundred militia; Steuben was in the 
vicinity of Charlottesville, trying to raise eighteen months' 
men to fill up Greene's new Continental regiments; and 
Wayne, although supposed to be marching through 
Maryland, had not in fact left York, Pa., at the time that May 24 
Cornwallis marched to cross the James. 

Cornwallis argued, then and afterward, in favor of " solid 
operations in Virginia." Here was his chance. Lafayette 
was at Richmond, only twenty miles off, with a force one- 
sixth as large as his own. Destroy him, and break up Cornwall's 

Feeble 

Steuben's recruiting depot at the mouth of the Rivanna, Movements 

and his march to Virginia would have been justified not 

only to Clinton but to all the world. Cornwallis lost 

the chance; and his movements for the next three months 

can only be characterized as feeble — far different from 

the energy which he had displayed in the Jerseys four 

years before. 

Lee and Jackson have shown what a general of the 
first rank would have done in Cornwallis's situation. Un- 
doubtedly either of them would have crossed the James 
above Richmond, between Lafayette and Steuben, and 
marched rapidly across the headwaters of the Virginia 

1 Phillips died a few days before Cornwallis arrived and Arnold was sent 
back to New York soon after. 

2 Sparks, VIII, 10, 13, 19, 22, 510-516; Tarleton, 285-292. 

3 Clinton-Cornwallis, I, 470-499. 



262 



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 



1781 



May 26 



Lafayette's 

Energetic 

Action 

May 27 



June 4 



June 1 



June 7 
June 9 



June 10 



streams to get between Lafayette and Wayne. With 
sufficient celerity of action, all three detachments could 
have been either destroyed or dispersed. 

Comwallis's base was the sea, and he could not forget 
it. His communications with New York were via the 
lower James, and he was not willing to cut loose and take 
the risk of Lafayette's small force getting in his rear. 
He therefore crossed the James 30 miles below Richmond, 
at Westover; and his plans extended no further than "to 
dislodge Lafayette from Richmond and with my [his] 
light troops to destroy any magazines or stores in the 
neighborhood" and then "to move to the neck (penin- 
sula) at Williamsburg." ' 

It was Lafayette who acted with the proper celerity. 
He promptly retreated to Ely's Ford on the Rapidan, 
covering the 70 miles in 7 days. Cornwallis pursued no 
farther than the North Anna (30 miles). He then sent 
his cavalry (which outnumbered that of Lafayette 10 to 
1) on two raids, one under Tarleton to Charlottesville 
to disperse the legislature, and the other under Simcoe 
to break up Steuben's depot at Point of Fork, where the 
Rivanna empties into the James, 50 miles above Rich- 
mond. With the main body he followed leisurely to the 
latter point (40 miles in 6 days), and was joined there 
by Tarleton and Simcoe, who had accomplished the ob- 
ject of their raids, destroying a great deal of tobacco and 
some arms and supplies. Steuben was forced to march 
rapidly southward with his 450 Continental recruits; but 
he was not pursued. He halted at Cole's Ferry, on the 
Staunton River, and waited for further advices or in- 
structions from either Greene or Lafayette. 2 

1 Clinton-Cornwallis, I, 488. 

2 Tarleton, 295-299; Kapp, Steuben, 448^150. 



YORKTOWN 263 

Meanwhile, Wayne was marching south with good i78i 
speed. He made the 160 miles from York, Pa., to the Arrival of 
Rapidan in 14 days, and he joined Lafayette without May 26 
any serious effort on Cornwallis's part to prevent it, June io 
although the latter knew that Wayne was on his way to 
reinforce Lafayette. As soon as the junction was made, 
Cornwallis retreated through Richmond to Williamsburg, June 14-26 
Lafayette following him, and Steuben joining Lafayette 
on the march. On the outskirts of this little village the 
first shot was fired after a month of marching. It was June 9 
an inconclusive skirmish between advance guard and 
rear guard, with a loss of about 30 men on each side. 1 

At Williamsburg Cornwallis received a letter from 
Clinton asking him to send about 3,000 men to New York. 
Cornwallis thereupon changed his plan of remaining at 
Williamsburg and prepared to cross the James and march 
to Portsmouth, where the men would embark. As he 
approached the river at Jamestown Lafayette pressed Battle of 

Jamestown, 

close to him and a smart engagement" resulted in which July 6 
the Americans lost 26 killed, 99 wounded and 12 missing, 
chiefly in Wayne's Pennsylvania regiments; and Corn- 
wallis lost 5 killed and 70 wounded. 

Lafayette was defeated, but Cornwallis made no at- 
tempt to follow him and he retired slowly to Malvern 
Hill, below Richmond. The next day Cornwallis crossed July 7 
the James, and sending on to Portsmouth the troops 
designated for embarkation, with the rest he marched as 
far as Suffolk. Tarleton was sent on a long raid 3 across juiy 9-24 
the State to the mountains and back — 400 miles in 15 
days — to destroy the stores which Steuben had been 
accumulating: for the Southern armv. These had beer 



i & 



1 Dawson, 69S-700. 2 Tarleton, 354; Dawson, 701-704. 

3 Tarleton, 358. 



264 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

i78i safely removed and all that Tarleton accomplished was 
to burn up a good many hogsheads of tobacco. 

A situation then existed on the British side which had 
a most important bearing on the issue of the campaign. 
It was somewhat similar to that of four years before 
which resulted so disastrously at Saratoga. 1 
Lack of In London, Lord George Germain — probably the most 

ordination on incompetent official that ever held an important post at 
British ' a critical moment — was Colonial Secretary, charged with 
the conduct of the war under the personal direction of 
the King, with whom he was a great favorite. His letters 
were sometimes six weeks and sometimes three months 
in crossing the ocean, and when they reached their desti- 
nation the state of facts on which they were based had 
usually changed. Yet he undertook to direct the opera- 
tions at this distance and corresponded directly with 
Clinton and with Cornwallis — frequently giving contra- 
dictory instructions. 

At New York, Clinton, who was commander-in-chief 
of the land forces and peace commissioner as well, was 
responsible for the operations; but he had no control 
over the navy, whose co-operation was absolutely essen- 
tial as all plans were based on the control of the sea. 
Sometimes the naval commander was in accord with 
Clinton and sometimes he was not; and in the latter 
cases he acted on his own judgment, regardless of Clin- 
ton's plans. 

At the south, from Virginia to Georgia, Cornwallis 
was in chief command. His letters reached New York 
in from eight days to two months. Clinton's letters to 
him were very numerous, and they were such as not to 
leave Cornwallis a free hand; neither did they give him 

1 P. 79, ante. 



YORKTOWN 265 

positive orders. Clinton and Cornwallis had different i78i 
views as to the proper plan of campaign, and Germain 
favored those of Cornwallis. Clinton sent instructions to 
Cornwallis, always with a saving clause that if the latter 
had other plans in view the instructions were not to be 
followed. Cornwallis tried to follow these directions, 
but every move he made was disapproved. Clinton cen- 
sured him for marching north from Wilmington, for not 
remaining at Williamsburg, for going to Portsmouth 
and finally for selecting Yorktown as the naval sta- 
tion. Clinton did not give him any positive instructions 
nor do his letters contain any clear, definite, matured 
plan. 1 

With such lack of co-operation and co-ordination 
among those in the highest authority, success would 
under any circumstances have been difficult. 

On the American side military conditions were far Favorable 
more favorable. When Greene was sent to the South the American 
Congress gave him full authority and placed at his dis- 
posal all its resources — they were meagre enough, but it 
was absolutely everything they had. Washington gave 
Greene the benefit of his advice before he left and after 
that never sent him an order, although he continued to 
accord him the most hearty and unstinted support. In 
short, the government and the commander-in-chief gave 
the local commander every assistance they could com- 
mand and they both left to him the conduct of the 
campaign. 

On the American side there was precisely that co- 
operation and co-ordination which was so completely 
lacking on the British side, and it was one of the prime 
factors of success. There were lessons in these opera- 

1 Clinton-Cornwallis, I, 493; II, 15, 53, 73, 98, 109, 143. 



266 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

i78i tions of 1781 which if they had been learned and applied 
in the Civil War would have saved many lives. 
Clinton's in- The instructions which Cornwallis received from Clin- 
cornwaiiis ton — always with a reservation as above stated — re- 
june ii-i5-i9 peated in three successive letters, were to send about 
3,000 men to New York. The reason given was that 
Washington and the French allies were approaching New 
York, and Clinton feared he had not enough men for its 
defence — a reason which would override the reservations. 
Cornwallis received the first two of these letters at Will- 
iamsburg, and crossed the James to march to Ports- 
mouth and obey them. While on the march he received 
June 28 another letter, of later date, ordering the detachment to 

Philadelphia instead of New York. Four days later 
juiyi came another letter, of subsequent date, ignoring the 

orders for Philadelphia, but urging immediate despatch 
of troops to New York. Before the troops could be put 
juiy ii on the transports came a sixth and a seventh letter, 

juiy is dated later than the others, directing him to keep all his 

troops in Virginia and to occupy Old Point Comfort as 
a support for the fleet which was to be sent to Hamp- 
juiy26 ton Roads. Cornwallis at once went in person to ex- 

amine Old Point Comfort, taking with him his army 
engineers and the naval commanders then present. They 
were all of opinion, and so reported in writing, that Old 
Point Comfort was not suitable for defence. Inasmuch 
as Clinton and Graves (the naval commander-in-chief) 
had both urged the supreme importance of establishing 
a naval station in the Chesapeake, supported by defen- 
sive works on shore, Cornwallis selected the harbor be- 
tween Yorktown and Gloucester as the one best adapted 
for that purpose. He informed Clinton and Graves of 
his decision, as being in accordance with the spirit of his 



YORKTOWN 267 

orders, and also in accordance with the opinion which i78i 
Phillips had given Clinton 1 — that Yorktown was the 
proper station — which opinion Clinton had previously 
sent to Comwallis for his guidance. The transports be- comwaiiis 
ing now at Portsmouth, the troops were sent to Gloucester Yorktown 
and Yorktown as quickly as possible, the lines of field 
fortifications were laid out and the work of constructing 
them was begun. 

Some excuse for the vacillating and contradictory Aug. 2 
orders that Clinton gave may be found in the masterly 
plans that Washington had recently been formulating 
and was now putting into effect. For three years, with 
infinite patience and tact, Washington had been trying 
to obtain some positive, tangible, military benefit from 
the French alliance. There was no doubt of its moral, Washington's 
political and financial advantage ; but as yet the French 
troops had taken little or no part in the military opera- 
tions. In 1778 the French fleet had been blown away 
from Newport carrying the soldiers with it. In 1779 it 
had to come to Savannah for a short period, only to en- 
gage in a disastrous repulse. In 1780 it had got into 
Newport, but had been bottled up there ever since. 
Now, at last, the diplomatic but incessant arguments of 
Washington with Rochambeau at Newport, and the less 
diplomatic but effective efforts of Laurens supported by 
Franklin in Paris, began to have their effect. A new 
fleet was to be sent under de Grasse to the West Indies 
and thence to the American coast — to co-operate with 
Rochambeau under Washington's direction. 

As soon as Washington heard of this at his head- May 22 
quarters at New Windsor (Newburg) he set out for 
Wethersfield (near Hartford) and there met Rocham- 

1 Clinton-Cornwallis, II, 19, 24, 26, 29, 41, 49, 61, 73. 



208 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

i78i beau. 1 They perfected the details of an attack on New 
York — the obvious plan, for the accomplishment of 
which Washington had so often asked the co-operation 
of the French. Washington again sent to the New 
England governors 2 the most urgent request that they 
fill up their quota in the Continental regiments, for one 
season if the men could not be obtained for longer. A 
small portion of de Grasse's fleet soon arrived in Boston, 
bringing 700 recruits for the regiments at Newport and 
announcing what de Grasse's movements would be. 
He intended to arrive on the American coast in July or 
August. Letters were sent k him by Luzerne and 
Rochambeau, at Washington's suggestion, urgently re- 
questing him to bring troops as well as ships from the 
West Indies, and to come to New York, stopping on his 
way at the Chesapeake, where perhaps he might find an 
opportunity for an important stroke. 3 

The Allies The operations against New York then proceeded. 

kew e York ' The French army finally left Newport for Providence 

June 10 and then marched westward. Washington marched south- 

ward from the Highlands, and the two armies came 

July 6 together, taking a position extending from Dobb's Ferry 

to White Plains. An attempt was made by the advance 

juiy 2-3 guard under Lincoln to surprise and capture the posts on 
the north end of Manhattan Island, and by Lauzun's 
Legion to capture an outpost of Provincials in Mor- 
risania; but both failed. 4 

juiy 20-23 Washington then carefully reconnoitred from Fort Lee 

in New Jersey and from Chatterton's Hill across the 
Harlem, the fortifications of the British on Manhattan 
Island where he had himself first laid out the fortified 

Sparks, VIII, 54. 2 Ibid., VIII, 51-53. 

3 Ibid., VIII, 64-78. * Ibid., VIII, 8G-98. 



YORKTOWN 269 

lines five years before. They were too strong to be at- i78i 
tacked. The French had 4 regiments, Bourbonnais, 
Soissonnais, Saintonge and Royal-Deux-Ponts. They 
were 10 company regiments and their full complement 
was about 65 officers and 1,250 men each. There had 
been some sickness, and detachments had been left at 
Providence and elsewhere to guard their stores. Their 
effective strength was now about 930 each. In addition 
there was Lauzun's Legion, the artillery and the engineers. 
The entire French force was 4,756.* Washington had 
little if any more, for his appeal to the New England 
governors had brought only a feeble response. Clinton 
had in New York about 14,000 effectives, 2 in fortified 
lines, to reach which it was necessary to pass one or the 
other of the rivers, which were controlled by the smaller 
British vessels, while a large squadron was in the lower 
bay. Until de Grasse should arrive an attack was out 
of the question. 

Washington's fertile mind was intently thinking of Washington's 
alternative plans; to be decided as soon as definite in- Plans 
telligence of de Grasse's movements should be received. 
He had written to Lafayette directing him to establish jui y 13 
a line of "expresses" to keep him quickly informed of 
any movements of the enemy and similarly to inform 
Greene; he now wrote to both Greene and Lafayette, July 30 
directing both of them to send him the most complete 
information they could obtain as to the strength and 
position of the British troops in Virginia and at Charles- 
ton, and intimating as clearly as he dared, in view of the 
possibility of his letters being intercepted as several had 
been recently, that a campaign to Virginia or a siege of 

1 Return of June 1 ; Keim, 389. 
8 Sparks, V, 544, 545. 



270 



THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 



1781 



News from 
de Grasse 



Aug. 14 
July 8 



The Allies 
March to 
Virginia 

Aug. 15 
Aug. 19 
Aug. 17 



Aug. 21 



Charleston might be the outcome of de Grasse's arrival. 
His later letters showed that he was considering three 
projects: if Clinton reinforced Cornwallis, to attack New 
York; if Cornwallis reinforced Clinton (as he thought the 
most probable), to march to Virginia; and if on arriving 
in the Chesapeake the conditions were favorable, to move 
by sea to Charleston and besiege it in conjunction with 
Greene. 1 

While he was thinking of these different plans, definite 
news came from de Grasse. The letter was addressed 
to Rochambeau and was dated at Cape St. Francis, San 
Domingo. It was clear and concise, very different from 
the letters that d'Estaing wrote. It stated that he would 
sail north on August 13; would bring with him 29 vessels 
of war and a portion of the garrison of San Domingo, to 
wit: 3 regiments, Gatinais, Agenois and Touraine, each 
1,000 strong, together with 100 dragoons, 100 artillery- 
men, 10 field pieces and several siege cannon and mortars; 
he would proceed directly to the Chesapeake and would 
sail back to the West Indies on October 15, taking the 
troops with him. 2 

Washington made an instant decision; he would march 
to the Chesapeake to meet him. Orders were immedi- 
ately despatched to Lafayette to prevent Cornwallis 
escaping to South Carolina; to Heath to take command 
of the little force, twelve small battalions, which was 
left in the north. A letter was sent by Duportail, the 
chief engineer, to de Grasse, explaining his plans, and 
asking him to send light vessels to Head of Elk in order 
to transport the troops down the Chesapeake. 3 And 
then the allied armies were put in motion, crossing the 
Hudson at King's Ferry to Stony Point, then marching 

1 Sparks, VIII, 116-122. * Ibid., VIII, 522. * Ibid., 127-139 



YORKTOWN 271 

behind the Palisades to Newark and New Brunswick, nsi 
making a feint against Staten Island, and then on through sept. 1 
Philadelphia to Head of Elk. So skilfully had Washing- 
ton conducted this movement and concealed it from the 
enemy that the troops had been 14 days on the march, . 
and most of them had passed Philadelphia when Clinton 
wrote to Cornwallis: 1 "By intelligence which I have 
this day received, it would seem that Mr. Washington is sept. 2 
moving an army to the southward, with an appearance 
of haste, and gives out that he expects the co-operation 
of a considerable French armament." 

In making this move Washington put everything to Boldness of 
the hazard. A vigorous antagonist would have marched piaiV 1 " 
up the Hudson, scattered Heath's little force, seized the Aug. 11 
Highlands and held them. Clinton had just been rein- 
forced by 2,500 Hessians, and his own return showed an 
effective strength at New York of 16,701 men. 2 Heath 
had, at the most, 2,500. Can there be any doubt of what 
a man like Grant or Lee would have done in Clinton's 
place? Further, if Washington failed in Virginia, New 
England was hopelessly separated from the South, and 
notwithstanding the Carolinas and Georgia had been re- 
gained, the Revolution would have collapsed. 

Daring as was the plan, it was eminently wise; for 
without a great victory the Revolution would die of ex- 
haustion. It was a time — as it had been at Trenton — 
when nothing but audacity would avail ; and it indicates 
the extraordinary balance and poise of Washington's 
mind that he could wait three long years for the psycho- 
logical moment to arrive, and when it did arrive that he 
instantly took advantage of it. 

1 Clinton-Cornwallis, II, 149, 150. * Sparks, V, 545. 






272 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

i78i In boldness of conception and celerity of execution 

this march to Virginia was comparable with Napoleon's 
famous campaign of 1805, when he suddenly abandoned 
the camp which he had formed at Boulogne for the in- 
vasion of England and marched to the Danube. The dis- 
tance was about the same, 400 miles. Washington cov- 
ered it in 28 days, Napoleon in 35 days. Napoleon left 
the Channel on August 27, and the capitulation of Ulm 
took place on October 15 — 49 days later. Washington 
crossed the Hudson August 21, and the surrender of 
Yorktown was on October 19 — 59 days. Washington's 
resources in men, money, equipment, supplies and trans- 
portation were but a small fraction of those at Napoleon's 
disposal; but the effect on the world's history of Ulm 
and Austerlitz was a still smaller fraction of the results 
which flowed from Yorktown. 
Movements of It was an integral part of Washington's plan that the 
and English French should for the time being at least control the sea, 

Fleets 

and fortunately the naval commander was of a different 
type from d'Estaing. De Grasse came up through the 
Bahama Channel instead of the direct route, and Hood, 
who left the Windward Islands in pursuit, thus passed 
him without knowing it. After looking in at the Chesa- 
peake, Hood went on to New York, and the united fleet, 

Aug. 31 under Graves, immediately sailed for the Chesapeake, 

hoping to intercept de Barras's smaller fleet (which was on 
its way from Newport) before it could join de Grasse. In 

Aug. 30 the interval de Grasse had passed inside of Cape Henry. 1 

He at once sent the land troops — the brigade of St. Simon 

sept. 5 — up to the James River and landed them near Williams- 

burg, where they were joined two days later by Lafayette 
who had marched down from Malvern Hill to meet them. 

1 Mahan, 389. 



YORKTOWN 273 

On the day the French troops landed the British fleet mi 
came in sight of Cape Henry. De Grasse went out to Navai Battle 
fight them, but, unlike d'Estaing at Newport, he did not Chesapeake 
carry his soldiers with him. These were left with Lafay- 
ette. The naval engagement was inconclusive, both sides 
losing heavily in men and guns, and then manoeuvring 
for four days without renewing the action. The net 
result was very advantageous to de Grasse, for the Brit- 
ish admiral found it necessary to take his fleet back to 
New York for repairs. De Grasse was left in control of 
the Chesapeake, and during the manoeuvring de Barras 
slipped in between the capes, bringing with him some 
recruits for the French regiments and a large train of 
siege artillery. 1 

Clinton at New York learned from Cornwallis prior to ciinton Goes 
Graves's return that de Grasse was in the Chesapeake, comwalus 
and saw at once that the only chance to save Cornwallis 
was to join him with troops from New York. He there- sept. 6 
fore embarked 4,000 men on transports and wrote to 
Cornwallis that he would sail with them as soon as the 
admiral could furnish a convoy. It was six weeks before 
the British ships were sufficiently repaired to furnish a 
convoy. Clinton then sailed with 7,000 men, but when he Oct. 19 
reached the capes he learned that Cornwallis had already Oct. 24 
surrendered, and he retraced his steps to New York. 2 

Meanwhile, Washington had joined Lafayette at Will- 
iamsburg and his troops continued to arrive during the sept. 14 
next ten days; some marching by land, but the greater Allied Army 
number coming down the Chesapeake from Annapolis, Washington 
Baltimore and Head of Elk in small vessels furnished by 
the French. The entire force 3 — the French from New- 

1 Mahan, 389. 2 Clinton-Cornwallis, II, 152, 172, 186, 188. 

'Johnston, Yorktown, 112-119. 



274 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

i78i port, the Americans from the Hudson, Lafayette's troops 
from Virginia and the French from Haiti — numbered 
about 16,600 men. The Americans were organized into 
3 divisions under Lincoln, Lafayette and Steuben ; there 
were the remnants of 17 infantry regiments from each 
of the States from Massachusetts to Virginia, 4 artillery 
regiments and 1 of cavalry — in all 5,645 Continentals; 
and there were 3 brigades of new militia — 3,200 men — 
from Virginia under command of the governor, Nelson. 
The French were organized in 2 brigades, and there were 
7 regiments of infantry, 1 of artillery and 1 of cavalry — 
about 7,800 rank and file, effective, in all. 

Cornwallis's return gave 5,316 effective. He had 1 
Provincial, 4 Hessian and 11 British regiments, besides 
artillery and the cavalry of Simcoe's Rangers and 
Tarleton's Legion. 

eof As soon as his army was assembled and organized 

Washington moved forward from Williamsburg and sur- 
rounded Yorktown, the Americans on the right and the 

. 28 French on the left. The siege was begun and prosecuted 

in thoroughly military fashion. Cornwallis did not feel 
strong enough to occupy his outlying works south-east of 

. 30 the village, and he therefore abandoned them. They were 

immediately occupied by the allies, and from them the 

6 first parallel was opened at 600 yards; the siege-guns had 

been landed from de Barras's fleet and brought to the 
trenches, and were vigorously used. The approaches 
were carried forward and the second parallel was opened, 

ii at 300 yards. Then a most gallant night assault was 

H made, Alexander Hamilton in the lead, and two redoubts 

were carried near the river on the British left. The second 

15 parallel was promptly extended to include these. On the 

following night just before daybreak Cornwallis made a 




Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company 
Publishers. Cleveland, Ohio 



40 
YoRKTOWN 

Sept. 30-Oct. 19, 1 78 1 



From Avery's History of The United States 
and Its People 



YORKTOWN 275 

vigorous sortie with the Guards and light infantry, carried 1781 
two batteries, hastily and imperfectly spiked the guns 
and inflicted a loss of about 100 men on the French. 
They could not hold the position and were driven back to 
their own lines. 1 

Cornwallis then attempted to ferry his men across to Oct. 16 
Gloucester in a desperate plan of trying to save his army 
by marching toward Philadelphia; but this plan was 
completely frustrated at the start by a violent storm 
which arose during the night and scattered and swamped 
his boats. With great difficulty his men were reassem- 
bled on the Yorktown side. Then Cornwallis opened Oct. 17 
negotiations for surrender and two days later the capit- Oct. 19 
ulation was signed. Washington took care that there capitulation 

i 1 1 i 1 • i i i i 1 i n at Yorktown 

should be no such mistakes as had been made at bara- 
toga. The garrison, including the naval force, was to be 
surrendered as prisoners of war; all public property was to 
belong to the United States ; no engagement was made as 
to future exchange of prisoners, "the soldiers to be kept in 
Virginia, Maryland or Pennsylvania . . . and supplied 
with . . . rations" ; the officers to be allowed to go to Eng- 
land or New York or elsewhere on parole; no stipulation as 
to the civil rights of the inhabitants ; a ship to be furnished 
to carry Cornwallis's sealed despatches to New York. 2 

It was a long time before the prisoners were ex- 
changed, and there never was a word of controversy con- 
cerning the capitulation. 

The number surrendered 3 was 7,157 soldiers, 840 sea- 

1 Johnston, Yorktown, 120-149; Dawson, 733-744; Tarleton, 368-393, 
414-433. 

2 The Articles of Capitulation are given in full in Tarleton, 438-442; 
Johnston, Yorktown, 186-189; Clinton-Cornwallis, 199-203; Sparks, 
VIII, 533-536. 

3 Johnston, Yorktown, 164, 169, 194; Tarleton, 390, 448-451. 



276 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

i78i men and 80 camp followers — 8,077 in all. In addition 
there were 144 cannon, 6,658 muskets, large quantities 
of ammunition, supplies and clothing belonging to the 
army and 4 frigates, 30 transports, 15 galleys and several 
smaller vessels belonging to the navy. The losses during 
the siege had been: British, 156 killed and 326 wounded; 
allies, 75 killed and 199 wounded. Two-thirds of the 
losses of the allies were sustained by the French. 
comment on Could Cornwallis have saved his army? The attempt 

Cornwallis's . iiiici i ••<• 

surrender he made the day before he opened negotiations for sur- 
render would almost certainly have resulted in over- 
whelming disaster. The celerity with which Washington 
marched to Virginia indicates the vigor with which he 
would have pursued any such attempt. Cornwallis, fol- 
lowed and harassed by an enemy outnumbering him 
three to one, the greater part of its troops well equipped 
and all of them supported by the French fleet moving 
up the Chesapeake, would have had small chance of 
ever reaching Philadelphia. There was an opportunity 
four weeks earlier when success was possible. When 
de Grasse returned within the capes after his engagement 
with the British fleet, the allied army was only beginning 

sept. i6 to arrive. The force then opposed to Cornwallis was 

about 2,000 Continentals under Lafayette and the 3 
French regiments from the West Indies. The roll of 
these latter shows 187 officers and 3,337 men; 1 but many 
of them were sick with scurvy, and it is not probable that 
more than 2,200 were effective. Lafayette's total force 
was thus not more than 4,200 effective. Cornwallis had 
5,100 effective. If he could have defeated Lafayette, or 
driven him back to Richmond, he might have crossed the 
James and marched to Charleston. Tarleton argues 2 that 

'Keim, 507. 2 Tarleton, 369. 



YORKTOWN 277 

this should have been attempted and would have sue- i78i 
ceeded. The distance was 420 miles, through a hostile 
country all the way, with many rivers to cross, with 
Washington and the allies following from the North, 
and Greene facing him from the South as soon as he 
reached South Carolina. It does not seem probable that 
it could have succeeded. Cornwallis did not attempt it, 
because he had already received Clinton's letter of Sep- 
temper 6 telling him that he was coming to his relief; 
and he could not doubt that the British would beat the 
French on the sea. 

Did Cornwallis surrender too soon? When he opened Oct. io 
negotiations he had 2,089 on the sick report and about 
4,700 effective. He had upward of 350,000* pounds of 
provisions; with proper care this would have lasted from 
20 to 25 days. Clinton, with 7,000 men, arrived off the 
capes within 7 days. The fleet which convoyed him 
contained 27 ships of the line; de Grasse had 36. If 
Cornwallis had held out 10 days longer, in the naval en- 
gagement that would have taken place there was a chance 
that the British would have won, and the addition of 
7,000 regulars to Cornwallis's force would have changed 
the whole situation. Cornwallis had received a week 
before a letter from Clinton saying that he would sail on 
the 12th. There is ground for argument that neither the 
number of his sick nor the state of his food supplies justi- 
fied him in surrendering at the time he did, and that he 
should have awaited Clinton's arrival and the result of 
the naval battle which that would bring on. Cornwallis 
gave his reasons as follows: 2 that his works "were going 
to ruin," that it would be "desperate to attempt to main- 
tain them," that he "could not fire a single gun," that 

'Tarleton, 457. 2 Clinton-Cornwallis, II, 212, 213. 



278 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

i78i his " numbers had been diminished by the enemy's fire, 
but particularly by sickness" and that "it would have 
been wanton and inhuman to the last degree to sacrifice 
the lives" of his soldiers "by exposing them to an assault, 
which from the numbers and precautions of the enemy 
could not fail to succeed." 

On his return to England Comwallis was never brought 
to trial nor even censured — except in Clinton's pamphlets. 
He lived twenty-five years longer, the greater part of 
which was spent as governor-general and commander- 
in-chief in India; where in the siege of Seringapatam 
and in his campaigns against Tippoo Sahib he conquered 
for his country a large part of what is now the Indian 
Empire. His contemporaries did not blame him for the 
loss of Yorktown, and the general opinion has since been 
that the surrender was due to the masterly combination 
of Washington from which no escape was possible. 

of the The war practically ended with Yorktown. Wash- 

ington tried to persuade de Grasse to join him in an ex- 
pedition against Charleston or in one against New York. 
The latter, however, insisted on returning to the West 
Indies. The troops were then scattered: Wayne and 
the Pennsylvania Continentals were sent to reinforce 
Greene at the South; Rochambeau remained at Williams- 
burg; St. Simon's brigade was sent back to Haiti; Wash- 
ington and the New York and New England Continentals 
returned to the Hudson ; Lafayette went back to France. 
In the following spring Clinton was superseded by 
Carleton. 

tyof There were no more military movements. A } T ear 

was spent in negotiating the treaty of peace, and during 
this year Savannah and Charleston were evacuated, as 
previously stated. When the treaty had been signed 



YORKTOWN 279 

New York was evacuated. The war was over and the 1783 
independence of the United States was established and Nov. 25 
acknowledged. 

The war had called forth the entire military strength 
of Great Britain — most of her navy, nearly all of her army 
and all the mercenaries that her money could hire. She 
sent to America 57 British and 30 Hessian regiments, and 
raised in or near New York 12 Provincial regiments 
which were thoroughly organized and equipped and 
served from three to six years. The number of sea- 
men exceeded 40,000, in more than 100 ships, and with 
these Great Britain kept control of the sea for the entire 
eight years, with the exception of forty-one days in 1779 
and sixty-four days in 1781. 

Considered in the light of its influence upon the prog- Washington's 
ress of mankind, the Revolution was one of the most soiE as 
important wars in the whole history of the world. The 
result was due — more than to all other causes combined 
— to the ability of Washington as a soldier. His political 
services were of such surpassing importance and value 
that it has long been the fashion to speak disparagingly 
or at least apologetically of his military achievements. 
If his campaigns are carefully studied, no other conclu- 
sion can be reached than that they were most skilfully 
conducted; and if Washington had died at any time 
between 1783 and 1789 he would have been known in 
history as one of the great soldiers of all time. 

In his principal battles, Long Island, Brandywine 
and Germantown, he was either defeated or the result 
was inconclusive. This was not because they were badly 
planned, but because the soldiers by whom they were 
fought, while brave and patriotic, were deficient in train- 



2S0 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 

1783 ing, experience and discipline — were not as efficient in- 
struments for accomplishing a specific purpose, plans for 
which had been properly made, as were their opponents. 
At Monmouth the combined treason and incapacity of 
Charles Lee robbed Washington of a well-deserved vic- 
tory. At Fort Washington, his own indecision caused a 
grave disaster. This is about the only criticism that can 
be made of his military acts during eight long years of 
warfare. 

Against this are the achievements on which his military 
reputation securely rests: the marvellous retreat from 
Long Island, the audacious attack at Trenton and Prince- 
ton, the well-planned movement from Valley Forge, when 
Howe evacuated Philadelphia, and the brilliant march 
to Yorktown. These four events occurred at intervals 
during five years, and between them were periods of 
enforced inaction compelled by the poverty of military 
resources. Those were the Fabian periods during which 
any other policy would have resulted in ruin. The four 
offensive events were Napoleonic. Each of them was 
characterized by an extraordinary exhibition of daring, 
celerity and skill, the three qualities to which both Caesar 
and Napoleon owed their classic triumphs. It was in 
the domain of strategy rather than of tactics that Wash- 
ington's genius was exhibited, and his successes were due 
to well-matured plans and rapid marches; the accidents 
of battle were nearly always unfavorable to him. He 
possessed the gaudium certaminis in a marked degree, 
and in the melees at Kip's Bay, Princeton and German- 
town his reckless exposure was phenomenal. The placid 
benignity which Stuart placed in the portraits which he 
painted a few years before Washington's death, and the 
austere character which Sparks has embodied in his 



YORKTOWN 281 



twelve volumes, must not make us forget that during 1783 
the Revolution, at the age of forty-four to fifty-one, 
Washington had very warm blood in his veins. He was 
a man of passionate vigor, intense energy and affection- 
ate sympathy. He was a pre-eminent soldier. 



PART II 



THE MILITARY POLICY OF THE 
UNITED STATES 

"Regular troops are alone equal to the exigencies of modern 
war, as well for defence as offence, and whenever a substitute is 
attempted it must prove illusory and ruinous." 

— George Washington. 



CHAPTER I 

THE POPULAR FAITH IN AN UNTRAINED 
MILITIA 

The usual statement of our military policy is that we 
maintain a small regular army in time of peace, raise 
large volunteer forces in time of war and maintain at all 
times a " well-regulated militia" in the various States. 
This policy rests upon certain fundamental principles, 
viz., distrust of a standing army, reliance upon untrained 
troops and dependence upon voluntary service. It is 
a singular fact that while we have been successful, not 
only in the general result, but in the specific military 
events, in all our wars except the second war with Great 
Britain, yet the principles upon which our armies have 
been raised and organized have been denounced by pro- 
fessional soldiers in every generation, beginning with 
Washington, as wasteful, extravagant, inefficient and 
wrong. 

The policy which we have adopted was not, as Glad- origin of 

1 J r ' . Our Military 

stone said of the Constitution, "struck off at one time by Policy 
the brain and purpose of man," but, on the contrary, is 
due in part to our geographical situation, but chiefly to 
racial prejudices which have their roots far back in Eng- 
lish history; as far back, indeed, as the very beginning 
of English — as distinguished from British — history, in 
the fifth and sixth centuries. The Teutonic tribes which 
then conquered Britain and founded England brought 

285 



286 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 



Ancient 
Hatred of a 
Standing 
Army 



with them two ideas of profound significance, 1 viz., the 
ideas of representative government and of voluntary mil- 
itary service; and these ideas or principles have never 
been abandoned, but have been maintained, developed 
and enlarged during nearly fifteen hundred years. They 
are the foundation of English civilization, English gov- 
ernment and English habit of thought. Our ancestors 
brought them to America in the seventeenth century, .at 
the very time when the Stuart kings were endeavoring 
to rule without Parliament, to levy taxes without legis- 
lative sanction, to create a standing army for the 
destruction of the liberties and the religion of the Eng- 
lish people. These twin principles — representative gov- 
ernment and voluntary military service — were the foun- 
dation of the state, no less in Virginia than in New 
England 2 ; for, while the Puritan looked upon the army 
as the instrument of oppression, to the Cavalier the 
words "standing army" meant Cromwell's disciplined 
troops, who had arrested members of Parliament, stabled 
their horses in cathedrals, insulted and robbed the nobility 
and gentry and murdered the king. To both Cavaliers 
and Puritans, therefore, as they founded their settlements 
in America, the name of standing army was hateful, with 
a bitterness and intensity of hatred which we can at 
this distance hardly appreciate. A hundred years or 
more later this hatred was, if possible, still further in- 
tensified by the acts of an English king and Parliament, 

1 "The base of the new English society was the freeman. . . . War 
was no sooner over than the warrior settled down into the farmer. . . . 
Each little village commonwealth lived the same life in Britain as its 
farmers had lived at home. Each . . . made laws in the assembly of 
its wise men, and chose its own leaders among the 'earls' for peace or war." 
(J. R. Green, Short History of the English People, 12. See also John 
Fiske, The Beginnings of New England, 25-30.) 

2 John Fiske, Civil Government in the United States, 64-65. 



POPULAR FAITH IN AN UNTRAINED MILITIA 287 

who again used a standing army to enforce their law for 
levying taxes against the will of those taxed. Thus, the 
outbreak of the Revolution found our ancestors, North 
and South, not only inheriting the hatred of a standing 
army, through generations of their own forebears, but at 
the instant confronted with a standing army as the in- 
strument of the oppression which they were determined 
no longer to tolerate. Detestation of the word army 
was not alone an inherited prejudice, but a vital funda- 
mental principle in the political faith of the day. 

Such a prejudice, founded originally on justice, is slow 
to die. It survived long after the conditions which gave 
rise to it had ceased to exist. It has been slowly expir- 
ing in this country during the last hundred years, but 
it can hardly yet be called extinct. The debates in 
Congress at the last reorganization of the army in 
1901 contain much of the same oratorical declamation 
about standing armies and the destruction of the liberties 
of Greece and Rome that Macaulay 1 so graphically nar- 
rates in his account of the debate in Parliament in 1697. 

On the other hand, the militia in England antedated popularity of 
the regular army by at least one thousand years; it was England 1 * m 
part of the local government, and although derided in 
Dry den's witty verse 2 it was always popular with the 
great body of the English people. It was essentially the 
same in the sixth century as in the seventeenth, and again 
in the nineteenth; its members were by turns fishermen, 
husbandmen, judges and warriors; they followed the 

1 History of England, V, 54. Debate on the mutiny act. 
s " Mouths without hands, maintained at vast expense, 
In peace a charge, in war a weak defence. 
Stout once a month they march, a blustering band, 
And ever but in time of need at hand." 

— Drydex, " Cymon and Iphigenia." 



288 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 



Popularity of 
the Militia in 
the American 
Colonies 



1775 trade of soldier, not as their chief occupation, but as in- 
cidental and subordinate to some other occupation by 
which they gained food, shelter and clothing. Their 
service was voluntary, although — for the able-bodied — 
the liability to service was universal; they elected their 
own officers; they were part of the people, and not a 
class apart. These ideas were also brought to America 
in the seventeenth century. Belief in the militia and 
reliance upon its sufficiency were as important a part 
of the creed of the early settlers as was their hatred 
of an army. The militia was organized in every Colony 
as soon as the government was established, and was as 
essential a part of the governing machinery as the town 
meeting in New England or the county court in Virginia. 1 
It performed its part, on the whole, perhaps, satisfac- 
torily, in the numerous Indian wars and in the French 
wars. It was the only military system indigenous to 
the Colonies; an army was the system employed by the 
" tyrant," George III. 

Naturally, when the Revolution broke out the first re- 
liance was upon the militia; but when the battles of Lex- 
ington and Concord brought a realization of how serious 
the struggle was going to be, the word "army" came to 
be used. Massachusetts and other New England Colonies 
began to raise their several armies and concentrate them 
at Boston; and in June, 1775, the Continental Congress 
took them over as a Continental army, appointed Wash- 
ington its commander-in-chief and adopted rules and 
June 30 regulations for its government. 2 A form of enlistment 

was agreed upon which prescribed that the term of ser- 
vice was to be "for one year, unless sooner discharged." 3 

1 John Fiske, Civil Government in the United States, 16-67. 

2 Jour. Cont. Cong., II, 90-111. 3 Ibid., II, 91. 



Origin of the 

Continental 

Array 



June 15 



POPULAR FAITH IN AN UNTRAINED MILITIA 289 

This legislation was framed upon the Mutiny Act of 1697, 1775 
which limited the existence of the British army to one j une i4 
year, and which had annually been re-enacted. Congress 
evidently thought that the liberty of the people might be 
subverted quite as well by a standing army as by George 
III, and determined to retain the right to disband it at 
any moment. But it soon became evident that the danger 
was not that of having a permanent army, but of having 
no army at all. Congress fixed the strength of the new Nov. 4 
army at 20,372 officers and men; 1 but by December 31, 
only 9,650 had enlisted 2 and of these large numbers were 
absent. On the same date the term of service of the old 
army expired. It became necessary to call on the militia 
for temporary service in the attack on Dorchester Heights 
in March, 1776. Congress attempted to remedy the lack 1776 
of enlistments by calling on the various Colonies to ineffective 
furnish a certain number of battalions for the Continental of congress 
army, for service until the end of the year, and various 
resolutions to this effect were passed between January 
and September of 1776. 3 The response was not alto- sept. ie 
gether encouraging, and then Congress adopted a resolu- 
tion 4 "that eighty-eight battalions be enlisted as soon as 
possible, to serve during the war, unless sooner dis- 
charged" — that each State furnish a certain quota; that 
a bounty of twenty dollars be given to each non-com- 
missioned officer and private; that a grant of land be 
made to each officer and soldier who shall engage for the 
war; and that the appointment of all officers below the 
grade of general be left to the States. Still the enlist- 
ments were not satisfactory, and in November two reso- 

1 Jour. Cont. Cong., Ill, 321. 2 Sparks, III, 220. 

3 Jour. Cont. Cong., IV, 29, 47, 99, 237, 357, 412; V, 486, 521, 598. 

4 Ibid., V, 762. 



290 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 

1776 lutions 1 were adopted, the first requiring the enlisting 
officers to offer to recruits their choice of two forms of 
enlistment, one for the war and the other for three years; 
the second, a few days later, providing for only one form 
of enlistment which read "for three years or during the 

. 27 war." The army meanwhile was dwindling down to 

less than 5,000 men; 2 thereupon Congress appointed 
Washington 3 virtually dictator, authorized him to raise 
16 battalions, in addition to those already resolved upon, 
and 3,000 light horse, 3 regiments of artillery and a corps 
of engineers; to appoint and discharge officers and fill 
all vacancies, to call on the States for militia, to impress 
supplies and to arrest and confine persons who refused 
to accept Continental currency or were disaffected to the 
American cause. 

The system of short-term voluntary enlistments thus 
came to grief before the Revolution had been much more 
than a year in progress. By Washington's personal 
efforts more than from any other cause, acting under any 
one of the many resolutions of Congress, the Continental 
army was maintained with varying strength from 6,000 
to 10,000 men, and the militia of the various States came 
from time to time to help out for a few weeks in an emer- 
gency. Congress continued to pass resolutions through- 
out the year 1777, 4 calling on the States to furnish their 
quota, but without much effect; and after a conference 
of a committee with Washington at Valley Forge it re- 
sorted to the draft. The states were 5 "required forth- 
with to fill up by drafts, from their militia or in any 
other way that shall be effectual their respective battalions 

1 Jour. Cont. Cong., VI, 945, 971. 2 Sparks, III, 225. 

3 Jour. Cont. Cong., VI, 1045; Upton, 30. 

* Upton, 25-32. * Jour. Cont. Cong., X, 200. 



POPULAR FAITH IN AN UNTRAINED MILITIA 291 

of Continental troops." Having no power to enforce its ms 
decree, this resolution of Congress had no more effect 
than its predecessors, but Washington's personal appeals, 
combined with the news of the French alliance, succeeded 
in bringing out enough men to carry on the war. 

It continued in this way to the end, Congress passing 1783 
futile resolutions and Washington raising men and carry- sept. 3 
ing on the war by the mere strength of his personal char- 
acter. The treaty of peace was signed in 1783 and in the 1784 
following year the army was disbanded, 1 except eighty j U ne2 
soldiers retained to guard the public stores at Fort Pitt 
and West Point. 

The total number of enlistments had been 395,858, 2 
and the maximum force in the field at any one time 
about 35,000, or one in eleven of the enlistments. 

We had succeeded in our main purpose of achieving waste and 
independence, and we had accomplished this without a of the 

. . « . , Revolution 

standing army, and by means of snort and numerous en- 
listments, large bounties and grants of lands. The waste 
and extravagance were repaired a few years later by the 
financial genius of Hamilton. The enormous pension roll 3 
was easily provided for from the resources of a land of 
rapidly developing wealth. Public sentiment was con- confirmed 
firmed in its opposition to a standing army and confidence a standing 
in the efficacy of untrained volunteers and militia was 
still further strengthened. The one man to whom suc- 
cess was due, and who achieved it, not because but in 
spite of our defective military policy, thought differently. 
Washington's opinions on the subject are worthy of 
careful study even at this late day, for his judgments 

1 Jour. Cong., IV, 433; Upton, 69. = Upton, 58. 

3 Total Revolutionary pensions during 126 years (1783 to 1908), 
$70,000,000. Report Com. Pensions, 1908, 12, 21. 



Army 



292 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 

1784 were the result of long deliberation and were of almost 
miraculous accuracy. He had seen service in the Indian 
and French wars before he came to take command at 
Cambridge in 1775. His knowledge of what took place 
between that date and 1783 was unrivalled. He was 
pre-eminently qualified as a witness. 

His writings on the subject during those eight years, 
to Congress, to the State authorities and to personal 
friends, form no inconsiderable part of the twelve vol- 
umes edited by Sparks. A few of the most pertinent of 
those addressed to the President of Congress are here 
quoted. 

February 9, 1776: 1 "To expect the same service from 
raw and undisciplined recruits as from veteran soldiers 
is to expect what never did and perhaps never will 
happen." 

September 24, 1776: 2 "To place any dependence upon 
militia is assuredly resting upon a broken staff. . . . The 
jealousy of a standing army, and the evils to be appre- 
hended from one, are remote and, in my judgment, 
situated and circumstanced as we are, not at all to be 
dreaded; but the consequence of wanting one, according 
to my ideas formed from the present view of things, is 
certain and inevitable ruin." 

December 20, 1776 : 3 "Short enlistments, and a mis- 
taken dependence upon militia, have been the origin of 
all our misfortunes and the great accumulation of our 
debt." 

August 20, 1780 : 4 "Had we formed a permanent army 
in the beginning, ... we never should have had to re- 
treat with a handful of men across the Delaware in 1776, 

Sparks, III, 279; Upton, 11. 2 Sparks, IV, 113-115; Upton, 16. 

3 Ibid., IV, 234. *Ibid., VII, 162; ibid., 53. 



POPULAR FAITH IN AN UNTRAINED MILITIA 293 

trembling for the fate of America; ... we should not 1784 
have been the greatest part of the war inferior to the Washington's 
enemy, indebted for our safety to their inactivity, en- ° pimoai 
during frequently the mortification of seeing inviting 
opportunities to ruin them pass unimproved for want of 
a force which the country was completely able to afford, 
and of seeing the country ravaged, our towns burnt, the 
inhabitants plundered, abused, murdered, with impunity, 
from the same cause." 

September 15, 1780 i 1 " Regular troops are alone equal 
to the exigencies of modern war, as well for defence as 
offence, and whenever a substitute is attempted it must 
prove illusory and ruinous." 

It will be observed that in these letters Washington 
addressed himself solely to the question of the moment : 
the proper method of organizing an army for carrying on 
the war. He said nothing about the propriety of main- 
taining an army in time of peace. In a letter 2 to John 
Banister, of Virginia, delegate in Congress, written from 
Valley Forge on April 21, 1778, Washington admits the 
justice of the jealousy of a standing army in time of 
peace. His words are: "The other point is, the jealousy, 3 
which Congress unhappily entertain of the army, and 
which, if reports are right, some members labor to estab- 
lish. You may be assured, there is nothing more in- 
jurious or more unfounded. This jealousy stands upon 
the commonly received opinion, which under proper 
limitations is certainly true, that standing armies are 
dangerous to a state. The prejudices in other countries 
have only gone to them in time of peace, and these from 
their not having any of the ties, the concerns or inter- 

1 Sparks, VII, 206; Upton, 54. 

2 Ibid., V, 328; ibid., 38. 3 Italics as in Sparks. 



Opinions 



294 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 

1784 ests of citizens, or any other dependence, than what 
Washington's flowed from their military employ; in short, from their 
being mercenaries, hirelings. It is our policy to be prej- 
udiced against them in war, though they are citizens, 
having all the ties and interests of citizens, and in most 
cases property totally unconnected with the military line." 

The final word of Washington, as general-in-chief, on 
military policy was given in the address 1 which he sent to 
the governors of the States from Newburg about six 
months prior to resigning his commission. He evidently 
thought it either useless or unwise to advocate a stand- 
ing army in time of peace, and therefore argued in favor 
of making the militia as effective as possible. He stated 
that there were four things "essential to the well-being, 
I may even venture to say to the existence, of the United 
States as an independent power," and one of them was 
"the adoption of a proper peace establishment." His 
opinion on this was as follows: 2 "The militia of this coun- 
try must be considered as the palladium of our security, 
and the first effectual resort in case of hostility. It is 
essential, therefore, that the same system should pervade 
the whole; that the formation and discipline of the 
militia of the continent should be absolutely uniform, 
and that the same species of arms, accoutrements and 
military apparatus should be introduced in every part 
of the United States. No one, who has not learned it 
from experience, can conceive the difficulty, expense and 
confusion which result from a contrary system, or the 
vague arrangements which have hitherto prevailed." 

While these recommendations were never carried into 
effect until 120 years after they were written, to wit, 
after the passage of the Militia Act of 1903, and while 

1 Sparks, VIII, 443; Upton, 68. 2 Sparks, VIII, 450. 



POPULAR FAITH IN AN UNTRAINED MILITIA 295 

each succeeding war has found us at the outset with 1787 
different systems of formation and discipline, and dif- Military 
ferent kinds of arms, accoutrements and military ap- congress 
paratus in the militia of the various States, yet these 
views of Washington were adopted in the Constitution 
in 1787, and have ever since been and now are the funda- 
mental law of the land. As to the navy, the Constitu- 
tion gives Congress power "to provide and maintain a 
navy," which evidently implies a permanent and con- 
tinuing force; but as to the army the power of Con- 
gress is "to raise and support armies, but no appropria- 
tion of money to that use shall be for a longer term than 
two years," which equally implies a temporary force 
raised for war or other emergency. 

Congress is further given power, 1 "to make rules for 
the government of the land and naval forces, to provide 
for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the 
Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions; and 
to provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the 
militia, and for governing such part of them as may be 
employed in the service of the United States, reserving 
to the States, respectively, the appointment of the offi- 
cers and the authority of training the militia according 
to the discipline prescribed by Congress." In order to 
emphasize still further the basis of the military policy, 
Congress at its first session passed an amendment 2 to the 
Constitution, which was promptly ratified by the States, 
reciting that "a well-regulated militia" is "necessary to 
the security of a free State." 

The English tradition, originating in the tyranny of 
the Stuarts more than 200 years before, was thus em- 

1 Constitution of the United States, I, VIII, 12, 13, 14. 

2 Ibid., Second Amendment. 



296 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 



1787 bodied in our fundamental law. The army was to exist 
on sufferance for no longer a period than two years. 
Our main reliance was to be on the militia and on such 
armies as could be improvised when war breaks out. 

ia Act It will be observed, however, that it was to be a " well- 

regulated militia"; and during the eight years of his presi- 
dency Washington made recommendations in each of 
his annual messages in favor of measures to make the 
militia a really effective force. The only result was the 
passage of the Militia Act of 1792, 1 which remained in 
force for 111 years, although it was obsolete a few years 
after it was enacted. In his message of 1793 2 Washing- 
ton called attention to its many defects, and again 
pressed upon Congress "the necessity of placing ourselves 
in a condition of complete defence. . . . The United 
States ought not to indulge a persuasion that, contrary 
to the order of human events, they will forever keep at 
a distance those painful appeals to arms with which the 
history of every other nation abounds. ... If we de- 
sire to secure peace, it must be known that we are at all 
times ready for war." In his message of 1794 he called 
attention to the "striking defects" in the militia law 
and resulting "extraordinary expense and waste." He 
referred to the subject again in 1795, and in his last 
message in 1796 3 he particularly advocated the establish- 
ment of a military academy to preserve and transmit a 
knowledge of the military art, which he considered "of 
great moment to the security of a nation." 

These appeals, however, were all unsuccessful. The 
memory of the Stuarts and of George III was still com- 
paratively fresh in the minds of the people, and the 



1 Mil. Laws, 95; Upton, 84. 

3 Mess. Presidents, I, 166, 184, 202. 



2 Mess. Presidents, I, 140. 



POPULAR FAITH IN AN UNTRAINED MILITIA 297 

prejudice against a standing army was not to be over- 1787 
come even by the arguments of the man who had gained, 
almost single-handed, their independence. 

With the close of the Revolution, as already stated, 1789 
the army was disbanded. Thirty years passed before 
we again had a serious war. In the meantime there were 
insurrections, such as Shay's Rebellion in Massachusetts 
in 1786, and the Whiskey Rebellion in Pennsylvania 
in 1794; Indian wars, such as Harmar's Miami expedi- 
tion in 1790, St. Clair's campaign of 1791 and Wayne's 
campaign of 1794; the probability of war with France 
in 1798. 1 These emergencies were met, partly by the 
militia and partly by volunteer armies raised for three 
years, and by a small but slowly increasing permanent 
force of regulars. This latter originated in a force of origin of the 
700 men raised for service against the Indians in 1784, ' b ' Army 
continued for three years in 1785, again extended for June 2, 1784 
three years in 1787 2 and finally recognized by the First April 1. 1735 
Congress 3 as "the establishment for the troops in the Oct. 3, 1787 
service of the United States." The army has existed sept. 29, 1789 
continuously from that day to the present, with increas- 
ing numbers, and with reorganizations in 1790, 1792, 
1795, 1798, 1802, 1808, 1812, 1815, 1821, 1838, 1842, 1846, 
1855, 1861, 1866, 1870, 1874, 1898, 1901— or, on an 
average, once in six years. 

In January, 1812, when war with Great Britain seemed war of 1812 
inevitable, the army consisted, under the laws of 1802 and 
1808, of 11 regiments. By successive acts, 4 Congress in- 
creased this as follows: 

January 11, 1812, to 24 regiments. 

1 Upton, 71-77, 79, 83, 86, 87. 

2 Jour. Cong., IV, 434, 493, 785; Upton, 69, 71, 

3 Mil. Laws, 87; Upton, 75. 

< Mil. Laws, 212, 230, 238, 250; Upton, 95, 123. 



298 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 



1812 



1814 

Refusal to 

Furnish 

Militia 



June 26, 1812, to 32 regiments. 

January 29, 1813, to 51 regiments. 

January 27, 1814, to 54 regiments. 

The authorized strength of the latter was about 63,000 
men. 

But recruiting was always slow. The actual force 
varied from one-quarter to one-half of that which the 
law authorized. Volunteers were not called for, but the 
President was "authorized to accept" 1 not exceeding 
30,000 volunteers. They did not come forward, the total 
number during the entire war being only about 10,000. 2 
The militia was called out, 3 but not exceeding 100,000 
men and for a period not longer than six months. Con- 
gress now possessed the power, which the Continental 
Congress lacked, to enforce its laws, but it did not exer- 
cise that power. All the evils of the Revolution were 
repeated in perhaps aggravated form: short enlistments, 
successive levies of raw troops, enormous bounties, ex- 
travagant grants of lands and liberal promises of pen- 
sions. The rolls of the Pension Office show that 527,654 4 
men were in service, most of them for periods of less 
than six months and more than half of them for less 
than three months. Not more than 25,000, or one in 
twenty, were in the field at any time. The Pension Office 
is still paying pensions to the widows of soldiers of the 
War of 1812 (338 in number), and the total pensions of 
that war have amounted to nearly $46,000,000. 5 

The military operations, as might be expected, were 
far from creditable; some of the militia refused, at 
critical periods, to cross the frontier. The governors of 
Massachusetts and Connecticut refused to call forth the 



1 Mil. Laws, 215; Upton, 95. 
3 Ibid,, 222. 4 Ibid., 137. 



2 Upton, 137. 

5 Com. Pensions, 1910, 11, 27. 



POPULAR FAITH IN AN UNTRAINED MILITIA 299 

militia of those States, reserving to themselves the right isi4 
to determine when the exigency provided for in the Con- 
stitution and in the Act of Congress of 1795 had arisen. 
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts sustained them in 
this contention, and the question remained in doubt until 
1827, when the Supreme Court of the United States de- 
cided that it belonged exclusively to the President to 
judge when such exigency arises. 1 

As soon as the war was over the army was reduced to Mar. 3 is is 
10,000 men, 2 and six years later to 6,000 men. 3 John C. Mar. 2 1821 
Calhoun was then Secretary of War. He held the posi- 
tion during the eight years of Monroe's administration, 
from 1817 to 1825, and next to Elihu Root was the ablest 
administrator among the fifty or more individuals who 
have filled that important office. Congress called upon 
him for two reports on the army, which he made in Decem- 
ber, 1818, 4 and December, 1820. In these he discussed in caihoun-s 
the most comprehensive manner the purposes for which 
we maintain an army, its relation to our political princi- 
ples, its strength, organization, equipment, emoluments, 
rations and clothing. He pointed out the terrible price 
which we had paid in 1812 in consequence of the lack 
of a proper military establishment and of suitable prep- 
aration in the preceding years; showed that "however 
remote our situation from the great powers of the world, 
and however pacific our policy, we are, notwithstanding, 
liable to be involved in war; and to resist, with success, 
its calamities and dangers, a standing army in peace is 
an indispensable preparation." He further stated that 
"to suppose our militia capable of meeting in the open 
field the regular troops of Europe would be to resist the 

1 Martin vs. Mott, 12; Wharton, 19; Upton, 96-97. 

2 Mil. Laws, 266. s Ibid., 306. 4 Burnside, 139, 144; Upton, 145. 



300 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 

i8i8 most obvious truth and the whole of our experience as 
i82o a nation"; and argued that "if our liberty should ever 
oun's be endangered by the military power gaining the ascen- 
dancy, it will be from the necessity to retrieve our affairs, 
after a series of disasters, caused by the want of adequate 
military knowledge." ' He laid down the fundamental 
proposition that "at the commencement of hostilities 
there should be nothing either to new-model or to create: 
the only difference between the peace and the war for- 
mation of the army ought to be in the increased magni- 
tude of the latter, and the only change in passing from 
the former to the latter should consist in giving to it the 
augmentation which will then be necessary. It is thus, 
and thus only, the dangerous transition from peace to 
war may be made without confusion and disorder." The 
staff should be completely formed in time of peace and 
the organization of the line such that when hostilities 
begin "the force may be sufficiently augmented without 
adding new regiments or battalions." 2 

In these documents, so remarkable in breadth and 
foresight, Calhoun followed to some extent the principles 
formulated by Scharnhorst in Prussia after the battle of 
Jena. He anticipated by more than a generation the 
system of expansion in war which has since been adopted 
for all European armies, and for which this country had 
to wait more than eighty years, during the greater part 
of which these principles were unsuccessfully advocated 
by army officers, until the genius and persistence of Mr. 
Root persuaded Congress to adopt them in the legislation 
of 1901-3. 

Upon these principles, including especially "the desire 
to avoid creating new regiments with raw, inexperienced 

1 Burnside, 145. 2 Bumside, 146; Upton, 149. 



POPULAR FAITH IN AN UNTRAINED MILITIA 301 

officers at their head in time of war," 1 Calhoun worked isi8 
out a complete scheme of organization for an army of 1820 
544 officers and 6,391 men in peace, to be augmented to 
832 officers and 18,200 men in war, without the formation 
of any new regiments. 2 

His wise words fell on deaf ears. Congress was then 1821 
in the midst of the intensely exciting debate which re- caihoun's Re- 
sulted in the "Missouri Compromise." Calhoun's report Adopted 
apparently received no attention in Congress; there does Feb. 27 
not seem to have been any debate on it; McMasters 
makes no reference to the subject; von Hoist does not 
mention it in his biography of Calhoun. The law, as March 2 
passed, simply reduced the army to 4 regiments of artil- 
lery, 7 regiments of infantry and a certain number of 
staff officers; the companies were small, each containing 
only 42 privates, and the entire authorized force was 
542 officers and 5,642 men. 3 No provision was made for 
augmenting the enlisted strength in time of war or other 
emergency. The old reliance upon militia and untrained 
levies was still the popular idea. 

No change of any importance was made in the army 
during the next seventeen years, except the formation 
of a regiment of dragoons, 4 now the 1st Cavalry. The 
actual strength was, however, at all times less than what 
the law authorized. In November, 1835, the author- 
ized strength, 5 including the dragoons, was 7,198 and 
the actual strength 3,888. 

In 1835 we became involved in the Florida war against 1833 
the Seminole Indians, which proved a very serious affair, The Florida 
lasting more than seven years. The army was altogether 

1 Burnside, 146. i Burnside, 157. 

3 Ibid., 217. 4 Mil. Laws, 329; Upton, 161. 

6 Upton, 162. 



302 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 



1333 



March 3 



1836 
May 23 
1838 

July 5 



1837 



The Florida 
War 



insufficient in numbers to cope with it; instead of aug- 
menting its enlisted strength, as Calhoun had advised, 
the Florida militia was called out and Colonel Clinch, 
commanding the few hundred regulars on duty in Flor- 
ida, was authorized to call on the governors of South 
Carolina, Georgia and Alabama for the militia of those 
States. The President was " authorized * to accept" vol- 
unteers not exceeding 10,000 men "to serve six or twelve 
months." The regular army was subsequently 2 increased 
by one more regiment of infantry and an addition of 
16 privates to every company of artillery and of 38 
privates to every company of infantry. This increased 
the authorized strength to 12,539 3 and the actual strength 
to perhaps 9,000. 

The greatest number of men in the field at any one 
time was in November, 1837, when they numbered 5,025 
regulars and 4,454 volunteers and militia. 4 The rolls 
of the Pension Office show that during the seven years 
of this war the total number of men in service was 
61,269 5 of whom the greater number served for three 
months or less. It was a repetition on a smaller scale of 
the methods of the Revolution and the War of 1812; and 
it should be remembered that the Indian warriors against 
whom these 60,000 or more men went out for a few days 
numbered only about 1,200. 6 The waste and extrava- 
gance of such methods are in sharp contrast with the 
effective work done by the small but well-trained army 
in the Indian campaigns after the Civil War. 

The jealousy of a standing army was still a living 
principle, and Andrew Jackson undoubtedly expressed 



1 Mil. Laws, 336; Upton, 168. 
8 Burnside, 219. 
3 Upton, 190. 



2 Mil. Laws, 341; Upton, 181-183. 
4 Upton, 175. 
6 Ibid., 194. 



POPULAR FAITH IN AN UNTRAINED MILITIA 303 

the opinions of a majority of his countrymen when in 1835 
his seventh annual message as President, in December, Jackson's 
1835, 1 he spoke of "the necessity of an efficient organiza- pm 
tion of the militia," and defined our military policy in 
these words: "To suppress domestic violence and to repel 
foreign invasion, should these calamities overtake us, we 
must rely in the first instance upon the great body of the 
community whose will has instituted and whose power 
must support the government. A large standing mili- 
tary force is not consonant to the spirit of our institu- 
tions nor to the feelings of our countrymen, and the 
lessons of former days and those also of our own times 
show the danger as well as the enormous expense of these 
permanent and extensive military organizations." In 
the message of 1836, 2 however, his views were slightly 
modified. "While the necessities existing during the pres- 
ent year for the service of militia and volunteers have 
furnished new proof of the patriotism of our fellow- 
citizens, they have also illustrated the importance of an 
increase in the rank and file of the regular army. . . . 
In this connection it is also proper to remind you that 
the defects in our present militia system are every day 
rendered more apparent." 

His successor, President Van Buren, in his message of 1837 
1837, 3 spoke of "the necessity of increasing our regular van Buren: 
forces; and the superior efficiency, as well as greatly 
diminished expense of that description of troops, recom- 
mend this measure as one of economy as well as of 
efficiency." But he hastened to add: "It is not, how- 
ever, compatible with the interests of the people to main- 
tain in time of peace a regular force adequate to the 

1 Mess. Presidents, III, 170. 2 Ibid., Ill, 254. 

3 IbUL, III, 300. 



304 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 

1837 defence of our extensive frontiers. In periods of danger 
and alarm we must rely principally upon a well-organized 
militia, and some general arrangement that will render 
this description of force more efficient has long been a 
subject of anxious solicitude." 

In subsequent messages 1 Van Buren referred, with 
diminishing interest, to the necessity of an efficient or- 
ganization of the militia; but nothing was done. The 
subject excited no popular interest until the outbreak 
of the war with Mexico. 

When the Seminole war ended in 1842 the army was 
reduced from 12,539 to 8,613 2 men, the reduction being 
made in the number of enlisted men in a company, and 



1842 
Aug. 23 
1846 



War with 

Mexico it so remained until 1846. 



Mess. Presidents, III, 497, 537. a Mil. Laws, 358; Upton, 193. 



CHAPTER II 

THE GRADUAL GROWTH OF THE REGULAR 

ARMY 

Seventy years had thus passed in which we had had 1846 
two wars with Great Britain and numerous campaigns 
against the Indians. Throughout this period the popular 
faith in an untrained militia remained unshaken. 

When, however, it became necessary to make prepa- 
rations for the war with Mexico, slightly different ideas 
began to prevail. The President was authorized, by suc- 
cessive acts of Congress, for the first time, to "call for," as 
well as to " accept," volunteers, the number not to exceed 
50,000, and the term of service to be twelve months "or 
to the end of the war"; "to employ" the militia for not May 13 
exceeding six months ; to increase the number of privates 
in any company to 100 men; to organize a company of 
engineers; to raise a regiment of mounted riflemen; to May 16 
raise a regiment of dragoons and nine more regiments of May 19 
infantry, to serve during the term of the war and no 1847 
longer. 1 These various laws provided for an authorized Feb. 11 
strength of 30,890 regulars and 50,000 volunteers. The 
volunteers first enlisted claimed their discharge at the 
end of twelve months, and a new force had to be en- 
listed; so that the total number of volunteers was 
73,532. The rolls of the Pension Office show a total of 
regulars and volunteers of 104,284. The greatest num- 

1 Mil. Laws, 367-379; Upton, 203-206. 
305 



306 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 

1847 ber at any time under Scott's command was 13,500 and 
war with under Taylor, 7,000. These figures 1 compare favorably 

Mexico 

with the corresponding figures in the Revolution and in 
the War of 1812. They show that the army in the field 
was nearly one-sixth of the total number of enlistments, 
whereas in the previous wars it had been only one-eleventh 
or one-twentieth. Considering the results accomplished, 
the number of men called out during the Mexican War 
was much smaller than in the previous wars. The benefit 
of military training was beginning to be felt, and the 
small armies of Scott and Taylor were very efficient. 
The Military Academy at West Point had sent out, 
from 1802 to 1847, no less than 1,368 graduates, 2 and of 
these 523 served in the regulars and 36 in the volunteers 3 
with the armies in Mexico. Scott, who had had personal 
experience of the wretched results due to untrained 
troops in the War of 1812 and the Florida war, gener- 
ously attributed his success in Mexico to these West 
Point graduates, stating his "fixed opinion" that but for 
them the war would have lasted four or five years, with 
more defeats than victories, whereas with their help 
complete victory had been obtained "in less than two 
campaigns." 4 

1848 The close of the war brought the usual reduction — to 
jui y 19 10,320 men: 5 but the army was soon increased 6 by add- 

1850 ing to the number of privates in each company, equiva- 

june 17 lent for the whole army, about 4,400 men; and later by 

two regiments of cavalry and two of infantry, about 

1855 4,000 men, carrying the authorized total to 18,349. At 
March 3 no time, however, did the actual strength exceed 15,000. 7 

1 Upton, 209, 215, 216. 2 Cullum, II, 206. 

3 Centennial of the U. S. M. A., 629-630. 

4 Cullum, I, XI; Upton, 222. 'Mil. Laws, 223, 393. 
6 Upton, 223 7 Upton, 224. 



GRADUAL GROWTH OF THE REGULAR ARMY 307 

With these exceptions there was no additional legislation i86i 
until the outbreak of the Civil War. 
The magnitude of this struggle was not underestimated. President's 

°° < Proclamation, 

As in previous wars the militia was first called out ; A P ril 15 
75,000 men for three months. As soon as Congress 
convened this was supplemented by two laws, each cal- The civii war 
ling for 500,000 volunteers, and a third law adding to jm y 22 
the regular army 9 regiments of infantry, 1 of cavalry July 25 
and 1 of artillery. These laws 1 were all under debate jm y 29 
at the time of the battle of Bull Run, and were passed July 21 
under its influence. The enlistment of volunteers in a i86i 
few months exceeded 700,000, 2 about one in six of the caiisfor 

11 # Volunteers 

able-bodied male population. It was a magnificent ris- 
ing in mass of the Northern population. Had this vast 
host possessed military training, the rebellion might 
possibly have been quickly suppressed. But the "well- 
regulated" militia of the Constitution, uniformly armed 
and accoutred, trained and disciplined, as Washington 
had advised, and possessed of a thorough knowledge of 
the military art, did not exist. The training and knowl- 
edge had to be gained as the war progressed. 

Enlistment in the regular army was not popular. Its 
total strength never reached 26,000, 3 or two-thirds of 
what was authorized, and of these a large number were 
stationed in the fortifications and on the Western frontier. 
The force available for the field was probably less than 
10,000, and most of these served in the "regular divis- 
ion," forming part of the 5th Army Corps. They formed 
an inconsiderable part of the great army by which the 
war was carried on. 

The strength of the volunteer army on January 1, 

1 War Records, 3, V, 606; Mil. Laws, 466, 471, 473. 

2 Ibid., 3, IV, 1264. 3 Upton, 257. 



308 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 



1862 



July 1 

1883 

Resort to 
Conscription 

March 3 
1864 

Feb. 24 
1885 



Number of 
Men in 
Service 



1862/ was about 528,000 men. The War Department 
in December, 1861, had directed that no more regi- 
ments be raised unless specially authorized, and on April 
3, 1862, had discontinued all recruiting. 2 This was 
resumed by order of June 6, 1862, and it was soon evi- 
dent that large numbers of men must still be raised in 
order to make up for the losses in the field. The gov- 
ernors of eighteen States thereupon joined in a letter to 
the President suggesting that he call for additional men, 
and on July 1 Lincoln made a call for 300,000 men, 
More than 420,000 3 were furnished. As the war went on 
further calls became necessary, the draft or conscription 
was authorized 4 and finally the President was empow- 
ered 5 to call for such numbers of men as the military 
service required. There were in all, between April, 1861, 
and December, 1864, eleven successive calls; six for vol- 
unteers for three years or the war; four for militia for 
three to nine months, and one for regulars for five years. 
The total number called for was 2,763,670, and the num- 
ber furnished was 2 J 778,304. 6 There were a great many re- 
enlistments, so that it is difficult to say how many 
individuals enlisted. The number was probably in ex- 
cess of 2,100,000. The enrollment of April, 1865, 7 showed 
2,245,063 able-bodied men at their homes. From this it 
would appear that the number of men available for 
military service in the Northern States was something 
more than 4,300,000 and of these about 2,100,000, or 
nearly one-half, were enlisted. 

The national government was victorious, at a fearful 
sacrifice; the Confederacy was annihilated. That the 

1 War Records, 3, I, 775. 2 Ibid., 3, V, 608. 

3 Ibid., 3, IV, 1265. * Ibid., 3, V, 611. 

6 Ibid., 3, V, 636. a Ibid., 3, IV, 1269. 

7 Ibid., 3, V, 620. 



GRADUAL GROWTH OF THE REGULAR ARMY 309 

struggle would have been shortened and the loss in lives 1S35 
and treasure reduced if we had had a larger trained army 
at the beginning has often been asserted by military 
writers. This is at least open to doubt; for in such case 
the South would have had almost the same relative ad- 
vantage as the North. The nature of the struggle was 
such that it could only be ended by the absolute destruc- 
tion of the military strength of the Confederacy, and this 
could only be accomplished by the use of almost the en- 
tire strength of the loyal States. On the other hand, it Defects of the 
is not open to dispute that the strength of the govern- tem m the 
ment was not employed to the best advantage, but was 
misapplied, with accompanying waste and extravagance 
almost equal to those of the Revolution and the War of 
1812. The same defects appeared: short service, enor- 
mous bounties and grants of land and a gigantic pension 
roll * destined probably to endure till the last quarter of 
the twentieth century. 

It is believed that at no other time in the history of 
the world have so many as 2,000,000 men been brought 
into the military service by a single nation in the space 
of four years. The failure to realize the full value of so 
numerous a force, composed for the most part of such 
superb material, was chiefly due to the constant raising 
of new regiments of raw recruits and inexperienced 
officers instead of keeping the old regiments filled up 
to their full strength. The maximum force under arms 
at any time was about 970,000 2 men, or the equivalent 
of 970 regiments. But the total number of organiza- 
tions raised during the war was 1,952 3 regiments, 36 

1 The pension bills of recent years — more than forty years after Appo- 
mattox— have been about $155,000,000, of which abo"ut$146,000,000 are 
paid to the Civil War pensioners. 

J War Records, 3, V, 137, 1029. s Ibid., 3, V, 1029. 



310 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 

1865 battalions and 900 independent companies; this gives a 
total equivalent of 2,050 regiments, or more than twice as 
many as were needed. Had the quota assigned to each 
State been a certain number of regiments, squadrons 
and batteries, instead of a certain number of men, with 
a requirement that these organizations be kept up to 
their maximum, and that the appointment of officers be 
limited to men who had seen at least six months of active 
service in the ranks, there is little doubt that the final 
result would have been accomplished in less time and 
with a smaller number of men than 2,000,000. This 
method was frequently advocated during the progress of 
the war, but always rejected on the ground that troops 
could not be raised except for new organizations and 
with new officers. We had to come to conscription in 
the middle of the war, and enforce it relentlessly for the 
remaining two years, and we shall doubtless have to 
do the same if we are ever again engaged in a war last- 
ing more than two years. A conscription law will be 
no more odious, if it contains these salutary provisions 
which have received the approval of our greatest soldiers. 1 
comparison It must be noted that there was a great improvement 

wars € in the Civil War over any previous war in the relation of 

the number of troops in the field at any one time to the 
total number of enlistments. We have seen that in the 

1 In a series of marginal notes made by General Sherman on an article 
by the author, published in Journal of the Military Service Institution in 
1883, he says: "There is no doubt that reinforcing by new regiments was 
bad in every sense, and that recruits should be sent to old regiments." 
The same opinion was more than once expressed by General Grant and by 
General Sheridan in conversations with the author. See also Sherman's 
Memoirs, Vol. II, 388: "I believe that 500 new men added to an old 
and experienced regiment were more valuable than 1,000 men in the form 
of a new regiment, for the former, by association with good, experienced 
captains, lieutenants and non-commissioned officers, soon became veterans, 
whereas the latter were generally unavailable for a year." 



GRADUAL GROWTH OF THE REGULAR ARMY 311 

Revolution and the War of 1812 this ratio was one in 1865 
twenty, and in the war with Mexico, one in six; in the 
War of the Rebellion it was one in four. The enlistments 
were 2,778,304; l in May, 1864, there were 970,710 in 
service, of which 662,345 2 were present for duty, in the 
field. 

The return of the volunteer army to the occupations Disbarment 
of peace has no parallel in history. The muster out tUr Army" 1 ' 
began within three weeks of Lee's surrender, and by 
August, 1865, 640,806 had been discharged; by Novem- 
ber, 800,963; by January, 1866, 918,722; by November, 
1866, 1,023,021." 

The regular army had an authorized strength in April, 18S6 
1865, 4 of 47,806. It was reorganized 5 so as to consist of July 2s 

10 regiments of cavalry; 

5 regiments of artillery; 

41 regiments of infantry; 

4 regiments of veteran reserves ; 
1 battalion of engineers; 

and the various staff corps. The total authorized 
strength was 80,258, but the actual strength was 54,581 . 6 
In 1869 7 the infantry regiments were reduced from 45 1869 
to 25, bringing down the authorized strength to 55,618 March 3 
and the actual strength to 37,383. 8 

In 1870 the number of enlisted men was reduced to Reorganiza- 
30,000, and in 1874 to 25,000. 9 There were no changes A?my Uhe 
of any importance in the organization or strength of i87o 
the army until the war with Spain, twenty-four years July is 
later. 

1 War Records, 3, IV, 1269. J Ibid., 3, V, 497. 

3 Ibid., 3, V, 517, 1012. * Army Register, 18G5, 106a. 

5 Array Register, 1867, 144a. 6 Army Register, 1866, 150c. 
7 Mil. Laws, 1907, 540. 8 Army Register, 1869, 235a. 
9 Mil. Laws, 1907, 187; Burnside, 102. 



Report 



312 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 

1874 During the years 1874 to 1878 the question of the 

June 17 permanent organization of the army was studied by 

successive committees of Congress; and a large amount 
of testimony was taken which, however, resulted in no 
legislation except the reduction to 25,000 men. In 
1878 a committee was formed of three senators and five 
representatives, to whom was referred "the whole sub- 
ject-matter of reform and reorganization of the army." 
1878 The report of this committee 1 is a veritable mine of in- 
Dee, is formation on every essential fact connected with the 
history of the army during the preceding 100 years. 
General Burnside, then senator from Rhode Island, 
Bumside was its chairman. All of its members had served in 
the Civil War, one of them (Senator M. C. Butler, of 
South Carolina) as a major-general in the Confederate 
army. General Garfield, then leader in the House of 
Representatives, and soon afterward President, contrib- 
uted two very thoughtful and instructive papers for its 
consideration. Prominent survivors of the Civil War, 
Hancock, McDowell, McClellan, Terry, Pope, Ord, Hazen, 
Hunt and others, were called upon to submit their views 
accompanied by a draft of a bill to carry them into 
effect. The chiefs of staff departments, Humphreys, 
Meigs, Townsend, Benet, Marcy, Alvord and McFeely, 
contributed exhaustive histories of their several depart- 
ments and recommendations as to their proper organiza- 
tion and their relations to the Secretary of War and the 
commanding general. Most important of all, General 
Sherman, then general-in-chief, submitted a history of 
the army from 1776 to 1876, accompanied by elaborate 
statistical data, extracts from the writings of Wash- 
ington and the reports of Knox, Dearborn, Calhoun, 

1 45th Cong., 3d Sess., Senate report, 555. 



GRADUAL GROWTH OF THE REGULAR ARMY 313 

Cass and other secretaries of war, and of committees of 1878 

Congress; and finally his own matured views as to our 

military policy and the proper organization of the army 

to carry it into effect. At that time General Emory 

Upton, one of the brilliant group of officers who attained 

the rank and command of a major-general within a few 

years of graduation from West Point in 1861, had just 

returned from a trip around the world, undertaken for 

the purpose of studying foreign military systems, and 

had written his book on "The Armies of Asia and Europe," 

to which the committee gave full consideration. He 

was then engaged upon his "Military Policy of the Upton's" mm. 

United States," which was not published until Mr. Root 

was Secretary of War in 1904, but the voluminous data 

which it contains were available to the committee as well 

as his views upon the proper method of organizing our 

military strength, and the best system of tactics, or drill 

regulations. 

These two documents, the report of the Burnside Bumside 
committee in 1878 and Upton's book on military policy, epor 
contain an encyclopaedia of military information, ex- 
tracted from hundreds of volumes of state papers and 
other archives not readily accessible. Nowhere else is 
there to be found so much original information relating 
to the army condensed into such comparatively small 
space. Full use has been made of these volumes in pre- 
paring this chapter, and I desire to express my grateful 
acknowledgment of them and to refer all students to 
them for fuller details. 

The bill 1 which the committee reported followed the 
recommendations of the distinguished soldiers who had 
given the committee their advice, in certain essential 

1 Burnside, 1. 



314 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 



1878 



Report not 
Adopted 



Lack of 
Popular 
Interest 



features, as to which these latter were substantially in 
accord, viz., a regiment of three battalions in each of the 
arms, infantry, artillery and cavalry; the staff depart- 
ments, instead of being officered by permanent appoint- 
ments, were to be filled by detail of officers from the line, 
who would return to the line after the expiration of their 
detail, thus giving to line officers a knowledge of staff 
duties and to staff officers familiarity with the needs of 
the army. The number of enlisted men in a company 
was to vary according to the exigencies of the services as 
determined by the President, subject to appropriations 
by Congress, thus providing a flexible system with small 
companies in time of peace capable of immediate and 
large expansion in time of war; and there was to be a 
"general staff," of somewhat limited functions, such as 
those hitherto performed by the adjutant-general's and 
inspector-general's departments. 

These wise provisions, and others, were enacted into 
law more than twenty years later. The Burnside bill 
of 1878 failed to pass, and the elaborate labors of the 
committee, based upon the experience and advice of the 
successful leaders in the greatest war of modern times, 
and upon a careful study of the military systems of 
Europe, apparently went for naught. The reason was 
not far to seek. There was no popular interest in the 
subject. Without that no measures can be enacted in 
this country. The discharged soldiers, North and South, 
more than 2,000,000 in number, and constituting about 
one in four of the entire voting population, were weary 
of the name of war; they were engaged in building up 
the industries of the country, in laying the foundations 
of that material development which in the succeeding 
thirty years has astonished the world ; they fondly hoped 



GRADUAL GROWTH OF THE REGULAR ARMY 315 

that we would never again be engaged in war. Many of 1878 
the statesmen of the period, discarding the lessons of 
history, did not hesitate to predict with entire confidence 
that there never would be another war in this country, 
that we should never have occasion to attack another 
nation, and no other nation would ever dare attack us. 
They could see no need for an army outside of a small 
force to protect the settlers against the Indians on the 
ever-advancing Western frontier. As to its organization 
they were indifferent, considering it a matter of very 
minor importance as compared with the development 
of railways, the silver question, the Chinese problem, the 
disfranchisement of the negroes and other public ques- 
tions then pressing for solution. 

The final effort of the Burnside committee, the cul- 
mination of more than twelve years' discussion about 
the army, having resulted in no action, the subject was 
dropped. The only point upon which the legislators, 
representing public opinion as they always do, were 
agreed was that the army should not exceed 25,000 l men 
in numbers, and this was inserted as a proviso in the 
appropriation bill, re-enacted in succeeding years and 
then incorporated in the "Revised Statutes," as the per- 
manent law. 

Twenty years later war came suddenly and almost 1898 
out of a clear sky, although its cause — the discontent of The war 
Cuba under Spanish rule — had been in existence for two 
generations and had more than once brought our rela- 
tions with Spain close to the breaking-point. The gen- 
eration of the Civil War had practically passed away, its 
passions had been largely forgotten, there were new 
leaders in Congress, new men coming to the front in the 
1 Mil. Laws, 1907, 187; Rev. Stat, of 1S78. 



with Spain 



316 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 

1898 army. Its faithful service under great hardship, its suc- 
cess in settling the Indian question, the aid it had ren- 
dered in building up the Great West, its thorough effi- 
ciency and the studious attainments of its officers had 
made for it a host of friends which it had never possessed 
at the outbreak of any previous war. When the law for 
raising troops to carry on the war came up in Congress, 

April 22 the latter did not hesitate to declare 1 that "The regular 

army is the permanent military establishment, which is 
maintained both in peace and war according to law." 
The law further provided that "The volunteer army 
shall be maintained only during the existence of war, or 
while war is imminent . . . that all enlistments for the 
volunteer army shall be for a term of two years, unless 
sooner terminated, and that all officers and men com- 

war with posing said army shall be discharged from the service of 
the United States when the purposes for which they were 
called into service shall have, been accomplished, or on 
the conclusion of hostilities." 

March 8 This and other laws 2 expanded the enlisted strength 

April 26 from 25,000 to 63,116, by adding 2 regiments of artil- 

lery, making all regiments to consist of 3 battalions 
and 12 companies, and the companies to have 106 en- 
listed men in the infantry, 200 in the heavy artillery, 
173 in the light artillery and 100 in the cavalry. 

April 20 In the joint resolution 3 which demanded that Spain 

relinquish its government of Cuba, the President was 
"directed and empowered to use the entire land and 
naval forces of the United States and to call into the 
actual service of the United States the militia of the 
several States, to such extent as may be necessary to 
carry these resolutions into effect." This was substan- 

1 Mil. Laws, 1907, 184. 2 Sec. War, 1898, 1, 252-262. 3 Ibid. 



GRADUAL GROWTH OF THE REGULAR ARMY 317 

tially according to precedent in previous wars. In the 1898 
law passed two days later there was a more specific war with 
direction 1 and one entirely novel: "When it becomes 
necessary to raise a volunteer army, the President shall 
issue his proclamation stating the number of men de- 
sired, within such limits as may be fixed by law." The 
law then specified in detail how such volunteers were to 
be organized. It also authorized another novelty, the 
raising of volunteer troops, " possessing special qualifica- 
tions," not from the States but "from the nation at large," 
not exceeding 3,000 men in all, the officers to be ap- 
pointed under "regulations to be prescribed by the 
Secretary of War." A little later this was expanded so May n 
as to provide for "a volunteer brigade of engineers from 
the nation at large," and "an additional volunteer force 
of not exceeding 10,000 enlisted men possessing immu- 
nity from disease incidental to tropical climates," the 
officers of these troops to be appointed by the President 
and not by the governors of States. The President's 
first call for volunteers was for 125,000 men, and in April 23 
order to be sure of getting enough men while the en- 
thusiasm was still warm, this was followed by a second May 25 
call 3 for 75,000 men. 

The President of the United States, William McKinley, 
had in his youth trudged through the long marches and 
fought in many battles of the Civil War; the Secretary 
of War, R. A. Alger, had also served in the same war; 
the adjutant-general, Henry C. Corbin, had not only had 
the same experience, but was a man of rare executive and 
administrative ability and of tireless energy. They used Mistakes of 

i-i . ,. ~ Civil War not 

their utmost efforts, and with success, in persuading ton- Repeated 
gress so to legislate that the mistakes of the Civil War 
1 Mil. Laws, 1907, 192. 2 Sec. War., 1898, I, 259. 



318 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 

1898 and our previous wars might not be repeated. It will be 
noticed that there was no limit except the President's 
discretion to the number of men to be called for; that 
national volunteers, officered by the President under 
regulations prescribing examinations as to their military 
qualifications, were provided for. Therefore, when the 
second call for volunteers was made, the rule was estab- 
lished and rigidly enforced that the recruits should be 
sent to fill up existing regiments from every State, and 
no new regiments were formed until this had been 
done. 

The laws passed and the regulations established for 
carrying them into effect in 1898 are models for similar 
occasions hereafter. It should be noted, however, that 
the able-bodied population was then about 13,000,000, 
and the number of men called for, about 250,000, was 
only one in fifty, instead of one in two as in the Civil War. 
It may be a question whether the principles established 
in 1898 can be carried out in a war making such a de- 
mand on our military strength as did the Civil War. 
There seems to be no ground to doubt that they can be, 
if the number of volunteers in the first call is sufficiently 
large, and if, in case volunteers do not respond, the con- 
scription is immediately applied. 

prompt There was no such difficulty in 1898. The number 

called for was ample, and the response was instantaneous, 
not only for the volunteer but also for the regular army. 
Within a month the regulars were increased to 44,125, 
and the volunteers to 124,804; within ninety days, 
regulars to 56,258 and volunteers to 212,094/ These 

war with troops were all organized, armed, equipped and in the 
field within the dates named. When the peace protocol 

1 Sec. War, 1898, I, 257, 260. 



Organization 



Spain 



GRADUAL GROWTH OF THE REGULAR ARMY 319 

was signed, on August 12, recruiting was stopped; there i8S8 
were then 274,717 men in the field, of which approxi- 
mately 59,000 were regulars, 16,000 United States vol- 
unteers, and 200,000 State volunteers. The army had 
numbered only 28,183 l on April 1. The number of Span- 
ish regular troops surrendered at Santiago was 13,006 
and at Manila about 13,500; 15,000 were dispersed at 
Santiago, and over 70,000 2 were sent home from Ha- 
vana as a result of the Santiago campaign. To have 
increased our military force by 1,000 per cent, and to 
have defeated, captured or dispersed the armies op- 
posed to us — all within a period of about four months 
— shows what can be accomplished with our latent 
military strength when it is judiciously applied. 

While the ratification of the treaty of peace with Spain 
was pending the insurrection broke out in the Philippines. 
Under the law the ratification of the treaty required the A P ru 22 
reduction of the regular army to its previous strength of 
about 28,000 men and the discharge of the entire vol- 
unteer force. This was done. Congress then enacted 1899 
that the regular army might be maintained at not ex- March 2 
ceeding 65,000 3 men, and that 35,000 volunteers should 
be raised " from the country at large." These new troops 1898 
were raised in the course of a few months, and all the National 

Volunteers 

volunteers and a large part of the regulars sent to the 
Philippines. The field officers were selected from the 
regular army on their efficiency records, and the com- 
pany officers were chosen, under rigid examination as to 
their service and qualifications, solely from those who 
had served in the war against Spain. These volunteers 
took their part side by side with the regulars in suppress- 

»Sec. War, 1898, I, 253-260. 2 Sargent, Campaign of Santiago, III, 1. 
3 Mil. Laws, 1907, 190, 200. 



320 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 



1839 

Philippine 
Insurrection 



Elihu Root as 
Secretary of 
War 



ing the Philippine insurrection. That they were the 
most efficient, the best disciplined and most thoroughly 
trained volunteers that were ever mustered into our 
service is generally conceded. The individuals had the 
same excellent qualities as the volunteers of the Civil 
War, but these " volunteers from the nation at large" 
were organized on a system immensely superior. It is 
not likely that this experience will be forgotten the next 
time there is occasion to call for volunteers. It is true 
that at the outbreak of the Civil War we discarded the 
experience of our previous wars and repeated the same 
mistakes. No other system had then ever been tried 
and proved. Now that a better system has been actually 
used, and the precedent established, it is probable that 
we shall adhere to it in similar emergencies hereafter. 

The organized force of insurgents was defeated and 
dispersed by midsummer of 1900; a guerilla warfare con- 
tinued for nearly a year longer, but practically ceased 
with the capture of Aguinaldo in March, 1901. Under 
the law 1 the army was to be reduced in strength to what 
it had been prior to April, 1898, and all the volunteers 
were to be discharged prior to July 1, 1901. 

In the meantime, in August, 1899, Elihu Root had 
become Secretary of War. During the five years of his 
administration the army obtained those measures of re- 
form and advancement for which its chief officers had 
been begging in vain for three generations; and the coun- 
try at last saw its military establishment placed on a 
footing for which a few of its most far-sighted states- 
men, Washington, Calhoun, Cass and others, had argued, 
equally without success. Congress finally adopted these 
measures chiefly in consequence of four successive annual 

1 Mil. Laws, 1907, 190. 



GRADUAL GROWTH OF THE REGULAR ARMY 321 

reports, 1899 to 1902 inclusive, 1 of the Secretary of War, 1899 
which for clearness of thought, brevity and lucidity of 
statement, have probably never been excelled in our state 
papers. Mr. Root had never had any military training 
or experience, even in a militia company; but he sur- 
rounded himself with the best military advisers, officers 
fresh from the experience of Cuba, the Philippines and 
China, and thoroughly familiar with our military his- 
tory and the defects of our military system in the past. 
Having absorbed their ideas, weighed them and clarified 
them, rejecting some and accepting others, he then pre- 
sented the subject to Congress in documents which read 
like the arguments in a great cause before the Supreme 
Court of the United States. 

It fell to Mr. Root's lot to. formulate and put into 1901 
operation a permanent scheme of government for the 
Philippines and for Porto Rico, and a temporary govern- 
ment for Cuba, which was followed by evacuation on 
conditions which provided for our intervention in case 
of mishap (which happened within a few years), all in 
accordance with a general plan of which the outlines 
only had been suggested by President McKinley. The 
organization of this civil government was constructive 
statesmanship of the highest order, and the instruments 
for carrying his plans into effect were the officers and men 
of the army. Simultaneously with the development and 
solution of these insular problems, he took up the needs 
of the army and secured, between 1901 and 1903, the 
reorganization of the army, the formation of the general 
staff and the establishment of a "well-regulated" militia. 
He obtained the necessary appropriations for completing 
and arming our sea-coast fortifications, the construction projects 

1 Sec. War, 1899-1903, 328-352. 



1903 



322 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 

1903 of which had begun in 1888; he amplified and system- 
atized the plan of education at the schools for infantry, 
cavalry and light artillery which had been established 
by Generals Sherman and Sheridan several years before, 
and enlarged the scope of instruction at the pre-existing 
schools for the heavy artillery and engineers; he founded 
the War College at Washington for advanced instruction 
of a limited number of officers; and finally, he organized 
the Army Medical School. He persuaded Congress to 
appropriate nearly $7,000,000 to rebuild and enlarge the 
historic Military Academy at West Point, but for whose 
existence during three-quarters of the nineteenth century 
the military art in this country would have been lost; 
and he procured an increase in the number of cadets 
from 384 to 481. 

The arguments in the annual reports, by which these re- 
sults were accomplished, are themselves so condensed that 
any summary of them is impossible. The key-note is the 
proposition, in the report for 1899, "that the real object of 
having an army is to provide for war" — a truism which 
singularly enough had been disregarded for many years. 

Reorganization With this object in view it was provided ' that the 
army should consist of 30 regiments of infantry, 15 of 

Feb. 2 cavalry, 1 of engineers, a corps of artillery (of size equal 

to 13 regiments) and the staff departments. The artil- 
lery was divided into two branches, the coast artillery 
and the field artillery, with a chief of artillery in charge 
of both. 2 The number of officers was fixed at 3,996 3 

1 Mil. Laws, 1907, 1048. 

2 By the act of January 25, 1907, the field artillery was transferred to 
the line of the army and organized into six regiments; the coast artillery 
became a corps, under its chief, charged with the care and use of coast 
fortifications, including torpedoes and submarine mines. 

3 Mil. Laws, 1907, 1048-1060. 



GRADUAL GROWTH OF THE REGULAR ARMY 323 

and the enlisted strength was left to the discretion of 1903 
the President, between 60 ; 000 and 100,000. The ad- 
vantage and economy of this flexible system have been 
fully utilized by successive executive orders, fixing the 
enlisted strength according to the necessities of the year 
and the appropriations of Congress; it has varied from 
59,866 to 78,782.* 

As to the staff departments, it was provided 2 that 
when a vacancy occurred in the position of chief of the 
corps or department, it should be filled by detail of any 
officer in the army, not below the rank of lieutenant- 
colonel, for a period of four years; and as to the other 
officers, those then holding permanent appointments were 
to retain them and be promoted according to seniority, 
but as vacancies occurred, they were to be filled by de- 
tails from the line, for a period of four years, under such 
system of examination as the President should prescribe. 
From these provisions the engineer, judge-advocate and 
medical departments, for obvious reasons, were excepted ; 
but as to all others the rule of details and consequent 
interchangeability of service in the staff and line was to 
prevail. The system has now been in operation for 
nearly ten years, more than fifty per cent of the officers 
in the seven other staff departments are detailed from 
the line and several hundred officers have already served 
their detail in the staff and returned to the line. The 
eternal bickering and mutual complaints between the 
staff and line which filled the air for thirty years prior 
to the passage of this law are no longer heard. The 
army is a homogeneous body, each part understanding 
and in touch with the others. 

The law also provided for the organization of battalions, 

1 Army Registers, 1903-1910, 2 Mil. Laws, 1907, 10G1. 



324 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 

1903 of which there are now seven, of Philippine scouts, with 
majors and captains detailed from the army and lieu- 
tenants appointed from officers and enlisted men who 
had served in the war with Spain; also for a Porto Rico 
regiment, with field officers detailed from the army and 
captains and lieutenants appointed from veterans of the 
war with Spain or citizens of Porto Rico — the latter for 
four years, but with provision for reappointment and pro- 
motion if found qualified. There are now ten native 
officers in this regiment. 

Feb. 14 The establishment of the general staff is a landmark in 

our military history. Its purpose was to prevent the 
recurrence of such confusion in the transport and supply 
departments as had accomplished the assembling of 
troops at Tampa in 1898, which was then fresh in the 
public mind but was by no means unprecedented. The 
law 1 provided for the selection by the President of one of 
the general officers, to be called chief of staff, and 4 
colonels, 6 lieutenant-colonels, 12 majors and 20 cap- 
tains, all for the period of four years, unless sooner re- 
lieved. The chief of artillery was to be an additional 
member of the staff. 

General staff The duties of the general staff are briefly but clearly 
defined in the law: 2 "To prepare plans for the national 
defence and for the mobilization of the military forces in 
time of war; to investigate and report upon all questions 
affecting the efficiency of the army and its state of prep- 
aration for military operations; to render professional 
aid and assistance to the Secretary of War and to general 
officers and other superior commanders, and to act as 
their agents in informing and co-ordinating the action of 
all the different officers who are subject under the terms 
1 Mil. Laws, 1907, 1290. 2 Ibid., 1907, 1291. 



GRADUAL GROWTH OF THE REGULAR ARMY 325 

of this act to the supervision of the chief of staff; and 1903 
to perform such other military duties not otherwise as- 
signed by law as may be from time to time prescribed by 
the President." The officers " subject to the supervision 
of the chief of staff" are those of all troops of the line 
and of the ten different staff departments — the entire 
army, in fact. The chief of staff is also required to per- 
form such duties as hitherto had been assigned by law 
to the commanding general of the army. They were 
only two in number, membership in the Board of Forti- 
fications and the commissioners of the Soldiers' Home. 
The anomaly of a commanding general in time of peace 
attempting to exercise actual command, whereas the 
Constitution makes the President commander-in-chief 
and the statute designates the Secretary of War as his 
agent, thus disappeared, and with it the cause of endless 
misunderstanding and resulting inefficiency. It was suc- 
ceeded by an efficient system under which one of the 
generals is selected as chief military adviser to the Presi- 
dent and holds the position at the pleasure of the latter. 
The merit of this law was soon tested. In September, 
1906, it became necessary 1 to send a force of 6,000 men 
to intervene in Cuba. Plans for such a contingency had 
been prepared long in advance. They were carried out 
with the smoothness and regularity of a drill on parade. 
The contrast to the confusion, extravagance and lack 
of efficiency in previous movements of our troops in an 
emergency was most striking. 2 

Report War Dept., House Documents, Vol. 2, 1906, 458-459. 

2 While these pages are going through the press a still larger movement 
has been carried out ; 20,000 men have been concentrated in Texas, with- 
out previous notice, in a period of nine days. Detailed reports are as yet 
lacking, but apparently the operation has shown great efficiency on the 
part of the general staff. 



326 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 

1903 It is the business of the general staff to be prepared 

for similar contingencies, which to the general public 
seem unexpected and improbable. All the world knows 
what the general staff did for Prussia in 1870. Our 
own general staff differs from that of the European armies 
in many particulars, but it is believed that it is adapted 
to our own requirements and will perform equally valuable 
service for us if a similar contingency should arise. 

Of its many but important minor duties it is impossible 
to speak here in detail. They are fully set forth in regu- 
lations 1 prepared by Mr. Root under date of August 3, 
1903. 

jimtia Actof The law 2 "to promote the efficiency of the militia" 
directed that the organization, armament and discipline 

Jan. 21 of the militia should be the same as in the regular army, 

and provided the funds to make this effective. For the 
first time in all our history the militia now has the same 
arms, equipment, uniforms and drill as the regular army, 
and is equipped with tents, cooking apparatus and other 
material necessary to take the field at a moment's notice. 
The law further authorized the President in time of war 
or other specified emergency to call forth any part of the 
militia for a period not exceeding nine months; and he 
is not required to call upon the governor of a State, but 
he may " issue his orders for that purpose to such officers 
of the militia as he may think proper." Every officer 
and enlisted man thus called forth shall be mustered into 
the service of the United States, and for failure to present 
himself for such muster there are heavy penalties. In 
other words, when the emergency arises, the President 
may order any colonel to report on a fixed date with his 
regiment, and all its arms and equipment (which remain 

1 Sec. War, 1899-1903, 483. 2 Mil. Laws, 1907, 1249. 



GRADUAL GROWTH OF THE REGULAR ARMY 327 

at all times the property of the United States), to a mus- 1903 
tering officer, and forthwith that regiment becomes a 
part of the volunteer army, as defined and provided for 
in the law of 1898. 

The militia law 1 also requires a certain number of 
drills every year, provides for annual encampments and 
manoeuvres in conjunction with regular troops, author- 
izes the detail of officers of the army for duty with it, 
affords safeguards for the issue and proper care of the 
arms and other property of the United States which are 
furnished to it and permits the attendance of any of its 
officers at any of the army schools, except West Point, 
with a view to their becoming officers of the army. 

Encampments and joint manoeuvres have been held MmtiaActof 
under this law every year since 1904, with manifest ad- 
vantage not alone to the militia but also to the army. 

The law goes to the utmost limit in carrying out 
the constitutional requirement of a well-regulated militia. 
Its only danger is that it may have gone so far as to 
discourage recruiting in the organized militia, commonly 
called the National Guard, the strength of which is about 
120,000 men. Officers of the army as well as the general 
public are apt to forget the full significance of the fact 
that the National Guard receives no pay, that its only 
material compensation is exemption from jury duty, 
that its drills are habitually carried on at night after the 
day's work is over, that all its members are engaged in 
other avocations in which they gain their living, and 
that their military duties are necessarily subordinate 
to the chief occupation of their lives. All that the ser- 
vice has to offer them is the occasional use of armories 
for athletic or social purposes, the physical advantages 
1 Mil. Laws, 1907, 1249-1250. 



1903 



328 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 

1903 of military drill, the pleasure of handling fire-arms and 
becoming proficient in their use and the applause of the 
Miiitia Act of public at parades. As against this they are liable to be 
called away from their families, and their business, per- 
haps losing their employment, as many did in 1898, on the 
President's order for service for any period not exceeding 
their term of enlistment and at any point within or with- 
out the United States. To remedy this it has been sug- 
gested that service in the militia be paid. But this is of 
doubtful expediency, for many of the best and oldest 
regiments in the National Guard have existed for several 
generations solely from pride and esprit-de-corps. To 
convert them into paid organizations would be to destroy 
their traditions and change the whole character of their 
personnel. 

It probably will work out in practice that in the sea- 
coast cities, where about one-half of the older National 
Guard regiments are to be found, they will prove to be 
a most satisfactory support to the coast artillery. Even 
with the present organization of the army we have less 
than half the number of instructed men necessary to 
man the guns already in position. To serve in the forts 
at the guns, or to be stationed near the forts to defend 
them from a land attack, will not take the men far from 
their homes. Already several of the National Guard or- 
ganizations have been changed from infantry regiments 
to coast artillery companies. They have their designated 
stations at certain of the ten-inch or twelve-inch guns 
in a fort within a few hours' ride by trolley-car or boat 
from their armories, and they have been drilling at these 
identical guns eveiy summer for several years. That 
fort and their particular gun are as familiar to them 
as their own armories. That they could render ad- 



GRADUAL GROWTH OF THE REGULAR ARMY 329 

mirable service there in time of war does not admit of 1903 
doubt. 

The other half of the National Guard, located at points 
distant from the seaboard, would probably respond to 
an order for active service with less loss than the regi- 
ments in the larger cities. It is equipped as infantry, 
and except in case of extraordinary emergency would 
probably not be kept away from its home, involuntarily, 
for any great length of time. 

The scheme formulated in Mr. Root's report for 1902 * Mr. Root's 

. , Plan 

embraced 

1. A regular army of from 60,000 to 100,000 men; 

2. A militia, trained and fully armed and equipped 
and subject to the President's order, of from 120,000 to 
150,000 men; 

3. A first volunteer reserve, composed of such portions 
of the organized militia as might volunteer for a longer 
period than nine months; 

4. A second volunteer reserve, composed of officers 
and men who have had previous military service ; 

5. Volunteers organized by the States, as in, the Civil 
War. 

He estimated the number available for immediate ac- 
tion, in the first four classes at 250,000 to 300,000 men, 
and stated that the number of the fifth class "has no 
limit, except the possibility of transportation and sup- 
ply." 

No legislation has yet been enacted in regard to the 
three classes of volunteers above referred to, although an 
act has been drafted 2 under the direction of the general 
staff, and has been pending in Congress since 1909. This 

1 Sec. War, 1899-1903, 286. 

2 61st Congress, 2d Session, Senate bill 4003. 



330 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 

1903 act is intended to provide in advance for the organiza- 
tion of the volunteer army, so that when war is imminent 
it would only be necessary for the President to state in his 
proclamation the number of men desired in each arm or 
corps. The act provides how they shall be organized 
and how many general and staff officers shall be ap- 
pointed in proportion to the number of men called for. 
Briefly, the law contains the following essential provisions, 
viz., the period of service is to be for the war, unless 
sooner discharged; all officers of every grade are to be 
appointed by the President; the men received into ser- 
vice are to be taken as far as practicable from the several 
States and Territories in proportion to population; the 
organization, arms and equipment are to be identical 
with those in the regular army; all volunteer organiza- 
tions are to be maintained as nearly as possible at their 
maximum strength by means of recruiting depots es- 
tablished for that purpose; regular officers are to be 
assigned to all organizations not exceeding five to one 
regiment; and officers and men in the volunteer army 
are to be on the same footing as those in the regular 
service. 

That these provisions are justified and demanded by 
our experience in previous wars does not admit of doubt, 
from the professional military stand-point. It is equally 
true that they run counter to various political considera- 
tions and to many deep-seated prejudices in favor of 
rights previously exercised by the governors of States. 
Whether these latter can be overcome to the extent 
necessary to enact these laws remains to be seen, 
system of One other question, brought forward by Mr. Root in 

his first report of 1899, 1 is still pending in Congress; that 

1 Sec. War, 1899-1903, 61. 



Promotion 



GRADUAL GROWTH OF THE REGULAR ARMY 331 

is, the system of promotion. In every other military ser- 1903 
vice in the world, and in every great corporate organi- 
zation employing large bodies of men, the promotion of 
officers is based on relative merit and fitness determined 
by some specified board or other agency. In our army, 
below the grade of general officers, promotion is deter- 
mined solely by seniority. Mr. Root proposed that one 
vacancy in three should be filled by selection under care- 
fully guarded regulations so as to prevent favoritism. 
The great majority of officers opposed this so vigorously 
that for eleven years they have defeated it. As an alter- 
native proposition the general staff has drafted a law, 
which has been pending in Congress for two years, based 
upon the principle of " elimination." If vacancies are 
less than a certain number in any grade during a certain 
number of years, then a definite number of officers in that 
grade are to be eliminated by retirement, the selections 
for elimination to be made by a board of officers under 
proper regulations. Such a measure would stimulate 
promotion, but would not accomplish the purpose of 
selecting the best men for command. When war comes 
and men's lives depend every day and every hour on the 
skill of the officers in command, then the rule of strict 
seniority is thrown to the wind; the purpose then is to 
select the best man, and no claim of vested right to pro- 
motion is considered or tolerated. The same principles 
should apply when, in time of peace, the army is prepar- 
ing for war. 

This chapter has already exceeded its intended length, summary 
and it only remains to summarize it. It has been my 
endeavor to show that our forefathers were imbued with 
an intense prejudice against a standing army in time of 



332 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 

1903 peace and a supreme reliance upon untrained militia; 
that these prejudices resulted in enormous waste, ex- 
travagance and inefficiency in the Revolution and the 
War of 1812, and to a minor extent in the Mexican War, 
the Civil War and the war with Spain; that neverthe- 
less a standing army was found to be necessary and has 
existed since the First Congress, gradually increasing in 
numbers and efficiency, and slowly, step by step, gain- 
ing the confidence of the people; that the strength of 
the army has varied from 50 to 120 per 100,000 of the 
population, or from 1 per cent to 2J per cent of the 
"able-bodied male population," and its annual cost, ex- 
clusive of pensions, has been less than 1 per cent of our 
national wealth; and that finally, in this 135th year of 
our independence, we have an efficient army, and a 
militia with uniform arms, equipment, organization and 
drill, both respectable in numbers, though small as 
modern armies are counted, and both subject to the 
instant call of the President. We have built proper 
fortifications on our sea-coasts and have placed in them 
a reasonable number of modern high-powered guns. 

More progress has been made in the improvement of 
our army during the last ten years than in all its pre- 
vious history. The war with Spain, so brief in point of 
time, so slight as regards loss of life, has changed com- 
pletely our relations to the rest of the world. It has 
brought us into close touch and sharp competition with 
the nations of Europe on one side and of Asia on the 
other; and with this competition the prospect of foreign 
war, which thirty years ago seemed so remote as to be 
negligible, is now a contingency that must be kept always 
in mind. Abuse of a disciplined regular army and praise 
of a patriotic untrained militia are no longer the popular 



GRADUAL GROWTH OF THE REGULAR ARMY 333 

cries with which demagogues in politics strive to catch 1903 
votes. Measures to improve the efficiency of the army 
and to put the country in a proper state of defence and 
keep it so are no longer approved in the abstract and 
neglected in the concrete, but they receive the serious 
consideration of Congress, and this consideration leads to 
actual legislation. 

Our military policy still remains, and is likely to remain, 
somewhat different from that of the nations of Europe. 
Enormous armies, conscription and universal military 
service seem not to be necessary with us. We still rely 
upon voluntary service; but universal liability to ser- 
vice is the law of the land, and conscription is in the 
background if volunteers are not sufficient. Above all, 
public opinion is beginning to appreciate the fact that 
untrained patriotism is not sufficient and that our chief 
reliance must be upon a military force trained in advance 
in time of peace for the immensely complex problems of 
war. 

It would be a mistake on the part of our legislators to possibility 

of War 

attempt to blink or dodge the fact that among the con- 
ditions of our national life at the present time is the 
possibility of war with one or another great nation 
possessing a trained army of from 300,000 to 1,000,000 
men, with ample transport facilities for crossing the 
oceans which bound our coasts, and a powerful navy to 
protect such transports. If such a war comes, the attack 
on our coasts will probably precede the declaration of war. 
It is a fallacy to argue that these oceans isolate and 
protect us from other nations. That might have been 
true when Washington gave his wise advice against en- 
tangling alliances; 1 although England crossed the At- 

1 Sparks, XII, 231, 232. 



334 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 

1903 lantic with 30,000 men in 1776, the allies sent 60,000 
men through the Mediterranean in 1854 and we moved 
12,600 men across the Gulf of Mexico in 1847. In two 
of these expeditions the troops were carried in sailing 
ships, moving with uncertain speed, from 50 to 100 miles 
in a day, and each carrying from 200 to 250 soldiers. 
Now they would be carried in great steamers, with 3,000 
to 5,000 troops on each, travelling at a certain speed of 
400 miles or more every day. More than one great na- 
tion can assemble and embark an army much larger 
than our own in 10 days and cross the Atlantic in 10 
days more, or the Pacific in 20 days. While our prin- 
cipal cities are protected by modern fortifications, yet 
there are long stretches of beach and several harbors on 
both coasts where a landing is feasible unless we have a 
mobile army strong enough to prevent it. 

These are not theories, but the actual conditions 
which confront us in this twentieth century. That we 
should ultimately prevail in any such contest, owing to 
our enormous resources, our mechanical ingenuity, our 
fertility in expedients and, above all, the dominant 
character of our race, seems probable — unless our race 
is decadent, and if that be true then we shall perish. 
The race which came out victorious from the Civil 
War will not probably be subdued; but if it wins 
it will be at the end of a sacrifice which cannot be 
measured. 

Such a contingency is among the possibilities under 
any circumstances; it goes with the conditions of our 
national life. If we are not prepared for it, it becomes 
not alone a probability but almost a certainty; for we 
are competing with all the world for the trade of the 
Orient and of South America, and we must so compete. 



GRADUAL GROWTH OF THE REGULAR ARMY 335 

If we abandon the competition our prosperity will come 1903 
to an end. It is not to be expected that we shall abandon 
it, but rather that the trade rivalry for foreign markets 
which has recently begun will rapidly increase in the 
next few years. In such rivalry the potential causes of 
war are numerous and frequent. 

The Venezuelan incident has shown that the ties which 
bind us to Great Britain are so strong that war with that 
country is improbable even under extreme provocation. 
But it is idle to deny that there are other nations which 
are jealous of our phenomenal growth. Their attitude 
toward us, however friendly it may have been in the 
past, is now by no means cordial, and at times seems like 
thinly veiled hostility. It is well to remember what 
Washington wrote in 1778 r 1 "It is a maxim, founded 
on the universal experience of mankind, that no nation 
is to be trusted further than it is bound by its interest; 
and no prudent statesman or politician will venture to 
depart from it." 

Some people say that the expression of such views inadequate 
provokes war. The teachings of history prove that this for war 
is not true, and that war comes to the nation that is not 
prepared for it. Especially is this true of a very rich 
nation, with abundant resources — unorganized. We have 
always been unprepared for war, and we have been at 
war one year in every seven since we declared our inde- 
pendence. We have a more efficient army and a more 
highly organized militia now than at any previous time 
in our history; but compared with the possibilities that 
confront us and the conditions which have resulted from 
the use of steam and electricity, we are about as unpre- 
pared now as at any previous time. 

'Sparks, VI, 110. 



336 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 

Necessity It would seem to be incumbent upon those who are 

Definite responsible for our national legislation to study these 

policy 7 facts, to forget the traditions which our Puritan and 

Cavalier ancestors brought over from England nearly 
three hundred years ago, to realize that what was wise 
in the days of the Stuart tyranny has no application in 
this twentieth century and to frame a military policy 
suited to the conditions under which we are now living. 



APPENDIX 

The Medical Department can justly claim an equal share 
with the Ordnance Department and the Corps of Engineers 
in the valuable contributions to the advancement of science 
made by the army in the last ninety years, and particularly 
since the Civil War. Among them is the suppression of 
yellow-fever in the tropics, which is solely due to the efforts 
of the army surgeons, one of whom lost his life in the process. 
Aside from the loss of life, the paralysis of business throughout 
the Mississippi Valley and the coast of the Gulf of Mexico, 
which was an incident to such epidemics as that of 1878 at 
Memphis, produced financial loss many times greater than 
the entire cost of the war with Spain and the resulting acqui- 
sition of the Philippines. From such financial losses and the 
appalling loss of life from yellow-fever, we are henceforth, 
apparently, immune. 

Moreover, it is reasonably certain that but for this great 
achievement of the Army Medical Corps and the sanitation 
introduced by Colonel Gorgas on the Isthmus, we should not 
have been able to construct the Panama Canal. Had we had 
such proportionate loss of life among the 45,000 or more 
laborers now working on the canal as attended the construc- 
tion, by a much smaller force, of the Panama Railroad from 
1849 to 1855 (where, as the phrase goes, a laborer was buried 
under every tie), or such loss of life as befell the French during 
their unsuccessful attempt to build the canal between 1883 
and 1892, there is little doubt that this would have created 
an adverse public sentiment sufficiently strong, when added to 
the sentiment against building the canal on other grounds, to 
have led to the abandonment of the entire project. 

337 



338 APPENDIX 

General Wood, chief of staff, has kindly caused to be pre- 
pared by Lieutenant-Colonel J. R. Kean, Medical Corps 
U. S. A., a condensed statement of the facts in regard to the 
suppression of yellow-fever and the connection of the mos- 
quito therewith. As the matter is one of world-wide im- 
portance, and has a distinct bearing on the enforcement of 
any military policy that the United States may decide upon, 
the statement is published in full, as follows: 

THE CONQUEST OF YELLOW-FEVER 

The military occupation of Cuba brought the army in con- 
frontation with yellow-fever, a foe which had before been de- 
structive to many invading expeditions in the Antilles and 
which at Santiago gave General Shafter's army a severe 
demonstration of its fatal and demoralizing power. Upon the 
recommendation of the surgeon-general, a commission was sent 
to Havana to study the question of its cause and prevention, a 
task upon which many distinguished scientists had labored in 
vain. Major Walter Reed, Surgeon, U. S. A., who was placed 
at its head, had recently overthrown the claim of the dis- 
tinguished bacteriologist, Sanarelli, to have discovered the 
bacillus of yellow-fever, by demonstrating that this organism 
was a common one in the United States and having no causa- 
tive relation to that disease. The other members of the com- 
mission were Acting Assistant Surgeons James Carroll, Jesse 
W. Lazear and A. Agramonte, the latter a Cuban by birth 
and the only member of the commission who had clinical 
experience with yellow-fever and was immune to it. The 
time was most opportune for such investigation, as the disease 
was at that time prevalent both in Havana and in the town 
of Marianao near the camp of the American troops, and it 
had become plainly evident that the energetic measures of 
the American military government to clean up the towns, 
disinfect and enforce other sanitary measures were without 
effect in preventing the spread of this mysterious disease. 



APPENDIX 339 

The transmission of malaria by a certain species of mos- 
quito had recently been demonstrated by the English military 
surgeon, Major Ronald Ross. Dr. Carlos Finlay, of Havana, 
had, since 1881, stoutly maintained that yellow-fever was a 
mosquito-borne disease and had fixed accurately upon the 
species which was responsible, but his numerous experiments 
had failed to demonstrate the truth of his hypothesis, and it 
therefore received no more attention or acceptance from the 
scientific world than the vast number of other theories which 
had at one time or another been advanced with regard to this 
peculiar and dreaded disease. Dr. H. R. Carter had observed 
that when a non-immune person went into an infected house 
he became sick in 5 days or less, but that 15 or 20 days elapsed 
before a house became infected after a patient sick with yellow- 
fever was carried into it and secondary cases appeared. Carter 
drew no inferences from this observation, but to Reed's mind it 
suggested that the difference between the period of incubation 
and that required to infect a building was due to the fact 
that the infective agent had to pass through a stage of devel- 
opment in some biting insect as an intermediate host, and 
he determined to investigate the mosquito theory of Finlay. 
The first attempts were tried secretly on Carroll and Lazear 
and other persons at the hospital of Columbia Barracks, but 
were failures owing to the same cause that had rendered neg- 
ative Finlay's numerous and intelligent experiments on human 
beings, namely, that two conditions have to be satisfied for 
the transmission of yellow-fever: the mosquito, in order to 
become infected, must bite a patient during the first three 
days of the disease, and, second, the insect must be kept at 
least twelve days before it can transmit the infection. Mean- 
while, during a temporary absence of Reed in the United States, 
mosquitoes in which both conditions were fulfilled were ap- 
plied to Dr. Carroll and to a cavalry soldier, both of whom 
came down with yellow-fever, Carroll's case being very severe. 
These cases convinced Reed, but they were not sufficient to 
convert the scientific world, and it was evident that a series 



340 APPENDIX 

of fully observed and controlled cases was necessary to con- 
firm and define the conditions of this momentous discovery. 
He went, therefore, to General Leonard Wood, the Military 
Governor of Cuba, to ask permission to conduct such danger- 
ous experiments on human beings and for a sum of money to 
reward volunteers who should offer themselves for this perilous 
experience. General Wood promptly granted both with a ready 
appreciation of the importance of the matter which entitles 
him to no small share of the glory of the discovery. Havana 
was at that time full of Spanish laborers who had come to 
Cuba seeking employment, and who all anticipated sooner 
or later an attack of yellow-fever, an expectation in which they 
were not usually deceived. It was found easy to induce these 
men to submit to the bite of infected mosquitoes, although 
the consequences were carefully explained to them. They 
concurred in the opinion of the board that their chances of 
recovery were far better with the skilful care and good nursing 
of an army hospital than if the disease were contracted in the 
usual way amid the squalor and neglect of their accustomed 
surroundings. American soldiers of the hospital corps also 
came forward in abundance, so that it was no longer necessary 
for other members of the commission to offer themselves for 
experiment. Lazear, however, the member who had charge 
of the infecting of the mosquitoes, was bitten while so doing in 
the yellow-fever hospital in Havana and died of malignant 
yellow-fever. In the fall of 1900, after Lazear's death, a camp 
named after him was established about a mile from Columbia 
Barracks for the conduct of a series of experiments which, 
by precision of detail and rigidness of control, would admit 
of no uncertainty of interpretation and would be a perfect 
demonstration carrying conviction to every scientific and un- 
prejudiced mind. Camp Lazear was established November 20 
and the subjects for experiment were kept there under rigid 
regulations to exclude infection in any way except experi- 
mentally. As soon as taken sick the cases were taken to the 
isolation hospital of the barracks. One building was con- 



APPENDIX 341 

structed for mosquito experiments. It was carefully screened 
and contained a large room entirely divided across its centre 
by a partition of wire gauze which permitted circulation of 
air but not the passage of mosquitoes. In one side of this 
screen infected mosquitoes were let loose, and the individuals 
who went into that side were bitten and infected. On the other 
side of the screen, breathing the same air, slept and lived 
non-immunes who remained uninfected. This demonstrated 
that the mosquito, not the air, carried the infection. At some 
distance away another building was constructed into which 
were carried bedclothes and shirts worn by yellow-fever 
patients, some even soiled with black vomit and other dis- 
charges. In this room, of which the air was kept warm and 
moist, slept and lived 6 non-immune American soldiers for 
periods of ten days each during a period of two months. 
Acting Assistant Surgeon R. P. Cook underwent this re- 
pulsive experience with the first 2 soldiers, and although they 
daily handled and even slept in this presumably infected cloth- 
ing, none of them contracted yellow-fever. Three of them 
afterward demonstrated their susceptibility by contracting 
the disease by the bites of infected mosquitoes. In these ex- 
periments 14 cases of yellow-fever were caused by infected 
mosquitoes of the genus Stegnomyia, 5 by injections of blood 
of patients in the first three days of their illness and 3 by in- 
jections of filtered blood serum, 22 cases in all, of which 15 
were Americans and 7 were Spaniards. No deaths occurred 
except that of Dr. Lazear above mentioned. In a series of 
10 experimental cases at Havana, however, conducted in 1901 
by Gorgas and. Guiteras, 3 proved fatal, 2 being Spaniards 
and 1 an American trained nurse, Miss Clara Louise Maas. 
These experiments demonstrated that 

1. Bacillus Idervides of Sanarelli does not cause yellow-fever. 

2. Yellow-fever is carried by the mosquito, genus Stegnomyia. 

3. That this mosquito cannot convey the disease until the 
twelfth day after biting the patient, and then retains the in- 
fective power for the rest of its life. 



342 APPENDIX 

4. Patients can transmit yellow-fever to the mosquito only 
during the first three days of the disease. 

5. Yellow-fever is not communicable by clothing, etc. 
Application was at once made of this knowledge by Major 

W. C. Gorgas, Health Officer of Havana, in February, 1901, 
and this dread disease was stamped out of Havana and Cuba 
for the first time in nearly two centuries. Between the years 
1853 and 1900 it has caused 35,952 deaths in the city of Havana 
alone. The application at the Isthmus of Panama of the 
same knowledge, together with the administrative methods 
worked out in Havana, has enabled Gorgas to make healthy one 
of the most pestilential countries in the world, and so make 
possible the construction of the Panama Canal. This same 
discovery has been applied with equal success in other centres 
of infection, such as Rio de Janeiro and Vera Cruz, so that 
there is now a good prospect of the extermination of this dis- 
ease in the western hemisphere. 

J. R. Kean, 
Lieutenant-Colonel, Medical Corps, U. S. A. 

BOOKS OF REFERENCE 

1. Dr. William Osier: "iEquanimitas" and other addresses. Pp. 118. 
P. Blakiston's Son & Co. 

2. Dr. Howard A. Kelly: "Walter Reed and Yellow Fever." McClure, 
Phillips & Co., New York. 

3. "Major Walter Reed and the Yellow Fever Commission." A com- 
pilation prepared by authority of the surgeon-general and published as a 
Senate Document. 

4. Major J. R. Kean: "The Scientific Work and Discoveries of the Late 
Major Walter Reed." Senate Doc. No. 118, 57th Congress, 2d Session. 

5. Also Senate Docs. No. 10, 59th Congress, 2d Session, and No. 520, 
Gist Congress, 2d Session. 



INDEX 



Abercrombey at Ticonderoga, 1758, 102. 

Adams, John, 14, 61, 99; endorses Gates, 
99. 

Adams, Samuel, 3; writes to Congress 
endorsing Gates, 99, 149. 

Agnew, General, mortally wounded, 92. 

Allen, Colonel Ethan, 6; captured and 
sent to England, 23, 102. 

Andre, Major, meets Arnold, 167; capt- 
ure of, 168; death of, 169. 

Anspach regiment sent by transports 
feared desertion, 141. 

Arbuthnot, Admiral, sails for Newport, 
173; with Clinton at Charleston, 208. 

Arnold, Benedict, 21, 22; plans to invade 
Canada, 22; arrives at Quebec, 24, 
25; wounded, 26; might have suc- 
ceeded, 27; defeated by Carleton, 
54; at Ridgefield, 80; defeats St. 
Leger, 108; joins Gates, 115; at- 
tacks Fraser, 116; in battle with- 
out command, 124; compared to 
Lee, 145; gets command at West 
Point, 166; meets Andre\ 167; es- 
capes to British ship, 168; subse- 
quent career of, 169; sent South to 
reinforce Cornwallis, 227. 

Ashe defeated at Briar Creek and court- 
martialled, 195. 

Augusta, siege of, 249. 

Balcarras, Earl, at Bemis' Heights, 124. 

Barren Hill, skirmish, 140. 

Baume, Lieutenant-Colonel, at Benning- 
ton, 110; warns Burgoyne, 111; 
death of, 113. 

Baxter, Colonel, 58; mortally wounded, 
59. 

Beaufort, action at, 193. 

Bennington, battle of, 113. 

Boston, besieged, 3; garrison of, 4; works 
completed, 5; evacuation of, 19. 

Boyd, Colonel, at Kettle Creek, 194. 

Brandywine, battle of, 85. 

Brant with St. Leger, 107. 

Breyman, Lieutenant-Colonel, at Ben- 
nington, 112-113; death of, 124. 

Briar Creek, battle of, 195. 

British army, 139, 163. 

British fleet, arrival at New York, 33. 

British plans for dividing the Colonies, 
182. 

Brown, Colonel, raids Burgoyne's com- 
munications, 119. 

Browne, Lieutenant-Colonel, defends Au- 
gusta, 250. 



Brunswick Dragoons at Bennington, 
110. 

Brunswick, Duke of, 28. 

Bunker Hill, Gage's plan of attack, 7; 
Howe's formation for assault, 9; 
American retreat, 10. 

Burgoyne, in command of reinforce- 
ments, 26; resented being shut up 
in Boston, 30; reasons for the loss 
of his army, 31; selected to com- 
mand two expeditions from Can- 
ada, 77; his plan to reach Albany, 
78; his force, 96; arrives at Quebec, 
100; advances from Crown Point, 
103; captures Ticonderoga and pur- 
sues Long up the lake, 104, 106; 
takes Fort Edward, 109; starts for 
Bennington, 110; position precari- 
out, 114; at Freeman's Farm, 116; 
at Bemis' Heights, 123; negotiates 
for surrender, 125; signs terms, 127; 
goes to England on parole, 130, 139. 

Burnside's report, 312-313; not adopted, 
314. 

Burr, Aaron, 23. 

Cadwalader, Colonel John, with Magaw 
at New York, 58; letter to, from 
Washington, 66, 67; occupies Bor- 
dentown, 69; ordered to join Wash- 
ington, 70. 

Calhoun's reports, 299; not adopted, 
301. 

Camden, battle of, 218. 

Campbell, Captain, messenger to Bur- 
goyne, 117; Colonel, sent to attack 
Fort Montgomery, 121. 

Campbell, Lieutenant-Colonel Archibald, 
sent to Georgia, 189; at Savannah, 
191; killed at Eutaw Springs, 255. 

Carleton, Sir Guy, Governor of Canada, 
at Montreal, 22; escapes in a small 
boat, 23; learns of Arnold's ap- 
proach, 24; at Quebec, 25; fails 
to attack Arnold, 26; reinforced by 
Burgoyne, 31; at Crown Point, 54; 
renders Burgoyne every assistance, 
100. 

Carlisle, Earl of, heads peace commis- 
sion, 138. 

Carrington, quartermaster-general of 
Greene's army, 226; meets Morgan 
with boats, 233, 234. 

Chad's Ford, battle of, 84. 

Charleston, preparations for the defence 
of, 184; result of the victory, 188; 



343 



344 



INDEX 



unsuccessful attack of Prevost, 197; 
its siege by Clinton, 209; its sur- 
render, 210. 

Charlestown set on fire, 9. 

Chew, Chief Justice, 91. 

Civil War, the, 307; call for volunteers, 
307; resort to conscription, 308; 
number of men in service, 308; de- 
fects of military system, 309; com- 
pared with previous wars, 310; dis- 
bandment of the volunteers, 311. 

Clarke, Colonel, defeats Dunlap, 214; at 
siege of Augusta, 250. 

Clary, Lieutenant-Colonel, 49. 

Clinton, Fort, captured, 121. 

Clinton, General George, 49; hastens 
to the relief of his brother, 121-138. 

Clinton, General James, 61; commander 
Forts Clinton and Montgomery, 121. 

Clinton, Sir Henry, at Bunker Hill, 10; 
failure at Charleston, 31; arrives at 
New York, 33; attacks Sullivan on 
Long Island, 38; lands at Kip's 
Bay, 46; sent to Newport, 62; 
notifies Burgoyne of intention to 
attack Fort Montgomery, 117; his 
message to Burgoyne, 118; moves 
up Hudson, 120; fails Burgoyne. 
122; in supreme command, 134; 
attempts to capture Lafayette, 140; 
evacuates Philadelphia, 141; at 
Monmouth, 144; escapes, 147; 
arrives at Newport, 154 ; captures 
Stony Point, 156; reoccuples Stony 
Point, 159; sends marauding ex- 
pedition up the Chesapeake, 161; 
corresponds with Arnold, 167; ap- 
peals for Andre\ 169; sails for New- 
port, 173; returns to New York, 
174, 176; at Charleston, 185; his 
expedition South, 206; lands near 
Charleston, 207; sends reinforce- 
ments South, 223; sends 7,500 men 
to Cornwallis, 261; instructions to 
Cornwallis, 266; goes to relieve 
Cornwallis, 273; superseded by 
Carleton, 278. 

Continental army, 17; movement to 
New York, 31-54, 162; ineffective 
plans for recruiting, 175; origin of, 
288. 

Continental Congress, appoints Washing- 
ton commander-in-chief, 13, 75; 
adjourns to York, Pa., 89; sends 
committee to Valley Forge, 134 ; in- 
effective resolutions of, 289; mili- 
tary powers of, 295. 

Conway, Cabal, 134; wounded in a duel, 
makes abject apology to Washing- 
ton, 135. 

Conway's brigade, 90. 

Cornwallis, reinforces Clinton at Charles- 
ton, 31; arrives at New York, 33; 
sent to Flatbush, 35; at the Cor- 
telyou house, 39; lands at Kip's 



Bay, 46; at Harlem Heights, 49; 
at Fort George, 58; at Fort Lee, 
59, 60; captures Lee, 65; his at- 
tempt to turn Washington's flank, 
66, rejoins his command, 70; 
marches toward Princeton, 71, 72; 
in battle of the Brandywine, 84 et 
seq.; hurrying with reinforcements, 
92; attacks Fort Mercer, 94, 163; 
with seven regiments at Cape Fear 
River, 184; goes South with Clinton, 
206; defeats Gates at Camden, 219; 
retreats to South Carolina after 
King's Mountain, 224; burns his 
baggage to pursue Morgan, 232; 
gives up the chase, 235; he defeats 
Green at Guilford, 240; retreats to 
Wilmington, 242; his perplexity at 
Wilmington, 259; arrives at York- 
town, 267; surrender, 275; returns 
to England, 278. 

Cowpens, battle of the, 229. 

Crown Point, capture of, 6. 

Cruger, Lieutenant-Colonel, sent to Geor- 
gia, 189; commands defence of 
Ninety-Six, 250. 

Cuba, occupation of, 338. 

Dearborn, Henry, 23. 

De Grasse, announces his co-operation, 
270; arrives at Cape Henry, 272; 
his naval battle with the English 
fleet, 273. 

De Kalb, Baron, sent South by Wash- 
ington, 214; mortally wounded at 
Camden, 218. 

De Lancey, Colonel, sent to Georgia, 189. 

Delaware, Washington crosses the, 66; 
forts destroyed, 93. 

Dillon, Count, at Savannah, 203. 

Donop, General, lands at Kip's Bay, 46; 
at Harlem Heights, 49; on the Dela- 
ware, 66; retreats to Amboy, 69; 
death of, 94. 

Dorchester Heights seized, 18. 

Duer, William, 64. 

Duportail stationed on coast to commu- 
nicate with d'Estaing, 171. 

Edward, Fort, 109. 

Estaing, Comte d', arrives with French 
fleet, 149; fails to attack, 150; sails 
for Newport, 150; fails to land his 
troops, 151; abandons allies at New- 
port, 152: sails for Martinique, 154; 
movements of, 171; returns with 
three expeditions, 200; after fiasco 
at Savannah, sails for France, 205. 

Eutaw Springs, battle of, 255. 

Ewing, Colonel, 68. 

Fellow's brigade at Saratoga, 125. 
Ferguson killed at King's Mountain, 224. 
Fleury receives medal from Congress, 
159. 



INDEX 



345 



Florida war, 301. 

Francis killed, 104. 

Fraser's brigade, at Ticonderoga, 103; at 

battle of Hubbardton, 104; mortally 

wounded, 124. 
Freeman's Farm, battle of, 116. 
French alliance, 132. 

Gadsden, Colonel, at Charleston, 185. 

Gage, Major-General Thomas, command- 
er-in-chief at Boston, 4; issues in- 
sulting proclamation, 7; assaults 
American works in front, 8; recalled 
in disgrace, 11. 

Gansevoort, Colonel, sent to Fort Stan- 
wix, 106, 108. 

Gates, Horatio, appointed adjutant-gen- 
eral, 16; called in council, 17; at 
Ticonderoga, 54; joins Washington, 
65; relations with Schuyler, 97; 
elected to command the Northern 
army, 99; his strength at surrender 
of Burgoyne, 106; relieves Schuyler, 
114; refuses to reinforce Arnold, 
116; jealous of Arnold, 118; not 
on field at Bemis' Heights, 124; 
surrounds Burgoyne, 125; grants 
armistice until sunset, 128, 137; re- 
tires from army, 166; sent South 
by Congress to command army, 215; 
defeated at Camden, 218. 

George III, arranges to buy soldiers for 
cash, 28; endorses Burgoyne's plan, 
78; plan that the king disliked, 131. 

Georgetown, capture of, 253. 

Georgia, conquest of, 192. 

Gerard, guest of d'Estaing, 154, 171. 

Germain, Lord George, 76; had failed to 
give Howe instructions, 119; incom- 
petence of, 264. 

Germantown, battle of, 90; panic of, 92. 

Gist, Major, captured, 39. 

Glover, Colonel John, regiment of Marble- 
head fishermen, 42, 43; his regi- 
ment to man the boats at the cross- 
ing of the Delaware, 67; brigade 
sent to Schuyler, 105; at Newport, 
153. 

Granby, Fort, capture of, 249. 

Grant, Major-General, takes over Corn- 
wall's command, 66; rallies his 
troops, 92: at Barren Hill, 140. 

Graves, Admiral, 4; arrives with fleet, 
173. 

Great Bridge, battle of, 183. 

Greene, Christopher, 23; gallant defence 
of Fort Mifflin, 94; in command of 
Rhode Island negroes at Newport, 
153. 

Greene, General Nathanael, appointed 
brigadier-general, 15; a great sol- 
dier, 16; in council of war, 17: at 
Boston, 19; ordered to Brooklyn 
Heights, 32; at New York, 34, 35; 
illness at the battle of Long Island, 



41; advocates evacuation of New 
York, 45; his division posted after 
retreat to Harlem Heights, 47; at 
battle of Harlem Heights, 48; in 
command of troops at Forts Lee and 
Washington, 52, 54; reports the 
passage of British ships up the 
river, 55; crosses river to Fort 
Washington with Washington, Put- 
nam and Mercer, 57; brings off the 
garrison of Fort Lee, 60; on march 
to Trenton, 67; in the attack on 
Trenton, 68; advises pushing on to 
Princeton, 69; gets one of the five 
new divisions, 76; selects position at 
Middlebrook, 80; in pursuit of 
Howe with three brigades, 81; on 
reconnoissance with Washington 
and Lafayette, 83; his batteries at 
Brandywine, 85; halts British ad- 
vance, 86; nearing the battle of 
Germantown, 90; fighting his way 
along Lime-kiln road, 91; ap- 
pointed quartermaster-general, 136; 
organization at Valley Forge, 140; 
at Monmouth, 146; at Newport, 
153; his loss at battle of Spring- 
field, 165; resigns as quartermaster- 
general, 166; president of Andrfi 
court-martial, 169; appointed to 
command Southern army, 220; his 
successful retreat, 234; receives 
reinforcements, 236; marches to 
South Carolina, 244; abandons 
siege of Fort Ninety-Six, 251; re- 
treats from Eutaw Springs, 256. 

Grey, General, attacks Wayne, 88, 140. 

Gridley, Colonel Richard, chief engineer 
at Boston, 5; sends guns to Cam- 
bridge from Ticonderoga, 6; builds 
square redoubt at Breed's Hill, 7; 
amazes Howe by night work on 
Dorchester Heights, 18. 

Guilford, battle of, 238. 

Hale, Nathan, absent at his own request, 
47. 

Hamilton, Alexander, 52; nearing his 
twentieth birthday, 68; sent to wel- 
come Comte d'Estaing, 149; sent to 
capture Arnold, 168, stationed on 
Jersey coast to meet d'Estaing, 171; 
leads the assault at Yorktown, 274. 

Hamilton, General, in council of war with 
Burgoyne, 125. 

Hancock, John, 3; at head of 7,000 New 
England militia, 150. 

Hand, Colonel, at Trenton, 68; his regi- 
ment at Princeton, 71. 

Harlem Heights, battle of, 49. 

Haslet, Colonel, 52; killed at Princeton, 
71. 

Heath, William, appointed brigadier- 
general, 14; in council of war, 17; 
stationed with Spencer and Stirling, 



346 



INDEX 



32; commands one of the five divi- 
sions, 34; after reorganization com- 
mands one of the three divisions, 44; 
commands Greene's division during 
his illness, 47; arrives at White 
Plains, 52; head-quarters at Peeks- 
kill, 54; might have been captured, 
61; ordered to Morristown, 69; goes 
into winter quarters, 72. 

Henry, Patrick, Washington's appea lto, 
as Governor of Virginia, 138; his 
eloquence fires the Southern Colo- 
nies, 183. 

Herkimer, General, 106; at battle of 
Oriskany, 107; death of, 108. 

Herrick, Colonel, at Bennington, 113. 

Hesse-Cassel, Landgrave of, 28. 

Hessians, engagement with, by England, 
28; at battle of Long Island with 
Cornwallis, 35; loss at White Plains, 
53; they attack Fort Washington, 
58; at Trenton, 67; they advance 
to Chad's Ford, 84; at battle of 
Brandywine, 85. 

Hinman, Colonel, 22. 

Hobkirk's Hill, battle of, 246. 

Hopkins, Commodore Ezek, 33. 

Howe, Lord, 93; at Sandy Hook to 
meet French fleet, 149; at New- 
port, 154. 

Howe, Major-General Robert, quells mu- 
tiny of New Jersey line, 177, 189; 
at Savannah, 190; tried by court- 
martial, 192. 

Howe, Sir William, sent out from Eng- 
land, 5; in command at Bunker 
Hill, 8; leaves Boston, 20; arrives 
at New York, 33; at battle of Long 
Island, 37; lands in New York, 46; 
flanking movement through West- 
chester, 51; at battle of White 
Plains, 52; sends Cornwallis in pur- 
suit of Washington, 59; captures 
Fort Washington, 60; goes into 
winter quarters, 62; withdraws from 
New Jersey, 72; sails for Chesa- 
peake, 82; at Chad's Ford, 82; at 
battle of Brandywine, 85; captures 
Philadelphia, 88; attacks Washing- 
ton, 93; returns to Philadelphia, 95; 
resignation of, 134; sails for Eng- 
land, 141. 

Hubbardton, battle of, 104. 

Hutchinson, Colonel, 27; Fort, 43. 

Jackson's opinions, 303. 
Jamestown, battle of, 263. 
Jay, John, 64. 
Johnson, Sir John, 97, 107. 
Jones, Brigadier-General, 4. 

Kettle Creek engagement, 194. 
King's Mountain, battle of, 223. 
Kip's Bay, British land at, 46. 
Knowlton, Colonel Thomas, ordered to 



reconnoitre with his " Rangers," 47; 
ordered to get in rear of the British, 
48; death of, 49. 

Knox, Henry, drags cannon through the 
snow from Ticonderoga, 18; guns 
placed under direction of, 32; his 
guns outclassed by British fleet, 33; 
his letter of December 28, 67; direct- 
ing the artillery at Trenton, 68. 

Knyphausen, Lieutenant-General, 53; 
his attack at Fort Washington, 58; 
Magaw surrenders to, 59; sustained 
three-fourths of the losses at Fort 
Washington, 60; at Brandywine, 
85; Wayne unable to resist his 
advance, 87; in charge of Clinton '3 
baggage, 143; at Monmouth, 144; 
expeditions into Jersey, 163; left in 
command in New York, 206. 

Kosciusko, fortifies Bemis' Heights, 115; 
engineer of Greene's Southern army, 
226; sent to throw up trenches, 234; 
opens first parallel at Ninety-Six, 
250. 

Lafayette, Marquis de, arrival of, 83; 
wounded, 86; commands a division, 
140; sent to Providence with two 
brigades, 150; sails for France, 154; 
member of Andre 1 court-martial, 
169; returns from France, 171; sent 
to confer with Rochambeau, 172; 
had gathered a few hundred militia, 
261; retreats from Richmond before 
Cornwallis, 262; returns to France, 
278. 

Laurens, Colonel John, aide-de-camp, 
sent to receive Comte d'Estaing, 
149; sent to France to raise money, 
178. 

Learned 's brigades at Saratoga, 125. 

Lee, Charles, appointed major-general, 
14; in council of war, 17; sent to 
New York, 31; reports situation in 
New York, 32; reaches White 
Plains, 52; at North Castle with 
5,000 men, 54; might have been 
prevented from crossing Hudson, 
61; Washington gives him orders 
in writing, 63; his dilatory march, 
64; capture, 65; a prisoner in 
Howe's hands, 77; gives traitorous 
information to Howe, 78; his dis- 
grace at Monmouth, 145; his court- 
martial, 148; sent to Charleston, 185. 

Lee, Major Henry, captures Paulus Hook, 
159; sent to defend Vauxhall bridge, 
165; stationed on Jersey coast to 
meet d'Estaing, 171; captures Fort 
Granby, 249; hastens to join Greene 
at Ninety-Six, 250 

Leitch, Major, wounded. 49. 

Leslie, General, 52; sent South to rein- 
force Cornwallis, 225. 

Lincoln, General, goes into winter quar- 



INDEX 



347 



ters at Morristown, 72; commands 
one of the five divisions of new 
troops, 76; sent by Washington to 
organize the New England militia, 
111; brings troops to Gates's camp, 
119; at Beaufort, 193; takes the 
offensive, 194; defeated at Stono 
Ferry, 198; joins d'Estaing at Sa- 
vannah, 201; raises siege, 205; de- 
feated at Charleston, 210. 

Livingston, Colonel James, 23. 

Long retreats before Burgoyne, 105. 

Long Island, battle of, 35; Howe's plan 
of battle, 37; arrival of Washing- 
ton, 39; responsibility for the de- 
feat, 40; withdrawal from, 42. 

McDougall, General, raises the first New 
York regiment, 43; retreats bringing 
off the guns at White Plains, 53; 
with Greene at Germantown, 90; 
fails to attack Verplanck's Point, 
157. 

Magaw, Colonel Robert, commander at 
Fort Washington, 56; commands 
three regiments, 58; opposes Howe's 
fourth attack, 59. 

Mahan, Captain, criticises Comte d'Es- 
taing, 150. 

Marion, on lower Pedee, 225; was hiding 
in the Pedee swamps, 244; capt- 
ures Fort Motte, 248; captures 
Georgetown, 253. 

Marjoribanks, Major, sortie at Eutaw 
Springs, 256. 

Mawhood attacks Mercer's brigade, 70. 

Maxwell's brigade, 92. 

Mercer, Fort, 94 

Mercer, General, reported to have ar- 
rived at Long Island as the retreat 
began, 43; offered to stay at Fort 
Washington, 57; death of, 71. 

Mexican War, 306. 

Mifflin, Fort, 94. 

Mifflin, Thomas, quartermaster-general, 
16; left toman the works on retreat 
from Long Island, 43; withdrawn 
under cover of fog, 44; sent to Phila- 
delphia to take charge of the stores, 
63; militia raised by his exertions 
at Philadelphia, 69: ordered to join 
Washington after Trenton, 70; in 
Conway Cabal, resigns from army, 
135. 

Military policy, origin of, 284; necessity 
of a definite one, 336. 

Militia, popularity of, in England, 287; 
popularity of, in American Colonies, 
288; act, 296; refusal to furnish, 
1814, 298; act of 1903, 326. 

Mischianza, the, 141. 

Monckton, Colonel, killed, 146. 

Moncrieff, Colonel, engineer at siege of 
Charleston, 209. 

Monmouth, battle of, 144. 



Monroe, Lieutenant James, 68. 

Montcalm at Ticonderoga in 1758, 
102. 

Montgomery, Fort, captured, 121. 

Montgomery, Richard, appointed briga- 
dier-general, 14; captures Montreal, 
23; joins Arnold, 24; death of, 25. 

Montreal, capture of, 23. 

Moore, General, in command at battle 
of Moore's Bridge, 183. 

Moore's Bridge, battie at, 183. 

Morgan, ranger, defeats Carleton. 230; 
retreats to the Catawba, 231. 

Morgan's riflemen, sent to Schuyler, 
105; attack Fraser, 116; at battle 
of Bemis' Heights, 123; in pursuit of 
Burgoyne, 125. 

Morris House, Washington gallops from, 
46; the 42d Highlanders attack, 59. 

Moultrie, Fort, surrenders, 210. 

Moultrie, 64; in defence of Charleston, 
185; won the battle at Sullivan's 
Island, 186; records his opinion, 
202. 

Muhlenberg, 86; at Stony Point, 157. 

Murray, Mrs., detains Howe. 

Musgrave, Colonel, places five companies 
in the Chew house, 90. 

Nash, General, mortally wounded at Ger- 
mantown, 92. 

New Jersey line mutineers, 177. 

New London massacre, 170. 

Newport, attack on, 150; evacuated by 
the British, 174. 

New York, defence of, 31; fortifications 
of, 33; disposition of troops, 34. 

Nicholls, Colonel, at Bennington, 113. 

Ninety-Six, siege of, 250; evacuated, 
252. 

Nixon's brigade sent to Schuyler, 105. 

O'Hara at Guilford, 241. 
Orangeburg, capture of, 249. 

Paoli massacre, 88. 

Parker, Admiral, 31; arrives at Charles- 
ton, 185; defeated, withdraws, 187. 

Parker, Commodore Hyde, sent to Geor- 
gia, 189. 

Paulus Hook, capture, 160. 

Peace Commission, 138. 

Pell's Point, 51. 

Pennsylvania line, mutiny of, 176. 

Penobscot expedition, 161. 

Percy, Earl, his brigade in garrison of 
Boston, 4; to attack Dorchester 
Heights, 19; left in New York. 51; 
Howe reinforced by two brigades of 
his division, 53; attacks Washing- 
ton Heights, 58. 

Philippine insurrection, 320. 

Phillips's brigade seizes Mount Hope, 
103; Phillips takes possession of 



348 



INDEX 



Fort George, 109; in council of war 
with Burgoyne, 125. 

Pickens, Colonel Andrew, at Kettle Creek, 
194; on familiar ground, 244; 
hastens to join Greene at Ninety- 
Six, 250; returns to his old recruit- 
ing-ground, 253. 

Pigott, Brigadier-General, 4; attacks at 
Lexington, 10; at Newport, 153. 

Pomeroy, Seth, 8; appointed brigadier- 
general, 14. 

Poor, Colonel, 71; after Bennington, 
115; at Bemis' Heights, 123; his 
brigade helps to surround Burgoyne, 
125. 

Potter, Colonel, killed, 71. 

Prescott, Colonel, fortifies Bunker Hill, 
7; completes his breastworks at 
Bunker Hill, 8; retains the com- 
mand, 9. 

Preston, Major, commanding at St. John, 
23. 

Prevost, Lieutenant-Colonel, at Briar 
Creek, 195. 

Prevost, General, at Savannah, 190; sum- 
mons Charleston to surrender, 196; 
withdraws, 197; retires to Savannah, 
199. 

Princeton, battle of, 70. 

Pulaski, 92; at Charleston, 197; mortal- 
ly wounded at Savannah, 204. 

Putnam, Israel, appointed major-gen- 
eral, 14; called in council of war, 
17; given one of the five divisions at 
New York, 34; takes command on 
Long Island, 35; failure as com- 
manding general, 40; Washington's 
letter to, 41 ; commands one of three 
divisions, 44; in the retreat from 
New York, 46; his division posted 
on the heights, 47; meets Washing- 
ton on the retreat, 48; in action at 
Harlem Heights, 49; leaves White 
Plains with Washington, 57; sent 
to fortify Philadelphia, 63; at Peeks- 
kill, 76; reports from, 82; out-gen- 
eralled by Clinton, 120; retreats up 
the river, 122; opposition to Wash- 
ington, 137. 

Pyle, colonel of tories, defeated, 236. 

Quebec, siege of, 25; retreat from, 26. 

Rail, Colonel, attacks with Knyphausen, 
58; in command at Trenton, 66; 
rudely awakened, 67; tries to form 
his troops, 68; his death, 69. 

Rawdon, Lord, at Charleston, 210; de- 
feats Greene at Hobkirk's Hill, 246; 
evacuates Camden, 248; comes to 
the relief of Fort Ninety-Six, 250; 
captured at sea by Count de Grasse, 
252. 

Rawlings' regiment, 58, 60. 

Reed, Adjutant-General Joseph, had 



been with Knowlton, 48; in action 
at Washington Heights, 49; won- 
ders if Washington was such a great 
man as he had been thought, 64. 

Revolution, nearly exhausted, 174; waste 
and extravagance of, 291. 

Riedesel, at battle of Hubbardton, 104; 
anxious to mount Duke of Bruns- 
wick's dragoons, 1 10; council of war 
with Burgoyne, 125. 

Rochambeau, 168; arrives with six 
French regiments, 172; at Hart- 
ford, 174. 

Root, Elihu, as Secretary of War, 320; his 
projects, 321 ; his plan for army, 329. 

St. Clair, selected for service at Ticon- 
deroga, 99; his force, 100; garrison 
of, 102; evacuates Ticonderoga, 103; 
watches Castleton, 104; sent by 
Washington to stop Pennsylvania 
mutineers, 177. 

St. Leger, commences expedition from 
Oswego, 96; advancing on Stanwix, 
100; his papers captured, 107; de- 
feated by Arnold, 108. 

Saratoga, surrender of Burgoyne, 125; 
controversy about terms at, 128. 

Savannah, capture of, 191; defence of, 
201; siege of, 202. 

Schuyler, Fort, siege of, 108. 

Schuyler, Philip, appointed major-gener- 
al, 14; to command Northern army, 
22; sick with fever, 23; Arnold's 
letter to, delivered to Carleton, 24; 
Washington calls on him for troops, 
64; reports from, led Washington to 
think Howe intended to move up 
the Hudson, 82; his difference with 
Gates, 97; reprimanded by Con- 
gress, 98, 100; reinforcements for, 
105; calls council of war, 108; re- 
treats to Stillwater, 109. 

Scott, Captain, third message to Bur- 
goyne, 118. 

Second war with Great Britain, 298. 

Skenesborough, battle of, 104. 

Smallwood, General, 90. 

Smith, Colonel, death of, at Fort Mifflin, 
94. 

South Carolina, defence of, 193. 

Spain, war with, 316; mistakes of Civil 
War not repeated, 317; prompt or- 
ganization, 318. 

Spencer, Joseph, appointed brigadier-gen- 
eral, 15; called in council, 17; 
stationed just outside New York, 
32; commands one of the five 
original divisions, 34; after reorgan- 
ization commands one of the three 
divisions, 44; his division at about 
147th St., 47; along the hills behind 
the Bronx, 51. 

Springfield, battle of, 164. 

Standing army, hatred of, 286; opposi- 
tion to, 291; ibid., 296. 



INDEX 



349 



Stark, General John, at Bennington, re- 
fuses to obey orders, 111; receives 
thanks of Congress, 112. 

Stephen, General, in command of divi- 
sion, 76; his division fires into 
Wagner's division, 91; court-mar- 
tialled and dismissed, 92. 

Steuben, Baron, appointed inspector- 
general, 137; organization prepared 
by, 175; second in command to 
Greene in the Southern army, 220; 
on the James, 261. 

Stewart, with Wayne at Stony Point, 
receives medal from Congress, 159. 

Stewart, Colonel, of the Guards, killed 
at Guilford, 241. 

Stewart, Lieutenant-Colonel, reinforces 
Rawdon, 252; commanded British 
force at Eutaw Springs, 254. 

Stirling, General Lord, stationed just 
outside New York, 32; his heroic 
attack, 38; capture of, 39; fought 
splendidly at Long Island, 40; his 
division reaches White Plains, 52; 
gets one of the five original divisions; 
76; driven back by Howe, 81; sent 
to cross the Hudson at Peekskill,S2, 
made the most stubborn resistance 
at Brandy wine, 86; his division 
formed the reserve at battle of Ger- 
mantown, 90; gets one of the four 
divisions at Valley Forge, 140; at 
Monmouth, 161. 

Stono Ferry, battle of, 198. 

Stony Point, capture of, 156; recapture, 
157; evacuation, 159. 

Sullivan, John, appointed brigadier-gen- 
eral, 14; in council of war, 17; to 
attack Boston Neck, 19; ordered 
to supersede Thomas, 26; not equal 
to an enterprise like expedition to 
Quebec, 27; driven back at Quebec, 
29; had brought back his regiments 
from Ticonderoga, 34; sent to take 
Greene's place, 35; captured, 38; 
unjust to hold him responsible for 
the battle of Long Island, 40; ar- 
rives at White Plains, 52; guarding 
fords of the Delaware, 66; 68, 70, 71, 
76, 80, 82, 85, 86, 90, 91; at Provi- 
dence, 150. 

Sullivan's Island, battle at, 186. 

Sumter, 244; captures Orangeburg, 249, 
253. 



Tarleton, with Clinton at Charles- 
ton, 209; his cavalry at Camden, 
218. 

Taylor, Sergeant, hung as spy, 117. 

Ternay, de, arrival with second French 
fleet, 172; at Hartford, 174. 

Thomas, John, appointed brigadier-gen- 
eral, 14; called in council, 17; oc- 
cupied Dorchester Heights, 18; re- 



inforcement of 2,000 men ordered 
for, 19; given command at Quebec 
and dies of small-pox, 26; not equal 
to the conquest of Quebec, 27. 

Thompson, Colonel, at Sullivan's Island, 
185. 

Throg's Neck, 51. 

Ticonderoga, captured by Ethan Allen, 
6; topography of, 100; previous op- 
erations at, 102; evacuation of, 103. 

Tompkins, Daniel D., 145. 

Trenton, battle of, 67. 

Trumbull, Jonathan, 21, 138. 

Tryon, Governor, raid into Connecticut, 
80. 



United States army, origin, 297; growth 
of, 305; reorganization of, 311, 322; 
general staff, 324. 

Upton's " Military Policy," 313. 

Valley Forge, 132. 

Van Buren's opinions, 303. 

Varnum's Rhode Island regiments at 
Newport, 153. 

Vaughan attacks Fort Clinton, 121. 

Vergennes's opinion of Laurens's diplo- 
macy, 178. 



War, possibility of, 333; inadequate prep- 
aration for, 335. 

Ward, Artemas, appointed commander- 
in-chief, 4; his regiments construct 
field works, 5; sends Prescott rein- 
forcements, 8; created major-gen- 
eral, 14; in council of war, 17; left 
in command in Boston when Wash- 
ington went to New York, 20. 

Warner's regiment at battle of Hubbard- 
ton, 104; Warner, 113. 

Warren, Joseph, President of Provincial 
Congress, 8; death of, 10. 

Washington, appointed commander-in- 
chief, 13; arrives at Cambridge, 16, 
reaches New York, 33; arrival at 
battle of Long Island, 39; retreat 
from Long Island, 43; disposition 
of troops in New York, 44; tries to 
rally retreating brigades at Kip's 
Bay, 46; arrives on Harlem Heights, 
47, 48; disappointed in Fort Wash- 
ington, 51; White Plains, 52; re- 
treats to North Castle, 53, 60; re- 
treats to the Delaware, 62, 64; he 
crosses the Delaware, 66; at Tren- 
ton, 67; recrosses the Delaware, 70; 
arrives at Morristown, 72; raising 
new army, 75; moves to Middle- 
brook, 80; marches south through 
Philadelphia, 83; returns to Chad's 
Ford, 84; fights battle at Brandy- 
wine, SO. 

Washington, General, at Germantown, 



350 



INDEX 



90; at Valley Forge, 133; writes 
two letters to Congress, 134; brings 
Continentals to Valley Forge, 137; 
leaves Valley Forge, 142; mutiny 
with Lee at Monmouth, 145; goes 
to White Plains, 148; in camp at 
Middlebrook, 155; retires to winter 
quarters at Morristown, 162; Wash- 
ington approves Andrews sentence, 
169; threatens New York to draw 
Clinton from Newport, 173; goes to 
Hartford, 174; sends Greene to com- 
mand Southern army, 220; he 
meets Rochambeau at Hartford, 
267; starts for Yorktown, 270; 
boldness of, 271; strategy compared 
to Napoleon's, 272; joins Lafayette, 
273; returns to New York, 278. 

Washington, George, his ability as a sol- 
dier, 279; dictator, 290; his opin 
ions, 292. 

Washington, Captain William, 68; with 
Greene's army South, 226; came 
up with his cavalry, 229; at Guil- 
ford Court House, 238; wounded 
and captured at Eutaw Springs, 
255. 



Washington, Fort, to be completed, 45, 
50; loss of, 57; results of loss, 60. 

Watson, Fort, capture of, 245. 

Wayne, Anthony, 86; at Brandywine, 
87; at Germantown, 90; his division 
fired into, 91; gets one of the four 
divisions formed at Valley Forte, 
140; at Monmouth, 146; at Stony 
Point, 157; mutiny of his division, 
176; hangs three emissaries from 
Clinton, 177; at York, Pa., 261; 
joins Lafayette, 263. 

Weedon, Colonel, with Sullivan, 86. 

Wharton, Thomas, governor of Pennsyl- 
vania, 138. 

White Plains, battle of, 52. 

Willett, Lieutenant-Colonel, at Fort 
Stanwix, 106; ordered to make a 
sortie at Oriskany, 107; sent to 
ask aid from Schuyler, 108. 

Wooster, David, appointed brigadier- 
general, 15; arrival at Quebec, 26, 
27; mortally wounded, 80. 

Yellow-fever, conquest of, 338. 
Yorktown, siege of, 274; surrender of, 
275. 



&77-1 



